*3 WICKERSHAM, CERCONE, and JJ. Before BECK CERCONE, Judge: parties upon
The are before this court lower court’s compel a second arbitration appellant’s petition denial of in appellant an automobile accident which hearing, involving involved, against party of a claim pursuance was in the first brought against the one he suit different than in the Appellant was involved proceedings. arbitration an identified and accident at an intersection with automobile averred was the cause of the insured driver whom panel trying an arbitration the case Subsequently accident. the identified and insured driver appellant and between of the driver and rendered an award favor pursue seeks to a second arbitra- appellant.1 Appellant now under the uninsured compensation hearing claiming tion Prudential policy clause of his automobile with (Prudential) on Casualty Company and Insurance Property truck, obstructing his view of the grounds parked that a him caused happened, intersection the accident where of the alleges identity the other car. He collide with he possible truck was because parked opinion court in an in the accident. The lower blacked out Philadelphia Court Judge County White of the authored in its unin- appellant’s policy, Pleas stated that Common for hit-and-run situations provision, provided sured motorist and parked an unidentified vehicle contemplate and did not *4 petition compel arbitration accordingly appellant’s denied a second time. We reverse. which was insured policy
The insurance under coverage following under the provides uninsured conditions: coverage (see Page), Declarations
If for this you’ve paid should have collected as you the amount pay you we’ll Pleas, Baratía, County, Philadelphia of Common 1. Mitchell v. Court No. 506. June Term 1980 damages injury for or bodily person from organiza- tion for responsible the car in you accident are injured, only you but could not collect because: person
The or organization responsible for the accident has no liability (less insurance or had inadequate than required amount by your state’s financial responsi- law) bility insurance liability coverage at the of time the accident. person
The or organization responsible for the accident has adequate liability coverage at the time of accident, but, reason, for some the company writing the insurance coverage. denies Neither the nor of owner the car which caused injury by hitting a person insured under this (or part by hitting car person that was occupying at accident) the time of can be identified. Appellee, Prudential, contends that appellant’s claim falls under the paragraph, supra, last of the uninsured motorist provision and that paragraph this applies only to hit-and-run argues situations. Appellant that the Uninsured Motorist Coverage is designed Act2 compensation insure to one iswho injured through the fault any of driver who cannot respond damage injuries and that furthermore, con- is tact not necessary long so as the prove claimant can there was culpable another vehicle involved. 14, 1963, August
2. Act P.L. 909 1§ as amended December P.L. 1254 pertinent part No. 397 140 P.S. § § 2000. The of the Act reads as follows: (a) liability No policy insuring motor vehicle of insurance resulting liability imposed by loss bodily from injury law for or by any person arising death ownership, suffered out mainte- registered nance or principally use a motor vehicle garaged or State, coverage provided this unless is supplemental therein or bodily injury thereto in limits for or as death fixed from time to by Assembly time the General in section 1421 of article XIV of "The Code,” (P.L.58), April Vehicle provisions act of under approved Commissioner, protection the Insurance for the persons legally insured thereunder who are entitled to recover damages operators from owners or of uninsured motor vehicles sickness, disease, bodily injury, because of including or death result- therefrom____ ing *5 332 have consist courts Pennsylvania we note
Initially
Act
Coverage
Motorist
be
that the Uninsured
ently declared
the intent of our
to achieve
in order
construed
liberally
who,
persons
to
protection
monetary
to
legislature
provide
at
injury
have suffered
highways,
the
lawfully using
while
See, Estate
driver.
irresponsible
of an
the hands
of Rosato
Company,
328 Pa.Su
Mutual Insurance
Harleysville
v.
Insur
Keystone
Pattani
(1984);
278,
While valid, it clause would contact physical hold the fraud to clearly cases recovery of any hope also eliminate has avoided motorist who negligent another involving is surely situation This latter getting away. liability by Motorist Cov- the Uninsured contemplation of within mitigated fraud can be Act, possibility and the erage If the claimant. on the proof placed the burden that an proof sustain burden party can injured recover, re- occur, entitled did he should be accident contact. actuality physical gardless Furthermore, are insulated from the companies *6 of burden untrammeled fraudulent claims when burden proof of to show that an unidentifiable vehicle was the of placed cause an accident is proponent on of claim. v. Harleysville Gerardi Insurance Company, 293 Pa.Su- per. (1981). Webb,
Under supra, Pennsylvania’s Uninsured Mo torist Coverage Act includes accidents which are caused by a driver whose vehicle did not come in contact with a claimant’s car. Here we decide must Prudential’s conten tion that appellant’s failure to claim in his first arbitration that an unidentifiable parked vehicle obscured his vision so that he with precludes collided another car a second arbitra tion under the provision appellant’s uninsured motorist of policy.
