In
Sampson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,
The instant case arises from the attempt of Missouri Pacific, pursuant to rule 52.11 and § 507.080, RSMo 1969, to bring Whitehead & Kales Company, Inc., the manufacturer and installer of the auto rack, into the Sampson case as a third party defendant liable to Missouri Pacific for all or a part of the plaintiff’s claim against Missouri Pacific.
Missouri Pacific alleged that Whitehead & Kales was the designer, manufacturer, seller and installer of the auto rack and knew that workmen would be working on the third deck in loading automobiles; that Whitehead & Kales warranted the auto rack was merchantable and fit for the purposes of loading and transporting automobiles by rail and was not defective in design or inherently dangerous for the uses intended; that Whitehead & Kales negligently designed and manufactured the auto rack by reason of the omission of a portion of a foot rail on the third deck and failed to warn Missouri Pacific or Sampson of this dangerous condition; that Missouri Pacific had notified Whitehead & Kales of the pendency, and tendered the defense, of the Sampson lawsuit, and that if Sampson recovered from Missouri Pacific it would be by virtue of Whitehead & Kales’ original, active, and primary negligence in the above respects. 1
The trial court dismissed Missouri Pacific’s third party petition and denied leave to file an amended petition, taking the posi *468 tion the parties were both “in pari delicto, where no legal right of contribution exists among those who are not joint judgment tortfeasors, and where no ground or legal basis for indemnity is stated.”
The court of appeals, Kansas City district, affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding that Missouri Pacific’s alleged failure to warn Sampson constituted active negligence and that it was in
pari delicto
with Whitehead & Kales, preventing any indemnification, citing
Crouch v. Tourtelot,
I.
A few preliminary observations are necessary.
It should be borne in mind that the right to non-contractual indemnity presupposes actionable negligence of both parties toward a third party.
Donald
v.
Home Service Oil Co.,
While Missouri Pacific is asking, on the face of its third-party petition, for full reimbursement or indemnity from Whitehead & Kales, in actuality it is doing so on the basis that while both are to blame, its fault is relatively less than that of Whitehead & Kales. If Missouri Pacific had not been found guilty of some fault on the Sampson claim, this case would not be before us.
Donald v. Home Service Oil Co.,
The third party rule under which Missouri Pacific is proceeding which stems from the statute passed in 1943 as explained below, expressly provides for bringing in a party who is or may be liable to the defendant “for all or part” of the claim being made against the defendant (emphasis supplied). This language does not limit the defendant to an “all or nothing” claim or recovery against the person he seeks to bring in.
Rule 52.11 was first adopted by the court July 1, 1959, to be effective April 1, 1960. Prior to that, however, in 1943, the legislature had enacted an entire new civil code, Laws 1943 at 353-97. Included therein was Missouri’s first third-party practice statute, § 20, later § 507.080, RSMo 1959, wherein a defendant was permitted to bring into the lawsuit a person not a party to the action who was liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him. Thus it can be said that the legislature, as a matter of policy, decided that a third party could be brought into the case where liable to the original defendant either in whole or in part for the plaintiff’s claim against him. 3 This comports exactly with what Missouri Pacific is seeking to do in the present case.
II.
The long history of the law of joint and concurrent tortfeasor liability in our jurisprudence is in fact a rich expositional re *469 finement of the principle of fairness. 4 Early in Anglo-American law the “rule” developed that there shall be no contribution or indemnity between joint tortfeasors, 1 T. Street, The Foundation of Legal Liability 490 (1906), as “a necessary consequence of the principle embodied in the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio [out of an immoral or illegal consideration an action does not arise].” Id. The “rule” has mistakenly been attributed to Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 D. & E. 186, 101 Eng.Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799), a case in which contribution was denied as between two intentional joint tort-feasors, the court disclaiming any effect its decision may have on “cases of indemnity”, id., by which is implied “a primary or basic liability in one person, though a second person is also for some reason liable with the first or even without the first, to a third person”. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 51 U.Pa.L.Rev. 130, 146 (1932). Rather, the “rule” in Merryweather v. Nixan, supra, is the exception, the true common law rule having been determined in Battersey’s Case, Winch’s Rep. 48 (Common Pleas 1623) that “among persons jointly liable the law implies an as-sumpsit either for indemnity [described above] or contribution [shared liability] and the exception is that no assumpsit, either express or implied, will be enforced among wilfull tortfeasors or wrongdoers.” Note, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence — Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 Harv.L.Rev. 176, 177 (1898).
