1 Ga. App. 446 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1907
Lead Opinion
We will first consider the motion of the defendant in error to dismiss the writ of error. The motion is predicated upon the following grounds: “1st. That on the 30th day of April, 1906, the Missouri State Life Insurance Company, the plaintiff in ■error in the above-stated case, filed its petition-against this defendant in error in the superior court of Fulton County. A copy of said petition is hereto attached and marked ‘Exhibit A/ and is made part of this motion. 2nd. That since the date of suing out the Merit of error in the above-stated ease by said company, the said case of the said company against this movant came on to be heard in the said superior court of Fulton County, and that the same was heard on a general demurrer made by movant to the said petition, on the 14th day of September, 1906, and during the September term, 1906, of said superior court, on which day this movant avers the court made and entered the following judgment therein, to wit: ‘The general demurrer in this case coming on to be heard, it is ordered that the same be sustained and plaintiff’s bill is dismissed. September 14, 1906. J. T. Pendleton, J. S. C. A. C.’ 3d. This movant avers that every contention which was made by
If we were to consult our own ease we would cheerfully avoid the voluminous record in this case by sustaining the motion to-dismiss the writ of error; and estoppels by judgment are favored.
“In Lampen v. Corke, Holroyd, J., says that estoppels are-odious in the law (7 Eng. S. L. E. 209). It is often so said, and truly said, of estoppels by recitals in deeds, admissions in pleadings, and all of that class. They are not to be readily allowed. Estoppels by judgment are, however, not odious. They are to be received with as much favor as any other defense; because it is the interest of the commonwealth that litigation should cease.” Evans v. Birge, 11 Ga. 265. On the other hand, “matters which have received a judicial determination can not be called again into controversy;” and this “applies with full force, not only in the same jurisdiction, but also as between courts of law and equity.” Pollock v. Gilbert, 16 Ga. 402. In Evans v. Birge, supra, Judge Nisbet delivered the opinion and announced the following rule of decision as to the plea of res adjudicata, and established its limita
Applying Judge Nisbet’s rule to the judgment of the judge of the superior court dismissing the equitable petition, as well as to the record in that case, we can not dismiss the writ of error on the ground of former adjudication, or hold that that judgment, although unexcepted to, is a bar to the right of the plaintiff in error to prosecute its writ of error in this court. The suit which was brought in the city court, of Atlanta was an action upon a contract, to which the insurance company filed substantially four defenses: (1) that the insured had made certain false representations in his application, which avoided the policy; (2) that the insured committed suicide, which should reduce the amount of the recovery; (3) that the insured became intemperate, and that this caused his death, and, by the terms of the contract, avoided the policy; (4)- that the policy never became effective, because the premium was not paid. The suit filed in the superior court for equitable relief by the company sought (1) to enjoin Mrs. Lovelace from- prosecuting the case in the city court, (2) to cancel the contract of insurance upon the life of her husband, upon various grounds, and ,(3) to have the superior court take jurisdiction of the entire cause in equity and, by appropriate decree, establish the rights of the insurance company in the premises. While there are many statements in the company’s petition in the superior court which are
Mrs. Lovelace sued the defendant company for $2,000 principal, $200 damages, and $500 attorney’s fees, on a policy of life-insurance, issued in June, 1904, on the life of Edwin Lovelace, her husband, and in which she was named the beneficiary. One of the stipulations of the policy was in these words: “This contract‘shall be governed by and construed according to the laws of Missouri; the place of this contract being expressly agreed to be the home
We are clearly of the opinion that when the general demurrer was overruled, and this judgment was not excepted to during the term at which it was rendered, the petition became the law of the case so far as the defendant was concerned. Sims v. Georgia Ry. & Electric Co., 123 Ga. 643 to 645, and cases therein cited. If we are right in this, the subsequent demurrer offered by the company could not be considered by the court below, because in conflict with its prior ruling. Section 8012 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, which was a ground of the second demurrer, was pleaded in the original petition and passed upon in overruling the first demurrer. As to the ground that there was a joinder of suit upon 'the contract of insurance with suit upon an alleged tort, we think it was property overruled by the court. The ground that the court had no 'jurisdiction to enforce the penalty of another State will come more property under what we shall have to say further on, with reference to the application of the laws of Missouri to the case as a whole. Suffice it to say here that the law of Missouri was the selection of the coifipany itself, and will be enforced, unless in conflict with our law or our public policy.
