MITEK HOLDINGS, INCORPORATED, MiTek Industries, Incorporated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARCE ENGINEERING COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 94-5262.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 5, 1996.
89 F.3d 1548
BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and SIMONS*, Senior District Judge.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (No. 91-2629-CIV-KMM), K. Michael Moore, Judge.
This case presents our circuit with an issue of first impression, namely the scope of copyright protection afforded to nonliteral elements of a computer program. The holder of copyright registrations in three versions of a wood truss layout program brought an infringement action against a competitor, alleging infringement of several of the program‘s nonliteral elements, including the menu and submenu command tree structure and other elements of the user interface. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the district court found that the copyright registrant‘s program contained largely unprotectable elements, and in those instances where elements were protectable and appropriated by the putative infringer, it deemed the copying to be de minimis. Therefore, the district court entered judgment for the putative
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs-appellants MiTek Holdings, Inc. and MiTek Industries, Inc. (“MiTek“), hold registration certificates for their claims of copyright in three versions of the ACES wood truss layout program, known as ACES Layout versions 1, 2, and 3. Defendant-appellee Arce Engineering Company, Inc. (“ArcE“),1 is the producer of a layout program known as TrussPro.2 The only version of TrussPro at issue in this case is TrussPro Layout Program Version 1, and we will refer to that ArcE program as “TrussPro.” There is no dispute that the ACES program, at least its first two versions, were released prior to the publication of TrussPro. A few months after ArcE released TrussPro, MiTek filed suit against ArcE, alleging copyright infringement and seeking a preliminary injunction.3 The district court conducted a bench trial, and in its findings of facts and conclusions of law, found in favor of ArcE. See MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng‘g Co., 864 F. Supp. 1568 (S.D.Fla.1994). Before we address the numerous issues on appeal, it is important to provide some background as to both the wood truss industry and the relationship between the parties to this litigation.
Both MiTek and ArcE are in the business of supplying products and services to the wood truss industry. A wood truss is group of wood beams, usually triangular in shape, that supports a roof; the beams in a wood truss are held together by connector plates. Wood trusses often are not constructed by the builder, but rather by off-site “fabricators” who build roof trusses to certain specifications and then deliver them in bulk to building sites. The use of off-site fabricators reduces construction time as well as labor costs. Prior to the advent of personal computers, fabricators would design and arrange the wood trusses by engaging an engineer to obtain the necessary truss specifications and drawings for the planned structures. After fabricators began using personal computers, layout programs,4 like the ones at issue in this case, were developed to permit fabricators to do their own engineering and related work for their building designs, thereby eliminating the need to employ an engineer.
In this case, the parties disagree over whether or not the layout programs are “substantially similar” in a copyright context, but both sides agree that the programs at issue were written by the same author, Emilio Sotolongo (“Sotolongo“).5 In 1988, Sotolongo
During the process of developing Version 3 of the ACES program, Sotolongo was approached by Art Sordo, MiTek‘s President of Operations, to gauge his interest in working for MiTek. MiTek wanted Sotolongo to compose a new truss layout program that was superior to the ACES program. Although MiTek offered Sotolongo a significant raise, he declined the offer, in large part because MiTek made its programmers maintain detailed logs and notes of the steps taken in writing their programs. Sotolongo testified that he preferred to work without notes, and that he would often conceptualize program segments in his mind. Sotolongo advised Aces of the MiTek offer and explained his reasons for rejecting it. He was concerned, however, with rumors that MiTek was going to acquire Aces and he asked Aces about this. Sotolongo was assured that the acquisition was not going to occur, and as a reward for his loyalty, he was given a raise.
Contrary to what Sotolongo was advised, MiTek purchased Aces for $2.5 million on April 1, 1991. As part of the purchase, MiTek received an assignment of Aces‘s copyrights in the layout programs at issue in this case.9 Eugene Toombs, the president and chief executive officer of MiTek, testified at trial that “the reason we paid the price we did [for Bemax/Aces], very frankly, was because of the software,” and he further stated that the ACES layout program was the “key” to the software. R6-485. After the sale was announced, Sotolongo inquired of MiTek if its preacquisition offer was still open. He was told that it was not, since MiTek now had acquired the intellectual property rights to the ACES program. MiTek did offer Sotolongo a job, but at a salary lower than what was previously offered.
