Case Information
*1 17 ‐ 4023 ‐ cv (L)
U NITED S TATES C OURT OF A PPEALS F OR THE S ECOND C IRCUIT August Term
(Argued: May Decided: March 2020) Docket Nos. ‐ ‐ cv (L); ‐ ‐ cv (Con); ‐ ‐ cv (Con) E LIYAHU M IRLIS ,
Plaintiff ‐ Appellee , L AWRENCE D RESSLER ,
Interested Party Appellee , ‐ against ‐
D ANIEL G REER , R ABBI , Y ESHIVA OF N EW H AVEN , I NC .,
Defendants Appellants , A VIAD H ACK ,
Appellant.
O N A PPEAL FROM THE U NITED S TATES D ISTRICT C OURT
F OR THE D ISTRICT OF C ONNECTICUT
Before: C HIN C ARNEY Circuit Judges S ANNES , District Judge . [*]
Appeal from final judgment United States District Court for District Connecticut (Shea, J. ), following jury trial, awarding plaintiff ‐ appellee $21,749,041.10 compensatory damages, punitive damages, interest against his former high school its chief administrator. Plaintiff ‐ appellee alleged administrator sexually abused him for several years student high school. Defendants ‐ appellees appeal, asserting error (1) instructions; (2) its rulings respect administrator Amendment against self ‐ incrimination; (3) its denial new trial remittitur basis award $15 million compensatory damages excessive; (4) denial motion for relief judgment based newly discovered evidence.
A FFIRMED .
A NTONIO P ONVERT III, Koskoff Koskoff & Bieder, P.C., Bridgeport, Connecticut, Plaintiff Appellee . L AWRENCE D RESSLER pro se New Haven, Connecticut, Interested Party Appellee . *3 D AVID T. G RUDBERG Carmody Torrance Sandak & Hennessey LLP, New Haven, Connecticut, for Defendants ‐ Appellants .
Steven J. Errante, Lynch, Traub, Keefe & Errante P.C., New Haven, Connecticut, for Appellant . C HIN Circuit Judge
: this diversity case, plaintiff ‐ appellee Eliyahu sued
defendants appellees Daniel Greer and Yeshiva New Haven, Inc. ( Yeshiva ʺ ), high school, alleging Greer, rabbi former chief administrator Yeshiva, sexually abused him several years while student high school. At conclusion trial, awarded $15 million in compensatory damages, thereafter district court awarded $5 million in punitive damages interest $1,749,041.10, total award $21,749,041.10. appeal, principally four grounds: (1)
district court erred in charging invocation his Fifth Amendment against self incrimination; (2) abused its discretion handling Amendment rights; (3) erred refusing order new trial remittitur light *4 size of award of compensatory damages; and (4) erred in denying defendants ʹ motion relief from judgment based newly discovered evidence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts
On appeal following a verdict, we view facts case in light most favorable prevailing party. Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc ., F.3d 192, (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Promisel First Am. Artificial Flowers, Inc ., 251, (2d Cir. 1991)).
Greer is a rabbi and has been, at various times, dean, director, treasurer, president board directors Yeshiva, an orthodox Jewish high school in New Haven, Connecticut. Mirlis a student at Fall until Spring During time, fourteen seventeen years old, sexually abused him frequent, certain points weekly, basis, sometimes hours time. recalled, inter alia supplied him alcohol engaged kissing, oral *5 anal sex, and mutual masturbation, several locations New Haven, including Yeshiva, motels, and Greer home, as well as Philadelphia.
Mirlis suffered physical, emotional, and psychological injuries as result Greer sexual abuse. The lasting effect abuse was corroborated by his wife and his clinical psychologist. For example, Mirlis and his wife frequently argued over his continuing relationship with during their marriage, and she believed emotionally detached and unable to trust form relationships with others. Mirlis psychologist, specialist post ‐ traumatic stress disorder ( PTSD ʺ ) and childhood trauma related physical, emotional, sexual abuse, conducted forensic interview Mirlis. He concluded shut off emotionally, had lost his sense trust, had difficulty with intimacy vulnerability, continued suffer PTSD, would continue struggle PTSD throughout lifetime.
