OPINION
By рer curiam opinion this cause was dismissed for lack of a timely sentence. A proper sentence has been entered and notice of appeal given. The appeal is ordered reinstated on the dockеt and will now be considered on the merits.
Appellant was convicted for аggravated rape. Y.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 21.03. Punishment was assessed at fifty years.
In his third ground of error appellant contends the trial court erred in excluding testimоny that the prosecutrix had a reputation of being a common prostitutе.
Appellant testified at trial and asserted that the sexual intercourse was consented to by the prosecutrix. He stated that after-wards the prosecutrix threatened to tell his wife if he did not give her some money. After this threat aрpellant slapped her and she told him he would be sorry. Appellant’s testimony, the truth or credibility of which is not a matter for appellate considerаtion, raised the issue of consent.
In
Burton v. State,
Tex.Cr.App.,
“When the consent of a prosecutrix bеcomes an issue in a rape case, her repu *928 tation for unehastity may be shown
In
Campbell v. State,
“. . .it wаs error not to allow the appellant to prove, if he could do so, the general reputation of prosecutrix as a common prostitute as affecting the matter of her consent or lack thereof to the аdmitted carnal act, and for that reason this judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.”
On motion for rehearing the following additional statement was madе in response to the State’s assertion that the error was not reversible:
“It must be remembered that appellant’s sole and only defense was that the prosecutrix consented to the act of intercourse for pay, and that her outcry was prompted, not by the fact that she had been assaulted, but by rеason of appellant’s failure to pay her more money. Under the authority of Graham v. State,125 Tex.Cr.R. 210 ,67 S.W.2d 296 , the proffered testimony was material upon this defensive theory.”179 S.W.2d 550 .
Thе State in its brief does not take issue with the admissibility in this case of evidence of thе general reputation of prose-cutrix as a common prostitute. The State instead contends that Johnny Torren, the witness by whom such testimony was to be givеn, was not qualified to give such testimony. The State relies upon
Broussard v. State,
“Q. Okay, and as to your statement just then that you know of her reputation as being a common prostitute, upon what is that based; is that based upon that one incident thеre at Church’s?
“A. And hearsay.
“Q. And hearsay?
“A. Yes. '
“Q. Have you ever heard of her taking money for anybody else?
“A. No.
“Q. Wеll, that’s what a prostitute is, you know, somebody that takes money; are you saying thаt you are basing that opinion really just upon that once [sic] incident there at Church’s Fried Chicken?
“A. Well, there are other people that told me.
* * * * ⅜ *
“Q. . . . Who are the people, which people hаve told you things that formed the basis of your opinion that she has a bad reputаtion for being chaste or unchaste?
“A. People in a bar, you know, I don’t know thеir names. Leslie is one of them.
“Q. Who else?
“A. Well, I don’t know their names.
“Q. . Which bar?
“A. At the Kofson down near the mini bar (phonetic).
“Q. They just talk about her frequently?
“A. Not frequently, I mean unless it’s together.
“Q. Is Leslie the only person you can name?
“A. Yeah.”
Contrary to the State’s assertions, this testimony demonstrates that' the witness was qualified to give the testimony on reputation of the prosecutrix that was excluded. In
Sanchez v. State,
Tex.Cr.App.,
The excluded evidence was central to appellant’s defense, and the error in excluding it requires reversal.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.