delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In this personal injury lawsuit, the plaintiff retained and endorsed an expert witness who was previously retained and utilized as a pretrial consultant by the opposing party. Fearing that their former consultant will be in a position to utilize confidential information to their detriment at trial, Petitioners/Defendants Robert Wilmore and Tramp Master, Inc. (collectively “Wilmore”), have sought relief in the nature of mandamus pursuant to article VI, section 3 of the Colorado Constitution and C.A.R. 21. Wilmore asserts that the trial court erroneously refused to disqualify the expert from further participation on behalf of the opposing party, Respondent/Plaintiff Linda Mitchell. We issued a rule to show cause, and now conclude that disqualification should have been ordered. Accordingly, we make the rule absolute.
I.
The personal injury action arises out of a rear-end automobile accident. At issue in the dispute below is whether the relatively low-speed accident could have caused the injuries being claimed by Mitchell.
During the course of pre-trial preparations, Wilmore contacted the firm of Biome-chanics Research & Consulting, Inc., (“BRC”), for input on the causation issues raised by the case. 1 BRC president Jeffrey Wheeler accepted the matter on behalf of BRC, and together with biomechanist John Brault, performed a work-up and preliminary analysis of the accident. During a July 15, 1998 telephone conference, Wheeler and Brault discussed the case with counsel for Wilmore. The content and nature of this call is addressed in more detail below. BRC was paid for its services, and its work on the case put on hold. Although Wilmore continued to retain the BRC firm on a consulting basis, the consultants were not designated as expert witnesses for trial.
One month later, Mitchell also took steps to employ the BRC firm. Like Wilmore, Mitchell was interested in a biomechanical work-up of the forces involved in the accident. BRC’s system of cross-checking files failed to detect the potential conflict of interest, and neither Wheeler nor Brault recog *174 nized the Mitchell representation as duplica-tive of the earlier work they had personally performed on behalf of Wilmore. As a result, the BRC firm — and Mr. Brault, in particular — became involved on both sides of the litigation. This dual retention occurred without the knowledge of either counsel, and the BRC experts have professed that the situation did not arise out of an intentional act or deliberate oversight on their part.
When Mitchell designated Brault as an expert witness for the upcoming trial, Wil-more objected, pointing to the conflict of interest created by the dual retention. Following Mitchell’s refusal to voluntarily withdraw the Brault designation, Wilmore filed a motion requesting that the designation be stricken. The motion was based on the court of appeals’ decision in
City of Westminster v. MOA, Inc.,
Alternatively, Wilmore claimed that the MOA opinion could be read to allow disqualification even absent the passing of confidential information. In essence, the argument was that the situation created by BRC’s dual role in the case had such an inherent appearance of impropriety that the BRC experts should be expunged in order to preserve the public’s confidence in the judicial system.
Mitchell conceded the existence of a prior confidential relationship, but insisted that Wilmore had not met the second requirement for disqualification. In support of this point, Mitchell attached a joint sworn affidavit by the BRC experts in which Wheeler stated that he “[did] not believe” that counsel for the Wilmore defendants had disclosed confidential information, and Brault stated that he “[did] not recall” whether any such disclosures were made during the July 15, 1998 phone conference.
The trial court held a hearing to consider whether confidential information had been shared with the BRC experts. Counsel for Wilmore swore out two affidavits and tendered them at the hearing. The first affidavit was intended for open court, and provided only a generic description of matters discussed during the phone conference of July 15, 1998:
During the conversation, we discussed their opinions and analyses of the biome-chanical aspects of this case. At that time, I shared with them certain mental impressions and thought processes of the case. I also discussed with them strategies for proceeding with the case. At that time, the plaintiffs deposition had not yet been completed. Among the strategies discussed -with Messrs. Wheeler and Brault were the approaches and issues to be covered with the plaintiff at the time of her deposition.
The second affidavit was for “in camera review only,” and was sealed by the trial court. In this affidavit, counsel for Wilmore explained the matters discussed during the July 15, 1998 phone conference in more detail. The affidavit reiterated the claim that confidential mental impressions regarding the case were passed, and gave several examples of the particular topics that counsel recalled discussing with the BRC experts.
The trial court conducted an in camera review of the sealed affidavit, and it accepted that the content of the July 15, 1998 phone conference was accurately reflected, finding “that this is what [counsel for Wilmore] discussed with the experts.” However, the court stated that it did not “believe this information [was] the kind of confidential or privileged information contemplated in the case law.” Accordingly, the court refused to strike the Brault designation.
Wilmore now asks this court for relief, arguing that the trial court’s ruling will irreversibly prejudice the litigation of this case on the merits.
