324 Mass. 246 | Mass. | 1949
The claimant appeals from a decision of (the Central District Court of Worcester which affirmed a decision of the board of review in the division of employment security in the department of labor and industries denying unemployment benefits under the employment security law. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 151A, as appearing in
The facts, which are not in dispute, are as follows: The claimant worked in the Worcester plant of The American Steel and Wire Company of New Jersey (hereinafter called the company), and at all times here material was a member of the United Steelworkers of America (CIO), a labor union with which the company had entered into a collective bargaining agreement.
The question for decision, as the parties agree, is whether on the foregoing facts the board committed error of law- in denying compensation to the claimant. The provisions of the employment security law pertinent to this question are the following: “Section 24. An individual, in order to be eligible for benefits under this chapter, shall . . . (b) Be capable of and available for work and unable to obtain work in his usual occupation or any other occupation for which he is reasonably fitted .... Section 25. No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter for . . . (d) Any period with respect to which he is receiving or has received or is about to receive remuneration in the form of . . . (2) vacation allowances .... (e) The period of unemployment next ensuing after an individual has left his employment; (1) Voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employing unit or its agent.”
It is plain that the claimant’s unemployment occurred as the result of a collective bargaining agreement between the company and a union of which the claimant was a member and which was the exclusive bargaining agency for those in the company’s employ. Under this agreement employees
It is apparent that the union had been designated, in accordance with the provisions of the national labor relations act, as the exclusive representative for all of the company’s employees “for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.” U. S. C. (1946 ed.) Title 29, § 159 (a). The right of the claimant to deal with the company with respect to these matters was surrendered to the union. The union had become the exclusive representative of all the employees of the company for the purposes of collective bargaining. Hamer v. Nashawena Mills, Inc. 315 Mass. 160, 165. Wallace Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 323 U. S. 248,255. McQuay-Norris Manuf. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 116 Fed. (2d) 748, 751 (C. C. A. 7). National Labor Relations Board v. Draper Corp. 145 Fed. (2d) 199, 203 (C. C. A. 4). The claimant was bound by the agreement made on his behalf by the union to the same extent as though he had entered into it individually. He is entitled to its benefits and must accept its burdens. The claimant speaking through
We have considered all of the questions argued by the claimant and have dealt with such of them as require discussion.
The decision of the District Court affirming the decision of the board of review and dismissing the petition is affirmed.
So ordered.
The agreement was entered into on April 22, 1947, and was to terminate on April 30,1949.