53 Wis. 548 | Wis. | 1881
This action was brought by the plaintiffs and respondents for the purpose of restraining the appellant town from collecting a tax levied and assessed upon personal property owned by said respondents, and situated in said town. The property taxed was lumber, timber, shingles, and such other articles as are generally found in a lumber-yard, and was kept for sale by the respondents at such yard in said town. The respondents resided in the city of Milwaukee, nearly 200 miles from the appellant town, and their agent who had charge of said lumber-yard resided in the city of Grand Eapids, adjoining said town of Plover. The evidence also shows that the business of said respondents, at their lumber-yard in said town, was buying and selling lumber, shingles, lath, etc.
No question is raised in this case by the appellant that the action ought not to be maintained because it is an action to restrain the collection of a tax levied upon personal property. Both parties desire that the case shall be determined upon the question of the right of the appellant town to levy and collect the taxes sought to be enjoined. The point made by the learned counsel for the respondents, against the right of the town of Plpver to levy and collect taxes upon the property of the respondents in their lumber-yard situated in said town, is that they are not residents of said town, nor is their agent, in charge of said lumber-yard, a resident thereof. Whether said property
Both the learned counsel who argued the case orally in this court, agree that the property in question is “ merchants’ goods, wares and commodities kept for sale,” within the meaning of that part of said section which provides that “ merchants’ goods, wares and commodities kept for sale ” shall be assessed in the district where located; and we have no doubt as to the correctness of this proposition. The words above quoted were clearly intended to cover all kinds of property kept for sale by merchants, and the word “ merchants” must receive its most extended meaning, and include all persons
The question being settled that the property of the respondents in their lumber-yard in the .town of Plover, and upon which the tax sought to be restrained was levied, is merchants’ stock, within the meaning of the statute above quoted, it is clear that the same was properly assessed and taxed in said town, where the same is located, unless the subsequent provisions of said section except this particular kind of merchants’ goods, etc., from merchants’ goods generally, spoken of in said first provision, and require this kind to be taxed at some other place than where located, when the owner is not a resident of such place. The learned counsel for the respondents have urged with great force that the subsequent provision of the section, which declares that “ saw-logs, timber, railroad ties, lumber, and other articles, not being manufacturers’ stock, shall be assessed where the owner or his agent, in the case aforesaid, resides,” excepts the articles mentioned therein out of the general provision as to where merchants’ goods shall be assessed, and makes them assessable only where the owner, or agent in charge of them, resides, whether they be merchants’ goods, etc., or not. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant insists that- this provision must be restricted to such kinds of lumber, railroad ties, etc., as are not merchants’, goods within the meaning of the provision in regard to such goods.
The first legislation of this state upon the subject of the place where merchants’ goods and wares should be assessed and taxed, is found in section 11, ch. 13, R. S. 1843, which reads as follows: “See. 11. All goods, wares and merchandise kept for sale in this state, all stock employed in any of the mechanic arts, and all capital and machinery employed in any branch of manufactures or other business within this state, owned by a corporation out of this state, or by any person or persons whether residing in or out of the state, shall be taxable in the town or ward where the same may be, either to the owner thereof, or to the person who shall have charge of or be in possession of the same.” This section seems to have remained unchanged until 1S59, when it was re-enacted as section 11, ch. 18, R. S. 1858, in the identical language of the section in the Revised Statues of 1849.
In 1858, and before the Revised Statutes of that year took effect, the legislature revised the tax laws by chapter 115 of that year, which is published in the Revised Statutes of 1858, pp. 239-248. This law not having provided in express terms where personal property of the kind mentioned would be taxed, it was amended by chapter 295, Laws of 1860. Subdivision 4 of section 1 of this chapter provides that merchants’ and manufacturers’ stock shall be listed or taxed in the town or ward in which it was situated at the time of listing, but all other personal property shall be listed and taxed in the town or ward in which the person charged with the tax thereon re
In 1868 the legislature again revised the tax laws by chapter 130, Laws of 1868, and section 20 of that chapter re-enacts-the provision in regard to merchants’ and manufacturers’ stock found in all the previous laws, and adds thereto “ tools, machinery and farm products,” making them all taxable in the town or ward where located, and declares “ that all other personal property shall be assessed in the town or ward where the owner resides.” An exception is then added in the following language: “Excepting that saw-logs, timber and lum--her, and any article of personal property in transit, shall be assessed in the town or ward where the owner resides; but if such owner be a non-resident of this state, then such property may be assessed wherever such owner’s place of business may be located.” This is, I think, the first time that saw-logs, timber, and lumber are mentioned in the assessment laws as a distinct kind of property for assessment. But it will be seen that this exception in no way modifies the provision in regard to the rule which requires the taxation of merchants’ stock in the place where located. Such stock still remained taxable where located.
