36 F. Supp. 607 | W.D. Okla. | 1941
Lead Opinion
The validity of article 2, chapter 63, Laws of Oklahoma 1937, 66 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 102, 103, is challenged on the ground that it violates the Commerce Clause, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and infringes certain acts of Congress relating to interstate commerce. The statute is entitled, “An Act to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads by compelling common carriers by railroad to limit the length of freight trains; and providing a penalty for the violation of this Act.” Section 1 forbids the operation of a freight train within the state consisting of more than seventy cars, exclusive of caboose; and, with an exception not material here, section 2 provides that each train operated in violation of the act shall constitute a separate offense, fixes a penalty of not less than $100 nor more than $500, and makes it the duty of the Attorney General to prosecute violations. The attack comes in this suit by Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company against Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, to enjoin the taking of any action to enforce or attempt to enforce the statute, or from instituting again'st plaintiff any criminal or civil action or proceeding for failure or refusal to observe, obey or comply with its provisions. A restraining order was issued; defendant answered, admitting certain allegations contained in the complaint and denying others, pleading the validity of the act, and alleging that the suit is one against the state, in violation of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and after certain postponements by agreement of the parties, the cause was submitted to this court, specially convened in accordance with section 266 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 380, on the question whether a temporary injunction shall be granted. The evidence adduced at the hearing — consisting of affidavits, and data to which reference is made in certain of such affidavits — fills almost nine hundred pages of printed record, and the questions presented have been ably and exhaustively briefed.
The questions to which our attention is first directed relate to the jurisdiction of the court. Plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws of Missouri, and defendant is a resident and citizen of Oklahoma. In order to comply with the provisions of the statute, plaintiff would require four additional engines on its main line, two additional engines on other lines, six additional cabooses, and more train crews. The immediate increased out-of-pocket expense would exceed eighty thousand dollars annually, and it would be still larger with expansion of business. Plaintiff seeks in the suit to be relieved of the necessity of providing such additional equipment and the employment of such additional crews. The right asserted is to be relieved of the requirement to do so. That is the very essence of the action. And the value of that right may be measured by the loss which would be entailed by compliance with the act. Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, 261 U.S. 264, 43 S.Ct. 252, 67 L.Ed. 645; McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135. There is complete diversity of citizenship, and the amount in controversy far exceéds $3000.
Of course, a suit in equity will not lie where the plaintiff has a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. But the remedy must be complete, practical and efficient. Ordinarily, resort may not be had to equity to restrain the institution and prosecution of criminal proceedings. But it is well settled that a court of equity will restrain the institution and prosecution of
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that the judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any suit at law or in , equity against a sovereign state by a citizen of another state. That immunity is without condition or limitation and places a state beyond the reach of the process of a United States court. But a suit against a state officer to restrain wrongful action under color of an unconstitutional statute, resulting in injury to the rights and property of plaintiff, is not a suit against the state, within the intent and meaning of the amendment. An officer is not immune in such circumstances from restraint. He may be enjoined, without impingement upon the amendment. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 843, 868, 6 L.Ed. 204; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 220, 21 L.Ed. 447; Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 114 U.S. 311, 5 S.Ct. 925, 962, 29 L.Ed. 200; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 10, 11 S.Ct. 699, 35 L.Ed. 363; In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 13 S.Ct. 785, 37 L.Ed. 689; Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 112, 17 S.Ct. 262, 41 L.Ed. 648; Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 220, 17 S.Ct. 770, 42 L.Ed. 137; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518, 519, 18 S.Ct. 418, 42 L.Ed. 819; Ex parte Young, supra; Philadelphia Company v. Stimson, supra; Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad Co., 305 U.S. 177, 59 S.Ct. 160, 83 L.Ed. 111. It is clear that the complaint states a cause of action in equity of which this court has jurisdiction.
It is contended with emphasis that the statute, applied to the business of plaintiff, is not a safety measure reasonably enacted in the exertion of the police power of the state, but is merely an attempt to regulate, delay and burden interstate commerce, in violation of the Commerce Clause. The supreme, plenary and complete power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is without limitation or restriction, except that prescribed in the Constitution; and within the reach of that paramount authority lies the power to protect such commerce against substantial dangers, burdens or obstructions, no matter the source from which the encroachment springs. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 398, 33 S.Ct. 729, 57 L.Ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A., N.S., 1151, Ann.Cas.1916A, 18; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352. Coming to apply that well recognized doctrine, many 'state and municipal enactments have been held invalid. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 24 L.Ed. 547; Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 14 S.Ct. 1087, 38 L.Ed. 962; Minnesota Rate Cases, supra; Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District, 233 U.S. 75, 34 S.Ct. 564, 58 L.Ed. 857; South Covington & Cincinnati Street Railway Co. v. City of Covington, 235 U.S. 537, 35 S.Ct. 158, 59 L.Ed. 350, L.R.A. 1915F, 792; Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310, 37 S.Ct. 640, 61 L.Ed. 1160, L.R.A.1917F, 1184; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Texas, 245 U.S. 484, 38 S.Ct. 178, 62 L.Ed. 419, L.R.A.1918C, 535.