At approximately the same time, Antonio Arce, one of the principals of ArcE, approached Sotolongo and recruited him to come work for ArcE. ArcE owned a layout program, but it only operated on Hewlett Packard equipment, and ArcE wanted Sotolongo to develop a program that functioned in the Microsoft Windows (“Windows“) environment on International Business Machines Corp. (“IBM“) compatible computers. Arce testified that he was aware that Sotolongo had been the principal programmer for all three versions of the ACES program. The ACES programs, however, were written for the MS-DOS (“DOS“) operating system, which was starting to be replaced by the more user-friendly Windows operating system.10
Sotolongo accepted ArcE‘s offer of employment. Arce testified that he instructed Sotolongo to write the new layout program “from scratch,” not relying on any source or object code from the ACES programs.11 In August of 1991, Sotolongo completed TrussPro, and customer testing of the program began shortly thereafter. By early November, Aces had released Version 3 of its layout program. On November 15, 1991, MiTek filed suit against ArcE, alleging copyright infringement.12 ArcE counterclaimed that MiTek‘s
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
On appeal, MiTek asserts that the district court erred in: (1) failing to separate copyrightable expression in the ACES program from the program‘s ideas, because it failed to perform an abstraction under the Altai14 abstraction-filtration-comparison test or failed to undertake a similar means of analysis; (2) finding that the menu and submenu command tree structure in the ACES program is an uncopyrightable “process,” based on its failure to abstract; (3) concluding that the menu and submenu command tree structure is an uncopyrightable “process” because of its erroneous finding of fact that the menu and the submenu command tree structure of the ACES program mimics the way a draftsman draws such a layout by hand; (4) failing to consider the copyrightability of the ACES program as a whole, including the combination of elements that themselves may not be copyrightable; (5) applying the wrong standard in comparing the programs at issue in this case; and (6) finding that ArcE‘s copying of the copyrightable elements of the ACES program was de minimis. We will address these issues in turn.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Claims of Copyright Infringement
To establish copyright infringement, MiTek must prove “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1296, 113 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1991); see also Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1541 (11th Cir.1996). A plaintiff satisfies Feist ‘s first prong by demonstrating that “the work as a whole is original,” and that it has “complied with applicable statutory formalities.” Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int‘l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir.1995), aff‘d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233, 116 S. Ct. 804, 133 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1996). The Copyright Act provides that “[i]n any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.”
In this case, Feist ‘s first prong is not at issue, because ArcE does not contest the validity of the copyright registrations for the three versions of the ACES program. What is at issue is Feist ‘s second prong, namely whether ArcE has copied constituent elements of the ACES programs that are original. As the Tenth Circuit stated, “[t]his question involves two separate inquiries: 1) whether the defendant, as a factual matter, copied portions of the plaintiff‘s program; and 2) whether, as a mixed issue of fact and law, those elements of the program that have been copied are protected expression and of such importance to the copied work that the appropriation is actionable.” Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 832 (10th Cir.1993).
Proof of copying as a factual matter may be shown either by direct evidence, or in the absence of direct evidence, it may be inferred from indirect evidence demonstrating that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that there are probative similarities between the allegedly infringing work and the copyrighted work. Id.; see also Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1541. Even if the court finds that the putative infringer copied portions of the copyright owner‘s program, that is not the end of the inquiry. Copyright infringement occurs only if one copies protected elements of a copyrighted work; in other words, the portion of the copyrighted work that is copied must “satisfy the constitutional requirement of originality as set forth in Article I, § 8, cl. 8.” Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1542; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-46, 111 S. Ct. at 1287-88 (noting that “[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality,” as well as emphasizing that it is a “constitutional requirement“). As the Court in Feist noted, “the mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be protected.” Id. at 348, 111 S. Ct. at 1289.
