64 Tex. 568 | Tex. | 1885
In this case the appellee recovered his first judgment against the appellant mainly upon the theory that the appellant was responsible for the negligent acts of its yardmaster and the foreman of carpenters engaged in its repair shops. On the former appeal, reported in 63 Texas, that judgment was reversed, and the theory upon which it was sustained in the court below was repudiated. It was then held by this court that the servants named and appellee, who was one of the carpenters under the orders of the foreman, were fellow-servants. On the trial resulting in the judgment now here for revision, another theory was presented in the charge of the court, involved, but less decisively, in the first judgment. This charge authorized the jury to find for appellee if they should believe, from the evidence, that when he entered the employment of the appellant he was inexperienced in the business “ and did not know of the danger to which he was subjected, and was not informed as to the course of the business and the rules, regulations and usages under which it was conducted, and that the defendant or its employees, who employed and had control over him, knew that he was so inexperienced and uninformed, and that they did not inform or warn him, and that he was thereby subjected to a danger of which he did not know, and which he would have avoided had he been so warned or instructed, and which was not open to his observation had he made proper use of his faculties and information.” Under this instruction, the jury found for appellee, and the appellant complains both of the charge and the finding.
It is urged that appellant was under no legal obligation to inform appellee of the dangers of the service for which he was seeking an engagement, unless such information was expressly solicited. The master’s duty to speak in such cases arises from the unfairness of silence. The master here knew that the service was dangerous, and
If it was appellant’s duty to inform appellee of the dangers of the service he was just entering upon, and if his ignorance of the danger and of the means provided by appellant to thwart it caused his injury, appellant’s liability would be neither defeated nor lessened by the fact that the negligent acts of appellee’s fellow-servants contributed to his injury. The duty of giving the needed information, in the qualification with which the court below gave the fourth special charge requested by appellant, was ascribed to the master. Though it should require this duty to be performed by an employee, in other respects sustaining to appellee the relation of fellow-servant, any failure to discharge it was the master’s failure.
To the inexperienced servant entering upon a dangerous service the master owes the duty not only of full information, but also of protection from the known danger as far as reasonably practicable. The appellee sought recovery in this case for neglect to give the information required, and the appellant asked the court below to charge the jury that the reasonable means provided for protection would defeat the suit. The master’s duty was not to do one of two things, but both, and if the failure to perform one caused injury, the liabil
Affirmed,
[Opinion delivered October 16, 1885.]