This is аn action by Andrew R. Moats, administrator of the estate of Marvin A. Moats, deceased, hereinafter called plaintiff, against Arnold C. Lienemann, administratоr of the estate of John B. Lienemann, deceased, hereinafter called defendant, for the wrongful death of Marvin A. Moats as a result of a cоllision of a car driven by Marvin A. Moats and a car driven by John B. Lienemann. Marvin A. Moats, deceased, will be hereinafter called Moats, and John B. Lienemann, deceased, will be hereinafter called Lienemann. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for $46,037.12. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Assignments of error Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, аnd 5 go to the sufficiency of the evidence and will be considered together. In considering these assignments of error we must look to the former decisions of this court. In Lund v. Mangelson,
“A motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must be treated as аn admission of the truth of all material and relevant evidence submitted on behalf of the party against whom the motion is directed. Such party is entitled to have every controverted fact resolved in his favor and to have the benefit of every inference that can reasonably be deduced frоm the evidence. Egenberger v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co.,164 Neb. 704 ,83 N. W. 2d 523 .”
In Flanagin v. DePriest,
In Wright v. Haffke,
ante
p. 270,
The autopsy revealed that Lienemann died as a result of a ruptured aorta probably caused by broken ribs, and that he had a blood clot in the brain which had been there before the accident oсcurred.
The defense of the defendant was that Lienemann was suddenly stricken by illness, which he had no reason to anticipate, while driving an automobile, whiсh rendered it impossible for him to control the car and is, therefore, not chargeable with negligence. The defend *455 ant argued that the basis for the jury vеrdict was the • result of speculation and conjecture.
The jury could have found from the evidence that ' Lienemann was driving his car north on U.S. Highway. No. 81 north оf Norfolk, Nebraska, at approximately 8:45 p.m. The road was concrete paved, 24 feet wide, dry, and with a slight incline from the south to the north. At a point approximately 3 miles north of Norfolk the ■ right wheels of Lienemann’s car left the pavement on the east side for .3 mile when the left side of the car left the pavement. The car continued in the ditch for some distance where it jumped a drainage ditch and was in the air for 42 feet. It continued on sоme distance • where it grazed a fence on the east side of the ditch, then veered to the west onto the pavement, and never again left the paved surface from that point to where ■ it struck head-on the car of Moats, which was a distance of 3,800 feet. As a result of the accident both Moats and Lienemann were killed. After Lienemann’s car returned to the pavement, it continued north in the west lane and at least the driver of one car avoided it by' going on the shoulder of the road. Just before Liene- ■ mann’s car came to a control ditch bridge it turned to the east lane and pаssed a car, the driver of which had stopped it on the bridge and had started to back up ■■ because he had seen Lienemann’s car in his lane of trаffic. Lienemann’s car continued north across a bridge of the North Fork of the Elkhorn River to a point a short distance south of a road which is the boundary between Madison and Pierce Counties where it turned into the - west lane. A car he was meeting swerved to the east lane to miss his car, and then Lienemаnn’s car ran head-on into Moat’s car at a point .1 mile north of the county ' line road. From the place the right wheels of Lienemann’s car first left the paved surface to the point of impact it was at least 1.2 miles.
The medical testimony regarding the ability of Lienemann to control his car is cоnflicting, but the jury could *456 have found from this testimony that in order to drive the car the distance of 3,800 feet from the place where he returned to the highway after being in the ditch and not thereafter having left the 24-foot paved road, he had the ability to control the car, which would include the ability to stop the car, and that such action on his part is evidence of negligence.
In the light of the cited cases and the evidence we find that the trial court did not err in overruling the defendant’s motion for directed verdict at the end of the testimony, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial, and that the verdict was not contrary to the evidence and to the law.
Assignments of error Nos. 6, 10, 11, and 12 are the claimed errors of the trial court in sustaining objections to questions on сross-examination. These questions were either argumentative, did not reflect a true statement of the evidence by other witnesses, or were indefinite, and the law is so firmly established on these points that it does not require the citation of cases thereon.
Assignments of error Nos. 7, 8 and 9 have to do with hypоthetical questions asked by the plaintiff of the doctors and the overruling of objections to these questions by the trial court. In considering these assignments we must consider the case of Jacobson v. Skinner Packing Co.,
In his brief the defendant cites Jacobson v. Skinner Packing Co., supra, and Brugh v. Peterson,
*457 In Jacobson v. Skinner Packing Co., supra, the court found: the witness “was not shown to have proper information upon which to base an estimate . . ..” In Brugh v. Peterson, supra, in ruling on an answer to a hypothetical question as to the speed of a vehicle, the court said: “. . . the expert oрinion depends upon the resolution of so many variables that it is, in effect, a statement of a possibility. Under the circumstances in this case the exрert testimony was neither necessary nor advisable as an aid to the jury.”
We find that this case was fairly and impartially tried, that the verdict of the jury was based upon sufficient evidence to find for the plaintiff, and that the verdict of the jury was not the result of speculation or conjecture.
Affirmed.