3 Ga. App. 542 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1908
The Henry Vogt Machine Company brought suit in the city court of Americus against Thomas E. Mitchell, on five promissory notes for the principal sum of $8,000, besides interest. The defendant filed his answer setting up that the notes sued upon were made by him as a part of a contract in writing entered into between him and the plaintiff, and that there was a breach of this prior contract on the part of the plaintiff, in that the plaintiff had agreed in said contract to obtain from the Central of ■Georgia Kailway Company certain leases referred to in the contract; and he sought to set up and recoup his damages resulting from the alleged breach, which he claimed to be the value of the leases, and also the expenses which he had incurred in performing his part of the contract.- The plaintiff demurred to this answer, -on the grounds, that the notes sued upon were unconditional contracts in writing, complete in themselves and making no refer-ence to this prior contract, and that the prior contract was between different parties from the parties to the notes sued on, and was an effort to vary the terms of said notes; and further, that the items of expenses set out in the answer showed on their face that they were not incurred by the defendant in compljdng with the contract, but were expenses incurred by him in the conduct of his business. The court overruled the demurrer, and, by agreement, heard the case without the intervention of a jury. After hearing all the evidence, and before the argument, the court re■quired the defendant to elect whether he would seek to recoup, as damages for the breach of the contract, the value of the leases, or - damages in the nature of expenses sustained by him arising out of
A narrative statement of the evidence is necessary to a clear understanding of the controlling questions in the case. The Henry Vogt Machine Company had sold to one E. D. Ansley an ice-machine plant. This ice-machine plant was located by Ansley on certain real estate in Americas, Georgia, which was owned by the-Central of Georgia Railway Company, and which he had leased from the railway, company for a period of twenty years, with an option of twenty years more. Ansley failed to pay the machine-company for the ice plant, and there was litigation pending be
1. The court did not err in compelling the defendant to elect between the two classes 'of damages resulting from the breach of the contract by the plaintiff in the failure to obtain the leases from the Central of Georgia Railway Company. It would be unjust to allow him, as damages for this breach, the value of the leases, and also expenses incurred on account of the. breach. Either class of damages would be proper, but to allow both would be to allow
The defendant having elected to recover the expenses sustained by him on account of the alleged breach, he could only recover such damages as were the natural and proximate consequence of the breach, and such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract. Civil Code, §3799; Georgia Railroad v. Hayden, 71 Ga. 518 (51 Am. R. 274), and many other decisions of the Supreme Court, following the rule announced in the leading English case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341-343. The defendant could only recover the necessary expenses incurred by him in complying with the contract. He could not recover for the expenses incident to the conduct of his business; such, for example, as the cost of additions or repairs to the ice plant, or the cost of operating il. Civil Code, §3806; Anderson v. Hilton & Dodge Co., 121 Ga. 691 (49 S. E. 725). The practical question is, what damages resulted to Mitchell from the failure to get the leases from the Central of Georgia Bailway Company? He testified, that the water supply of the ice plant was located about 500 feet from the plant, and, to get to this water, a pipe line would have to be laid on the land of the Central of Georgia Companjr which was included in the leases made to Ansley by the railway company, which the plaintiff had agreed to obtain for him; that the company refused to allow him to lay his pipe under its land, and he was compelled to make other arrangements for his supply of water. The expenses incurred in making the arrangements wrere property allowed by the court.
The evidence did not show any other expense directly traceable to the breach of the contract in failing to get the leases to the land on which the ice plant was located. The railway company did not interfere with the operation of the ice plant by the defendant, except as to the matter of laying the pipe, above mentioned. The evidence showed that while the plaintiff failed to get a twenty-year lease, as it had agreed to do, it did obtain a five-year lease from the railway company, and offered to transfer
Several errors are assigned on the ruling excluding testimony .as to the value of the leases. There was no error in excluding such evidence; for, after the defendant had elected to recover as damages his expenses, the value of the leases was not pertinent or relevant. Other items of expense, such as the difference in the ice actually manufactured and that which could have been manufactured but for the refusal of the railway company to permit the defendant to lay the pipe line as above mentioned, and the cost of erecting a pump-house for the engine and pump to supply water, were not proved.
2. It is insisted that the court rendered a judgment for a principal amount in excess of the principal amount sued for. The amount of the principal sued for was $8,000, and the judgment is for $8,024.51. An analysis of the judgment shows that the court, after deducting the amount of damages which he allowed the defendant from the principal amount sued for, calculated the interest on this balance at six per cent, to date of the judgment, and rendered his judgment for a lump sum including both principal and interest. This was an immaterial lapsus, and is easily remedied by affirming the judgment with direction that the court amend the judgment by separating principal from interest.
3. We have carefully considered all other assignments of error in the motion for new trial, and we think none are of material merit, and the .refusal to grant a new trial was right.
Judgment, on the main bill of exceptions, affirmed. Cross-bill >of exceptions dismissed.