47 Ct. Cl. 59 | Ct. Cl. | 1911
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a demurrer to claimant’s petition. The Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co., claimant herein, is a Kansas corporation and was originally incorporated under the name of Union Pacific Railroad, Southern Branch. In 1870, by
Section 11 of the act of 1866 provided, among other things, as follows:
“ That should the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Fort Gibson Railroad Company, or the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Southern Branch, construct and complete its road to that point on the southern boundary of the State of Kansas where the line of the said Kansas and Neosho Valley Railroad shall cross the same, before the said Kansas and Neo-sho Valley Railroad Company shall have constructed and completed its said road to said point, then in that event the company so first reaching in completion the said point on the southern boundary of the State of Kansas shall be au*70 thorized, upon obtaining the written approval of the President of the United States, to construct and operate its line of railroad from said point to a point- at or near Preston, in the State of Texas, with grants of lands according to the provisions of this act * *
The claimant company, acting under said act, entered upon the construction of its road, and was the first of the competing lines to reach the point designated in the act. On July 22, 1870, it was formally notified of its rights under the statute and duly authorized upon compliance with certain formalities to proceed with the construction of its road through Indian Territory.
The petition alleges, and it is not here open to dispute, that it did proceed with reasonable dispatch to complete its line through Indian Territory, and that the same was accepted and approved by the proper officers of the Government as a compliance with the statute in 1873. The petition further alleges that, in pursuance of a general governmental policy, the United States, through Congress, the executive departments, the Secretary of the Interior, the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, and the various town-site commissions, has extinguished the Indian title to said lands by treaties and legislation relative thereto; that the greater portion of said lands have been allotted to the individual Indians belonging to said tribes, patents issued therefor, and the unallotted lands sold by the defendants to purchasers other than Indians and otherwise disposed of, irrespective of claimant’s right and title thereto, and despite its repeated protests to each and all the proceedings. The petition concludes with the averment that the United States has extinguished the Indian title to all of said lands embraced within its grant; that said lands did become a part of the public lands of the United States; that the United States not only failed to carry into execution its obligations under the act of July 25, 1866, but by allotting to said Indians and otherwise selling and disposing of said lands, made the performance of the contract impossible upon its part, thereby depriving the petitioner of 3,114,368 acrés of land of the value of $61,287,800, for which amount it asks judgment.
The statute is anomalous. A land grant act containing similar terms and conditions has not been shown the court, and doubtless none exists. The general purpose of the legislation is not difficult to ascertain. The Congress evidently was concerned in aiding and thereby procuring a connecting line of railroad extending from the main line of the Union Pacific to the Gulf of Mexico. The Civil War and the advancing settlement of the West had demonstrated its necessity. To facilitate its construction the eleventh section of the act sets up a competition between substantially three parallel lines and offering as the inducement an additional extensive land grant through an undeveloped country, every acre of which was in the possession of and inhabited by Indians and known as Indian lands.
There is nothing, however, in the terms of the statute, or the peculiar circumstances surrounding its enactment, which would seem to exempt the application of the usual rules heretofore applied by the Supreme Court in construing statutes of a similar character. It comes within the purview of what are commonly designated “ land grant acts;” its purpose was the same, though worded in a way to meet the exigencies of the then situation of the parties. The Supreme Court, in a long line of decisions extending over the entire range of land grant legislation in aid of railroads, has uniformly held that grants of this description are to be construed most strongly against the grantee; that nothing passes except by the explicit terms of the grant, keeping in mind that the conveyance is by act of Congress, which is always susceptible to a construction in consonance with legislative intention. {The Dubuque and Pacific Railroad
In the last cited case, wherein a grant through Indian lands was directly involved, Mr. Justice Davis used this language in reference to its construction:
“ This grant, like that to Iowa, was made for the purpose of aiding a work of internal improvement, and does not extend beyond the intent it expresses. It should be neither enlarged by ingenious reasoning nor diminished by strained construction. The interpretation must be reasonable, and such as will give effect to the intention of Congress. This is to be ascertained from the terms employed, the situation of the parties, and the nature of the grant. If these terms are plain and unambiguous there can be no difficulty in interpreting them; but if they admit of different meanings — one of extension and the other of limitation — they must be accepted in a sense favorable to the grantor; and if rights claimed under the Government be set up against it they must be so clearly defined that there can be no question of the purpose of Congress to confer them. In other words, what is not given expressly or by necessary implication is withheld.”
Subsequently, in Winona & St. Peter R. R. Co. v. Barney (113 U. S., 625), Mr. Justice Field, in construing certain acts granting public lands to the State of Minnesota to aid in the construction of railroads, condensed in a few words the rule directly applicable to the present case:
“ The solution of these questions depends of course upon the construction given to the acts making the grants, and they are to receive such a construction as will carry out the intent of Congress, however difficult it might be to give full effect to the language used if the grants were by instruments of private conveyance. To ascertain that intent we must look to the condition of the country when the acts were passed as well as to the purpose declared on their face and read all parts of them together.”
The courts have uniformly held in construing land-grant legislation, where the donation is a portion of the unencumbered public lands of the United States, that the grant was in prcesenti to take effect upon the specific tracts when the line of the road is located; the grant then becomes cer
In construing grants cum onere, especially where the outstanding title or encumbrance was the Indian right of occupancy, a different rule has obtained, and it would be difficult to say from a review of the authorities that the grant in each instance was in prmenti subject to the encumbrance. The Congress respecting legislation wherein Indian lands and reservations were known to have been invaded by land grants has almost uniformly provided specifically as to them, either obligating itself to extinguish the title, as it did in the Pacific railroad grants and other acts of similar character, or withholding the attachment of the grant until the Indian title has been extinguished. The Indian lands were, in the absence of express words of reservation, excepted from the operation of the grant by the general provisions found in all land-grant acts reserving lands previously disposed of by the United States by preemption or homestead entries or for any other purpose whatever. In the Leavenworth case (supra) the Supreme Court held that even in the absence of such reservation title would not attach to lands of this character. In the acts of March 3, 1857 (11 Stat., 196), July 1, 1862 (12 Stat., 491), July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 364), July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 367), July 25, 1866 (14 Stat., 236), July 26, 1866 (14 Stat, 289), where it was apparent that the line of the railroad must pass over Indian lands, express provisions were made respecting their reservation and the extinguishment of title. In all these instances cited above the United States either withheld the grant until the Indian title was extinguished or expressly agreed to extinguish it for the purposes of the act. In Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad (119 U. S., 55) the Supreme Court held that the grant although through Indian lands was in prmenti passing the fee subject to one condition only. In the Buttz case, however, there was an express agreement to extinguish the Indian title. In the cases where no such express obligation rested upon the Government it has been settled beyond dispute that the grant of Indian lands is in the nature of a float conditioned upon the extinguishment of Indian title, the time, manner, and con
The Indian title was one of occupancy, the fee was in the United States, and the right of conveyance was limited to the United States or to others by their express consent. This rule has prevailed since the first litigation involving the subject and has never been departed from in any case. (Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat., 543; Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S., 1; United States v. Winans, 198 U. S., 371.) While the Indian title was limited to the use and occupation of the lands and they were held in communal ownership, still it was such a title as the United States, in theory at least, fully respected and generally protected in its dealings with the respective tribes. The question of Indian title and Indian rights has been so frequently before the courts that it is needless to multiply citations supporting this contention.