What is unmistakable about the common law of joint or concurrent tortfeasor liability, in whatever configuration it may be understood, is its attention to the relative weight of fault. Negligent commission of a tort was “bad” but not as “bad” as the intentional commission of a tort,
Batter-sey’s Case, supra,
to which the response of courts was to refuse to “adjust among intentional wrongdoers the damage flowing from the wrong . . [which] would aid intentional wrongdoers in avoiding the consequences of their acts.”
Leflar, supra
at 179. For those whose joint torts were not wilful, malicious, intentional, unlawful, or immoral, contribution would be allowed even though they were in
pari delicto.
Note,
supra,
12 Harv.L.Rev. at 182. These rules and maxims were developed and sustained by application of fairness and the “ethical principles involved.”
Id.
at 194. Actually, “it seems not to make much difference what formal explanation is accepted, so long as it is understood that the right to contribution is not necessarily based on a voluntary consensual transaction between the parties. The essential thing is the attempt to be fair as between persons subjected to a common legal liability.”
Leflar, supra
at 137;
See
R. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 20-31 (1921). Nonetheless, in Missouri the courts did not restrict denial of contribution or indemnity to intentional tortfeasors. The general rule has been there is no right to indemnity or contribution between concurrent or joint tort-feasors in
pari delicto,
except as provided by statute.
E. g., Union Electric Company v. Magary,
III.
Despite the early common law “rule”, we do permit indemnity to some extent' between non-contractual concurrent tort-feasors in Missouri. Indemnity is theoretically tied to the principle of fairness. It was once described by Learned Hand as “an extra form of contribution.”
Slattery v. Marra Brothers, Inc.,
The elucidation of the distinction between concurrent tortfeasors as to their relative fault has spawned a series of court-coined terms which is “bewildering, to say the least.” Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 Iowa L.Rev. 517, 536 (1952). We ourselves have criticized them as unworkable and unsatisfactory.
Donald
v.
Home Service Oil Co.,
Following
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.,
the “active-passive” test has come into general use in Missouri: e.
g., Union Electric Co. v. Magary,
But how is this all important distinction determined? An attempt to define “active” and “passive” negligence as between two tortfeasors where the plaintiff, as in the present case, had earlier obtained a judgment against one of them, was made in Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Payway Feed Mills, Inc., supra. The instruction, which was prior to MAI-Civil, was as follows:
“The jury is instructed that the terms passive or secondary negligence mean a failure or fault that is imputed because a duty is imposed based on some legal relation between the parties or because the duty involved arises from some positive rule of statutory law or because the duty imposed is neglected by reason of a failure to discover or correct a defect or to remedy a dangerous condition caused by the act of another who is primarily liable. The jury is further instructed that the terms active and primary negligence mean the act of creating a dangerous condition which under all the other facts *471 and circumstances present is likely to cause injury to others.” 5
While this “definition” instruction passed muster in pre-MAI Civil days, by current requirements it is unwieldy, complex, and replete with terms which themselves require definition before it is understandable by a jury. In addition, while it is supposed to be a definition which will enable the jury to determine which tortfeasor is primarily liable, it assumes that fact is already known because part of the definition is couched in terms of failing to discover or remedy a dangerous condition caused by the act of another “who is primarily liable.” It also assumes to be a legal “one size fits all” device. In the case before us it cannot be denied for example, that a portion of the foot rail was missing and that no one warned the injured employee, Robert Sampson. If we assume for purposes of discussion that the auto rack was dangerous as designed or manufactured by Whitehead & Kales for the use which was certain to be made of it, and if we further assume that Missouri Pacific was negligent in furnishing the auto rack as a place to work, then it can be said with equal force that both created a dangerous condition and hence that each is primarily liable as between themselves, which is a self-contradiction.