Significantly, the Copyright Act expressly states that:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
B. The District Court Opinion
On appeal, the district court‘s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Worthington v. United States, 21 F.3d 399, 400 (11th Cir.1994). A district court‘s findings of fact in a bench trial “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). “A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court, after assessing the evidence, “is left with [the] definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Worthington, 21 F.3d at 400 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948)). Applying these standards of review, we examine seriatim the six issues presented.
1. Failure to Perform an Abstraction Under the Altai Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test
MiTek asserts that although the district court purported to apply the abstraction-filtration-comparison test of Computer Assocs. Int‘l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.1992), it failed not only to understand the test, but also to apply it properly. More specifically, MiTek argues that the district court erred in finding that no abstraction or similar type of analysis was necessary. This finding was based on the district court‘s determination that since MiTek had “identified 18 non-literal elements of its layout programs that it contends are entitled to copyright protection and which the Defendant infringed upon,” the court would “limit its inquiry as to the copyrightability of these 18 elements designated by the Plaintiff.” MiTek, 864 F. Supp. at 1579. The district court concluded that it did not need to undertake any abstraction, since MiTek had done this for it. Accordingly, the district court proceeded directly to step two of the Altai test, i.e., filtration.
MiTek is correct in asserting that the district court did not further abstract the list of eighteen elements that MiTek presented as being expressive and original elements of the three versions of the ACES program. However, the district court did not err in failing to further abstract the features that MiTek presented to it in its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as being “original at the time they were first incorporated into those versions of the ACES Layout Program.” R2-104-10. During the bench trial, one of MiTek‘s experts was questioned about an exhibit that he had prepared, which he stated contained the “expressive features in the Aces layout programs Versions 1, 2 and 3” that he deemed to be “original.” R5-367-68; see also Plaintiff‘s Exh. 18L, pp. 4-5. This same list was presented to the court by MiTek in its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R2-104-10-12. In other words, the district court took at face value MiTek‘s
What MiTek apparently fails to appreciate is that the ultimate burden is on the copyright holder to prove infringement. Therefore, if the copyright holder presents the court with a list of features that it believes to be protectable (i.e., original and outside of
2. The ACES Menu and Submenu Command Tree Structure is an Uncopyrightable Process
MiTek also contends that the district court, in failing to abstract the ACES program‘s menu17 and submenu command tree structure,18 erred in concluding that it is a “process” and thus foreclosed from copyright protection by
The district court found that “the method the Aces Layout Programs follow, including the menu and the sub-menu command tree structure, is a process that is not entitled to copyright protection.” MiTek, 864 F. Supp. at 1580. The district court‘s conclusion was based principally on its finding that “the means by which the Aces Layout Programs undertake their task of drafting roof truss planes mimic the steps a draftsman would follow in designing a roof truss plan by hand.” Id. MiTek argues that the district court‘s failure to abstract the ACES menu and submenu command tree structure beyond the level at which MiTek presented it to the district court led it to conclude that it is unprotectable as a process. MiTek contends that an abstraction should have been performed by the court and that such an abstraction would have discovered substantial protectable expression.19
The First Circuit recently addressed the issue of “[w]hether a computer menu command hierarchy constitutes copyrightable subject matter.” Lotus, 49 F.3d at 813. The Lotus court held that “the Lotus menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable “method of operation’ ” that provided “the means by which users control and operate Lotus 1-2-3.” Id. at 815. In reaching its conclusion, the First Circuit analogized the “buttons” that operate a computer program to those that operate a VCR, the latter being an obvious example of a “method of operation.” Id. at 817. Unlike the Lotus court, we need not decide today whether a main menu and submenu command tree structure is uncopyrightable as a matter of law. We agree with the conclusion reached by the district court that the ACES menu and submenu command tree structure is uncopyrightable under