The statute of 1866, passed as it was at the close of the war, evidently induced in part at least by the limited transportation facilities available to the Government during that crisis, sought to promote the' construction of an extensive railroad line connecting the South with the East and West. In the consummation of the project and in the interest of time, the Government availed itself of the existence of three railway companies, all of which were incorporated and pursuing a course directly in harmony with the purposes of the act. The country through which the major portion of the
What was the situation of the parties at the time? All but one of the tribes occupying the lands in issue had joined the Confederacy during the war; it therefore became neces
Subsequent to the passage of the act a different policy was inaugurated by the United States with respect to Indian tribes and tribal lands. Being substantially contemporaneous with the act, it may have then been anticipated. In 1871 the United States discontinued its recognition of Indian tribes as dependent sovereignties and the Congress assumed control. Treaties were no longer negotiated, and a comprehensive scheme was adopted involving the ultimate dissolution of the tribes, the allotment of their lands, and the citizenizing of the individual Indian. The western
In 1884 (23 Stat., 96) an Indian residing on the public lands of the United States was permitted to avail himself of the homestead laws.
In 1887 (24 Stat. L., 388) a most comprehensive law was passed providing for the allotment of Indian lands in sever-alty to Indian tribes residing on Indian reservations, and conferring on them» the rights of citizenship. This statute did not reach the Indian tribes concerned in this suit; the reason therefor will appear hereafter. In 1889 (25 Stat. L., 783) a United States court was established in Indian Territory and its jurisdiction defined. In March, 1889, the entire western half of Indian Territory was ceded to the United States by the Indians then in possession thereof, out of which lands the Territory of Oklahoma was established in 1890. In fact, legislation too extensive to review was enacted at each session of the Congress tending toward the plainly expressed purpose to ultimately discontinue the previous relationship of the United States toward its Indian tribes. (Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S., 553, 25 Stat. L., 642).
In March, 1893 (27 Stat. L., 645), by the sixteenth section of the general appropriation act for the Indians, the Congress provided for a commission to negotiate with the Creeks, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Cherokee Indian tribes— tribes exempt from the act of 1889, supra, and the tribes whose lands are concerned in this suit — looking toward a dissolution of their tribes and a cession or allotment in severalty among them of their lands. While the expressed purpose of the law was to ultimately create a State of the Union out
While in a strict and technical sense the possessory title of the Indians was by this legislation extinguished, the United States was not the beneficiary; no provision of the law vested in the Government the united title of itself and the Indians. The transition was directly the opposite; the Government divested itself of whatever title it possessed and by a united conveyance merged the lesser and the greater estate in the allottee. The Indian title was only extinguished in the sense that the Indian acquired the outstanding title of the Government and by this act merged a posses-sory right into a fee simple. The Indian continued in possession. It is true his estate was partitioned and his possession limited by metes and bounds, and the communal ownership of the lands destroyed, but the United States did not at any time by any provision of the law acquire the Indian title or any dominion over the lands which it did not already possess before the transaction. It was not the extinguishment contemplated by the act in order to vest title by its terms.
What was intended by the proviso to section 9 of the granting act “Provided, That said lands become a part of
The proviso was inserted for some purpose; it was not surplusage; it had some definite intent. In view of what has been said, it seems to have met a situation, whether anticipated or not, in strict accord with the policy of the United States in its relations to Indian tribes. The United States, in the act making the grant to claimant company, was in no position to convey immediate title; it did not even know when, how, or in what manner it might ever convey the same, and it wisely circumscribed the grant by conditions not only that the Indian title should be extinguished but that the lands should again become part of the public domain, owned absolutely by the United States, free from incumbrance of any kind or character, and subject to its
. It is not to be presumed that the United States would, by treaty stipulations, provide lands for tribal Indians, an unlettered and dependent people, and at the same time enact legislation which by its express terms would incapacitate it from disposing of said lands in,the very maimer they had expressly agreed to do. The successive acts by which the Indians received their allotments in severalty were, in effect, agreements between the Indians and the United States. The Indians did not cede title to the United States, and, if they did, it was in pursuance of an agreement not to throw said lands open to public settlement, nor to allow the United States the absolute power of disposal, but to reconvey them to the Indians in severalty, making them in no event public lands in the sense in which that term is used in referring to that particular portion of the landed possessions of the United States. If they became public lands and claimant company’s grant attached, then the United States, in violation of express contracts, gave to the claimant company over 3,000,000 acres of' land belonging to the respective tribes concerned herein, which some of them had occupied and owned, as Indian tribes owned land, since 1828. That it did not so intend is evidenced by the twenty-seventh section of the act of April 26, 1906 (34 Stat., 148), wherein it is expressly stated that said lands shall not become public lands nor the property of the United States. It is more consistent with the circumstances of the grant to say that the proviso was inserted for the purpose of enabling the United States to discharge its obligations under the treaties of 1866 by distinguishing between lands which are simply the property of the United States and its public lands donated to settlers and others for the purposes of internal improvements. As before observed, “ if rights claimed under the Government be set up against it, they must be so clearly defined there can be no question of the purpose of Congress to confer them.” (Leavenworth case, supra.)
The Congress knew that in the course of time Indian tribal relations and Indian tribal lands must be segregated; that the existence of a large body of people holding im
It is urged, however, that the particular portion of lands falling within the grant which were not allotted to the Indians are subject to the claimant company’s grant. It is true that quite a significant portion of the Indian Territory was not alloted to the individual Indians. Town-site commissions were appointed to survey, plat, and dispose of certain quantities of land for town-site purposes. The coal, asphalt, and mineral lands were segregated from allotment and leased and disposed of under salutary provisions of the law to secure their full value to the Indians; in fact, provision was made for the disposition of all surplus lands over :he allotments. The mode prescribed for the disposition of
The United States and the Indian tribes joined in conferring upon certain commissions, upon each of which both were represented, power and authority to lay out the town sites as therein provided, and dispose of the lots so platted at auction. Schools were to retain their locations by paying a certain amount for their lands. Cemeteries could be established by the town authorities upon certain terms and conditions. The leasing and sale of mineral lands was wisely lodged in the Interior Department. Churches were to receive their lands gratuitously. The United States had the option to purchase suitable lands for the location of courthouses, jails, and other public buildings — a rather novel provision if the lands were public lands of the Government — and finally, as provided in sections 17 of the act approved April 26, 1906, supra, all the money arising from said sales, “ or from any source whatever,” was to be credited to said Indian tribes by the Treasury Department and thereafter paid to the Indians per capita. Public lands of the United States were not disposed of in this manner then, and they are not so disposed of now.
In pursuance of the general plan of allotment it was indispensable to take an equitable basis of distribution. In the agreements, ratified by Congress, it was fixed at a certain number of acres at a fixed price per acre and either the specified acreage was allotted or an increased or diminished allotment according to its appraised value. It was physically impossible to absorb the whole body of lands, even if desirable, and the surplus lands were disposed of with a view to continuing existing Indian towns and encouraging their enlargement. Indian villages had of course grown up in this large community; they were indispensable and the lands being held by communal title necessarily came within the Indian agreements with the United States. What has been said before applies to them; the United States never acquired title to them free from incumbrance; they were never conveyed or in any way ceded to the United
Again it is insisted that there rested upon the United States an implied obligation to extinguish the Indian title so the grant might attach; that the United States having prevented and made impossible of performance the condition it agreed to perform must respond in damages. It is indisputable that authority and power to deal with Indian tribes and Indian lands was lodged exclusively in the Government. The time and manner of disposition was exclusively for the United States, free from interference at the suit of private parties. If, then, an implied obligation rested upon the United States in this instance it was equivalent to saying we will extinguish title and make said lands public lands of the United States, and the* language of the act as qualifying terms was meaningless. There would have been no distinction between this grant and other grants wherein the United States expressly agreed to extinguish Indian title. The case is different from an ordinary execu-tory contract where one party refuses or renders' himself unable to perform a condition he impliedly engaged to perform. It can not be asserted that the United States impliedly engaged itself to extinguish the Indian title within a reasonable time; that was a matter within their exclusive right to determine; it could have continued the reservations indefinitely and no liability attached. It might never have extinguished Indian title and still be exempt. The condition was not one certain of performance; it was expressly contingent, and its performance was reserved exclusively to the grantor indeterminately.
