Defendant appeals by right the trial court’s October 3, 2011, order granting a modification of the parties’ divorce judgment with respect to child custody. We affirm.
The parties were married in 1991, had one child in 2003 and one in 2006, and were divorced on March 30, 2009. The parties were awarded joint physical and legal custody of the children. Six months after the divorce judgment, defendant moved to Texas with the children. Defendant began dating Todd Smith while in Texas, and plaintiff requested that Smith submit to a background check because plaintiff was concerned for the safety of his children. The trial court ordered defendant to provide information to plaintiff, but defendant and Smith refused.
At a hearing on December 29, 2010, the trial court ordered defendant to provide Smith’s information to the Friend of the Court, reasoning that a background check was necessary to ensure the children’s safety. Defendant and Smith continued to resist. Later, on February 15, 2011, the trial court entered an order temporarily transferring physical custody to plaintiff. Defendant appealed, and this Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for continued proceedings consistent with the Child Custody Act. Mitchell v Mitchell, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September 15, 2011 (Docket No. 303257) {Mitchell I).
Before this Court released its opinion in Mitchell I, plaintiff moved to modify the custody arrangement so that he would have physical custody during the school year and defendant would have physical custody during the summers. The trial court issued an oral opinion after a two-day evidentiary hearing.
Defendant first argues that the trial court did not establish proper cause or a change of circumstances in a separate proceeding before the hearing to modify custody. We disagree.
All custody orders must be affirmed on appeal unless the trial court committed a palpable abuse of discretion, made findings against the great weight of the evidence, or made a clear legal error. MCL 722.28; Pierron v Pierron,
To establish proper cause, the moving party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence an appropriate ground that would justify the trial court’s taking action. Vodvarka v Grasmeyer,
In this case, the trial court expressly stated on the record its reasons for finding that the proper cause standard had been satisfied. Defendant argues that this determination should have been made before the hearing to modify custody and relies on this Court’s opinion in Mitchell I. Defendant mischaracterizes this Court’s opinion, which provides: “Before modifying or amending an existing custody order, however, the circuit court must determine whether there has been a change in circumstances or if proper cause exists to revisit the custody decision.” Mitchell I, unpub op at 2. This Court did not hold that a separate hearing had to be conducted before a custody decision may be revisited, nor is one necessarily required. Vodvarka,
In this case, the trial court clearly stated on the record its determination that proper cause had been established before proceeding with its custody analysis of the statutory best-interest factors. Specifically, the trial court found defendant at fault for failing to facilitate plaintiffs communication with the children by Skype, as the court had previously ordered. The trial court also found that defendant had failed to pay her court-ordered share of parenting-time travel expenses and failed to sign a release for the children’s school records, again as required by previous court order. The trial court found that defendant and Smith had continued to refuse to disclose information on Smith for a background check. Finally, the trial court found that
Defendant also argues that the trial court’s bases for determining proper cause were the exact factors this Court in Mitchell I said could not be considered. Again, defendant mischaracterizes this Court’s opinion. In Mitchell I this Court said that the trial court had erred by not following the procedure outlined in MCL 722.27(1), i.e., by not considering the statutory best-interest factors of MCL 722.23 and by improperly using custody as a means to punish defendant for refusing to obey the court’s orders. Mitchell I, unpub op at 3. This Court remanded to the trial court to conduct proceedings consistent with the Child Custody Act. Id. This Court did not state that the trial court could not consider certain facts or circumstances in proper proceedings. The trial court’s determination that proper cause or a change of circumstances existed to justify considering whether modification of its prior order would be in the children’s best interests was not against the great weight of the evidence. Pierron,
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by modifying custody because the trial court’s decision was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree.
This Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact under the great weight of the evidence standard. MCL 722.28. Under this standard the trial court’s determination will be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the other direction. Pierron, 486 Mich
Once the trial court determines there is proper cause or a change of circumstances to permit the matter to be revisited, the trial court still may not modify custody from an established custodial environment unless there is clear and convincing evidence that a modification is in the best interest of the child. MCL 722.27(l)(c). Thus, if the trial court determines that an established custodial environment exists, the moving party has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed modification is in the best interests of the children. Parent,
The trial court specified on the record the evidence it considered for each of the statutory best-interest factors and which parent the trial court found to be better suited in regard to each factor. The trial court also interviewed the children to determine their preference; however, the trial court indicated that the youngest child was not old enough to express a preference. The trial court further stated that it was not going to
Defendant on appeal sets out many specific instances of what she does for the children and argues that she is the better parent. But defendant fails to acknowledge any of the testimony from plaintiff and makes assertions not supported by evidence in the record. The trial court considered everything defendant does for the children and commended her on her efforts; however, the trial court determined that, overall, a modification in custody was in the best interests of the children. After thoroughly reviewing the evidence presented and the trial court’s findings, we conclude that the court’s findings of fact were not against the great weight of the evidence. We also conclude that the court did not commit clear legal error on a major issue or abuse its discretion. MCL 722.28; Pierron,
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in limiting her parenting time because she had not provided Smith’s personal information. Defendant argues that because obtaining Smith’s personal information is not relevant to the best interests of the children, the conditions placed on defendant’s visitation with the children should be struck. We disagree.
Because this issue was not raised before the trial court, it is unpreserved. Walters v Nadell,
This Court reviews discretionary rulings, including a trial court’s custody and parenting-time decisions, for an abuse of discretion. Berger v Berger,
The trial court determined that modifying the custody award was in the best interests of the children and awarded plaintiff physical custody during the school year. The trial court also determined that defendant’s parenting time in Texas would be suspended until Smith disclosed his information for a background check. The trial court also expressed concern that defendant was “bitter, and vengeful, and vindictive” and that defendant would continue to make up unfounded allegations about plaintiff.
Defendant argues that the trial court’s decision to place conditions on her parenting time because of Smith’s refusal to submit to a background check was inappropriate. Defendant argues that this Court in Mitchell I held that defendant’s failure to provide Smith’s background information could not be considered. Defendant again mischaracterizes this Court’s opinion. Although this Court determined that the trial court had failed to follow the proper steps before modifying the custody arrangement, it specifically did not make any decision regarding the legality of the
Lastly, defendant argues that the trial judge should be disqualified from hearing further matters on this case because he showed indignation toward defendant and this Court’s rulings. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings on a motion to disqualify for an abuse of discretion and reviews de novo the trial court’s application of the facts to the law. Olson v Olson,
Defendant has not indicated any other basis to find that the trial judge is biased or otherwise partial. A party cannot simply assert an error or announce a position and then leave it to this Court to “discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Mitcham v Detroit,
We affirm.