II. District Court Proceedings
A. Pre Trial
On May commenced this action alleging had sexually abused him administrators had knowledge but failed report law enforcement required Connecticut *6 law. In his third amended complaint, filed May 8, 2017, asserted causes of action for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Yeshiva; recklessness and intentional infliction emotional distress against Greer Yeshiva; and sexual assault and battery against Greer.
Prior to trial, moved an order precluding calling him witness because planned to invoke Fifth Amendment privilege, the grounds the claims sexual misconduct could give rise to criminal charges against him. At pretrial conference May denied the motion, without prejudice, to right object specific questions where Fifth Amendment before jury becomes
cumulative, wastes time, or probative value [the evidence] is substantially outweighed by danger unfair prejudice.
App x 65; see also D. Ct. Dkt. No. (minute order). addition, requested
instruct been asserted [by Greer] variety reasons, including reasons unrelated [his] guilt innocence any matters related this case, could choose totally disregard assertion Amendment Mr. Greer. App x His request denied.
B. Trial
At trial, at the start his direct examination response to questions from Mirlis counsel, Greer acknowledged that at his deposition he had refused to testify about allegations that he sexually abused Mirlis at or was responsible ʺ covering up allowing sexual at the school ʺ because he believed the answers could incriminate him. D. Ct. Doc. No. at 41. also indicated that he would invoke privilege throughout trial. Soon thereafter, agreed that he had invoked privilege deposition when he was asked whether he had produced documents that pertain to Rabbi sexual relationship with Eli any underage children. ʺ Id. ‐ 44. He then invoked when asked whether denying [he] assaulted Eli [Mirlis] child. Id .
At point, issued following instruction: A witness has right under Fifth Amendment to Constitution decline to answer questions ground doing so may tend incriminate him.
However, you may, but are required to, infer from such refusal answer would been adverse witness ʹ interest interest any parties case who are closely associated with witness. You should consider any inference you may choose draw refusal testify Amendment grounds together all other *8 in case. The law requires witness, if he going to invoke his rights under Amendment, to do so with regard to specific questions. And, therefore, it may be necessary [counsel] to ask a series questions, and it necessary witness, if he chooses to do so, to invoke rights with regard to each question.
Id. at 47.
The direct examination continued, and Greer answered many questions about a variety topics. But when he was asked questions about whether he engaged in sexual misconduct with Mirlis while Mirlis was a minor student at related questions, Greer repeatedly invoked privilege advice counsel. Meanwhile, counsel requested a standing objection line questioning. court, however, ruled *9 objections had to follow each question. thereafter overruled several additional objections from Greer ʹ s counsel, but it eventually sustained the objections as it determined that the questions had become cumulative. Id. Subsequently, Mirlis ʹ s counsel referred to Greer ʹ s the on cross examination and during summation. addition to Greer testimony, presented other extensive sexual abuse him the impact it had on him, including own testimony as well as the testimony his wife, his psychologist,
Aviad Hack (a former assistant principal who testified via deposition he aware but not report that he also had sexual relationship with began student).
At close evidence, during charge to jury, the instructed with respect to Fifth Amendment follows: A witness has right under Fifth Amendment to Constitution decline to answer questions ground doing so may tend incriminate him.
However, you may, but are required to, infer from such refusal answer would been adverse witness interest interest any parties case who are closely associated witness. You should consider any inference you may choose draw refusal testify *10 Amendment grounds together with all other in case. D. Ct. Dkt. No. 233 450 ‐ 51. jury reached verdict in favor of Mirlis each claim
awarded compensatory damages $15 million. It also found punitive damages should assessed against both Yeshiva. D. Ct. Dkt. No.
