Opinion op the Court by
Reversing.
Appellee defeated claim made by - appellant for $1,500.00, that being the amount of a check which appellant charged appellee had misappropriated. G-. L. Campbell was one of appellee’s directors and was a very active real estate аgent. Appellant formerly owned a piece of property in Hopkinsville, and had placed it in the hands of Campbell for sale. Campbell sold it to one B. S. Ezell and wife, in payment for which a note for $500.00 was executed payable to Mitchell and a check was given, which, with the endorsеments thereon, is as follows:
“Hopkinsville, Ky., Jan’v 7th, 1921. No.............
73-68 Planters’ Bank & Trust Company 73-68
Pay to.........Gr. L. Campbell, Agt.......or bearer $1,500.00
Fifteen hundred & .....................................................................Dollars
For part payment on house
12th street. B. S. Ezell.”
On January 7, 1921, Gr. L. Campbell having endorsed this check, “Gr. L. Campbell, Agt.,” delivered it and his individual passbook to the First National Bank of Hopkinsville, and it placed this check to his individual» credit. On the following day the appellee presented this check to the Planters ’ Bank & Trust Co., and it was paid. At the time appellee received this check, the individual account of G. L. Campbell was $337.4.3 ovеrdrawn. Campbell began checking at once on this account and at the close of business on January 10 was again overdrawn $22.42, notwithstanding the fact that on the 10th he made a. deposit of $554.70. He continued checking, and before breakfast on January 12th committed suicide. At the time he did so, his individual account was $258.12 overdrawn.
“The fact that the instrument on its face is made payable to a person in his fiduciary capacity is notice thаt the payee is acting in such capacity and that he can only give title or deal with such instrument for the benefit of the person whom he represents.” Eaton & Gilbert on Commercial Paper 370.
“Agt.” in this check was notice to appellee that possibly this money was impressed with a trust and the bank should have inquired as to the nature thеreof. Many cases can be cited supporting this doctrine. In Taylor v. Harris’ Admr.,
“The entry of the check to the personal credit of the guardian, by the bank, was a conversion of the fund by both. • Upon the making of such entry, the bank became the trustee of the fund and became liable therefor, and could be saved from being compelled to account to the wards therefor, only upon the guardian’s subsequent true' administration thereof, and accounting therefor. ’ ’
The case of Farmers’ & Traders’ Bank of Shelbyville v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland,
Appellee stoutly insists that the expression “agt.” was only descriptio personae, and that might be true of some such expressions as we frequently use, e. g., “Dr. Smith,” “Rev. Jones,” “Judge Campbell,” “Esquire Brown,” but it would be rather unusual to see those or other men referred to as “Agent Smith,” “Guardian Jones,” “Trustee Campbell,” or “Executor Brown.”
In Keeney v. Bank of Italy,
In Third National Bank v. Lange,
In Davis v. Henderson,
In the case of Bank of Hickory v. McPherson,
In Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 156 N. Y. S. 563, it was held “that the bank was charged with knowledge that the executor hаd no authority to use the funds- of the estate for his personal benefit by reason of the form , of the checks, for they .put the* bank on notice and such matters could have been discovered by-reasonable inquiry so the defendant bank is liable to the estate for the amount of the proceeds of cheeks deposited with it.”
“In Shaw v. Spencer,
Onе who has reasonable grounds for suspecting or inquiring ought to suspect and ought to inquire and the law charges him with the knowledge which th§ proper inquiry would havе disclosed. If a person has knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and prudent man, using - ordinary care and thoughtfulness, to make further inquiry, and he fаils to do so, he is chargeable with the knowledge which by ordinary diligence he would have acquired.
The appellee knew that Campbell was misappropriating this money. It participated in the misappropriation and as a result thereof it is responsible therefor. Doubtlessly, appellant owed Campbell something for his services in effecting this sale. It is not very clear from the record just what this was. Campbell made this memorandum on аn envelop' containing the Ezell note: “I owe Mitchell $1,500.00 less $100.00 comr. the within notes is his. Gk L. C.”
The appellee should have credit upon this $1,500.00 for any sum that Mitchell may owe Campbell, and should be required to account for the remainder.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