The Congress by the act of 1866 did not dp a “ vain thing.” The treaties with the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws consummated in 1866 reserved to the United States the right under certain conditions to grant extensive rights of way for railroad purposes through their lands. The act of 1866 transferred in almost identical terms this right to the successful competitor under the eleventh section of the act, and in addition thereto granted extensive areas of land in the State of Kansas, all of which was acquired by the claimant company. There was, no possible way for the claimant company, or either of its competitors, to connect their railroad lines and reach the coast via Preston (now Denison), Tex., except by permission of the Congress to pass through Indian Territory. The keenness of the competition and the subsequent disputes relative thereto appearing in claimant’s exhibits to its petition indicate the zeal of the competitors.
The claimant company accepted the grant with the conditions imposed, conditions which clearly expressed and intended to express the uncertainty of its complete realization. The United States from its very beginning had regarded its treaties with the Indians, and the court can not presume, nor in the absence of express language indicating an intent so to do, enlarge the terms of the granting act to cover, a vast area of land solemnly dedicated at the time of the grant to Indian tribes and for Indian purposes. If the United States so intended, apt language would have been employed, and terms of conveyance used in acts of similar character would have been used, leaving no doubt as to its purposes or what lands passed by the grant. Following the rules of construction heretofore set forth, we think the demurrer should be sustained. It is so ordered.
Concurrence Opinion
delivered the following opinion:
The magnitude of this cause and the importance of the issues raised by demurrer to the plaintiff’s petition of 698 printed pages of allegation and exhibit are causes sufficient to warrant full expression of opinion by any or all responsible for the result. Especially is this so because of the statement' contained in the brief of one of the learned counsel that it had been said that a suit for more than $61,000,000 never had been and never could be carried through, followed by the further declaration that it had been frequently stated that if this were a suit between private parties for a moderate amount there could be no question of its receiving favorable consideration. But who said it and by what authority % And why should the courts be thus discredited ? If the size of the claim could have anything to do with the result, the sooner this court retires from business the better for the citizen.
But any court must pause in considering so enormous a demand and be well assured of its merit before saying there is liability. Certainly statements in the nature of advance criticism can not have the effect of preventing the proper judgment in the discharge of an unavoidable duty, as that duty is understood.
Whilst concurring with many of the views expressed in the preceding opinion this opinion is submitted along somewhat different lines as covering my reasons for sustaining the demurrer to the petition.
Four great estates lying in what was formerly known as the Indian Territory (but now the State of Oklahoma) are involved. The plaintiff company, as the successor of the Kansas & Neosho Valley Eailroad, claims a grant in frcesenti of over 3,000,000 acres of land, covering 4,866 sections, or 135 solid townships, at the rate of 12,800 acres to the mile, through 243 miles of territory beginning at the southern line of Kansas and extending to the northern line of Texas. The area attached to and with whatever passed, according to the petition, embraced alternate sections on each side of the railroad. If anything was granted, it was in the nature of a float until the lands were surveyed as public lands of the United States. Upon such survey, it is
Congress by an act approved July 25, 1866, 14 Stat., 236, granted, for the benefit of the original company, certain public lands in the State of Kansas. By section 1, ten alternate sections of land on each side of the road to every mile, to be selected within 20 miles of the railroad, were granted to the governor of that State to aid in the construction of the Kansas & Neosho Valley Railroad, and in the event of such lands having already been preempted, it was provided that lieu lands should be selected likewise within the 20-mile limit. There was attached to this grant a proviso:
“ That any and all lands heretofore reserved to the United States by any act of Congress, or in any other manner by competent authority, for the purpose of aiding in any object of internal improvement or other purpose whatever, be, and the same are hereby, reserved and excepted from the operation of this act, except so far as it may be found necessary to locate the route of said road through such reserved lands, in which case the right of way, 200 feet in width, is hereby granted, subject to the approval of the President of the United States: And provided further, That said lands hereby granted shall not be selected beyond 20 miles from the line of said road.”
Section 2 provided that the sections and parts of sections remaining should not be sold for less than double the minimum price. Section 3 provided for the free transportation of Government troops and the terms upon which the lands should be patented to the railroad and that if the road should not be completed within two years the unpatented lands should revert. Section 4 provided that as soon as the company should file its maps designating the route the lands should be withdrawn from the market. Section 5 provided for the transportation of mails. Section 6 granted a right of way through the public lands 100 feet wide, with grounds
“ That the acceptance of the terms, conditions, and impositions of this act by the Kansas Valley road shall be signified in writing, * * * which acceptance shall be made within one year after the passage of this act, and not after-wards, and shall be deposited with the Secretary of the Interior.”
The foregoing sections relate to the grant of public lands exclusively in Kansas and have no relation to grants of lands within the Indian Territory.
The sections which relate to the construction of the road through the Territory dealt with lands not public lands at the time of the conditional grant. The four sections are so entirely different in scope and effect they are set forth verbatim in the footnote.
“ The United States will grant a patent, in fee simple, to the Creek Nation of Indians for the land assigned said nation by this treaty or convention, whenever the same shall have been ratified by the President and Senate of the United States, and the right thus guaranteed by the United States shall be continued to said tribe of Indians so long as they shall exist as a nation and continue to occupy the country hereby assigned them.”
The Muskogees (or Creeks) received a patent to their lands August 11, 1852.
The Choctaw Nation went into the possession of their lands in the same Territory by virtue of a treaty with the United States, known as the Dancing Rabbit Creek treaty, dated September 30, 1830, 7 Stat., 332. Their possession was described by metes and bounds and was guaranteed to the Choctaws by article 2, as follows:
“ The United States under a grant specially to be made by the President of the United States shall cause to be issued to the Choctaw Nation a tract of country west of the Mississippi River in fee simple to them and their descendants to inure to them while they shall exist as a nation and live on it.”
Subsequently, March 23, 1842, the United States issued their patent to the Choctaw Nation in accordance with section 2 of the treaty between the parties. Subsequent to that time, January 17, 1837, the Choctaws and Chickasaws entered into “ articles of convention and agreement,” 11 Stat., 573. by article 1 of which it was provided:
“ It is agreed by the Choctaws that the Chickasaws shall have the privilege of forming a district within the limits of*90 their country, to be held on the same terms that the Choctaws now hold it, except the right of disposing of it, which is held in common with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, to be called the ‘ Chickasaw district of the Choctaw Nation.’ ”
Later, on June 22, 1855, another treaty was entered into between the United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes, 11 Stat., 611, by which the boundaries of the Choctaw and Chickasaw country were defined and secured and guaranteed “ to the members of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes, their heirs and successors, to be held in common ” and to “ revert to the United States if said Indians and their heirs become extinct or abandon the same.'1'’
The Chickasaws were removed to these lands by the United States. Beginning with the treaty between those people and the United States of October 20, 1832, 7 Stats., 382, known as the treaty of Pontitoc Creek, we find the initial steps taken for their removal. They went west seeking a permanent home, and it was so expressed to them by the Government. For a consideration the Chickasaw Nation ceded to the United States all the land which they owned in Mississippi. By a supplemental treaty proclaimed May 24, 1834, known as the treaty of Washington, the original treaty was modified with respect to the disposition of certain reservations in Mississippi, but the general scheme of removal was carried out. The tribe subsequently, in 1837, obtained title to land in the Choctaw country in pursuance of the original intent between the Chickasaws and the Government. The United States supervised and sanctioned the treaty between the Choctaws and the Chickasaws. The purpose then was unqualified as to any possibility of the removal of any of these people from the country where they were located west of the Mississippi.
