291 S.W. 1099 | Tex. Comm'n App. | 1927
This suit was filed in the district court of Potter county by the defendant in error, Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, whose office and place of "business is in Potter county, against the plaintiff in error, Joe Mitchell, who resides in Castro county, to recover on two series of promissory notes executed by the latter, and for foreclosure of certain chattel- mortgages securing the payment of same. The plaintiff in error interposed a plea in abatement of the suit on the ground that two prior suits brought by him against the defendant in error seeking to cancel said two series of notes and the chattel mortgages securing same were pending in the district court of Castro county. Each of said promissory notes, according to its terms, was payable in Amarillo, Potter county, Tex., and all had matured and ré-mained unpaid. In answer to said plea in abatement the defendant in error set up the fraud of plaintiff in error hereinafter described, and prayed for general relief. The trial court, upon hearing .the plea and answer thereto and the evidence, sustained the plea in abatement and ordered the case dismissed. The undisputed evidence shows, and the Court of Civil Appeals has found substantially, the following facts:
The notes in controversy were placed-by the defendant in error in the hands of its attorney for the purpose of bringing suit thereon. The attorney, on July 27, 1925, had
The fact that a prior suit is pending in another jurisdiction when a second suit involving the same parties and subject-matter is brought does not automatically deprive the court of jurisdiction of the second suit. Unless the pendency of the suit first filed is set up in the second suit by proper pleading, the abatement of the second suit is waived. Cleveland v. Ward (Tex. Sup.) 285 S. W. 1071, and authorities there cited. We think that, as a corollary of the rule that a party may waive the abatement of the second suit, he may become estopped from urging its abatement, if sufficient grounds are shown upon which to base an estoppel.
If a proposed plaintiff contemplates bringing suit immediately in a given court in which he has the right to bring it, and the proposed defendant, knowing of such intention of the proposed plaintiff, fraudulently induces him- to postpone the filing of his suit —the proposed defendant purposing at the time to take advantage of the delay thus .fraudulently obtained to forestall the plaintiff’s contemplated suit by another suit in different county — the plainest principles of equity and fair dealing require that such defendant be estopped from asserting, as ground for abatement, the pendency of the suit so filed by him in consummation, of. his fraud. In such a case, when the proposed plaintiff files his suit in the court in which he so contemplated bringing it, such court takes and holds the dominant jurisdiction over the parties and subject-matter of the suit, for the reason the defendant will not be permitted to defraud the plaintiff of the benefits of the full and unhampered jurisdiction of that court which, in good conscience, he is entitled to enjoy.
In the instant suit the notes held by the Allis-Chal'mers Company were payable in Potter county. In the absence of the pend-ency of a prior suit involving the same parties and subject-matter, instituted by the defendant, Mitchell, in another jurisdiction without deceit having, been practiced on the company for the purpose of defeating such right, the said company had the right to bring its suit on the notes in the district court of Potter county. The defendant, Mitchell, undertook to defraud the company of this right in the manner shown. He should not be permitted to avail himself of the fruits of his fraud.
We recommend that the judgment of ‘the Court of Civil Appeals, reversing the judgment of the trial court and remanding the cause, be affirmed.