Moen Incorporated v. InSinkErator LLCMoen Incorporated v. InSinkErator LLC
Defendant InSinkErator LLC (“InSinkErator“) moves to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and the absence of authority to assert supplemental jurisdiction over asserted state-law claims. (Doc. 11.) Plaintiff Moen Incorporated (“Moen“) opposed (Doc. 13), and InSinkErator replied (Doc. 17). For the reasons stated herein, Defendant InSinkErator LLC‘s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Moen and InSinkErator are competitors in the residential and commercial plumbing market. (Doc. 1 at 3-4, ¶¶ 7, 15.)1 Both companies manufacture and sell garbage disposals. (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 16.) Moen offers various models of garbage disposals differing in size, features, and grinding power. (Id. at 3, ¶ 10.) For instance, Moen manufactures garbage disposals with
This dispute involves two models of garbage disposals produced by Moen: the EX 75c and EX 100c. (Id. at 4, ¶ 18.) Moen markets these garbage disposals as 3/4 HP and 1 HP, respectively. (Id.) On December 16, 2024, InSinkErator sent a letter to Moen regarding InSinkErator‘s internal testing of Moen‘s garbage disposals. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18; Doc. 11-2 at 77, ¶ 2.) InSinkErator‘s internal testing allegedly showed Moen‘s 3/4 HP and 1 HP models did not achieve their claimed HP. (Id.) Moen maintains there are several ways to measure HP and Moen‘s testing substantiates the marketing claims about its 3/4 and 1 HP models. (Doc. 1 at 3, ¶¶ 13-14.) InSinkErator‘s communications alleged Moen falsely advertised in violation of federal law and threatened legal action if Moen did not substantiate its HP claims. (Id. at 4, ¶¶ 19-22.) In early 2025, the parties executed a non-disclosure agreement to engage in meaningful discussions and share testing data and information regarding testing methodologies and results. (Doc. 11-2 at 77, ¶ 3.)
Manufacturers like Moen and InSinkErator often market their products at tradeshows where the parties compete for business, namely that of resellers. On November 14, 2024, at the American Supply Association tradeshow in Chicago, Moen believes an InSinkErator representative communicated to Moen resellers that Moen was providing private label garbage disposals for a large reseller. (Doc. 1 at 5, ¶¶ 27-28.) That InSinkErator representative told Moen customers “Moen is lying to you if they tell you otherwise.” (Id. at ¶ 29.) To Moen, this created a perception that Moen is providing preferential treatment for that reseller. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-
B. Procedural History
On January 17, 2025, Moen filed its complaint. (Doc. 1.) The complaint alleges three claims: (1) under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(1): Declaratory Judgment Act Claim (Count One)
1. Legal Standard
As to ripeness, “a claim is not ripe if it turns on ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.‘” Safety Specialty, 53 F.4th at 1020 (quoting Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 125, 131 (2020)). To determine whether a claim is ripe, a court weighs several factors, including: (1) whether the likelihood that the harm alleged by the plaintiffs will ever come to pass; (2) whether the factual record is sufficiently developed to produce a fair adjudication of the merits of the parties’ respective claims; and (3) the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied at this stage in the proceedings. Dealer Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 547 F.3d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 2008).
Important here, the “Declaratory Judgment Act ‘does not alter these rules or otherwise enable federal courts to deliver an expression of opinion about the validity of laws.‘” Safety Specialty, 53 F.4th at 1020 (quoting STAT Emergency, 946 F.3d at 954). Instead, “[t]he Act
To establish standing in a declaratory judgment action, “the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). “A useful question to ask in determining whether an actual controversy exists is what, if any, cause of action the declaratory judgment defendant may have against the declaratory judgment plaintiff[.]” Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “The concepts of ‘adverse legal rights’ and ‘legal risk,’ used in these cases to describe the standard for jurisdiction require that there be an underlying legal cause of action that the declaratory defendant could have brought or threatened to bring, if not for the fact that the declaratory plaintiff has preempted it.” Microchip Tech. Inc. v. Chamberlain Grp., Inc., 441 F.3d 936, 943 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “Article III jurisdiction may be met where [a party] takes a position that puts the declaratory judgment plaintiff in the position of either pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that which he claims a right to do.” Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass‘n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quotations and citation omitted).