C. Post ‐ Trial
On June 6, 2017, entered judgment, awarding, in addition award $15 million in compensatory damages, $5 million in punitive damages (calculated in accordance with Connecticut common law as amount attorneys ʹ fees, representing one ‐ third award) as well $1,749,041.10 offer ‐ compromise interest (in accordance Conn. Gen. Stat. § 192a), for total award $21,749,041.10 favor against Yeshiva.
Pursuant Federal Rule Civil Procedure 59(a), filed motion new trial, alternative, remittitur June *11 28, They argued the evidence presented at trial simply cannot support the jury ʹ s exorbitant verdict in this case, which is dramatically out of step non ‐ economic damage awards juries in cases involving similar claims of sexual abuse, both Connecticut and throughout the country. D. Ct. Doc. No. Attachment #1. Later, on October 27, 2017, Greer and Yeshiva filed motion relief from final judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2), arguing new form of testimony from former teacher Yeshiva would undermine credibility Hack would likely led different verdict had it been presented trial. On December 2017, ruling bench, district court denied both motions.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Greer challenge (1) instructions on invocation privilege; (2) handling Greer privilege; (3) denial their motion new trial remittitur based purported excessiveness compensatory *12 damages award; (4) the denial of their motion relief judgment based on newly discovered evidence. We discuss each issue in turn.
I. Jury Instruction Amendment Privilege acknowledge that the district court jury
instruction set forth ʺ correct statement law ‐‐ at least part. ʺ Defs. Apps. Br. 15. They argue, however, more extensive instructions were warranted given ʺ controversial emotional nature allegations sexual minor this case. Id. particular, they contend should included language effect have been asserted [by Greer] variety reasons, including reasons unrelated [his] guilt or innocence any matters related this case. ʺ App x 54; see Defs. ‐ Apps. Br. We are persuaded.
A. Applicable Law
We review instructions jury
de novo
.
Uzoukwu City New York
(2d Cir. 2015). ʺ Jury instructions are erroneous if they mislead do adequately inform jury law.
Id.
For verdict set aside based an erroneous charge, appellant must show error prejudicial light charge
*13
whole. ʺ
E.g.
,
Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc
.,
In Brink Inc. v. City New York , we upheld admission witnesses ʹ invocations where court instructed jury that ʺ witness ha[s] a constitutional right to decline to answer ground it may tend to incriminate him [and] you may, but need not, infer such refusal answers would have been adverse to witness ʹ interest. F.2d (2d Cir. 1983) (alterations original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. Md. , n.5 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding instruction proper where stated [a] witness has constitutional right decline answer grounds it might tend incriminate him draw an inference against party ʺ ); Leonard B. Sand et al. Modern Federal Jury Instructions: Civil Instruction (2019) ( ʺ [I]n civil cases, you are permitted, but required, draw inference withheld information would have been unfavorable defendant. ).
We addressed whether party witness suffers prejudice adverse inference instruction regarding privilege. Woods START *14 Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc ., we held that the party suffered ʺ acute prejudice ʺ where the jury instructions included language permitting the jury to infer that, but the assertion of the privilege, the party would have answered ʺ yes ʺ asked whether she had been accused of unethical conduct. See 864 F.3d (2d Cir. 2017). In Woods the district court instruction effectively directed the jury adopt the negative inference. Noting the questionable probative value of the adverse inferences there, we held that admission of the invocations the instruction were improper.
B. Application
We conclude that the court instruction here neither erroneous nor unfairly prejudicial.