But every state statute having some relation to interstate commerce is not to be condemned on that ground. A state is free in the exertion of its police power to enact reasonable measures in
If a statute which purports to have been enacted in the interest of public health or safety has no real relation to that object, or is an invasion of rights protected by the Constitution, it should be so adjudged and declared invalid. Hennington v. Georgia, supra. But a court is not concerned with the efficacy of such legislation if it bears some substantial relation to that object, and does not contravene any provision of the Constitution. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. v. New York, supra. Its efficacy is a matter exclusively for the legislature. The legislature is familiar with local conditions, and is the judge of the necessity of such enactments. And even though a court may differ with the legislature in respect of a question of public policy, that fact does not afford any sustainable basis for judicial interference. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 547, 29 S.Ct. 206, 53 L.Ed. 315. Whether a statute, addressed to a question of police policy, and enacted within the permitted scope of legislative power, is wise or unwise, is based on sound economic theory or otherwise, or is the best means to achieve the desired result, are matters solely and exclusively for the judgment of the legislature. They are beyond the range of judicial inquiry.
The trend in practice among railroads throughout the country during the past twenty-five years or more has been in the direction of improved facilities, long-train operation, and faster and more dependable
Plaintiff’s trains are equipped with modern and approved airbrakes, but the voluminous evidence presented is in hopeless conflict upon the question whether trains of more than seventy cars can be operated with safety by the use of such brakes. A detailed review of the evidence would unduly extend this opinion, and would not serve any useful purpose. It suffices to say that the evidence of plaintiff tends to show that a train of more than seventy cars can be operated safely by the use of airbrakes; that so-called slack action and resulting shock, particularly on the rear, is not appreciably greater on trains exceeding seventy cars than on those of less number; that the number of cars has little if anything to do with safety of operation through the use of such brakes; that the control of a long train, consisting of more than seventy cars, does not present any substantial danger of bucking, that ability to see from one end of a train to another in order to give and receive hand signals is not essential to safe operation; that the limitation of trains to seventy cars or less would necessarily increase the number of trains operated; and that the hazards to employees, to persons at crossings, and to others, necessarily growing out of operation, increase or decrease somewhat in proportion to the number of trains operated. But the evidence of defendant tends with greater strength to show that the severity of the shock caused by the application of airbrakes depends in part upon the length of the train; that the longer the train the more the slack, and the farther the caboose is from the engine or the break in the train where the air goes into emergency, the more severe is the shock and the greater is the possibility of injury to employees, caretakers of livestock, and others, riding in the caboose; that due to such hazard, employees riding in the caboose work under constant nervous strain, are constantly watchful, and sometimes sustain serious injury from shock; that the likelihood of broken archbars, fallen brake beams, stuck brakes resulting in slid wheels, overheated and broken wheels with consequent danger, is far greater on long trains than on short ones; that such dangerous and hazardous developments can be more easily and readily observed from the caboose on a short train that on one of more than
Plaintiff relies upon the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is obvious that ,to comply with the statute plaintiff will be required to expend additional sums in the operation of its business. The cost of compliance with a statute of this kind is an element for appropriate consideration in determining whether the statute is arbitrary, capricious, or repugnant to due process; but, standing alone, it is not always enough to warrant judicial determination of invalidity. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 262, 30 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed. 472; Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 278 U.S. 24, 49 S.Ct. 69, 73 L.Ed. 161, 62 A.L.R. 805; Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Nor-wood, supra. The facts presented are not sufficient to distinguish or set apart this case from those to which reference has been made in which statutes enacted in the exercise of the police power of the state were sustained, although interstate commerce was incidentally and indirectly affected and the expenditure of additional sums was necessitated.
