Mitchell v. Degrand

17 F. Cas. 494 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts | 1817

STORY, Circuit Justice.

This is an action on a bill of exchange, brought by the payee against the drawer. The bill was payable five days after sight; and was presented at the counting-room of the drawee for acceptance on the 30th of September. No acceptance was then made, the drawee being absent on military duty, and his clerk expressing only an opinion, that it would be accepted by the drawee. I do not say, that under these circumstances the holder was bound to treat what passed between him and the clerk, as a non-acceptance of the bill. On the contrary he might properly have waited until the next day, as a reasonable time to ascertain the intention's of the drawee, and such delay could not have been deemed laches on his part. But he elected to consider the bill as dishonored on the *49630th of September, and protested it accordingly for non-acceptance. And the question now is, whether, as to all the other parties to the bill, he is not bound by that act; and I am very clear that he is. When a bill is once dishonored, the holder is bound to give notice, by the next practicable mail, to the parties, whom he means to charge for the default. Lenox v. Roberts, 2Wheat. [15 U.S.] 377. By the legal construction of the contract they have a right to such notice, and the omission to give it, with due and seasonable diligence, discharges them from every legal liability upon the bill. No such notice was given in this case, and therefore the drawee was absolved from all liability. But it is said that on the 1st of October, and before the mail for Boston was closed on that day, the drawee accepted the bill, and thereby notice became unnecessary. Assuming that the evidence in this case clearly shows an acceptance, still in my judgment it does not change the previous legal predicament of the parties. When once a bill is dishonored, the right of the other parties to notice immediately and absolutely attaches, and no subsequent acts between the holder and drawee can vary that right. Whatever is afterwards done by the holder is at his own peril, and cannot change the responsibility of others. A holder cannot elect to treat a bill as dishonored, and afterwards as duly honored. The consequences of such a doctrine would be the most mischievous to the commercial world; and I have no difficulty in holding it not to be law.. ■ ...

NOTE. Upon examination 'it will be found that Beawes does not assert the position contended for. His language is, “If bills are made payable at some days after sight, their acceptance is dated on the day they are presented, and from thence the days of their running are counted.” ■ Beawes, Bills Exch. (Ed. • 1795) p. 455, § 252. This language is not free from all ambiguity; but its true meaning seems to be, that the acceptance is the time, from which the running of the days of a bill, payable at so many days after sight, is to be computed, which is in effect the same as the doctrine of Marius. The doctrine of Marius is recognised in Chit. Bills, pp. 195. 277; Com. Dig. “Merchant,” F. 7. Campbell v. French, 6 Term R. -200, 212: Poth. de Change, pt. 1, c. 1, § 2. art. 13; Code de Comm. lib. 1, tit. 8, art 131. See, also, Bay-ley, Bills, 53.

But supposing this point were doubtful, there is another, which is decisive against the plaintiff. The acceptance, if any, was certainly not made before the 1st day of October; and upon that supposition the bill being payable five days after sight, was payable on the ninth and not on the eighth day of October; payment was therefore demanded a day before the bill became due. To avoid this conclusion, it is argued, that the acceptance may be considered as relating back to the 30th of September, when tne bill was first presented. But neither of these grounds can be maintained. The doctrine of relation cannot apply to cases of this nature. The acceptance or non-acceptance of a bill is a single act, taking effect from the time when done, and having no retroactive operation. How can it be possible to say, that this bill was accepted on the 30th of September, When the party has expressly protested it for non-acceptance on .that day? There is as little foundation for the other suggestion. A bill, payable in so many days after sight, means after so many days legal sight. Now, it is not merely the fact of having seen the bill, or known of its existence, that constitutes a presentment to the drawee in legal contemplation. It must be presented to him for acceptance, and the time of the bill begins to run, not from the mere presentment, but from the presentment and acceptance'. If the acceptance be general, it is in legal construction an agreement to pay in so many days after the acceptance, for that is the sight, which the drawee admits and refers to. A different doctrine is supposed by Mr. Justice Bayley (Bayley, Bills, 67. But see Id. 53) to be asserted by Beawes (1 Beawes, Bills Exch., Ed. Svo. 1795, p. 455, § 252); and if it be so (which is not admitted), I should not incline to uphold his authority against that of Marius (Marius, Bills, 19), who holds the doctrine I have asserted, and which I think stands sustained upon principle, as well as authority.

Plaintiff non-suited.