The opinion of the court was delivered by
This case is not exactly like Friedly v. Hamilton, 17 Serg. & Rawle 70, in which a recorded conveyance and an unrecorded defeasance, constituting an unrecorded mortgage betwixt the parties, were postponed to a subsequent judgment. But though both have been recorded in this instance, the principle applicable to them is the same. They were recorded in the same volume, on the same day, and though it does not expressly so appear, most probably in juxta-position. But a creditor in search of a clew to the title, would necessarily stop at a conveyance absolute on the face of it, and referring to nothing beyond it. He would have no reason to suspect that further search would lead to a defeasance of which, not lying in the channel of the title, he would not, though actually recorded, be bound to take notice; as was held in Woods v. Farmere, 7 Watts 385; for a purchaser of a regular chain of title is not bound to notice a thing which is not ostensibly attached
But even were the registry of these two deeds taken as such, how could it benefit the case of the defendant below, who, as a purchaser subject to his own mortgage, as he.must be deemed by force of the statute of 1830, must look, not to the purchase-money, but the premises in his own hands. The agreement subjoined to the articles, if it did any thing, turned'the conveyance into a mortgage, to secure the payment of the notes given for the purchase-money. What is “a lien,in the nature of a mortgage,” but a mortgage itself? It is hard to conceive of a lien, simply, without.a means to enforce it; yet I will not say there may not be'such a thing. But if the agreement in this case be not deemed'a defeasance of the conveyance, and both together as constituting, one instrument, then the registration is incontestibly several, and the creditor would be
Judgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.