The title of the Cherokees to the portion of their lands involved in this case was first acquired under treaty with the United States May 6, 1828, 7 Stat., 311. Article II was a guaranty to the Cherokees for possession forever of 7,000,000 acres of land. This guaranty was to “the Cherokees.” And in addition to the guaranty of 7,000,000 acres the United States further guaranteed “to the Cherokee Nation” a perpetual outlet west. On February 14, 1833, a
“In the making of any such exchange or exchanges, it shall and may be lawful for the President solemnly to assure the tribe or nation with which the exchange is made, that the United States will forever secure and guarantee to them, and their heirs or successors, the country so exchanged with them; and, if they prefer it, that the United States will cause a patent or grant to be made and executed to them for the same: Provided always, That such lands shall revert to the United States if the Indians become extinct or abandon the same.”
By section 7:
“Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall be construed as authorizing or directing the violation of any existing treaty between the United States and any of the Indian tribes.”
On December 31, 1838, a patent was issued by the United States reciting provisions of the treaties of 1828, 1833, and 1835 in regard to the grants of such lands.
After the close of the war between the States treaties of amnesty between the United States and the tribes whose lands are here affected were proclaimed as follows, viz: With the Choctaws and Chickasaws, proclaimed with amendments July 10, 1886, 14 Stat., 769; with the Creeks,
Previous to the passage of the act under which plaintiff claims and subsequently, other acts had been passed for the construction of railroads .southward from Kansas. Under its original name of Union Pacific Kailroad Co., Southern Branch, it was granted lands by acts of Congress of March 3, 1863, July 1, 1864, and July 26, 1866. The first named of these acts was for the grant of land to the State of Kansas for aid in the construction of certain railroads, 12 Stat., 772. Among the railroads for whose benefit aid was granted by this act was a line extending from Atchison via Topeka through Kansas in the direction of Santa Fe, N. Mex., with a branch from where the road crossed the Neosho in Kansas down the valley of that name to a point where the railroad, also aided by said act, extended from Leavenworth in the direction of Galveston Bay, in Texas. This was the route substantially covered by the original charter. On July 2, 1864, Congress passed another act making additional grants of land in Kansas to aid in the construction of railways. On March 19, 1866, the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Kailway and plaintiff entered into an agreement whereby the Atchison Co. assigned all its rights in and to the lands granted by the act of March 3, 1863, and of July 1, 1864, as to the line from Fort Biley down the Neosho Valley, and known as the Neosho Valley Branch. Then came the act of July 25, 1866, supra, and on July 26, 1866, Congress passed another act granting lands to the State of Kansas for the construction of the Southern Branch of the Union Pacific. .These lands so granted inured to the benefit of the plaintiff, and were, as alleged in the petition, parts of a general scheme and purpose, subject to the will of Congress, as I think, with respect to the outstanding claims of others.
These acts of Congress of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat., 772, July 1, 1864, 13 Stat., 339, and July 26, 1866, 14 Stat., 289,
In the exercise of the political power over the civilized tribes as wards of the Government, Congress provided for the appointment of a commission, known as the Dawes Commission, to enter into negotiations with the civilized tribes for the purpose of extinguishing the national or tribal title, either by cession of some part of the soil or by allotment and division among the Indians upon the acceptance by the Indians of the terms imposed. The national claim of title was superseded by the allotment of lands in severalty, and by subsequent legislation Congress declared “that the lands belonging to the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, or Seminole Tribes upon the dissolution of said tribes shall not become public lands nor property of the United States, but shall be held in trust by the United States for the use and benefit of the Indians respectively comprising each of said tribes and their heirs.”
Pending the allotment of the lands in severalty the plaintiff company gave formal notice of its claim to the land by virtue of an act approved July 25, 1866. (14 Stat., 236.) It claimed that by the performance on its part of the conditions set forth in the act mentioned an express contract founded upon the said act had been created whereby the company had acquired the title in fee simple to the lands, subject only to the communal, possessory, or usufructuary rights then existing in the four nations in occupancy. It is contended that as the national tribal title of occupancy existing at the date of the grant became extinguished the company’s title took immediate effect by relation as of the
As an alternative proposition to that alleging breach of an express contract it is further alleged that even if this proceeding “be treated as a mere suit to recover the value of lands owned by the claimant and taken by the United States, it is an action upon an implied contract and one based on the Constitution.” Thus, a grant in prmsenti of such character as to entitle the plaintiff to immediate possession, as well as to patents to the lands described in the petition, is claimed under and by virtue of alleged express covenants as well (it is further contended) on the implied promise of the Government to pay for the lands on demand, which has found expression in the present proceeding, for a money judgment against the United States.
The demurrer to the petition is made by counsel to raise two questions:
(1) Whether the claim is within the jurisdiction of the court under the provisions of the Tucker Act.
(2) Whether the petition sets forth a cause of action.
The law and the facts arising out of the allegations of the petition under the statutes and treaties affecting the issues are too intimately blended to deal separately with the matter of jurisdiction without going into the merits of the case so far as can be done properly on the demurrer.
There is authority for this course. Fauntelroy v. Lum, 210 U. S., 235. In Louisville Trust Co. v. Cormingor, 184 U. S., 26, the court declared that the power to hear and determine a subject matter was limited in such various ways in many cases the matter of jurisdiction might depend on the ascertainment of facts involving the merits, and in that sense courts could exercise jurisdiction in disposing of the preliminary inquiry, subject to correction on a review where jurisdiction was erroneously retained by an adjudication on the merits.
But plaintiff objects to the consideration of anything in the nature of extraneous matter and seeks to restrict consideration of the case as made by the petition.
The office of a demurrer should not be undermined by the use of testimony of a documentary character which, accord
Eliminating certain documentary evidence offered by defendants to qualify or contradict the statements of the complaint because not proper to be considered on demurrer, all acts of Congress relating to the alleged grant and all public treaties affecting the Indian right can now properly be considered. Judicial notice must be taken not only of the legislation treaty agreements and contracts with all parties affected, but all matters of public history must be taken into account. The averments and exhibits of the petition require the court to take an unrestricted view of practically everything material in any stage of the case.
The general jurisdiction of the Court of Claims conferred by the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat., 505, gives the court authority to hear and determine:
(1) All claims founded upon the Constitution; or, upon any law of Congress except for pensions.
(2) Those founded upon any regulation of an Executive Department.
(3) Or those founded upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the Government of the United States.
(4) Or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty, if the United States were suable.
For and against jurisdiction under the Tucker Act of 1887, 24 Stat., 505, a large number of authorities have been cited. In support of the demurrer defendants particularly rely upon the following: Langford's case, 12 C. Cls. R., 338, 101 U. S., 341; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Same, 41 ib., 19, 205 U. S., 105; Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., 113 ib., 59; United States v. Palmer, 128 ib., 262; Hill v. United States, 149 ib., 593; Schillinger v. Same, 155 ib., 163; United States v. Berdan Fire Arms Co., 156 ib., 552; Dooley v. Same, 182 ib., 222; Russell v. Same, 182 ib., 516; Bigby v. Same, 188 ib., 400; Harley v. Same, 198 ib., 229.
It would not be profitable to review the many cases relating to the jurisdiction under the Tucker Act of 1887. Several relating to the general jurisdiction of this court under the act mentioned, including a number of those cited by the respective counsel, were specifically considered in Lynah's ease, 188 U. S., 445. It is enough now to say that some of the cases relied on relate to express contracts and some to the right of the parties to recover upon the implied promise to pay; some are for the taking of land for public improvements, while others relate to compensation for the alleged appropriation of rights under patents, while there are yet other cases of a class presenting questions of a character quite different from the case at bar.