As claim error, advised the jurors that they may, but are not required to, infer ʺ ʺ answer would have been adverse [his] interest. ʺ D. Ct. Doc. 15. *15 This instruction an accurate statement the law was not materially different adverse inference instruction we approved Brink . And while desired additional language advise jury ability ʺ totally disregard assertion Fifth Amendment by [] Greer, ʺ App x 54, there is no requirement that jury instructions be favorable party, see Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A ., F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 1994) ( ʺ While more specific instruction might have been helpful, there is no basis concluding given misleading or inaccurate impression law. ʺ ); see also Coquina Invs. v. TD Bank, N.A ., F.3d n.8 (11th Cir. 2014) ( ʺ [W]hen instructions, taken together, properly express law applicable case, there is no error even though an isolated clause may be inaccurate, ambiguous, incomplete otherwise subject criticism. ʺ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fid. & Deposit Co. Md. F.3d (holding err cautioning Amendment may invoked an innocent party ); cf. United States Green (4th Cir. 2010) (holding even though ʺʹ more specific instruction might have been desirable ʹʺ proposed instruction more adequately presented defense theory, does *16 not abuse its discretion where defendant ʹ s proposed instructions were clearly covered by the district court instruction (citation omitted)). Greer do not cite any example case where the instruction they requested was actually given.
As claim prejudice, district court instruction the jury not prejudicial. Unlike Woods where instruction suggested that should assume negative inference, instruction here not invite prejudice against implying that silence should construed an outright admission. Accordingly, district instruction proper.
II. Invocation Privilege does dispute relevance questions concerning incidents sexual against Mirlis, but argues series questions elicited were cumulative unduly prejudicial, erred decision prohibit, reasonably limit, questioning about critical potentially inflammatory allegations sexual abuse. Defs. Apps. Br. We hold abuse discretion admitting evidence ʹ s invocation privilege manner it did.
A. Applicable Law
ʺ We review discretion ʹ s admission into evidence witness invocation Fifth Amendment. ʺ
Woods
,
Relevant evidence, however, may excluded ʺ if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger . . . unfair prejudice . . . needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. ʺ Fed. R. Evid. 403. ʺ While [the analysis under Rule 403] is case specific, mere fact a Fifth Amendment invocation is ʹ damning ʹ to a party ʹ s position does preclude its introduction, ʺ but invocations cross line ʹ inflammatory ʹ are more likely fail under Rule
650 Fifth Ave.
,
As function discretion under Rule controls form which evidence privilege invocation reaches jury. Id. 171 72 (distinguishing between content form respect admission evidence witnesses invoked privilege); Rad Servs., Inc. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co ., F.2d (3d Cir. 1986). And dramatization party ʹ s presentation ʺ tip[] Rule scale from ʹ damning ʹ inflammatory. ʹʺ Ave. (quoting Brink ʹ F.2d 710) . dissent Brink foreshadowed issue factfinders being induced draw prejudicial adverse inferences witness privilege counsel sharp practice conducting systematic interrogation witnesses direct examination . . . know[ing] they will assert *19 against self ‐ incrimination. ʺ F.2d at (Winter, J. dissenting). One principal concern was that party would ask fact ‐ specific, leading questions ʺ designed to suggest to the jury but the privilege the answer each case would been ʹ yes ʹʺ ʺ inevitably invite[] jurors to give evidentiary weight to questions rather than answers. ʺ Id. at 716. dissent was also concerned the strategy would ʺ effectively den[y] right cross ‐ examination since the witness cannot even made explain why privilege has been invoked, much less contradict intended inference. Id. On other hand, it precisely these kinds questions ‐‐ fact specific, leading questions ‐‐ majority Brink held were permissible. Id. (dissent quoting questions).
We revisited issue surrounding dramatization witness Fifth Avenue. There, permitted Government present videotapes witnesses, who testify trial, ʺ declining answer question after question during their depositions. ʺ Ave. We held parad[ing] videotapes, which Government strategically spread out across multiple days trial, substantially more prejudicial redundant than probative because [t]he videotapes repeatedly reminded witnesses ʹ decisions *20 testify ʺ ʺ repeatedly put Government incriminating questions jurors ʹ minds ‐‐ questions parties agreed were evidence that court allowed Government submit as an exhibit. Id. evaluating risk of unfair prejudice that may result
manner which party introduces his evidence, we may compare course of action against evidentiary alternatives. Id. (reasoning could employed [s]ubstantially less prejudicial redundant alternatives ʺ such stipulation more limited showing of videotape evidence witnesses ʹ invocation privilege); accord Fed. R. Evid. advisory committee note proposed rules ( ʺ availability other means proof may also be an appropriate factor deciding whether exclude grounds unfair prejudice); Old Chief United States U.S. (1997) (holding probative value evidence calculated comparing evidentiary alternatives ).