Much stress is laid by learned counsel for the company on the fact that certain of the Missouri statutes use the term “citizens of this State,” and it is contended that by reason of these words the benefits which would accrue to the plaintiff in this case were she a citizen of Missouri are denied to her, because she is a citizen of Georgia. From the place assigned these sections in the Revised Statutes of Missouri it is evident to our minds that, these words are used merely because it would naturally be presumed that generally the persons to be affected by the provision of the Missouri statutes would be citizens of Missouri; and as the plaintiff is forced, by the very contract prepared and proposed by the company, to have the contract construed and her rights adjudicated by the laws of Missouri, it is apparent that the words “citizens of this State”
We do not see either that the demurrer, which had at a former term been overruled, could be renewed at a subsequent term; or that it can be justly claimed that the plaintiff’s petition set forth two causes of action merely because the plaintiff offered an amend
We come next to the amended grounds of the motion for a new trial, which relate to the method of proving.the laws of Missouri. It is settled that where either party claims a benefit under a foreign law, the statute must be pleaded; and vof course, where the laws of a foreign State are specially pleaded, they must, as any other material matter, be proved. Champion v. Wilson, supra. But according to prior decisions of our courts, there is no inexorable rule which demands a certain kind of proof or prescribes the exact quantum of proof required to satisfy the trial court as to the authenticity of the statutes of one of our sister States. The court’s own' knowledge may give testimony and supply the proper verification of the law. “The courts, on the trial of a cause, may proceed on their knowledge of the laws of another State, and it is not necessary, in that case, to prove them; and their judgment will not be reversed, when they proceed on such knowledge, unless it should appear that they decided wrong as to those laws.” Herschfeld v. Dexel, 12 Ga. 582. Three methods of proof have been recognized. One is by proof of witnesses, testifiying as to their familiarity with the law in reference to a certain subject. A second method is by certified copy of the statute in question. And the third method of proof is, we think, clearly authorized by the code; which is judicial recognition. Civil Code, §5231. An instance of the first appears in Chattanooga, Rome & C. R. Co. v. Jackson, 86 Ga. 681, where the Supreme Court approved proof by attorneys, who testified as to the law of Tennessee (as Latham did
The method of proving the laws of other States by copy thereof, “under the great seal of their respective States,” is provided for by the Civil Code, §5233; but this mode of proof-is not, as has sometimes been supposed, exclusive of every other means. That the court may consider the law as proven, by judicial recognition of its terms and provisions, is shown in Massachusetts Benefit Life Association v. Hale, 96 Ga. 802, where it was decided that
The policy of insurance prepared by the company named the situs in which it preferred its right to be administered, and made the State of Missouri "the place of the contract. Having made-choice, it is bound by its selection, and estopped to vary or retract its own contract from its written provisions. The policy, in its concluding paragraph, says, “This contract shall be governed by and construed according to the laws of Missouri; the place of this, contract being expressly agreed to be the home office of the company.” All contracts of insurance are to be construed most
The plaintiff in error excepted pendente lite to the allowance of certain amendments, for reasons given in its demurrer, and error is assigned thereon in the bill of exceptions. We think the court was right in overruling the demurrers and allowing the amend
In reference to the plea of suicide, the statute (Eevised Statutes of Missouri, §7896), voids any suicide provision in policies of life-insurance. But it was insisted that the provision' in this case is not in the nature of a defense to the action, but simply provides for an apportionment of the loss in case of suicide; simply reducing the amount to be recovered, without defeating recovery itself. This same question has been decided by the Court of Appeals of Missouri, passing upon a provision identical with the contents