Thus we must decide appellant whether can receive com- pensation for his injuries under both the no-fault and the uninsured motorist provisions of his If policy. double re- is covery allowed then a question further arises as to whether had to advance his uninsured motorist claim at the first arbitration when the no-fault provisions of his policy litigated. were
In keeping with the of legislative mandate liberal construction of the Motorist Coverage Uninsured Act our courts have demonstrated a for propensity deciding that a party can receive benefits under both the no-fault and uninsured motorist protection of automobile insurance so policy, long (See as these are not duplicated. benefits infra). In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company Williams, v. (1978) Pa. A.2d 281 our Supreme Court concluded that
Where there exists a of valid contract insurance which contains uninsured coverage, an insurance carri- er is obligated to compensate the insured damages for inflicted upon insured because conduct operator owner and/or of an uninsured motor vehicle except for three exclusions. An statutory obligated compensate insured within
carrier is for: provision the uninsured motorist the ambit of 1. Property damage. the insured or his injury damages
2. Bodily written consent the insur- representative has without judgment any prosecuted ance carrier settled or liable persons or for such person action any injuries. would damage, payment be Any compensa- or indirect benefit a workmen’s
the direct
who would
as a
person
qualify
tion carrier or any
compensation law.
any
self-insurer under
workmen’s
Brader
court
as
our
on Williams
Relying
precedent
270 Pa.Super.
Company,
Mutual
Nationwide
Insurance
*7
258,
(1979),
an
clause
exclusionary
From this line of cases collect for may general an insured tion loss benefits basic his provision damages under the uninsured motorist 335 Furthermore, policy. herein, if he is able to prove that the parked unidentifiable truck near the corner where his accident legal accident, occurred was the cause of the may damages recover under uninsured motorist cover- age as well as those he under recovered his no-fault insur- ance.
It is well settled that arbitration proceedings are informal in hearings adversarial which the arbitrators are not bound by the technical rules of civil procedure. Where parties their controversy to submit arbitration and make provision no the mode conducting the proceedings, parties thereby dispense with the technical rules. (1984); P.L.E. Arbitration 10 Rosenbaum et al. v. Druck § al., 434, er (1943). Moreover, et 346 Pa. 31 117 A.2d Rule 2227 provides Pa.R.C.P. for compulsory joinder parties very applicable limited situations.3 It is where only sub stantive law interest provides joint is and so con nected claims litigants with the that no decree can be granted impairing rights without of the litigants. Kelly 361, v. Carborundum 307 Company, Pa.Super. 453 A.2d 624 (1982); Corporation, Shaw Electric Westinghouse 276 Pa.Super. (1980). 175 A.2d Rule Under Pa.R.C.P. are indispensible parties tenants, inter joint alia common, tenants in and tenants entireties. Moore- head v. Lopatin, Pa.Super. (1982)(in a suit for negligent maintenance of real estate owned by the parties common, as tenants both are indispen tenants *8 parties); sible Brabant, Pa.Super. 30, Patwardhan v. (1982)(in judgment seeking creditor’s action attack an fund in escrow the name of the judgment debtor wife, and his indispensible the wife is an suit). to the party Thus, due to informality the arbitration hearing and Rule 2227 the Pa.R.C.P. unidentifiable truck negligently parked near of appellant’s the intersection accident and Compulsory 3. Rule 2227. Joinder (a) having only joint subject Persons a interest in the matter of an joined plaintiffs action must be on the same side as or defendants. (b) person joined plaintiff If join, a who must be as a refuses to shall, case, proper he a involuntary a be made defendant or an plaintiff permits the involuntary joinder. substantive such law car was him to collide with another he avers caused first arbitration appellant’s indispensible party not an of the car with and appellant between proceeding collided. which he is entitled to a
Therefore, we conclude appel are hearing, parties to which arbitration second Prudential, unidentifiable whether the to determine lant and legal cause of accident. truck was in parked fact mandate legislative is in with keeping decision Our Coverage Act Motorist construction of Uninsured liberal Webb,supra. court in decision our and the relinquished. and Jurisdiction Reversed remanded. files, WICKERSHAM, J., dissenting a statement. WICKERSHAM, dissenting statement: Judge, opens the majority opinion I that the I dissent. believe claimants, could contend who to unlimited fraudulent door after another vehicle that one unidentifiable ad infinitum panel was responsive until arbitration injury caused sense violates common the law—it found. Such cannot be very least. say 499 A.2d REYNOLDS, INC., Appellant, DEAN WITTER
v. (Two Cases) Cheryl Joseph L. Genteel. and M. GENTEEL REYNOLDS, DEAN INC. WITTER Genteel, Cheryl Appellant. L. Joseph M. GENTEEL and Pennsylvania. Superior Court April Argued 11, 1985. Filed Oct.