The remaining contention to be considered is that the statute must fall because Congress has occupied the field; that the act infringes and is in conflict with legislation heretofore enacted by Congress pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause. To sustain the contention, plaintiff relies upon paragraphs 10 to 17 and paragraph 21 of section 1, and section 26, of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 26; and sections 1 and 9 of the Safety Appliance Act, as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 9. Paragraph 10, section 1, of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, defines the term “car service”; paragraph 11 makes it the duty of a railroad company to furnish safe and adequate car service, and to enforce just and reasonable rules, regulations, and practices in respect of car service; paragraph 12.relates to the distribution of cars for the transportation of coal; paragraph 13 authorizes the Commission to require railroads to file with it their rules and regulations relating to car service, and empowers the Commission to direct that such rules and regulations be incorporated in the schedules showing rates, fares and charges for transportation; paragraph 14 authorizes the Commission to establish rules, regulations, and practices touching car service; paragraph 15 is addressed to the furnishing of car service and the use of facilities in case of shortage of equipment, congestion of traffic, or other emergency; paragraph 16 empowers the Commission to make just and reasonable directions in respect to the handling, routing, and movement of traffic over other lines ; paragraph 17 requires railroad companies to obey orders of the Commission concerning car service, and provides a penalty for disobedience; and paragraph 21 vests in the Commission authority to require any railroad to provide itself with safe and adequate facilities for performing its car service, and fixes a penalty for refusal or neglect to comply with such an order; and section 26 authorizes the Commission
In respect to the regulatory power of the state and the occasions for its exercise, the general subject of commerce has been divided into three separate and distinct classes. They are those in which the power of the state is exclusive, those in which the state may act in the absence of legislation by Congress, and those in which the action of Congress is exclusive and therefore the state cannot act at all. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, supra; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U.S. 650, 16 S.Ct. 934, 40 L.Ed. 1105; Southern Railway Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 32 S.Ct. 140, 56 L.Ed. 257. The reasonable limitation of the length of trains in the interest of public safety falls within the second class. As to that class, the exercise of the paramount power of Congress is necessary to take from the state its subordinate power to legislate. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, supra; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, supra. And mere congressional delegation of power to the Interstate Commerce Commission to act in respect to that class does not require the state to yield. It is only after action by the Commission that the state is shorn of its power. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612, 29 S.Ct. 214, 53 L.Ed. 352; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. State Public Utilities Commission, 242 U.S. 333, 37 S.Ct. 173, 61 L.Ed. 341; c/f Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Harris, 234 U.S. 412, 34 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Ed. 1377, L.R.A.1915E, 942. But the intent of Congress’ to exert its superior authority and thus exclude or supersede state legislation concerning the same matter is not to be lightly inferred. It must be fairly manifested. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148, 23 S.Ct. 92, 47 L.Ed. 108; Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533, 32 S.Ct. 715, 56 L.Ed. 1182; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Georgia, supra; Southern Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439, 446, 35 S.Ct. 304, 59 L.Ed. 661; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 245 U.S. 493, 510, 38 S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed. 425; Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission, 283 U.S. 380, 392, 393, 51 S.Ct., 553, 75 L.Ed. 1128; Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Railway Co., 292 U.S. 57, 54 S.Ct. 573, 78 L.Ed. 1123; c/f Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 623, 18 S.Ct. 488, 42 L.Ed. 878. And it is within the power of Congress to limit its regulation to only part of a given field, thus leaving the remainder open to action by the state. Southern Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana, supra; Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Railway Co., supra; c/f Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., supra.
The acts of Congress relied upon fail to make specific reference to the length of trains as an element of safety, and it is not contended that the Interstate Commerce Commission has acted or asserted its authority to act in respect of the matter under the powers which Congress has delegated to it. True, some if not all of the statutes concern themselves with various aspects of safety in the
In arriving at the conclusion that the statute of the state is without constitutional infirmity, we are mindful of Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. La Prade, D.C., 2 F.Supp. 855,
The restraining order will be vacated, and a temporary injunction will be denied.
Fixed by subsequent regulation oí tbe Interstate Commerce Commission, at eighty-five per cent. See, Eairport, Paines ville & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589, 54 S.Ct. 826, 78 L.Ed. 1446.
Dismissed ■ as to the substituted defendant, Ex parte La Prade, 289 U.S. 444, 53 S.Ct. 682, 77 L.Ed. 1311.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
The majority opinion fairly and fully states the issues in this case. It also reviews the authorities, both state and federal, passing upon kindred issues to those herein involved. But, as stated in the majority opinion, only two courts have passed upon the identical question here presented.