The plaintiff in error urges that the clause of the policy invoked in this answer is a mere contractual limitation of the amount of the recovery to be had, and not a defense. Under the above-quoted decision of the Court of Appeals of Missouri, we can not agree with this contention. “The plain purpose of the statute-quoted above was to prevent the insertion in policies of life-insurance of exceptions of liability on the ground of the suicide of the insured, unless it could be proven ‘that the insured contemplated suicide at the time he made the application for the policy.’ This was in effect a legislative declaration of the public policy” of Missouri, the State which the company itself selected as the place of contract. In the Keller case, above cited, the Court of Appeals of Missouri says: “That it was intended to limit the power to contract for a lesser liability in cases of death by suicide, not within the limitation expressed in the statute, is also apparent from its terms, to wit: ‘and any stipulation to the contrary shall be void/
For the same reasons as heretofore stated, we think that the ■question of attorney’s fees and damages should also be determined by the laws of Missouri. As Chief Justice Jackson said in the case of Champion v. Wilson, supra, the court was pro hac vice sitting in Missouri, and the finding of the jury is in accordance with that law, which the Supreme Court of the United States has held to be constitutional and valid. “It was for the legislature . . to ■define the public policy of that State in respect of life-insurance, •and to imppse such conditions on the transaction of business by .life-insurance companies within the State as was deemed best. We ■do not see any arbitrary classification or unlawful discrimination in this legislation, but, at all events, we can not say that the Federal constitution has been violated in the exercise, in this regard, by the State of its undoubted power over corporations.” Hancock Insurance Co. v. Warren, 181 U. S. 73. The reasoning in Rail-way Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150-153, 154, says the court, in Fidelity Mutual Life Association v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 326, does not apply to life-insurance companies. “The ground for placing life ■and health companies in a different class from fire, marine and inland companies is obvious, and we think that putting them in a different class . . rests on sufficient reason. The legislature evidently intended to distinguish between life and health insurance ■companies engaged in business for profit, . . and lodges and associations of a mutual benefit or benevolent character, having in mind also the necessity of the prompt payment of the insurance money in very many cases in order to provide the means of living of which .the beneficiaries had 'been deprived by the death of the insured.”
We come now to the complaint with reference to the striking of defendant’s plea. If the court was right in adjudicating the case according to the laws of Missouri, it was clearly right in striking the defendant’s answer, upon the ground that it constituted no defense. The defense was based upon five propositions:
(1) That Lovelace had made false statements in his application and failed to pay his premium. Under the statute of Missouri the company could not plead the application as a part of the contract, for it was not endorsed or the substance of the application entered on
(2) The fifth paragraph of defendant’s answer denied that the premium was ever paid, and, as we said above, we think the recital of the policy that the premium had been paid estops the company to deny the receipt of the premium after the death of the insured.
(3) The sixth paragraph of the answer set up as a defense, that “one of the conditions of said alleged contract of insurance was that if within one year from the date thereof said Edwin Lovelace should become intemperate in the use of narcotic or other stimulants, any policy issued thereunder should be null and void; and this defendant alleges that the said Edwin Lovelace did become-intemperate in the use of narcotic, alcoholic, or other stimulants, and that his death was the result of narcotic, alcoholic, or other stimulants.” Counsel for plaintiff in error, in their very exhaustive brief, say, “We are at a loss to know how counsel for defendant in error ever convinced the court below that this one of the defenses was not good.” We think that under the decision in Kern v. Legion of Honor, cited above, the answer should have been accompanied by the deposit in court of the premiums received; and
(4) The seventh and eighth paragraphs of the answer were corl rectly stricken, under the laws of Missouri, — the seventh for the reason that the application was not endorsed upon the policy, and the eighth because the anti-suicide provision of the policy, as has been shown heretofore, is, under the laws of Missouri, void and of no effect. We have carefully examined all of the contentions of the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error, grouped in three heads: First, that the statute of the State of Missouri, allowing the recovery of damages and attorney’s fees, will not be enforced by . the courts of Georgia. Second, that the court erred in striking the defenses; which is assigned to be error upon three grounds: (a) that the main defenses, if proved, were good; (5) that the statutes of Missouri relative to- misrepresentations and procurement of the policy