Mitchell v. New York City Department of Consumer AffairsMitchell v. New York City Department of Consumer Affairs
— Judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Michael Dontzin, J.), entered September 30, 1988, which granted a petition brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 to annul respondent’s determination revoking petitioner’s license to operate a sidewalk newsstand, denying his renewal application for said license and padlocking his newsstand, unanimously reversed, on the law, and the petition dismissed, without costs.
Based upon our assessment of the record before us, we are unable to conclude that the penalty imposed upon petitioner is so disproportionate to the offenses which he was found to have committed as to be shocking to our sense of fairness (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ.,
Respondent imposed administrative sanctions upon peti
As a result of an inspection conducted on October 26, 1987, petitioner was again charged with selling merchandise from an area external or adjacent to the newsstand and with occupying an area greater than 72 square feet. Petitioner appeared at a hearing conducted on November 5, 1987 by his employee, Mahmoud Rkein. Respondent thereafter issued a determination dated March 11, 1988 sustaining the charges, fining petitioner $900 and revoking his license by way of a notice dated March 14, 1988. Petitioner likewise took no action to vacate or appeal this decision.
Subsequent to the revocation of his license, petitioner’s newsstand was twice inspected and found to be in continued operation, as a result of which respondent issued citations for engaging in unlicensed activity. On the first occasion, petitioner entered into a settlement agreement providing for the payment of a $600 fine and immediate cessation of the unlicensed activity. The second violation resulted in the sealing of the newsstand pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 20-105 (Padlock Law). Petitioner thereupon instituted the within article 78 proceeding by way of an order to show cause dated July 11,1988.
We note that, because petitioner failed to pursue available administrative remedies, judicial review would normally be unavailable for failure to exhaust those remedies (Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth.,
Upon consideration of the merits, however, we do not view the penalty imposed by respondent as excessive. It is well settled that, upon review, "a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board or body it reviews unless the decision under review is arbitrary and unreasonable and constitutes an abuse of discretion” (Matter of Diocese of Rochester v Planning Bd.,