A related argument advanced by MiTek is that the district court erred in characterizing the ACES program‘s use of trapezoids in truss design as a means of visually depicting planes. MiTek contends that the trapezoids are used not to depict planes, but rather to indicate to the program user that a pitched or sloping plane for a particular wall has been defined. MiTek states that “[a]s part of defining the shape of the roof using the concept of intersecting planes, after all the walls are entered, and after information about each plane is entered for a particular wall, a trapezoid shape surrounds the wall on the screen.” Brief of Appellants at 38. MiTek contends that “the use of a trapezoid in this manner is a purely arbitrary, expressive feature.” Id. We are not certain that the district court misconstrued the purpose behind the use of trapezoids,21 but even if it did, this use of trapezoids lacks sufficient originality to be entitled to copyright protection.22
3. The ACES Program Mimics the way a Draftsman Draws a Truss Layout by Hand
Closely related to the menu and submenu command tree issue is MiTek‘s contention that the district court erred in concluding that the ACES program mimicked the steps that a draftsman would take in drawing and designing a roof truss plan by hand. MiTek, 864 F. Supp. at 1580. MiTek contends that its programs do not mimic the steps taken by a draftsman, because, inter alia, a mouse is used, the walls are drawn in different colors, and a pop-up keypad is used on the screen to enter numeric information. Appellants Brief at 33-38. We find that the district court was not suggesting that the ACES program was an exact correlation to the steps that a draftsman would take, given the different mediums that are being used (i.e., a computer as compared to a pen and paper). Constraints associated with computer programs and computer design dictate a somewhat different design process. However, as a general matter, the idea of closely correlating the ACES program to the longhand steps taken by a draftsman was the constraining force in the design of the menu and submenu command tree structure. The logic inherent in this step-by-step process renders the resulting program unoriginal in that such logic may only be expressed in a limited number of ways. More than a minor departure from the logical sequence renders the result unusable. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that this structure is not entitled to copyright protection.
4. Consideration of the Copyrightability of the ACES Program as a Compilation
MiTek argues that the district court gave short shrift to its contention that the selection, coordination, and arrangement embodied in the ACES program and its user interfaces are entitled to compilation copyright protection.23 It points out that the Supreme Court, in Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 359-60, 111 S. Ct. at 1295, noted that a work comprised only of facts is copyrightable to the extent that such facts are selected, arranged, or organized (and thus presented) in an original way. This protection is limited, however, and only extends to the work as a whole, and only if the selection, coordination, or arrangement is sufficiently original to be copyrightable.
We acknowledge that a user interface, here a screen display (itself an audiovisual work), may be entitled to copyright protection as a compilation. In order to receive this protection, however, the compilation must be original and expressive. MiTek cites to Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 463 (N.D.Ga.1987), as a case in which a court concluded that “the status screen, which is a compilation, is copyrightable to the extent of its arrangement and design of parameter/command terms.” Underlying this holding, however, was the Softklone court‘s finding that the copyright holder‘s compilation met the requirements of
This circuit has never set forth what standard should be used in analyzing claims of compilation infringement of nonliteral elements of a computer program. Today, we join the Ninth Circuit in adopting the “bodily appropriation of expression” or “virtual identicality” standard.24 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that, in the case of alleged infringement of a work as a whole (i.e., a compilation), “there can be no infringement unless the works are virtually identical“), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1184, 115 S. Ct. 1176, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1129 (1995); Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir.1989) (stating that “[a]s with factual compilations, copyright infringement of compilations consisting of largely uncopyrightable elements should not be found in the absence of “bodily appropriation of expression’ “) (citation omitted).
In analyzing MiTek‘s compilation claim, the district court applied the virtual identicality standard and concluded that “the visual display of the Arc[E] program differs sufficiently, if not substantially, from the Aces Layout Programs to preclude a finding of virtual identicality.” MiTek, 864 F. Supp. at 1584. This conclusion was based in part on the fact that “[t]he Arc[E] Program depicts its commands as icons in the Windows environment, rather than as words in the Aces Layout Programs.”25 Id. Assuming without deciding that the nonliteral elements of the ACES user interface are a protectable compilation, we agree with the district court that there is not a virtual identicality between the ACES program and TrussPro, and thus MiTek‘s compilation infringement claim must fail.