2. Discussion
InSinkErator argues Moen lacks standing to assert its Declaratory Judgment Act claim. (Doc. 11-1 at 67.) It therefore moves to dismiss Count One under
Moen asserts it has standing to sue, and the Declaratory Judgment Act claim is ripe. (Doc. 13 at 96-97.) It contends InSinkErator‘s legal threats created a sufficient reasonable apprehension of litigation. (Id.) Moen cites InSinkErator‘s letters and communications accusing Moen of false advertising pertaining to its HP claims and demanding corrective action.3 (Id. at 98.) If not, InSinkErator told Moen it would “be forced to take legal action without delay to protect itself, consumers, and retailers.” (Id. at 98.) Moen also argues InSinkErator‘s ripeness arguments fall flat because a “threat of legal action” is sufficient for a “present or significantly likely controversy,” and therefore its claim is ripe. (Id. at 99-100.)
The threat of legal action for ongoing and future conduct sufficiently satisfies the “actual controversy” requirement under Article III and the Declaratory Judgment Act. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 130-32. Here, InSinkErator, through its demand letters, threatened to bring false advertising claims under the Lanham Act. For instance, InSinkErator stated, in unequivocal terms, that Moen‘s garbage disposals “do not actually achieve the claimed horsepower.” (Doc. 13-1 at 112, ¶ 4.) InSinkErator did not suggest that the false advertising claims might violate federal law; instead, InSinkErator stated “Moen‘s false HP claims violate various federal and state law, regulations, and standards.” (Id.) InSinkErator described Moen‘s conduct as
InSinkErator says the threats were not unequivocal. But nonetheless, InSinkErator maintained, and still maintains, it is presently suffering an injury from Moen‘s alleged false advertising. For its part, Moen also claims injury by alleging InSinkErator‘s accusations will harm its standing in the marketplace. Indeed, InSinkErator has confronted Moen with alleged scientific testing which shows Moen‘s products do not operate as advertised. For Article III standing, this is a sufficient dispute. Afterall, “‘[t]he central purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act . . . is to provide the opportunity to clarify rights and legal relationships without waiting for an adversary to file suit.‘” Severe Records, LLC v. Rich, 658 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fireman‘s Fund Ins. Co. v. Ignacio, 860 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1988)).
In this case, there is a “substantial controversy” between Moen and InSinkErator. The parties have “adverse legal interests” and their dispute is of “sufficient immediacy” since both parties claim present harm. See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127. This is sufficient for Article III standing. See Sussman v. Soleil Mgmt., No. 18-cv-2218, 2020 WL 870222, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30432, at *10 (D. Nev. Feb. 21, 2020) (finding standing for Declaratory Judgment Act claim for Lanham Act false advertising where defendant threatened legal action unless plaintiff ceased false advertising). InSinkErator‘s request to dismiss Count One pursuant to
1. Legal Standard
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
When courts evaluate whether a complaint makes out a plausible claim, they must accept all factual allegations as true. Cates v. Crystal Clear Techs., LLC, 874 F.3d 530, 534 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2016)). Courts must also draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and they must generally construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. But courts do not accept legal conclusions or other conclusory allegations as true. D‘Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 275-76 (6th Cir. 2010)). And courts need not make unwarranted factual inferences. Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 2006).
2. Discussion
Moen asks this Court to declare that it does not falsely advertise HP on the specified garbage disposals in violation of the Lanham Act,
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or any representation of fact, which--
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person‘s goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
InSinkErator argues Moen‘s Declaratory Judgment Act claim must be dismissed under
Having reviewed the entirety of the allegations, and having drawn all reasonable inferences from those allegations, the complaint allegations sufficiently state a claim for declaratory judgment. Moen identified the products at issue. (See Doc. 1 at 3-4, ¶¶ 11, 18.) Moen alleged InSinkErator believes the HP claims associated with these products are false. (See id. at 4, 6, ¶¶ 17-20, 33.) Because the statements associated with the products, to Moen, are not false, they do not deceive the marketplace nor improperly induce consumers’ purchasing decisions. (See id. at 3-6, ¶¶ 13-14, 24-26, 33-34.) Moen need not, at this stage, put forth all the evidence supporting these allegations so long as they are plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In short, InSinkErator has fair notice of Moen‘s claim. InSinkErator‘s motion to dismiss Count One pursuant to
C. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State-Law Claims (Counts Two and Three)
1. Legal Standard
If a federal court has original jurisdiction over a claim, it “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”
2. Discussion
The complaint asserts two state-law claims: slander and a violation of the ODTPA. (Doc. 1 at 6-7, ¶¶ 37-46.) Moen asserts the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over these claims under
The supplemental jurisdiction question hinges on whether Moen‘s Declaratory Judgment Act, slander, and ODTPA claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fact. They do not.
