In еarly 1987, appellant Michael Mitcham established an account at Atlanta Securities & Investments (ASI) and invested $46,000 through ASI and broker Jones. Jones bought and sold high-risk securities without Mitcham’s authorization and made false statements to Mitcham when questioned about the activity on Mitcham’s account. When Mitcham sought to close the account in August 1989, the broker admitted that all Mitcham’s money had been lost. After he was unsuccessful in his attempts to resolve the problems with ASI’s management, Mitcham hired present counsel and filed an arbitration claim with the National Association of Securitiеs Dealers (NASD) in July 1990. The three arbitrators found ASI and Jones jointly and severally liable to Mitcham on his claims and awarded him $60,000. Appellees Blalock, Bradley, and Ringo (corporate officers or directors of ASI) were named as respondents in the arbitration matter, but they were dismissed by the arbitrators as defendants due to lack of notice. 1 The award against ASI and Jones was confirmed by the State Court of Fulton County.
In September 1991, Mitcham filed a complaint in the Superior Court of DeKalb County against Ingram and the three individuals who had been dismissed from the arbitration proceeding, Blalоck, Bradley, and Ringo. Summary judgment was awarded the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
Mitcham v. Blalock,
Eight days after Mitcham filed his notice of appeal from the trial court’s grant of the injunction to appellees, appellee Blalock filed a motion under OCGA § 9-15-14 for assessment of attorney fees against Mitcham and his counsel. After the main appeal was docketed in this Court, the trial court granted the motion pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of
1. We address first the main appeal, and our initial inquiry is whether the trial court had the power to enjoin arbitration proceedings. The Georgia Constitutiоn authorizes a court to exercise “such powers as necessary ... to protect or effectuate its judgments. . . .” (1983 Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. IV), and OCGA § 15-6-8 gives a superior court judge the authority to grant writs оf injunction. We conclude that the trial court was empowered to protect the judgment it had entered in Mitcham’s lawsuit against appellees by enjoining an arbitration proceeding оn the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
2. Res judicata is statutorily defined as follows:
A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside.
“Finality is the goal and the essence of the dоctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment. Both doctrines generally prevent an unsuccessful litigant from attempting to re-litigate issues previously litigated by a court of competent jurisdiction.”
Jim West Housemovers v. Cobb County,
3. In the counts of the NASD arbitration “Statement of Claim” against appellees which were enjoinеd by the trial court, Mitcham alleged:
(1) that the appellees were jointly and severally liable to him for the amount of the NASD arbitration award against ASI and Jones since each appеllee had the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of ASI and Jones, and that each appellee had been stubbornly litigious in refusing to рay the award;
(3) that each appellee was a controlling person of Jones, as that term is used in OCGA § 10-5-14 (c), making each liable for Jones’s acts. Each appellee was alsо alleged to have been a control person over ASI who breached his duty to Mitcham by failing to supervise ASI employees;
(4) that appellees had neglected their obligations tо monitor and supervise Mitcham’s account and ASI employees, and violated NASD’s Rule of Fair Practice; and
(5) that appellees had breached their fiduciary duties to Mitcham, imposеd by the Rules of Fair Practice, by reason of appellees’ relationship with Mitcham.
The first count mirrored the first count of the 1991 complaint filed in the superior court; the third and fourth counts werе embodied in the seventh and eighth counts of the 1991 complaint; and the fifth count was raised in the seventh and tenth counts of the complaint. The trial court did not err when it grounded the grant of the motion fоr injunctive relief on the principles of res judicata.
4. In S97A1656, Mitcham seeks reversal of the trial court’s order finding him and his attorney jointly and severally liable to Blalock under OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) and (b) for $4,242.74 in attorney fеes and expenses of litigation.
Although OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (10) requires that an appeal of an award of attorney fees made pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14 be preceded by the grant of a discretionary apрlication, a direct appeal is
permitted “when it is appealed as part of a judgment that is directly appealable.”
Haggard v. Bd. of Regents,
5. Blalock sought the § 9-15-14 assessment due to Mitcham’s opposition to Blalock’s motion to enjoin the NASD arbitration proceedings, an action Blalock wаs forced to take when Mitcham declined to agree that the injunction procured by Blalock’s co-defendant, Ingram, was applicable to Blalock and the other co-defеndants. A letter sent by Blalock’s counsel to Mitcham’s counsel two weeks after Blalock filed the motion for injunctive relief warned that an assessment would be sought under § 9-15-14 should Mitcham require Blalock to continue to pursue separate injunctive relief. At the hearing on the § 9-15-14 motion, the trial court recalled the court’s six-year history with Mitcham’s litigation against appellees and agreed with Blalock that the injunction issued at his request “was virtually identical” to the previous order entered at co-defendant Ingram’s request. Stating that the court had “the entire history and flavor of the litigаtion,” the trial court found that “the litigation was vexatious and for the purpose of harassment” and awarded the requested attorney fees and expenses. Blalock’s counsel testified thаt the amount sought constituted the expenses incurred with respect to seeking and obtaining the injunction.
3
To the extent the trial court’s award was based on § 9-15-14 (a), it must be sustained if there is any evidence to support it.
Haggard v. Bd. of Regents,
supra,
Judgments affirmed.
Notes
In a separate procеeding, the District Business Conduct Committee of NASD imposed sanctions upon ASI, Blalock, Bradley, and Ringo, with the three individuals being censured, $10,000 fines assessed against Bradley and Ringo, and a $110,000 fine assessed against Blalock. Blalock was barred from further association with any NASD member, and Bradley and Ringo were barred from association with a NASD member as a general securities principal.
Mitcham’s eаrlier appeal from the grant of the injunction to Ingram was dismissed by this Court because the Notice of Appeal was not filed within 30 days of the entry of the injunction. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). Mitcham v. Blalock, S96A0822, decided March 1, 1996.
A small portion of the expеnses submitted to the trial court resulted from Blalock’s efforts to obtain an injunction from the NASD arbitration panel. These expenses were incurred as a result of Mitcham’s refusal to recognize that the Ingram injunction was also appropriate to Blalock.