5. The Standard Applied in Comparing the Elements Found to be Copyrightable
Further, MiTek contends that the district court, in comparing to TrussPro the five nonliteral elements of the ACES program that it deemed to be protectable, erroneously employed a “substantial identicality” standard rather than the appropriate “substantial similarity” standard. MiTek‘s challenge is based on the following portion of the district court‘s opinion: “[w]hen comparing the core protectable elements of the copyright-holder‘s program to the alleged infringer, the Court will employ the substantial identicality standard applied by the Ninth Circuit to nonliteral elements of computer programs, such as visual displays.” MiTek, 864 F. Supp. at 1578-79.
If the district court did apply the substantial identicality standard in performing the comparison portion of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, then it erred in doing so. Our circuit, in applying the Altai test, employs the substantial similarity standard in comparing what remains after the abstraction and filtration steps with respect to noncompilation copyrighted works. See Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1541-45. We are not convinced, however, that the district court incorrectly applied the substantial identicality standard, because in the comparison section of the opinion, the district court stated that:
Having distilled the Plaintiffs’ programs to their core of protectable expression, the Court now must compare these elements to the Defendant‘s program. If any of the core elements have been copied, the Court will look at the relative importance of the copied elements to the overall program to determine whether or not the Aces Layout Programs are substantially similar to the Arc[E] Program....
The Court finds that of the five protectable elements identified in the Aces Layout Programs, four are substantially similar to elements in the Arc[E] programs.
MiTek, 864 F. Supp. at 1584 (emphasis added). Based on its comparison, it appears that the district court used imprecise language regarding “substantial identicality” in an earlier portion of its opinion and later correctly compared for substantial similarity in reaching its ultimate conclusion. There is no indication that it applied a substantial identicality standard in its comparison analysis; in fact, the language of the district court‘s opinion leads us to conclude that it correctly compared for substantial similarity. Thus, there is no merit to MiTek‘s contention that the district court erred in comparing the protectable elements of the ACES program to elements in TrussPro.
6. Copying of the Copyrightable Elements of the ACES Program was De Minimis
MiTek argues that the district court erred in concluding that the copying by ArcE of the protectable elements of the ACES programs was de minimis and therefore not actionable. In its comparison analysis, after concluding that of the five protectable elements of the ACES programs, four in TrussPro were substantially similar, the district court concluded that:
A finding of a substantial similarity [of certain program elements] does not end the Court‘s inquiry, however. To find infringement, the Court must also determine that the Arc[E] Program has appropriated substantial elements of the Aces Layout Programs. The Court has reviewed the programs and concludes that these five elements are not significant in the context of the Aces Layout Programs as a whole.
MiTek, 864 F. Supp. at 1584. Based on this finding, the court concluded that the copying was de minimis and not actionable.
MiTek cites to a treatise on copyright law, Nimmer on Copyright, for the proposition that “even a quantitatively small amount of copied material may be sufficiently important to the operation of plaintiff‘s program to justify a finding of substantial similarity.” 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[F][5] at 13-146 (1996) (footnote omitted) (hereinafter “Nimmer“). Certainly even a quantitatively small amount of copied material may justify a finding of substantial similarity, but, as Nimmer correctly observes, “[i]n some cases, the amount of material copied will be so small as to be de minimis, and will not justify a finding of substantial similarity.”26 Id. (footnote omitted). We agree with the district court that the elements that were considered original and appropriated were not of such significance to the overall program to warrant an ultimate finding of substantial similarity and hence infringement. The burden is on the copyright owner to demonstrate the significance of the copied features, and, in this case, MiTek has failed to meet that burden.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court‘s determination that the TrussPro program does not infringe the ACES programs is AFFIRMED.
APPENDIX A (R3-144-Pl. Exh. 18C)
CA (96) 3760,SIZE-44 PICAS,TYPE-PDI,PARCEL-O,FSIZE-05280