It is true, as said by some of the counsel, that the case here is so unique that there is nothing like it to be found in the books. Yet in many respects it is a case which can not be regarded as so unusual that precedents can not be found and applied.
There is no room for any alternative proposition as upon an implied contract. It is a rule of ancient pleading sanctioned in modern practice that parties can not be bound by implied promises when express contracts have been made as to the same subject matter. Chitty said that this proposition was certainly sound law unless the express contract be rescinded or abandoned. So, where an express written contract exists the complaining party must declare upon the written agreement so long as the special agreement remains in force, and under such circumstances such party can not recover upon a quantum meruit. The principle has met the approval of the Supreme Court when it declared the Chitty rule that implied promises in law exist only where there is
Applying these principles, there is -no implied, contract, and the cause must stand on the alleged express agreement for whatever there may appear to be respecting a breach. If there is a breach, the action must only lie for that breach; but if there be no breach, no action will lie for the implied assumpsit until it be shown that the parties have either abandoned the express agreement or have so rescinded or modified it as to give rise to the necessary implication.
In Harley's case, 39 C. Cls., 114, Nott, Ch. J., said that implied contracts are of two kinds. The first is where a man has tortiously taken property and the owner waives the tort and sues in assumpsit. In such cases there is no meeting of minds. Such cases, said this court, rest upon the principle that if the owner chooses to waive the tort and sue for the money derived from his property in the defendant’s hands, the defendant can not set up his own unlawful conduct as a defense. The second kind of implied contracts, continued the writer of that opinion, “ is where the parties met and their meeting resulted in a wordless agreement.”
But this is a suit against the United States first upon an express contract and as an alternative upon an alleged implied agreement. The double method of proceeding is inconsistent. If there was an express contract founded upon a law in favor of the company, the plaintiff not only does not abandon it, but stands upon what it says is the express agreement. If there was no express contract, it is not apparent how the jurisdiction can be asserted for the taking of the lands claimed, inasmuch as the action is against the Government and there is no implied promise to pay; but, according to the petition, an express promise on the part of the Government to do so.
Individuals may sometimes waive a tort and sue in as-sumpsit, but where there is a tortious taking by the United States the wrong can not be so waived as to warrant an action under the provisions of the Tucker Act. In so far, then, as this action rests upon the alternative proposition asserted as upon an implied promise the jurisdiction is
As to the second kind of implied contracts where parties have met but their meeting resulted in a wordless agreement, there can be no room for the statement that jurisdiction can be maintained under plaintiff’s alternative proposition, because the company’s entire case comes back to the express agreement. It is that which must be enforced, if anything can be.
No clearer statement can be found relating to jurisdiction than that stated in United States v. Jones, 131 U. S., 16, where the court said that the circuit and district courts had concurrent jurisdiction, within certain limits as to amounts, to render judgments on money demands, but the power of those courts was no broader than the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to render judgments for the larger amounts of which this court has jurisdiction; and that “ claims redressible in a court of law, equity, or admiralty may be claims for money only,'or they may be claims for property for specific relief, according as the context of the statute may require or allow.” Other cases practically repeat this phase of the matter under the provisions of the Tucker Act, viz: United States v. Behan, 110 U. S., 338; United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 ib., 645; Hollister v. Benedict, 113 ib., 67.
If, then, plaintiff’s title became complete by the lawful merger of the Indian title with such reversionary interest as the railroad acquired from the United States — that is, if divesting the Government of all its interest in the lands by the act of July 25, 1866, the United States lawfully extinguished the Indian titles and also converted the land now claimed into the public domain of the Government— the railroad interest became vested and there arose a breach of an express contract for the value of the land for which a judgment sounding in damages for money can be entered.
No question of tort is involved under the provisions of the Tucker Act if full and complete title became vested in the railroad by contract; or, in other words, if the railroad acquired such a title that the lands became a property right which the company could assert by due process of law at
It is well to observe here that a claim against the United States for a specific amount of money which is not expressly or by necessary implication authorized by a valid enactment of Congress can not be said to be founded on the Constitution. Hooe v. United States, 218 U. S., 322. And where the United States have not acknowledged any right of property in a petitioner the case is one sounding in tort, of which this court has no jurisdiction under the act of March 3, 1887. Hill v. United States, 149 U. S., 593.
By the Constitution Congress became invested with the power to deal with the Indian tribes, and the question arises whether the courts can deny the validity of acts of Congress where, pursuant to treaties in existence at the time of the passage of the alleged granting act, the legislative body undertook to carry out the provisions of those treaties for the benefit of the then occupants of the lands. In other words, can it be said that the claim of the plaintiff is justiciable?
When the company proves, if it can prove, that the conditions imposed by the act of July 25, 1866, have happened there is jurisdiction to proceed as for a breach. The fulfillment of the conditions of the grant sufficiently acknowledges on the part of the United States plaintiff’s right of property created by the grant, but otherwise not.
Here the Government does not claim to own the fee to the lands or to have any interest in them, and in this respect the matter of tort is unlike Langford's case, 101 U. S., 341, and unlike Hill v. United States, 149 U. S., 593. The rule dedueible from these and other cases was stated in the
This phase of the matter will be understood more clearly after considering the terms of the grant and the existing treaties together. The suggestion in its nature is jurisdictional, to be sure, but does not involve defendants in anything tortious unless it be shown that the Government had no power to execute its treaties because of the grant.
All parties are agreed that section 9 is the vital section.
Plaintiff’s contention is that upon the transfer of the tribal title to the members of the tribe the nations lost their interest in the lands and the individual occupants acquired none, but that the railroad acquired a complete title. By relation is meant an act done at one time operating upon the thing as if done at another time. The authorities hold that the doctrine iá a fiction of law for the promotion of justice and of the lawful intention of the par-ties by giving effect to acts or instruments which, without it, would be invalid. We are thus brought to two crucial questions; that is, as to the intent of Congress in the passage of the act, and, next, as to the proper construction to be given to the act itself.
The civilized tribes had forfeited no rights secured to them by previous treaties because of their participation in the war which had just ended. It is true that the majority of the occupants of the land had, in the war between the
The granting section carries words of absolute donation, with something following to limit the grant. Railroad Co. v. Smith, 9 Wall., 95; Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Ib., 60; Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. United States, 92 U. S., 733. The language implied present conveyance of the fee but subject to conditions liable never to happen. That is, the Indian title had to be extinguished and the lands had to become public lands, but nothing attached to any of the alternate sections until there was a survey of the lands as a part of the public domain of the United States, the road having been located. But, as said in the case of Rice v. Railroad Co., 1 Black, 380, and repeated in the Leavenworth case, supra, the grant embraced such lands as could be sold and enjoyed and not those which the Indians, pursuant to treaty stipulations, were left free to occupy.
When learned counsel say it is immaterial whether the railroad claim be a grant in prcesenti, or a grant in futuro, by what name the grant be called, the concession would seem to follow that the granting act on its face involved contingencies too indefinite to have constituted a present or prospective transfer perfect enough' to be called a statutory
“An estate in reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor, to commence in possession after the determination of some particular estate granted out by him. Sir Edward Coke describes a reversion to be the returning of land to the grantor or his heirs after the grant is over.”
When this act was passed the Government had already agreed never to assert the residue of any estate for itself so long as the occupants observed their treaties by remaining in possession.
But the learned commentator also says that “ The fee simple of all lands must abide somewhere”; and that “A reversion is never created by deed or writing, but arises from construction of law.” In Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U. S., 212, the Supreme Court recognized the common-law rule that a fee can not be in abeyance, though the reasons the court said were not to be of universal application because a common-law maxim must yield to statutory provisions inconsistent with the rule. Is there, then, anything in this alleged statutory contract inconsistent with the rule ?