by fraud, and relative to the suicide of the insured, are confined to citizens of Missouri; and (c) that the provision in the policy sued on, relative to the matter of suicide, was not in violation of the laws of Missouri. Third, that the evidence was not sufficient to authorize the verdict allowing the plaintiff damages and attorney’s fees, because it did not show vexatious refusal on the part of the company to pay. For the reasons already heretofore stated we think the case wa^to be tried 'as if in Missouri and before a Missouri court, and that to deprive a citizen of Georgia of any rights belonging to a citizen of Missouri can not, under the constitution of the United States, be countenanced. Parties are presumed to contract with reference to the place of the contract. If it is valid there, it is valid everywhere. The lex loci contractus controls as to the nature, construction, and interpretation of the contract. The laws of one State have force in the territory of another, as long as they do not come in conflict with the power or right of that State, or violate its policy or conscience. Cox v. Adams, 2 Ga. 158. Where a contract is made in one State to be performed in another, the laws of the latter State govern as to the .validity, nature, obligation, and construction of the contract (Dunn v. Welsh, 62 Ga. 241; Herschfeld v. Dexel, 12 Ga. 584); and they will be enforced by comity, unless contrary to our statute law, our general public policy, or violative of the conscience of the State called on to give it effect. We see no reason why a new trial should be granted
Was the evidence of vexatious refusal sufficient to authorize the verdict upon the subject of damages and attorney’s fees? We think that where it appears, as it does in this case, that the defendant had no ground of defense, or at least could set up none, to the pajunent of the policy, and yet declined to pay it, and thereby imposed upon the beneficiary a burden not contemplated in the original contract with the insured, and, without establishing any good reason for delajq subjects the widow and children of the dead to the expense of collecting by law what was contracted to be paid upon proofs of death, and extensively prolongs the litigation, it would be a great hardship if this loss and expense should be deducted from the provision made by the deceased for his family. On the other hand, we think that the expense necessary to collect the policy should be paid by the company, unless it establishes some good reason for an apparently frivolous refusal to pay promptly. In other words, the burden of proof, where unusual and unnecessary delay is shown, should be upon the company, to give reason for the delay; or, after the delay is shown, it will be presumed to be vexatious, as in this case, or in bad faith, if under our Georgia statute. It must appear, from the evidence in this case, that the refusal or the neglect to pay was frivolous. The purpose of the law is to force prompt payment of such losses, after the lapse of a reasonable time, to enable the compan}'- to ascertain good grounds, if any, for not meeting the demand, and if no such cause existed for the; refusal of compliance with the demand and it refuses to respond, the company does so subject to the further claim for damages. Cotton States Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 74 Ga. 231. The meaning of the term “bad faith” is “any frivolous or unfounded refusal in law or in fact to comply with the requisition of the policy-holder to pay according to the terms of his contract and the conditions imposed by the statute.” We can hardly
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially. I can not agree with all the reasoning by which my brethren of this court arrive at the result in this case; indeed 'it is only with hesitation that I am able to concur at all. It does seem, however, that if the insurance statutes of Missouri are to be read into the contract of insurance as a part thereof, these laws, as construed by the decisions of the courts of review in that State, authorize an affirmance of the judgment. The difficulty is that these statutes do not on their face purport to include the plaintiff within their purview. By express language they are applicable only to policies of insurance written upon the lives of citizens of Missouri; and it is presumed that as to policies of insurance not written upon lives of its own citizens, the common law still prevails in that State. But I have finally come to the conclusion that since policies of insurance are to be most strongly construed against the insurer, the language of the policy, wherein it contracts that the rights of the parties thereunder shall be determined in accordance with the laws of Missouri, contemplates these statutes, and not the common law merely; in other words, that the policy contracted to give to Lovelace the same rights which he would have if he were a citizen of Missouri. In this view of the question I am able to concur in the judgment.