A three-judge court in the District of Arizona (Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. La Prade, 2 F.Supp. 855) held a similar statute, passed by the Legislature of Arizona, unconstitutional; and four years later, a three-judge court in the District of Nevada (Southern Pacific Co. v. Mashburn, 18 F.Supp. 393) held a similar statute, passed by the Legislature of Nevada, unconstitutional, following and approving the doctrine announced in Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. La Prade, supra.
These two important decisions of the three-judge courts are mentioned but are neither followed nor distinguished by the majority opinion. In the Arizona case the court carefully reviewed the authorities relied upon in the majority opinion but reached an entirely different conclusion.
The majority opinion' states that by a preponderance of the evidence presented in this case a train of more than seventy cars is more unsafe than trains of seventy cars or less.
I cannot agree with the conclusion of my learned associates. In my judgment, the preponderance of the evidence in this case supports the contention that long trains tend to add to the safety of operation and to the prevention of accidents, and that the conclusion reached in the majority opinion, that the Act in question is a safety measure, is not supported by the evidence.
Whether this is a safety measure, the majority opinion contends, is a matter for the Legislature to decide. If the Legislature decides that this is a safety measure, and the safety measure is in direct con.flict with the Constitution and laws of the United States, then the measure must fall notwithstanding it was determined to be a safety. measure by the state legislative body.
In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. La Prade, supra [2 F.Supp. 859], the court said:
“Clearly, the Constitution has conferred upon Congress full and exclusive power to regulate commerce between the states, and any attempted enforcement of the statute of a state, passed under the guise of the police power which directly affects interstate commerce to such an extent as to amount to a regulation thereof, is void and will be enjoined. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 489, 24 L.Ed. 547, and other cases. * * *
“In the case of Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207, 210, 71 L.Ed. 432, a case involving a statute of Wisconsin, prescribing a cab curtain for locomotives, Mr. Justice Brandéis said:
“ ‘The federal and the state statutes are directed to the same subject — the equipment of locomotives. They operate upon the same object. It is suggested that the power delegated to the Commission has been exerted only in respect to minor changes or additions. But this, if true, is not of legal significance. It is also urged that, even if the Commission has power to prescribe an automatic firebox door and a cab curtain, it has not done so, and that it has made no other requirement inconsist
“ Tf the protection now afforded by the Commission’s rules is deemed inadequate, application for relief must be made to it. The Commission’s power is ample.’"
The majority opinion assumes that Congress has passed no act dealing with the subject of train lengths; that the Boiler Inspection Act, the Safety Appliance Act, and Section 26 of the Interstate Commerce Act do not cover the dangers and hazards of train operation; and that until Congress deals with this subject specifically, the states are free to adopt such regulations in the exercise of police power.
In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. La Prade, supra, the court analyzed this proposition and said:
“We cannot agree to this proposition. The Interstate Commerce Act, section 1, subdivision 10, title 49 U.S.C.A., which deals with the subject of car service, provides as follows: ‘The term “car service’’ in this chapter shall include the use, control, supply, movement, distribution, exchange, interchange, and return of locomotives, cars, and other vehicles used in the transportation of property, including special types of equipment, and the supply of trains, by any carrier by railroad subject to this chapter.’
“Subdivision 14 of said section 1, provides: ‘The commission may, after hearing, on a complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, establish reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service by carriers by railroad subject to this chapter, including the compensation to be paid for the use of any locomotive, car, or other vehicle not owned by the carrier using it, and the penalties or other sanctions for nonobservance of such rules, regulations or practices.’
“The power conferred by Congress upon the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate the supply of trains must necessarily include authority to prescribe the number of interstate trains to be operated by the carrier. The Arizona law limiting the number of cars contained in a freight or passenger train in effect prescribes the number of trains to be operated by the interstate carrier, by increasing the number of trains after interstate commerce enters within the state. It is therefore in conflict with and attempts to occupy the same field of regulation delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission by the car service act.”
In Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 32 S.Ct. 715, 722, 56 L.Ed. 1182; the case of Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 16 S.Ct. 1086, 41 L.Ed. 166, was cited and considered, and the court said: “The state cannot, under cover of exerting its police powers, undertake what amounts essentially to a regulation of interstate commerce, or impose a direct burden upon that commerce.”
I am so convinced that the reasoning and conclusions in the Arizona and Nevada cases are sound and that they should be followed by this court, that it is my judgment the Oklahoma Act should be held unconstitutional and a temporary injunction should issue.
I most respectfully dissent.