The two events are simply unconnected by any common facts. Under these circumstances, courts routinely find the state-law claims do not arise from a common nucleus of operative fact. See, e.g., Kubala, 984 F.3d at 1137-39 (First Amendment retaliation claim shared no common facts with state sexual harassment claim); Vogel v. N.E. Ohio Media Grp. LLC, No. 17-cv-272, 2017 WL 3157920, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116044, at * 5-6 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2017) (federal workplace claims shared no common nucleus of operative fact with state law defamation claim); Farmer v. Whaley‘s Auto Repair & Towing, Inc., No. 22-cv-2809, 2023 WL 11830118, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239242, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2023) (federal FLSA claim did not share common nucleus of operative fact with state law contract and trade secret claims); New Beginnings Ministries v. George, No. 15-cv-2781, 2018 WL 11378829, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 245391, at *68 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2018) (declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims where federal claims “arise form separate events and have separate facts than the state claim“).
Moen‘s arguments otherwise are unpersuasive. First, while Moen‘s opposition brief asserts a “campaign” to smear Moen, no such campaign is alleged in the complaint. (See Doc. 1 at 4-5.) In fact, the complaint specifically delineates the two incidents as separate issues and does not connect them at all. (Id.) If plaintiffs plead facts that prove a flaw in the claim or
Second, Moen‘s argument that discovery will overlap is strained. The false advertising issues will involve significantly different written discovery than the slander and ODTPA claims, much like any witnesses to be deposed do not, based on the allegations presented, appear to be the same. The slander and ODTPA claims will involve discovery regarding private label garbage disposals, the alleged falsity of that statement, witnesses to that statement, and any harm Moen has suffered as a result. The false advertising claims separately involve issues regarding marketing, the operation/HP of the garbage disposals, and the effect on the marketplace. Lastly, Moen argues
Moen‘s cited case law does not further its arguments, and conversely, reveals notable weaknesses. For instance, Moen cites Consol. Indus., LLC v. Maupin, No. 22-cv-1230, 2023 WL 7312493, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199032 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 6, 2023). But there, plaintiff, a manufacturing company, asserted federal trade secret claims and state-law claims against a former employee and competitor for working together to steal plaintiff‘s trade secrets. All claims related to one alleged scheme to misappropriate plaintiff‘s trade secrets. Not so here.
Instead, consider Kubala. 984 F.3d 1132. There, plaintiff sued his former employers alleging sexual harassment under Ohio law and First Amendment retaliation under federal law. Id. at 1135. The sexual harassment claim related to allegations that plaintiff‘s boss made a series of sexually suggestive comments about plaintiff‘s sexuality. Id. at 1135-36. The First Amendment retaliation claim related to allegations that plaintiff‘s boss changed plaintiff‘s job status to prevent him from running for political office. Id. at 1136. The Sixth Circuit held the district court lacked supplemental jurisdiction over the sexual harassment claim. Id. at 1137-39. While both claims were inflicted by plaintiff‘s boss, there was otherwise no substantial similarity between them. Id. The facts giving rise to the claims occurred at different times, had no overlap, and were separate incidents altogether. Id. While recognizing “an interest in judicial economy,” the court explained “subject-matter jurisdiction reaches beyond efficiency concerns . . . We may not, and must not, hear a case over which we have no power.” Id. at 1138. So too here. Moen‘s state-law claims rely on a separate set of facts than the false advertising issues. While Moen alleges InSinkErator inflicted both sets of injuries, that is not enough. The events giving rise to the claims involve different people, different fact patterns, and, as pleaded, are not connected to each other.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant InSinkErator LLC‘s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The parties’ Joint Request to Stay Proceedings (Doc. 16) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: August 10, 2026
BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE