MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY OF TEXAS V. JAMES H. HAWKINS
Texas Court of Civil Appeals
April 4, 1908
109 S.W. 221 | 50 Tex. Civ. App. 128
Affirmed.
Writ of error refused.
MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY OF TEXAS V. JAMES H. HAWKINS.
Decided April 4, 1908.
1.—Pleading—Overruling Exception—Harmless Error.
Overruling an exception to a count in a petition becomes harmless error, if error at all, when the court by its charge expressly withdraws the issues presented by such count from the consideration of the jury.
2.—Damages—Injuries to Wife—Husband May Sue—Pleading.
The husband has a right to sue for injuries to his wife. In a suit by a married man against a railroad for damages for rough handling of the corpse of his child, it is not error for the court, in the absence of exception to the petition or objection to the evidence, to authorize a recovery by the plaintiff, for mental suffering on the part of his wife, although the petition did not expressly allege that she was a party to the contract for the shipment of the corpse, or that she sustained any relation to the child. The act was a wrongful one by which she was injured, and for which a recovery could be had.
3.—Carrier—Injury to Corpse—Liability.
In a suit against a railroad company for damages for rough and negligent handling of a corpse during transportation over its road, evidence considered and held to support a verdict for $1,425.
4.—Verdict by Lot—Test Rule.
Where, during their deliberations, the jury agree that each member should name an amount, that the sum of the amounts should be divided by twelve, and the result should be the basis for reaching a verdict, and afterwards adopt such result as their verdict, the verdict is not a gambling verdict. The test in such cases is, did the jury agree beforehand to be bound by the result? If so, the verdict should be set aside; otherwise it should not.
Appeal from the District Court of Hunt County. Tried below before Hon. R. L. Porter.
Coke, Miller & Coke and John T. Craddock, for appellant.—The charge is erroneous in authorizing a recovery of damages for injuries to the feelings of appellee‘s wife, because it is not alleged in the petition, that she was in any way a party to the contract for the transportation of the corpse of the child, nor that appellant knew of her relation to the deceased, nor that it knew she sustained any
The verdict of the jury should have been set aside and a new trial granted, because the verdict, as found, was not the result of a fair and impartial deliberation of the jury, but was arrived at by lot and was a gambling verdict. 22 Enc. Pleading & Practice, p. 855-57; Hauk v. Allen, (Ind.), 11 L. R. A., 706; Dixon v. Pluns, (Cal.), 20 L. R. A., 698; Chicago & I. C. Railroad Co. v. McDaniel, 134 Ind., 166, (32 N. E., 728); Williams v. State, 15 Lea, 129, (54 Am. Rep., 404); Johnson v. Husband, 22 Kan., 277.
It is contemplated by the law that the verdict of a jury shall be the result of sound judgment, deliberate consideration and conscientious conviction. “Nothing short of a free and deliberate finding made upon a conscientious conviction of the judgment of the jurors will satisfy the law.” Merseve v. Shine, 37 Iowa, 253.
Since the passage of the Act of February 24, 1905, the evidence of the jurors themselves upon a motion for new trial is competent to impeach their verdict; and if under the evidence submitted upon such motion the misconduct proven be material it is the duty of the court to set the verdict aside.
B. Q. Evans, for appellee.
RAINEY, CHIEF JUSTICE.—This suit was brought by appellee Hawkins against the appellant railway company to recover damages for injuries to the feelings of Hawkins and wife on account of the negligent handling by the railway company of the corpse of the infant child of Hawkins and wife, which was being shipped from Caney, Indian Territory, to Scurry, Kaufman County, Texas, for the purpose of burial, and for delay in reaching Scurry at the time appointed for the burial.
The railway company answered by general and special demurrers, general denial and contributory negligence, in that the box which contained the casket had the appearance of ordinary baggage or a box containing household goods and furnished no indication that it contained a corpse, and if there was any delay in the continuation of their journey it was occasioned by the negligent act of plaintiff in placing the casket in such a box, etc. The demurrers were overruled, exceptions taken and a trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. The railway company appeals.
