187 Pa. 217 | Pa. | 1898
Opinion by
There is but one question in this case, and that is whether the plaintiff was so manifestly guilty of contributory negligence as to make it the duty of the court below to direct a compulsory nonsuit. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s testimony, upon motion of defendant’s counsel, the court granted a compulsory nonsuit, which, afterwards in an exhaustive and able opinion, they refused to take off.
The plaintiff received his injury by an explosion of gasoline in the cellar of his own leased house. He entered the cellar with a lighted lantern in his hand and the explosion instantly took place. Was this the result of an act of negligence on his part which caused his injury ? The explosion resulted immediately and directly from the presence of the lighted lamp. The plaintiff was the one, only person who brought the lamp in contact with the explosive gas, and was, of course, the sole producing agent of the resulting explosion. Whether his act was culpably negligent depends chiefly upon his prior knowledge of the character and qualities of gasoline, the condition of the apparatus in the cellar, and the probable or possible presence of gas in the cellar. The full detail of the plaintiff’s knowledge and acquaintance with the gasoline plant, its connections with the house, the manner of lighting the house, and the condition and situation of the pipes and apparatus in the cellar are set forth with much clearness and force in the opinion of the court below on the motion to take off the nonsuit, and therefore they do not need much repetition here. Substantially, they amount to this: the hotel had been lighted with gas made from gasoline for about ten years; the generator was placed about a hundred feet from the house and the
On cross-examination, after saying he thought there was something wrong with the gas, he was asked: “ Q. You say you thought there was something wrong with the gas ? A. Yes, sir: something wrong with the pipes. Q. Did you think it was dangerous? A. Yes, sir. Q. On the evening of the 28th of May? A. Yes, sir. Q. What did you do about it? A. I put the lights out and then the next morning I went down to Mr. Stewart’s office and told him about it. Q. Then the next
The witness then described the finding of a leak in the pipe some time after the explosion, on the side of the pipe next the wall, and it is perhaps a reasonable inference that the gas escaped into the cellar through that leak, and exploded the moment it came in contact with the light in the lantern carried by the plaintiff. From the foregoing testimony, all of which comes from the plaintiff and, of course, is entirely uncontradicted, several conclusions follow. (1) The plaintiff himself was the producing agent whose act caused the explosion. If it had not been for the lighted lamp which he carried, there would not have been any explosion. (2) There is not a particle of testimony to show that Stewart had the least knowledge of the existence of any leak or opening in the pipe. (3) The plaintiff had at least as good, and indeed better, opportunities for knowing the condition of the gas pipes and air pump in the cellar, than the defendant. (I) The plaintiff was warned by the plumber not to turn on the gas until the pipe was fixed. (5) The plaintiff admits several times that he thought there was something wrong with the pipe, and that it was in a dangerous condition. (6) He was also informed by the book of instructions that it was dangerous to approach the gas vault with a light, and the generator should never be filled with gas except by daylight. From all which he must have inferred as an ordinarily reasonable man that it would be most highly dangerous to enter a cellar in which there was, or might be, escaping gas, with a lighted lamp. (7) The plaintiff was admonished by the manner in which the gas burned that there was something the matter with the gas apparatus in the cellar, and as an ordinarily prudent person he should have scrupulously avoided any probability or possibility of an explosion, by the introduction of a lighted lamp into the cellar in such circumstances. (8) The plaintiff had personal knowledge that the machinery in the cellar for supplying light was in a defective condition, and believing, as he says he did, that it was in a dangerous condition, he became subject to a special duty of care before entering the cellar, and most particu
The case comes within different lines of decisions upon the subject of contributory negligence. Thus in Oil City Gas Co. v. Robinson, 99 Pa. 1, the plaintiff was a civil engineer who entered a street sewer with a lighted lantern and was injured by the explosion of gas escaping into the sewer from an adjacent gas pipe. We held that although the gas company was liable for the consequences of the leak in their pipes, yet the . plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence for entering the sewer with a lighted lantern if it was probable that the escaping gas might enter the sewer, as this was a result which he ought to have anticipated. We said, Gobdon, J.: “ If it was probable that gas escaping from the leak would find its way into the sewer in quantities sufficient to produce an explosion, he ought to have anticipated the result, and not entered the sewer with a lighted lamp. If he did so, under the conditions stated, he was guilty of such contributory negligence as ought to have prevented his recovery.” In Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. 432, we held that to prove contributory negligence, evidence is admissible that the deceased at the time of the accident was in a position which he had been warned, and himself had warned others, to avoid as dangerous. In Russell v. Hutchinson, 15 W. N. C. 482, we held it was contributory negligence for a boy eighteen years of age to go into a known dangerous chamber to work, against the advice of his father, but at the solicitation of the pit boss, and we sustained a compulsory nonsuit for that reason. To the same effect is Fairview Coal Co. v. Biddle, 18 W. N. C. 108. In Township of Crescent v. Anderson, 114 Pa. 643, we held that one who knows, or by ordinary care may know, of a defect in a highway, and voluntarily undertakes to test it when it could be avoided, cannot recover against the municipal authorities for losses incurred through such defect. In Kibele v. City, 105 Pa. 41, which was an action to recover damages resulting from an explosion of gas escaping from a gas main in the streets and entering the plaintiff’s house, we said: “ If the plaintiff knew that illuminating gas was escaping from the main, and also knew that from it an explosion might reasonably be expected, it was his duty to have withdrawn from the
These citations might be multiplied, and they might also embrace the class of decisions in which persons -knowing of defects in machinery continue to use it, and are therefore deprived of the right to recover for damages resulting from the defects, but it is not necessary. This plaintiff admits that he knew of the defects in this gas apparatus in the cellar; that he considered it in a dangerous condition, and that he had been warned not to turn the gas on until the defects were repaired. Nevertheless he did knowingly what he was warned not to do, to wit: turn on the gas before the apparatus was repaired, and he did knowingly enter the cellar with a lighted lamp when he knew there was something wrong, without first ascertaining whether gas was escaping, and when he had been told by the plumber and the book of instructions not to approach with a lamp when gas was escaping.
We are clearly of -opinion lie was guilty of contributory negligence, and the learned court below was right in refusing to take off the nonsuit.
Judgment affirmed.