B. Application
Because concede relevant, we focus whether elicitation evidence trial withstands scrutiny under Rule It does. While *21 invocation privilege against self ‐ incrimination was surely damning, ʺ it was not unfairly prejudicial, did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence in manner it did.
First, was highly probative. His refusal to answer such basic questions as whether he forced Mirlis to sex with him when Mirlis was child is telling. ʺ Silence is often evidence most persuasive character. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod , U.S. 54 (1923) (quoted approval Baxter , U.S. 319).
Second, there was substantial independent evidence to corroborate inference. See Baxter U.S. ( ʺ [T]he Amendment does forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify response probative evidence offered against them. ʺ ); Doe ex rel. Rudy ‐ Glanzer Glanzer (9th Cir. 2000) ( ʺ [A]n adverse inference can drawn independent evidence exists fact which party refuses answer. ). Of course, testified painful detail as abuse him; subjected cross examination, believed him. There other well, including assistant principal testimony. Clearly, base decision solely *22 Greer refusal testify. See Cerro Gordo Charity Fireman Fund Am. Life Ins. Co ., (8th Cir. 1987).
Third, the district court gave the limiting instructions during Greer testimony again at the end the trial. Indeed, after Greer had answered few questions about whether he had invoked the privilege deposition whether he intended invoke the privilege trial, he asserted privilege only once before the court intervened give limiting instruction. After Greer invoked privilege few more times, reminded [s]ame instruction as before. D. Ct. Doc. No. And soon thereafter, sustained objection grounds questions had become cumulative. Mirlis counsel ceased asking questions about sexual assaults.
Fourth, Greer asserted privilege inconsistently. He answered many questions, including questions inquiring as whether he had sexually abused he student. For instance, shortly after invoking privilege, denied had sexually abused woods in Hamden. also invoked response questions no apparent implication had engaged criminal conduct, such *23 whether taught religious secular studies. As the district court observed, the was likely swayed by ʺ Greer ʹ s selective invocation of his rights rather than by his assertion of the [privilege]. ʺ D. Ct. Doc. No. at 28. Fifth Avenue where Government presented parade of
videotapes, ʺ ʺ spread out across multiple days trial, of witnesses their depositions refusing answer question after question, we concluded district court ʹ s failure moderate Government ʹ s extreme tactic was an abuse discretion. Avenue 172. Here, use invocation privilege was not extreme, district court in fact moderated presentation evidence. Accordingly, we conclude discretion in permitting in circumstances here. III. Motion New Trial or Remittitur maintains erred denying motion
pursuant Rule new trial remittitur because there insufficient proof noneconomic damages $15 million verdict shocking. ʺ Defs. Apps. Br. We are persuaded, light similar awards juries courts Connecticut.
A. Applicable Law
We review discretion a motion under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 59 remittitur new trial.
Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch
.,
jury verdict is excessive as ʹ matter law. ʹʺ Imbrogno , F.3d (quoting Peck Jacquemin , A.2d (Conn. 1985)). size scope jury verdict must supported record. Munn F.3d 36.
If concludes, after examining comparing similar jury awards Connecticut, verdict instant case is excessive matter Connecticut law, it should order new trial issue damages, unless plaintiffs agree remit portion verdict deemed excessive.
