OPINION OF THE COURT
This action was instituted by certain homeless men infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) on their own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, and by the Coalition for the Homeless, a not-for-profit organization which provides advocacy and direct services to homeless persons. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief compelling defendants, officials of the State and City of New York, to provide homeless persons infected with HIV, the virus which causes acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), AIDS-related complex (ARC) and other HIV-related illnesses, with medically appropriate housing. The action is premised on the contention that placing HIV-infected individuals whose immune systems are weakened, in large city shelters, where many occupants have infectious diseases, endangers the lives of HIV-infected individuals such as the named plaintiffs. Although the city has acknowledged that homeless persons with a diagnosis of AIDS as defined by the Federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC) are entitled to private, nonshelter housing, those persons infected with HIV or other AIDS-related illnesses not classified as AIDS by CDC are not provided with such accommodations.
After a motion for a preliminary injunction was filed on behalf of the three original named plaintiffs, the city agreed to provide them with noncongregate housing. The Supreme Court thereafter granted a preliminary injunction to Wayne Phillips, another homeless man suffering from an HIV-related illness, whose motion for leave to intervene was unopposed and granted by the court, compelling defendants to provide
The Supreme Court found that the Coalition for the Homeless lacked standing to bring the action either in its own right or in a representative capacity. We disagree and modify the order accordingly.
The municipal defendants contend, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the Coalition lacked standing to sue in its own right, because it failed to demonstrate that it had suffered any injury in fact as a result of defendants’ actions (Matter of MFY Legal Servs. v Dudley,
In Grant v Cuomo (
Injury in fact has been sufficiently alleged, however, since affidavits submitted by the named plaintiffs specify sums expended by the Coalition on their behalf. For example, the Coalition provided financial assistance to Kenneth Mixon so
The Federal courts recognize the right of organizations to sue on their own behalf when the injury they allegedly suffered as a result of defendants’ actions or inactions is a drain on their resources. In Havens Realty Corp. v Coleman (
The Coalition for the Homeless also contends that it has standing to bring this action in a representative capacity. While it is true that in order to establish standing as a representative of other individuals, an organization must be asserting the rights of at least one of its members and not be attempting to sue on its own behalf for a declaration of the rights of its potential clients (see, Matter of MFY Legal Servs. v Dudley, supra), we have held that organizations such as the Coalition for the Homeless, which represent individuals who are unable to seek a judicial remedy on their own behalf, have standing. In Grant v Cuomo (
Although the individuals whose rights the Coalition seeks to assert in this case are adults and not children as in Grant v Cuomo (supra), the majority of desperately ill homeless individuals are as helpless as abused children and cannot, due to illness, poverty, myriad AIDS-related problems, unfamiliarity with their legal rights and the legal process, seek relief on their own behalf. As was stated in Grant v Cuomo (supra, at 159) "we cannot ignore the obvious fact that if organizations of this kind are denied standing, the practical effect would be to exempt from judicial review the failure of the defendants” to comply with their legal obligations. It was further noted that "[g]iven the obvious reality that the protection of abused or maltreated children is a central concern of our society, and given the historic relationship of organizations concerned with the care and protection of children to the goals sought to be achieved by the relevant statute, we are persuaded that Special Term was justified in denying the motion to dismiss as to the organizational plaintiffs” (supra, at 159).
It has been estimated that there are from 60,000 to 80,000 homeless people living in New York City, 25,000 of whom are housed in the city’s shelters on any given night. While 14,000
The order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Edward H. Lehner, J.), dated January 11, 1989, which, inter alia, granted defendant City of New York’s motion to dismiss the complaint of the Coalition for the Homeless for lack of standing, should be modified, on the law, the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, by denying the motion to dismiss and reinstating the complaint, without costs, and the order should be otherwise affirmed.
Murphy, P. J., Ross, Kassal and Wallach, JJ., concur.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on or about January 11, 1989, unanimously modified, on the law, the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, by denying the motion to dismiss and reinstating the complaint and otherwise affirmed, without costs and without disbursements.