This is not a sensible way to fix responsibility in indemnity. It comes about by attempting to find a formula by which to excuse one of two joint or concurrent tort-feasors completely when as a practical matter they both are to blame, the true difference between them being only a matter of degree or relativity of fault. With a little ingenuity in phrasing, negligence can be made to be either “active” or “passive” as suits the writer. For example, “driving an automobile with bad brakes” or “running through the stop sign” or “using a defective crane” might be said to be “active” negligence, while “omitting maintenance of brake fluid level” or “neglecting to apply the brakes” or “failing to inspect the crane in order to discover its defectiveness” might be “passive” negligence — these are the same acts or omissions, but the outcome depends not upon the facts, but upon how someone chooses to characterize them.
In
Crouch v. Tourtelot,
In
Fields v.
Berry,
Our precedents give scant guidance for the avoidance of such illogical results as these.
*472
It has been said that indemnification is dependent on the “character” of the negligence rather than the difference in the degrees of negligence of the two tort-feasors,
State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Godfrey,
Negligence is negligence. There is no such thing as “good” negligence and “bad” negligence, or some kind of negligence which should be overlooked and another kind which should not. Nevertheless, our “active-passive” approach has produced awards of full indemnity in numerous Missouri cases, e.
g., Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Payway Feed Mills, Inc.,
Using the analogy of an old time-worn building, we have added and re-constructed so much of our law of joint and concurrent tortfeasor liability, the origins of which are ancient, that it has lost its architectural integrity and its structural balance. Only the foundation — the principle of fairness— remains undisturbed and sturdy. We have therefore determined that, steadfastly consistent with the dictates of our common law tradition and the principles of equity embedded therein, we are obligated to reconstruct upon the principle of fairness a law of joint and concurrent tortfeasor liability which is secure, predictable, and effective.
A principled right to indemnity should rest on relative responsibility and should be determined by the facts as applied to that issue. In a case such as we have before us, the jury should be instructed that if they find the third party defendant did certain acts or omissions and was thereby negligent and that the same directly contributed to cause the injuries and damage to the original plaintiff, then the jury should award the third party plaintiff such proportion of the total sum paid by it to plaintiff as corresponds to the degree of fault of the third party defendant. 6 The two concurrent tortfeasors should be treated according to their respective fault or responsibility.
This would present no insurmountable problem to the jury. We already differentiate verdicts among joint tortfeasors where punitive damages are involved. The jury is instructed that they may find punitive damages against several defendants in different amounts, depending upon differing degrees of culpability,
State ex rel. Hall v. Cook,
*473 Rule 71.01 defines a general verdict as “one by which the jury pronounces generally upon all or any of the issues,” so the jury’s verdict could assess damages, in accordance with the instructions, and award indemnity in an amount proportionate to the relative fault of the parties.
This could be done by ordinary third party practice such as Missouri Pacific is attempting here, or it could be done by cross-claims between codefendants.
This method of handling non-contractual indemnity will provide a clear and definite set of guidelines. It avoids deciding cases on the basis of whether conduct or noncon-duct can be characterized as active or passive. And it removes the inequity of a plaintiff being able to saddle the entire burden on one defendant while letting another equally or more culpable party go free, for whatever reason plaintiff may have.
IV.
Our contribution statute, § 537.060, RSMo 1969, originally passed December 12, 1855, Ch. 51, § 8, RSMo 1855, relaxed the common law ban on contribution in tort actions, discussed
supra.
It represented a change in public policy “to avoid the injustices flowing from adherence to the rule of no contribution.” Note, The Joint Tortfeasor in Missouri, 25 Wash.U.L.Q. 572, 573 (1940). It provides that “[djefendants in a judgment founded on an action for the redress of a private wrong shall be subject to contribution, and all other consequences of such judgment, in the same manner and to the same extent as defendants in a judgment in an action founded on contract. . . .” It is to be noted that § 537.060 is silent as to contribution between defendants other than judgment defendants. It “has no application to any proceedings prior” to judgment.
Moudy v. St. Louis Dressed Beef & Provision Co.,
We live in an economic and commercial environment vastly apart from the quiescent era of the 1850s during which our contribution statute was originally enacted. Now, for example, complex procedural tangles flow from the necessary development of a law of products liability. We no longer value the antique moralism that if we permit concurrent tortfeasors to share their burden we will thereby be encouraging them in the very joint negligence for which we hold them liable. To limit any apportionment of damages between tortfeasors to those whom the plaintiff has chosen to sue and against whom judgment is rendered is an inartful and capricious policy, relying in excess upon the whim and wrath of a plaintiff before concurrent wrongdoers can share liability.