In 1872 the-legislature again revised the tax laws, so far as . the particular section thereof fixing the place where personal property shall be taxed, is concerned. Chapter 148, Laws of 1872. Section 1 of this chapter'reads as follows: “Merchants’ goods, wares, commodities kept for sale, tools and machinery, manufacturers’ stock, farm implements, live stock
It will be seen that the first sentence of the section prescribes that merchants’ goods, etc., kept for sale, tools and machinery, manufacturers’ stock, farm implements, live stock, and farm products, excepting grain in warehouse and such personal property as may be owned by non-residents who shall have no agent or place of business in this state, shall be assessed in the town or ward where the same may be located. The exception in this provision of “grain in warehouse and such personal property as may be owned by non-residents who shall have no agent or place of business in this state,” leaves all property not “ merchants’ goods, etc., tools and machinery, farm implements, live stock, and farm products,” to be pro
It seems to us that any other construction of this section renders its provisions conflicting, and leaves a large class of personal property unprovided for. If the third sentence should be construed to limit its provisions to saw-logs, timber, railroad ties, lumber, and all other articles of personal property of a like nature, then there is nothing in the section which prescribes the place where a large part of the personal property of the state shall be assessed and taxed. Giving this provision of the section this limited construction, the section fails to prescribe where personal property other than merchants’ goods, etc., tools and machinery, manufacturers’ stock, farm implements, live stock, farm products (excluding grain in warehouse), saw-logs, timber, railroad ties, lumber, and other articles of a like kind, and personal property owned by nonresidents of this state having no agent in this state, shall be assessed. Such a construction would render the section ineffectual to accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted. Giving the words in the third sentence their ordinary meaning, and construing the words “all other personal property” as meaning all such property not theretofore provided for, the section, becomes a perfect section, and fixes the situs of all personal property in the state for the purpose of taxation.
This was the law upon the subject of assessment of personal property, sp far as relates to the place where the same shall be assessed, at the time the Revised Statutes of 1878 took effect, and when section 1040 of those statutes took the place of all former laws upon that subject. It is insisted by the learned counsel for the respondents, that this section changes the law so far as it relates to the place where lumber shall be assessed, even though such lumber be “ merchants’ goods, wares, and commodities kept for sale.” This section was written by the revisers in the exact language of the section as found in the revision, and, so far as it has any bearing upon the question involved in this case, has not since been changed.
So far as we can learn from the revisers’ note made upon this section, it was not their intention to change it in any of its material requirements, but they simply sought to express the ideas contained in section 1, ch. 148, Laws of 1872, in different and more concise language. We are not, however, disposed to give any undue weight to the expressed intention of the revisers. If the language used by them, fairly construed, does in fact change the place of assessment as prescribed in'the act of 1872 referred to, then it must be so construed, notwithstanding the intention of the revisers was not to make any such change. The revisers had no power to enact laws, and it must be presumed the legislature enacted what they prepared, with a knowledge of the language used by them and intending that
The phraseology of the different sentences of the section itself is, we think, against the construction sought to be placed upon it by the learned counsel for the respondents. This section commences with a general provision, which in all the former enactments had stood as the last one. The former statutes first prescribed the situs for taxation of certain kinds of property particularly described, and was then followed by the general provision that all other personal property should be assessed where the owner resides. This section starts out with a general rule that all personal property shall be assessed where the owner resides, and closes with the words “ except as hereinafter provided.” The second sentence prescribes the rules as to nonresident owners of personal property, and it will be noticed that this sentence also concludes with the same words
The third sentence differs from the first and second in this, that the property mentioned in it is to be assessed in the district where located, in all cases and without any exception. There is no proviso which authorizes us to construe the subsequent provisions of the section as in any way qualifying or controlling this. The fact that exceptions were expressly made in the first and second sentences, and not in the third, is an almost conclusive argument for holding that there was no intention on the part of the law-makers to restrict or limit it in any way by any subsequent provision, making a different rule applicable to a particular kind of merchandise; nor do we think there isjanything in the following sentences which clearly indicates any such intention. The next sentence clearly indicates its purpose, and has no reference to any merchants’ stock. The one following that is the only one which can, by any plausible argument, be said to change the rule as laid down in the third sentence. It must be admitted that this sentence seems to be a repetition of what had been before provided for in the first and second sentences, and was, perhaps, wholly unnecessary to perfect the section; yet we are of the opinion there could have been no intent to change the meaning of the third sentence by its provisions. There is, perhaps, some reason for putting it in, following the provision making logs and timber in certain cases manufacturers’ stock, which would not be such under the terms used in the third sentence, and prescribing a different place for their assessment; or it may have been inserted ex industria, and for fear something had been omitted in the previous provision, or to cover property in transit, as
We hold that the personal property in the respondents’ lumber-yard in the town of Plover, kept there by them for the purpose of sale, was merchants’ goods, wares, and commodities .kept for sale by them as merchants, and was rightfully assessed and taxed in said town by the proper authorities thereof; that the fifth sentence in section 1040, R. S. 1878, does not limit
By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to the circuit court to dismiss the respondents’ complaint.