The evidence shows that plaintiff delivered to the railway company the corpse of his two months old infant at Caney, Indian Territory, for transportation to Scurry, Kaufman County, Texas, for the pur-
The first, second and third assignments of error complain of the action of the court in overruling special exceptions to that portion
Besides, the court gave a special charge requested by appellant, which reads: “If you should find for the plaintiff under the charges given you by the court, then you are instructed that you can not allow the plaintiff anything for the delay and postponement, if any, of the burial of the child at Scurry, in Kaufman County, and you will therefore, if you should find for the plaintiff, exclude from consideration any mental suffering of himself or wife brought about by such delay and postponement of the burial of the child at Scurry, if there was any suffering.” If there was error in overruling the demurrers as complained of, it was cured by the court giving the charges mentioned, as it will be presumed the jury obeyed the instructions of the court and did not consider the question of delay in rendering their verdict. Weaver v. Nugent, 72 Texas, 272; Turner v. Farbin, 7 Texas Ct. Rep., 443.
The fourth and fifth assignments of error complain of the charge of the court because it authorizes a recovery for injuries to the feelings of appellee‘s wife, when the petition fails to allege that she was in any way a party to the contract for the transportation of the corpse of the child, or that she sustained any relation to the child, or to the transportation of said corpse, and that her mental suffering was not in contemplation as a probable breach of said contract, or such as ought reasonably to have been foreseen and anticipated as the probable result of the injuries to the corpse.
Plaintiff alleged in his petition that he was a married man with several children; that he purchased from the ticket agent at Caney, Indian Territory, tickets for himself, two children and the corpse. That plaintiff and his wife and two children boarded one of the passenger trains on said road and became and were passengers on the defendant‘s train and entitled to transportation to Greenville. The petition also alleges the suffering and distress of himself and wife and prays damages therefor.
There was no exception to the pleading on the ground that no recovery could be had for the wife‘s suffering, nor was there any objection to the evidence in this respect. The evidence shows that the wife accompanied the plaintiff as a passenger on the ticket purchased for her by him at Caney to Greenville, and was present at the depot when the injury was done. The husband has the right to sue and recover for injuries to the wife. He was acting for her, as well as for himself, in buying the tickets and arranging for the transportation of the corpse. She was accompanying him as a passenger on their sad errand, and under the circumstances we think she sustained such relation to the transportation of the corpse
Quoting from Sutherland on Damages, p. 92: “The wrong-doer is answerable for all injurious consequences of his tortious act which, according to the usual course of events and general experience, were likely to ensue and which therefore when the act was committed he may reasonably be supposed to have foreseen and anticipated.” The suffering of the wife and mother for the injury to the corpse of her child was most natural, and when such an act is committed the law will hold that the suffering could have been foreseen and anticipated.
The court did not assume in its charge that the box was roughly handled, but left it to the jury to determine that issue from the evidence. So there is no merit in the objection to the fifth paragraph of the court‘s charge on this score.
Complaint is made of the overruling by the court of the motion for a new trial, because the verdict of the jury is excessive in amount, in that “it was shown that the infant whose corpse was being shipped was less than two months old; that it was placed in an ordinary rough pine box, bearing no indication from the outside of the box that it contained a corpse,” and defendant‘s servants were led to believe it contained ordinary household goods or baggage, etc. This matter has been passed upon by the jury, and their verdict is supported by the evidence. There is no error on this ground.
The verdict is also attacked on the ground that it was arrived at by lot and was a “gambling verdict.” There was evidence tending to show that the jury agreed to write the amount each was willing to assess, then add said amounts together, divide by twelve and the result would be their verdict, that is, that they agreed beforehand that the sum thus obtained should be their verdict. On the other hand, there was evidence tending to show that the agreement was for each to name a sum, which sums were to be added together, and the result of the division by twelve should form the basis for reaching a verdict. That afterward they finally agreed upon the sum reached by said division, but that no agreement was made before said division that said sum should be the verdict.
Affirmed.
ON REHEARING.
In our original opinion we stated that “only one juror testified” on the hearing of the motion for a new trial before the court. In this we were mistaken. Two jurors testified, but this does not change the result of the case. The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Overruled.
Writ of error refused.