Even now where there is a joint tort judgment, contribution does not automatically follow. The proportion to be paid remains to be determined. In
Hays-Fendler Construction Co. v. Traroloc Investment Co.,
In Hays-Fendler the court concluded that despite the joint obligation to the plaintiff, the entire burden should be borne by one of the defendants (Hays-Fendler); that the other defendant’s liability was derivative and passive while Hays-Fendler’s was primary.
Similarly, in
Kinloch Telephone Co. v. City of St. Louis,
“The . . . [contribution] statute . applies the same rule of contribution to judgments rendered in actions on torts.”
The telephone company was held to be primarily liable and hence not entitled to any contribution, despite having paid the judgment in full.
If liability between joint tortfeasors after judgment turns on indemnity principles, then there is no sound reason why this issue should not be decided by the jury prior to judgment on the basis of relative fault. To do so would not in any way be violating the contribution statute as we have applied it, nor would there be any point in further contribution proceedings between the defendants after judgment because it would not produce any different result than the apportionment already made under the rule announced herein.
V.
The principle of fairness imbedded within our law compels this adoption of a system for the distribution of joint tort liability on the basis of relative fault. 7 This would apply whether the tortfeasors were joined as defendants by the plaintiff or a third party defendant was added to a cause under our rule 52.11.
In either instance the ability of a plaintiff to sue and ultimately collect judgment against his or her choice of tortfeasor need not be impaired. Plaintiff continues free to sue one or more concurrent tort-feasors as he sees fit and nothing that transpires between them as to their relative responsibility can reduce or take away from plaintiff any part of his judgment. Concurrent or joint tortfeasors not sued by plaintiff, however, may now be brought in by third party practice for a determination in due course of their relative part of the responsibility, if such is the case, for the overall injury and damage to the plaintiff. A jury in the same or separate trial at the discretion of the trial court, § 507.040, RSMo 1969; rule 52.11(a); rule 66.02, should be charged with the responsibility for determining a relative distribution of fault and liability for the damages flowing from a tort, which damages will be, along with a finding of negligence, the predicate to apportionment. 8 The interests of plaintiffs are secure; the interests of joint or *475 concurrent tortfeasors will now be clothed in a rule based upon realism and fairness between them.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
Notes
. Missouri Pacific’s petition is susceptible of being read to include negligence, warranty, and strict liability as possible theories of recovery. Missourl Pacific is, of course, at the pleading stage, free to plead as many theories of recovery as it may consider warranted. Rule 55.10.
. By “non-contractual” indemnity we have reference to indemnity between joint tortfeasors culpably negligent, having no legal relation to each other. We do not include indemnity which comes about by reason of contracts, or by reason of vicarious liability.
. In
State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie,
. By the “principle of fairness” here we mean the promise which is derivative of economic and political freedom and personal physical mobility. That is, in exchange for the opportunity of some undertaking, we each promise all others that we will be liable for the damage which our own negligence in the undertaking has caused. This creates a shared fiduciary obligation for which the principle of fairness is a premise. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 348 (1971). This premise is the basis of our fault-based system of tort liability.
. We have found no case since the advent of MAI-Civil (January 1, 1965) wherein is set forth an instruction attempting definition of “active” and “passive” negligence in an indemnity case. This is not surprising, as MAI-Civil instructions are required to be simple and brief. Rule 70.02(e).
. The court is requesting its committee on MAI-Civil instructions to submit proposed instructions for use in non-contractual indemnity cases applying the principles set forth in this case. Members of the bar and appropriate bar committees are invited to communicate their views on the subject to the committee.
. For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view,
see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes,
. Whether or not a separate trial is required of the issues between the third party plaintiff and the third party defendant necessarily depends upon the particular case. Economy of litigation and avoidance of duplication of evidence, time, effort and expense is essential in these days of increasing demands on limited judicial resources, provided it is done without prejudice
*475
to the rights of parties.
State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co.
v.
Godfrey,