*175 ii.
This court’s original jurisdiction may be exercised when a pre-trial ruling will place a party at a “significant disadvantage in litigating the merits of the controversy,” and conventional appellate remedies would prove inadequate.
See Margolis v. District Court,
III.
Wilmore argues that, although the trial court accepted that the subject matter described in the in camera affidavit had been discussed with the BRC experts, it failed to recognize that this was the type of confidential information that requires disqualification. Specifically, Wilmore contends that the discussions between counsel and the BRC experts revealed the type of mental impressions and strategic preparations protected by the work-product doctrine. We agree. Because we conclude that Brault must be disqualified due to the information he received during the July 15, 1998 phone conference, we need not address whether any of the other disclosures by Wilmore were similarly disabling.
A.
As the court of appeals’ decision in
MOA
recognized, conflicts of interest involving non-attorney experts should be analyzed under a two-part test evaluating both the nature of the earlier relationship and the type of information shared during the retention.
See MOA
First, was it objectively reasonable for the first party who claims to have retained the consultant ... to conclude that a confidential relationship existed?
Second, was any confidential or privileged information disclosed by the first party to the consultant?
Id.
Under this framework, “[ajffirmative answers to both inquiries compel disqualification,” but “disqualification is likely inappropriate if either inquiry yields a negative response.”
Id.
Further, the party seeking disqualification has the burden of proving both the grounds for disqualification, and the non-waiver of any confidentiality being asserted.
See English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Lab., Inc.,
Wilmore’s alternative argument at the hearing below embraced the view that disqualification might be appropriate even absent a showing that confidential information was passed during the prior retention. This position was based on language from
MOA
suggesting that “[e]ven if no disclosures occur,” disqualification might be required to “protect the integrity of the judicial process.”
See MOA
In this context, “confidential information” includes disclosures containing information in the nature of attorney work-product or privileged attorney-client communication. In
Wang,
for example, the court found disqualification to be appropriate in light of the fact that the expert had been exposed to both an assessment of a disputed patent, and counsel’s views regarding potential defenses in the suit.
By way of contrast, however, the discussion of mere technical information about a case does not meet a party’s burden under this framework.
See, e.g., Nikkal Industries v. Salton, Inc.,
B.
In light of these principles, we turn now to the facts of this case. We have reviewed the “in camera” affidavit considered by the trial court.
2
In our view, the discussions related therein include the mental impressions and thought processes of counsel, as well as strategies pertaining to discovery and trial — all matters in the nature of attorney work-product.
See People v. Martinez,
Wilmore obtained the services of the BRC consultants for the initial purpose of establishing whether the low-speed accident in question could be conclusively excluded as a cause of the plaintiffs injuries. Even if the BRC experts were of the view that the acci *177 dent could not be fully excluded, the consulting relationship remained important - as did Wilmore’s objectively reasonable belief that their relationship with BRC was a confidential one and that the matters discussed would remain inviolate.
By reviewing the biomechanical possibilities and engaging in further dialog as to what information might be useful if obtained in discovery, counsel for Wilmore and the BRC consultants acted in a manner consistent with the proper preparation of the case. Moreover, through their participation in this exchange, the BRC consultants learned of and contributed to the strategies and mental impressions of counsel.
Given the absence of any evidence that Wilmore waived these confidences, we believe that disqualification was compelled. As stated in
Wang,
“While the value of the disclosures is debatable, their essential work-product nature is not. No experienced litigator would freely disclose these materials to opposing counsel.”
Wang,
IV.
In sum, we hold that where a party (1) is objectively reasonable in concluding that a confidential relationship has been established with an expert consultant; and (2) shares confidential information during the course of said relationship, the consultant may not be subsequently utilized as an expert witness by the opposing party. We further hold that the trial court failed to recognize that the discussions described in the sealed affidavit included confidential information in the form of counsel’s strategies and mental impressions, and as a result, erroneously concluded that the second prong of the test for disqualification had not been established.
Accordingly, we make our rule absolute and direct the trial court to order the witness disqualified.
Notes
. The record indicates that the field of biome-chanics involves the analysis of physical forces acting upon or through biological systems, and as relevant here, the study of the effects or potential effects of such forces in automobile and other accidents.
. Although we have reviewed the sealed affidavit, we are unable to offer much about its contents because it remains under seal.
. While the work-product doctrine is most frequently encountered in the context of discovery requests regarding tangible materials prepared in anticipation of litigation, it is the inclusion of an attorney's mental processes and case strategies that invoke the applicable protections.
See Watson v. RTD,