The act on its face only purported to grant the naked fee clouded by conditions and qualified by terms which left the grantor free to carry out the previous (and also contemporaneous) pledges of the Government to those already occupying the lands. The Government did not in the passage of the act divest itself of control. If it did, then the grantee had the better and superior right to assume control. The manner, time, and conditions of extinguishing the right of occupancy were exclusively matters for the consideration of the Government and could not be interfered with nor put in contest by private parties. Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 119 U. S., 55.
If the conveyance of the reversionary interest operated as a present grant of the fee, then there was presented the anomaly of the remainderman asserting ownership, with the power reserved by the grantor not only to remain in present control but in control for all time as well, for the
This part of the discussion may be unnecessary and as beside the questions arising as to the happening of the condi- ' tions imposed.
But the nature of the alleged grant derives its preliminary ' importance from the character of the estate implied by the language of the granting act. In Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall., 476, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the rule as to when a remainder vested and said:
“ Where a remainder is limited to take effect in possession, if ever, immediately upon the determination of a particular estate, which estate is to determine by an event that must unavoidably happen by the effkix of time, the remainder vests as soon as the remainderman is in esse and ascertained, provided, etc.”
In the case at bar the Indian estate could not be determined (according to the Supreme Court) except by a voluntary
Parenthetically, the railroad can hardly claim that the Government plea of the Indian right is wanting in that exalted morality which the railroad claims for itself. While it is true that governments may break treaties and that our own Government has occasionally exercised the right to terminate protocols and like obligations with foreign governments as well as with our domestic tribes, the political power never does so except for the best of reasons and for causes plainly declared in unambiguous language. There are no instances where governments promise to break treaties; otherwise they would not be made.
The established rule of construction is that where there is uncertainty of the right of enjoyment the remainder is a contingent and not a vested remainder. While the Supreme Court in Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S., 331, dealt solely with the question of the original jurisdiction of the appellate tribunal in a case involving these very lands, there is contained in the opinion of that court the statement that if the allotments made to the individuals of these tribes should be taken from them (as a part of the relief sought by the bill then before the court) the United States would be subject to a demand from them for the value of the lands taken or for other lands involved. It is plain, then, that
There are cases where out of the terms of an express contract an implied obligation arises and becomes part of the contract itself. For example, in every lease there is, unless excluded by the operation of some express covenant or agreement, an implied obligation on the part of the lessee to so use the property as not unnecessarily to injure it. Obligations implied against citizens will be implied against the United States, but the circumstances must be the same, United States v. Bostwick, 94 U. S., 58. The principle also obtains that if a precedent act is to be performed at a certain time or -place and a strict performance of it is prevented by the absence of the party who has a right to claim it, nonperformance of the condition can not be pleaded. Williams v. Bank, 2 Pet., 76. But to say that the language used in the act of July 25,1866, raised an implied obligation on the part of the Government to extinguish titles and make the lands public lands for the benefit of this railroad is also to say that Congress committed the Government to a gross breach of public faith with the occupants of the lands at the time of the passage of the act. The Government did not do that. There was no pledge given by the United States by this grant as in Buttz v. Northern Pacific R. R., 119 U. S., 57, where it appeared that there was a stipulation for extinguishment and the Sioux had retired from the lands by agreement with the United States. The circumstances are too essentially different for any court to say that an implied contract could possibly grow out of language designed to prevent the contention for the thing now asserted.
This heritable and sacred right has from time to time been emphasized by the policy of the Government in making treaties with aboriginal occupants. The primitive control of the uses made of these lands passed by the treaties with the civilized tribes from the communal owners and became lodged in the government of the nations for the use of their members.
In Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall., 211, the court said that it was not important as between the parties in that case whether the title in dispute “ was a fee simple or an Indian title of occupancy or some other title,” but that the Indian tribes were capable of talcing as owners in fee simple lands by purchase where the United States in form, for a valuable and declared consideration, sold such land to them. Considering that the civilized tribes yielded their possessions east of the Mississippi River for lands which they now occupy under treaties with the United States guaranteeing possession of the lands so occupied at the present time, the consideration was given because the treaties declared a consideration.
In Leavenworth R. R. v. United States, 92 U. S., 733, the court said that upon every principle of natural right lands dedicated to the Indian use should be carefully guarded by the Government and saved from a possible grant, and that “ as the transfer of any part of an Indian reservation secured by treaty would involve a gross breach of public faith the presumption is conclusive that Congress never meant to grant it:”
In Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U. S., 437, the court declared that as nothing could be inferred against the State,
In Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U. S., 656, the court valued tribal patents from the United States as the equivalent of holding the lands in fee simple, saying that the lands of the Cherokee Nation, like lands held by private owners everywhere within the geographical limits of the United States, were held subject to the authority of the General Government in the exercise of the right of eminent domain to take them for such objects as were germane to the execution of the powers granted to it, provided only that the lands were not taken without just compensation being made to the owner.
The statutes of the Cherokees, for example, afforded evidence of a status, by virtue of treaties, somewhat different from the rights enjoyed by the aboriginal occupants. While the title to the lands passed from the communal owners and became lodged in the Indian governments for the use of the members of the tribe, these statutes were adopted under treaties for the better government of the individual Indians through the agencies of their own governments. In affirming this court in the case of Journeycake, 28 C. Cls. R., 302; 155 U. S., 206, the Supreme Court referred to the lands patented to the Cherokee Nation and said that the millions of acres of land appropriately styled common property of the Cherokee Nation and known as its public domain belonged to the Cherokees as a nation and that “ the public domain of the Cherokee Nation is analogous to the public lands of the United States or the demesne lands of the
In the case of The Delawares, 38 C. Cls. R,., 249, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court, it was said by this court that the Cherokee Nation, in the policy of their national development, had granted a fee simple in one part of their country as to the rights of those members of the tribe desiring a change of their habitat and to another, depending on the location of the grant, a different tenure of right or estate, and that they were within the terms of one grant and omitted as to the other.
In Spaulding v. Chandler, 160 U. S., 406, the Supreme Court referred to certain orders relating to an Indian reserve and declared that the operation of those orders was clearly postponed until after the extinguishment of the reserve either by a voluntary cession to the Government, a cession or abandonment of the use, or the arbitrary exercise by Congress of its power to appropriate the lands. I am not unmindful of the case of Fleming v. McCurtain, 215 U. S., 56, where it was decided that a treaty conveying a tract to the Choctaw Indians in fee simple to them and their descendents was a grant to the Choctaw Nation only; and that it did not create a trust for the individuals then comprising the nation and their respective descendants. In that case, however, it was made to appear that plaintiffs did not claim under any title to be derived from the statute providing for distribution according to the rolls of citizenship, nor did the bill attempt to bring plaintiffs within any grant later than the treaty and patent discussed by the court.
In the case at bar Congress manifested a clear purpose to abide by its treaties with the occupants of these lands at the time of the passage of the act of July 25, 1866. Taking the occurrences altogether, the purpose was made plain that there was no intent to take advantage of any of the tribes. The proof of this intent is found in that requirement that before the railroad company could secure even the right of way through the lands from the Kansas line to the Texas border the consent of the occupants had first to be obtained unless the government reserved the right to grant
In reassuming the obligations of previous treaties with the Cherokees and the other three tribes contemporaneous with the passage of the alleged grant to the railroad, Congress manifested a clear pui'pose to grant nothing except by the consent of the tribes.
Thus, by Article XI of the new treaty with the Cherokee Nation the United States stipulated that the road when built and operated should be subject to the Indian trade and intercourse laws, and by the treaty itself the concession of the Cherokees only embraced a right of way not exceeding 200 feet wide except at stations, switches, water stations, or river crossings, where more land might be indispensable, and then only 200 feet additional was provided to be taken if reserved by treaty, and by consent if not.
