Aрpellant was convicted of armed robbery. The evidence adduced at trial revealed that on March 22,1980, appellаnt entered Dutch’s Fried Chicken, a Chatham County restaurant, and told employee Shirley Lemon that he and his companions were going to rob the place and that she should leave. Ms. Lemon ignored appellant but later turned around to find that he had pulled a gun and was holding it to the cashier’s head. Appellant, along with his cohorts, took money from the cash register and a lock box and exited by way of the back door. However, when the police officers arrived, Ms. Lemon told them that the perpetrators had all worn masks and that she was therefore unable to recognize any of them.
At a later date, Detective Murphy was given a tip by an informer thаt Ms. Lemon was not telling everything she knew about the robbery at Dutch’s. When the detective confronted her, Ms. Lemon admitted that even though thе robbers had worn masks, she could *631 identify appellant as one of the men involved in the robbery. Appellant was subsequently arrested fоr the Dutch’s Fried Chicken robbery, but at his preliminary hearing Ms. Lemon again switched her story and testified that the men who robbed the restaurant had worn masks and were impossible to identify. Thereafter, all charges against appellant were dismissed.
Appellant was later indicted by special presentment by the Chatham County Grand Jury for the armed robbery of Dutch’s Fried Chicken. At trial, Ms. Lemon testified that she could identify appellant as the one who held the gun to the cashier’s head. When asked about her conflicting testimony, Ms. Lemon explained that she had lied earlier because she had feared for her life. She insisted that she could truthfully identify appellant as a participant in the robbery. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and this appeal ensued.
1. Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury regarding the effect of a witness wilfully and knowingly swearing falsely.
OCGA § 24-9-85 (b) (Code Ann. § 38-1806) states: “If a witness shall willfully and knowingly swear falsely, his testimony shall be disregarded entirely, unless corroborated by circumstances or other unimpeached evidence.” Since Ms. Lemon admitted that she had lied when she previously testified that she could not identify any of the robbers, appellant, citing
Roach v. Carroll,
The language of OCGA § 24-9-85 (b) (Cоde Ann. § 38-1806) “was substantially given by the judge, wherein he instructed in detail about the believability of witnesses and disbelieving a discredited witness ... The charge as a whole substantially covered the principle urged; therefore, the failure to charge in the exact language of the Code section was not error.”
Poteat v. State,
2. Contending that Ms. Lemon’s testimony should have been disregarded in light of her false swearing, appellant maintains that *632 the evidence presented was insufficient to authorize his conviction. However, appellant’s basic premise is faulty, as is evidenced by our conclusion in Division 1.
Aftеr a careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence, as summarized above, was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
3. Appellant contends thаt the trial court erred in denying him the opportunity to open and conclude argument to the jury.
“After the evidence is closed on bоth sides, the prosecuting attorney shall open and conclude the argument to the jury. If the defendant introduces no evidence, his counsel shall open and conclude the argument to the jury after the evidence on the part of the state is closed.” OCGA § 17-8-71 (Code Ann. § 27-2201). In the present case, the trial court ruled that appellant had introduced an exhibit into evidence thereby precluding him from оpening and closing the final arguments to the jury. The following colloquy transpired at trial when defense counsel was examining a state witness:
“[Defense Counsel]: I offer Defendant’s Exhibit 1. I’ll wait until I put my case up, Your Honor.
“[Assistant District Attorney]: Your Honor, I’ll admit it into evidence at this time.
“[Defеnse Counsel]: Well, I don’t think it’s even proper. Let me just withdraw that tender and I’ll do it —
“The Court: What are you doing now?
“[Defense Counsel]: Well, I got the cart before the horse, Judge.
“[Assistant District Attorney]: Your Honor, I would have no objection to its admission now or later, so I’d like to waive any —
“The Court: Well, I’m going to let the rеcord show that Defendant’s Exhibit 1 is admitted into evidence.”
The above exchange at trial makes it abundantly clear that appellant’s counsel did in fact intend to introduce Defendant’s Exhibit 1 into evidence and that the item’s admission is not erroneous simply because it оccurred during defense counsel’s cross-examination of a state witness. See
Pierce v. State,
Furthermore, since appellant failed to object at trial to the trial court’s failure to allow him the opportunity to open and close the final argument, he may not now rаise the issue on appeal.
Scott v. State,
4. At trial, Detective Murphy was allowed to testify that when *633 he confronted Ms. Lemon about her initial aсcount of the robbery, she admitted that she had lied and that she could in fact identify appellant as one of the participants in the robbery. Appellant objected to this testimony, arguing that it was inadmissible hearsay, but the trial court ruled that the testimony was admissible to еxplain Detective Murphy’s subsequent conduct in arresting appellant. See OCGA § 24-3-2 (Code Ann. § 38-302). Appellant asserts that the testimony in question wаs not admissible to explain the detective’s conduct since his conduct in arresting appellant was irrelevant to the issue of аppellant’s guilt or innocence.
Regardless of whatever merit aрpellant’s argument may have, the admission of the disputed testimony was harmless since it was cumulative in nature.
Dover v. State,
Judgment affirmed.