Imbrogno considering damages award, trial must evaluate whether award falls somewhere within necessarily uncertain limits just damages or whether size the verdict so shocks the sense justice compel conclusion jury [was] influenced partiality, prejudice,
mistake corruption. ʹʺ
Munn
, 795 335 (quoting
Birgel v. Heintz
,
There are only a few decisions in Connecticut addressing size award in cases concerning sexual a minor, but they are instructive. For example, Iino v. Spalter , denied motion set aside $15 million verdict against defendant based claims sexually abused plaintiff time she six years old until she seventeen. Conn. App. Ct. (2019). Doe v. Boy Scouts Am. Corp. A.3d (Conn. 2016), Connecticut Supreme Court upheld an award $7 million for three incidents sexual assault against minor victim. And Blair LaFrance awarded $75,200 economic damages; $500,000 noneconomic damages; $167,800 punitive damages based claims defendant sexually molested plaintiff several times before plaintiff sixteenth *26 birthday. No. CV 980149622S, WL *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 2000).
B. Application
The abuse discretion in denying Greer ʹ s motion new trial remittitur because verdict is excessive as matter Connecticut law. While Greer argues that Mirlis lacked evidence support award noneconomic damages, there ample in record Mirlis ʹ s physical, emotional, and psychological injuries. addition Mirlis ʹ s own testimony, wife and psychologist both testified Mirlis had issues with intimacy, forming emotional attachments, and vulnerability with others. Mirlis wife explained ʹ s abuse had significant, negative impact their married life and continued presence Mirlis life source discord between her Mirlis. psychologist, an expert PTSD childhood trauma, indicated even treatment, sexual suffered minor would lifelong consequences him. clearly credited witnesses ʹ testimony finding liable awarding compensatory damages $15 million.
The amount compensatory damages is undoubtedly high, but we are persuaded a new trial or remittitur is warranted under Connecticut law. The award here is excessive compared awards cases cited above. Here, record indicates Mirlis suffered repeated abuse for approximately three years, time he was fourteen until he was seventeen years old. At certain points, Mirlis was abused for hours a time, a weekly basis. first time abused Mirlis, plied Mirlis alcohol, pretended care about and family, acknowledged Mirlis parents ʹ financial struggles, then kissed him. Eventually included oral sex, anal sex, mutual masturbation, watching pornography together ‐‐ while a sophomore, junior, senior high school something year old man.
On per incident basis, $15 million verdict falls within range noneconomic damages been upheld Connecticut courts cases sexual abuse. See Boy Scouts A.3d (permitting $7 million award three incidents sexual assault ten ‐ eleven year old); Doe Thames Valley Council Cmty. Action, Inc ., A.2d n.1 (Conn. 2002) (upholding total award noneconomic damages $220,000 minors who *28 were sexually assaulted their school bus driver); Sciola Shernow A.2d (Conn. 1990) (holding that trial court erred ordering remittitur $323,833.34 $400,000 verdict plaintiff claims that her dentist sexually assaulted her while she was sedated). Mirlis testified that sexually abused him weekly during his sophomore year (when he was fourteen years old) somewhat less often during his junior senior years (but still least every three or four weeks), therefore he was sexually assaulted dozens times. Based presented trial, we are not persuaded that award ʺ shocks sense justice. Consequently, we conclude discretion denying motion for new trial remittitur. challenge amount verdict fails.
IV. Motion Relief Final Judgment
Finally, contends newly discovered evidence, former teacher recounting interactions with Hack while two *29 were Yeshiva, would have changed outcome trial discrediting testimony Hack. This argument is without merit.
A. Applicable Law
This Court reviews ruling Rule 60(b) motion discretion.
Devlin v. Transp. Commc ns Int l Union
,
[T]he movant must demonstrate (1) newly discovered evidence facts existed time trial or other dispositive proceeding, (2) movant must have been justifiably ignorant them despite due diligence, (3) evidence must be admissible such importance it probably would changed outcome, (4) must merely cumulative impeaching.