By the new treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws the United States also stipulated for a right of way through their lands to any company or companies authorized by Congress to undertake to construct roads through those nations, and when constructed such railroads were to be sub-' ject to the laws relating to intercourse with Indian tribes.
The United States by its new treaty with the Creek Nation stipulated for the right of way through their lands to any company duly authorized by Congress, but subjecting the road and its employees, as in the other cases, to the laws relating to intercourse with the Indian tribes.
By section 8 of the act of July 25, 1866, this Kansas & Neosho Valley Bailway was authorized to extend and construct its road as stated in the petition with right of way through the Indian Territory wherever such right is now
“That said Kansas City & Neosho Valley Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, shall have the right to negotiate with and acquire from any Indian nation or tribe authorized by the United States to dispose of lands for railroad purposes, and from any other nation or tribe of Indians through whose lands said railroad may pass, subject to the approval of the President of the United States, or from any company or parties incorporated or authorized for such purposes, by such nation or tribe, or which such Parties may have acquired under the laws of the United tates.”
The United States by its new treaty with the Cherokees in article 20 provided that whenever the Cherokee National Council should request it the Secretary of the Interior should cause the country reserved for the Cberokees to be surveyed and allotted among them at the expense of the United States.
By its new treaty with the Chickasaws and Choctaws it was provided in section 2 of article 1 that the lands occupied by those treaties, as described in the treaty of 1855, were held in common, that it would promote the civilization of said nations, and be to their best interests to have their lands allotted to individual members of the tribe in sever-alty. It was further provided by articles 11 to 36, inclusive, that their lands should be allotted in severalty and surveys
“ All lands selected as herein provided shall thereafter be held in severalty by the respective parties, and the unselected lands shall be the common property of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in their corporate capacities, subject to the joint control of their legislative authorities.”
In Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S., 402, the Supreme Court alluded to allotments made in severalty and as containing something attempted more than a provision for the material wants of the Indians and declared it to be a duty for the Government “to secure to the Indians all that by any fair construction of treaty or statute can be held to have been understood by them or intended by Congress.”
It is impossible to resist the conclusion that there was nothing in the nature of an absolute grant to the plaintiff company creating contractual rights or to believe that the Government bound itself to extinguish the Indian title or to make their lands a part of the public domain of the United States.
How can it be said in view of the language of these treaties that there was any promise to any railroad to break other obligations for the benefit of a private company acquiring large bodies of land elsewhere and building roads to join with those being built in Texas northward?
But while the railroad admits that its title is derived from the ninth section of the act of July 25, 1866, counsel also contend that section 11 is fundamental and established the consideration for the grant or promise contained in section 9, which, when duly performed, made the grant or promise binding and irrevocably freed from any other conditions or restrictions than those contained in section 9. They deny that the proviso in section 1 applies to the language of the grant claimed under section 9 declaring that the reference in section 1 relates to the area of the grant alone. But the area is definitely fixed by section 9 “ not to exceed the ratio per mile granted in the first section of this act.” The proviso to section 1 is as follows:
“ Provided, That any and all lands heretofore reserved to the United States by any act of Congress, or in any other*112 manner by competent authority, for the purpose of aiding in any object of internal improvement or other purpose whatever, be, and the same are hereby, reserved and excepted from the operation of this act, except so far as it may be found necessary to locate the route of said road through said reserved lands, in which case a right of way 200 feet in width is hereby granted, subject to the approval of the President of the United States.”
As all the lands in the Indian Territory had already been reserved to the occupants, and that, too, by treaty, there was nothing upon which section 9 could operate until the Indian title would be extinguished and likewise until the land became a part of the public- lands. On this point I think the contention of the Government is sound. The reference in section 9 can not be made to apply to a single part or portion, but must be applied as far as possible to section 1 in its entirety, including each and every proviso forming a part of section 1. Taking the two sections and construing them together in the light of the treaty obligations assumed by the United States to the occupants, the purpose of Congress in incorporating the reference in section 9 was to throw around these occupants additional safeguards for their continued, permanent use of the lands, and were designed to exclude the construction of the terms of the alleged grant for which the plaintiff company is now contending.
The exception created by the proviso of section 9 is practically claimed to be without meaning, if the statement be true that by the doctrine of relation the title acquired by the grant became specific and related back to the date of the grant when the road was located and built and surveyed. The effect "of this argument, if true, would be to wipe out the two conditions.
Again, it is contended that the extinguishment of the Indian title made the lands part of the public lands of the United States. If so, what would be the occasion for the use of the second condition as a separate proposition ?
The title of an act can not be used to extend or to restrain any positive provisions contained in the body of an act. The title is only useful when the meaning of statutory provisions be doubtful and even then is of little weight. Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wall., 107; Goodlett v. Louisville
Considering the obligations of the treaties and their scope, that the real interest in the lands as a permanent home had been conferred upon the individual occupants; that the organized national tribal governments held the patents for the actual use of the memberships of the four nations, the purpose of the United States was at the time of the passage of the act of July 25, 1866, as reasonably certain as when but recently the Supreme Court decided that by the act of April 26, 1906, 34 Stat., 137, Congress had not released control over the lands occupied by one of these tribes (the other three being on the same footing), notwithstanding the bestowal of citizenship upon the individuals. Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U. S., 287. By the allotments there was no such extinguishment of the title of the beneficiaries in the occupancy of the lands as will permit plaintilf now to be heard to say that the first condition of the act of July 25, 1866, has been met. The subsequent legislation of Congress relating to these titles, and which counsel say can not affect the case, not only can but must be considered to assist in the interpretation of the prior legislation — a rule which the court must follow, as the Supreme Court has said in the last case cited.
The second condition set forth in the act of July 25, 1866, is of equally large import. Before this grant could take effect the lands asserted under the grant had to become public lands. But it is argued that “nothing can be clearer” than that Congress meant in the act of July 25, 1866, that when the tribal Indian title was extinguished, nothing else having supervened, the lands would be public lands of the United States, and that nothing else ever did supervene; and that in fact they were, immediately upon the extin-guishment of the Indian title, used as public lands, subject to the uncontrolled exercise of the absolute power of the United States. But this uncontrolled and absolute power of
The Government exercised the conceded power by virtue of the relation of the United States to the four tribes in their corporate capacity to convert the national tribal title to the use of the individuals of the tribes. The United States thereby abrogated the relation involved in the national or tribal holding in favor of the original beneficiaries. It has already been pointed out that the lands comprise the national domain of the tribes in their corporate capacity. It was corporate property of the Indian governments limited to uses of the individuals which made those governments a necessity for the welfare of the Individual occupants.
If, for the sake of the argument, it be conceded that the Indian title was extinguished, it does not follow that the lands did thereby become public lands, because the extin-guishment of the tribal title and the lands becoming public lands are not synonomous terms. The soil was not subject to absolute disposal of the United States without ignoring treaty rights which the occupants never supposed they could be called on to surrender. The condition that the lands should first become public lands is a separate and independent condition with but one meaning. To become public lands within the meaning of the act of July 25, 1866, the Government would have had to exclude the occupants from the alternate sections claimed under the grant and open these lands to public entry. That result was clearly never contemplated, because Congress knew and claimant also knew that there were outstanding patent rights which Congress reserved to deal with according to exigencies of public policy for the interests of the individuals of the nations who held the patents. These patents were in the nature of quitclaims of the United States subject to the rights of
It is claimed that at the time of the alleged grant there was in force an act passed in 1864, 13 Stat., 41; sec. 2115, R. S., which provided that:
“ Whenever it becomes necessary to survey any Indian or other reservations, or any lands, the same shall be surveyed under the direction and control of the General Land Office, and as nearly as may be in conformity to the rules and regulations under which other public lands are surveyed.”
This statute does not specifically declare that the lands patented to the civilized tribes were public lands of the United States. Public lands are subject to preemption. These lands were not. The allotments certainly were not. The proceeds of the lands not needed for allotments were reserved for the occupants pursuant to the higher obligations stated.
The requirement of the proviso that the grant was not complete until these patented' lands to the Indian occupants were made public lands of the United States was a legislative declaration and absolute notice that they were not public lands when the granting act was passed, but had to become so, if at all, by subsequent legislation.
While learned counsel contend that it will not do to apply the ordinary technical rules and definitions found in other cases involving public lands to a case like this, they also concede that the use of the phrase “public lands” is not governed by an ironclad and inflexible definition, but that it depends upon the facts of each particular case. In Union Pacific Co. v. Harris et al., 215 U. S., 386, the Supreme Court said:
“What is meant by ‘public lands’ is well settled. As stated in Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S., 763, ‘The words “public lands” are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general law.’ ”
That case also recited that if in any given case the words are used in a different meaning it should be apparent either from the context or from the circumstances attending the legislation; and “while the power of Congress over lands
It is insisted finally that the conditions precedent can not be insisted upon to defeat the railroad claim (if it be
There are cases of private right where it appears that if a party to a contract who is entitled to the benefit of a condition upon the performance of which responsibility is to arise dispense with or, by act of his own, prevent the performance, the opposite party is excused from proving a strict compliance with the condition. These cases, however, rest upon contracts containing covenants by the grantor to bring about the event on the happening of which his obligation depends or covenants necessarily implied from the terms of the agreements of the parties.'
It does not follow that this statutory grant, if it be considered as a grant at all, can be construed as comprising a covenant “that after a reasonable time the Indian title” should be extinguished, or that the lands should become public lands so far as necessary to effectuate the grant. The proposition of learned counsel that the granting act contains implied covenants of any such character is a mistake. The Government did not disable itself by the grant from keeping the occupants and their descendants on the land at will. The treaties provided that the United States could do that very thing. Congress did not intend, and by the terms of the granting act did not surrender the constitutional power of the Government to maintain the occupancy of those in possession. With notice of contemporaneous action providing for such dealing with the land as made it a matter of doubt whether the statutory grant could ever be effectuated, it is but fair to say that the railroad was neither misled nor deceived; that the railroad interest knew that the claim of the road was too remote and uncertain for purposes of credit at any time, and that the road would be built, and was expected to be built, by the aid of its grants of land elsewhere. It is reasonable to assume, considering the situation and the conditions imposed, that the agents of the company took chances as to the ultimate action of the Government.
Section 27 of that act provides that the lands belonging to the four tribes shall not become public lands, but shall be held in trust by the United States for the use and benefit of the members. All acts inconsistent with this section being expressly repealed, can it be said that the claim is justiciable ?
There is no middle ground to take as between the contention of learned counsel for the railroad that the allotment proceedings beginning with the creation of the Dawes Commission and closing with the act last mentioned (including several intermediate acts) are acts of outright repudiation or are statutes which Congress had the power to enact and the President to approve.
Congress may not break the contracts of the Government where rights have become vested. On the other hand, the discharge of political duties intrusted by the Constitution to the political departments of the Government can not be the proper subject of'complaint by an appeal to the courts.
Underlying all the subsequent legislation leading up to the act last mentioned (which in itself is a legislative construction of direct application in the dispute relating to the nature of the grant in this cause) are treaties between this Government as the sovereign and the four nations of red men. While the construction of treaties is the province of the judiciary, and certain rights under treaties can not be affected by legislation, cases arising under treaties of a purely political character may be the subject of legislative action. In Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall., 160, it was held that patents of the United States for land which it had previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated are void. At the time of this grant the plenary power of the legislative body was ample-to determine that patents other than those being confirmed for Indian uses might issue and
The history of the Government’s dealings with the property in controversy shows that these lands were reserved from the beginning from the public lands which were to be sold, and that from the time the occupants were put upon these reservations it was never intended that any part of that country should be sold as public lands. The lands were patented to organized civil tribal governments created by direction of Congress pursuant to a great public policy for the benefit of the coming generations of individuals of a class. The patents rested on treaties made with tribal governments as agencies for the individuals in interest. In every treaty and by repeated declaration of intention the Government committed itself to the policy of maintaining and protecting the full membership in their posession.' Property 'of these tribes was withdrawn from the operation of state laws. It was not the subject of taxation so long as tribal organization continued to be recognized by the political department. The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall., 73. When the treaty-making system with domestic Indians was abandoned in 1871 Congress provided (sec. 2079, E. S.) that “ no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.”
As with treaties made with foreign nations, Chinese Exclusion case, 130 U. S., 600, the legislative power has the right to pass laws in conflict with treaties made with the Indians. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S., 553. But
And in the case of Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, supra, the court quoted from a Senate document to the effect that “ the title to these lands is held by the tribe in trust' for the people.”
As the plenary authority over the occupants of these lands has always been deemed a political power not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the Government,, the claim of this railroad, as I see it, is not within the power of the court to aid. Its right never vested sufficiently for the courts to say that Congress did not reserve the power of control enough to make the grant effective without the consent of the occupants or to carry out the promises of the treaties without the consent of the railroad because there were no covenants expressed or implied to either extinguish the Indian title or to open the lands to the public except for Indian uses.
The action of Congress carrying out the treaties of the Government with the occupants of these lands was in no sense the repudiation of an implied promise to the railroad, because no promise could be im/plied against the right of the Government to deal with the manner, time, and conditions of extinguishing the titles outstanding at the time of the grant. These were matters exclusively for the consideration of the Government and can not be interfered with nor put in contest by private parties. Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 119 U. S., 55.
This court is without authority to entertain jurisdiction on the demand of plaintiff for a money judgment for the
Sec. 8. And he it further enacted, That said Kansas & Neosho Valley Railroad Co., its successors and assigns, is hereby authorized and empowered to extend and construct its railroad from the southern boundary of Kansas south, through the Indian Territory, to. Red Riyer, at or near Preston, in the State of Texas, so as to connect with the railway now being constructed from Galveston to a point at or near Preston, in said State, and the right of way through the Indian Territory, wherever such right is now reserved or may hereafter be reserved to the united States by treaty with the Indian tribes, is hereby granted to said company, to the same extent as granted by the sixth section of this act, through the public lands; and in all cases where the right of way, as aforesaid, through the Indian lands shall not be reserved to the Government, the said company shall, before constructing its road, procure the consent of the tribe or tribes interested, which consent, with all its terms and conditions, shall be previously approved and endorsed by the President and filed with the Secretary of the Interior.
Sac. 9. And he it further enacted, That the same grants of lands through the Indian Territory are hereby made as provided in the first section of this act, whenever the Indian title shall be extinguished by treaty or otherwise, not to exceed the ratio per mile granted in the first section of this act: Provided, That said lands become a part of the public lands of the united States.
Sec. 10. And he it further enacted, That said Kansas & Neosho Valley Railroad Co., its successors and assigns, shall have the right to negotiate with and acquire from any Indian nation or tribe, authorized by the United States to dispose of lands for railroad purposes, and from any other nation or tribe of Indians through whose lands said railroad may pass, subject to the approval of the President of the United States, or from any company or parties incorporated or authorized. for such purposes, by such nation or tribe, or which such parties may have acquired under the laws of the United States.
Sec. 11. And he it further enacted, That any railroad company chartered under any law of the United States, or of the State of Kansas, which may have been heretofore or shall hereafter be recognized and subsidized by any act of Congress of the United States, may connect, unite, and consolidate with this railroad company, after the same shall be located to the valley of the Neosho River, upon just, fair, and equitable terms, to be agreed upon