United States v. Int l Bhd. Teamsters , F.3d 370, 392 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada F.3d 158, (2d Cir. 2004); Westerly Elecs. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co ., (2d Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (citing Kolan Csengeri F.2d (2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam)).
B. Application
The motion relief from final judgment relied witness who purportedly came forward only after learning verdict in case, but motion papers did not identify witness name and was supported only by affidavits from two attorneys and Greer. One lawyers reported that individual claimed that Mirlis was student he taught at Yeshiva and that Mirlis engaged ʺ unusual behavior ʺ and was ʺ frequent liar. ʺ App x at 432. The lawyer also reported that witness observed that Mirlis and Hack had very unusual relationship was ʺ normal student/teacher relationship. ʺ Id. abuse discretion denying motion.
It concluded even assuming Mirlis engaged bad behavior, ʺ ʺ could reasonably viewed such behavior as evidence mental toll upon Mirlis. D. Ct. Doc. No. at We agree this assessment. Moreover, evidence was frequent liar Hack had an unusual relationship, extent admissible all, it merely impeachment evidence. cross ‐ examined length trial, they had an opportunity attack Hack *31 credibility well deposition. did not err, much less discretion, concluding proposed additional from unnamed teacher would changed outcome case warrant relief judgment.
CONCLUSION
For reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM judgment court.
Notes
[*] Judge Brenda K. Sannes, United States District Court Northern District New York, sitting designation.
[1] On January request interested party appellee Lawrence Dressler, ordered public release portions video deposition appellant Aviad Hack, witness case. Hack appeal decision is addressed separate opinion, also filed today.
[2] invoked privilege when asked whether he: (1) ʺ sexually abused and assaulted other minor boys, including a man named Aviad Hack, ʺ D. Ct. Doc. No. at 48; (2) taught religious secular studies at Yeshiva, id. at 52; (3) taught Mirlis, id. at 57; (4) taught communal service, ethics, theology, Jewish history, id. at 58; (5) force[d] . . . Mirlis have sex with [him] when he was a child ʺ at various New Haven addresses, id. at 95; (6) ʺ molested [Mirlis] in [Greer s] bedroom, ʺ id. at 95; (7) had ʺ sex with [Mirlis] at a motel in Branford, ʺ id. at 96; (8) ʺ force[d] [Mirlis] have sex with [him] at a motel in Paoli, ʺ id. at 96; (9) ʺ force[d] [Mirlis] sex with [him] when [Mirlis] was child at hotel in Philadelphia, ʺ id. at 97; (10) had ʺ sex with [Mirlis] when he child land Hamden, ʺ id. at 97; (11) got . . . when he child become involved sexually with [Greer] showing him pornography, id. 98. invoke essentially denied allegation asked whether had sex [o]n blanket out woods some land Hamden. Id.
[3] See, e.g. Berry v. Loiseau , A.2d (Conn. 1992) (punitive damages limited expense litigation, including attorneys ʹ fees, less taxable costs); Waterbury Petroleum Prods., Inc. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co. A.2d (Conn. 1984) (same).
[4] convicted four counts risk injury minor violation Connecticut law, he sentenced years ʹ imprisonment, suspended after serves years. See Docket, State NNH CR17 ‐ T. has appealed decision.
[5] Woods instructed you infer plaintiff answers deposition, if she had refused answer, would have been ʹ yes ʹ questions asked. 170. Moreover, most disputed questions asked whether plaintiff had been accused something, and, we noted, mere accusations little, if any, probative value. Id . Other questions asked whether plaintiff had ever been convicted any immoral unethical conduct, these questions risked admission prior convictions meet requirements Federal Rule Evidence 609(a)(2). Id .
[6] In appellate brief, estimates sexually assaulted ninety times over course three academic years. denying motion new trial, noted $15 million award would amount roughly $300,000 per episode using fifty number incidents, which it concluded out line ʺ other cases. D. Ct. Doc. No.