Case Information
*1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT (COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON JORGI; MIRANDA and Civ. No. 04-CV-241 AA IRENI< MIRANDA,
Plaintiffs,
CITY OF CORNELIUS and
ACME TOWING, INC.,
Defendants.
Spenl:er M. Neal
Oregon Law Center
921 :;W Washington #516
Port -and, OR 97205
Attorney for plaintiffs
Gera L d L. Warren
280 Street SE, Suite 206
Sale~n, OR 97301
Attorney for defendants
AIKE? J, Judge :
Plaintiffs, having received judgment in their favor, move for an aliard of attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $17,235.57 purs~lant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Local Rule 54.4. For the reasons set l'orth below, plaintiffs' motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
In February 2004, plaintiffs filed suit against defendants for violcition of plaintiffs ' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plair~tiffs' vehicle had been towed from the driveway of their home purs~~ant to a city ordinance authorizing tows when a driver is citecl for driving without an operator's license. On January 9, 2006, this court entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor for $3000 plus reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred prior to December 23, :!005, in an amount to be stipulated by the parties or to be January dete1,mined by the court if the parties could not agree. 20, .!006, plaintiffs moved for attorneys fees and costs in the amourlt of $17,235.57 .'
STANDARDS
A determination of a reasonable attorney's fee begins with the Plaintiffs also seek an order of $13,817 in appellate attolmey's fees and costs from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appezls. Defendants ask this court to wait until the Ninth Circ~.it determines whether to remand the issue to this court so as tcl avoid inconsistent rulings on a reasonable hourly rate. I find such a delay unnecessary. If the Ninth Circuit ultimately dec1c.e~ to transfer the issue to this court, I will consider the appellate attorney's fees at that time.
"lod<:star, I' which is the "number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Penn:;ylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 J.S. 546, 563-64 (1986). Plaintiff carries the burden of provrng the lodestar. Id. A few of the factors considered incll~de: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and diff: culty of the questions; (3) the skill required; (4) the custc~mary fee; (5) the amount involved and the results obtained; and 6) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys. See !:err v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. - 1975) (outlining twelve factors bearing on reasonableness). Only those factors which are applicable need be addressed. Sapper v. Lencc Blade. Inc., 704 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1983)
The court may adjust the lodestar downward if the plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, Henslev v. Eckerhart, 461 1 J . S . 424, 435 (1983), or upward in "rare" and "exceptionalu cases, Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 565. However, there is a strorg presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. Miller v. L.A. County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1987).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs are seeking attorney's fees for a total of 88.6 hour^ : 49.6 hours for the lead attorney, Spencer Neal, and 39 hours for Mr. Neal's law clerk. The hourly rates sought for this *4 work are $295 and $60, respectively. Some of the services performed include legal research, meeting with co-counsel and plairltiffs, and preparing and litigating three motions, including cros~l-motions for summary judgment
Defendants object to plaintiffs1 request on the following grour ~ d s : (1) Mr. Neal used "block billing," which does not reasonably identify the tasks performed; (2) Mr. Neal is charging for ;.n unreasonable number of hours; and (3) Mr. Neal's requested hourly rate of $295 exceeds the prevailing market rate in the comm~.nity and should be placed in the range of $230 to $240 per hour.2 I disagree with each of defendants' objections.
First, the time records submitted by plaintiffs clearly reveal the rlature of the work performed by Mr. Neal and his law clerk. Deferdants fail to define "block billingu and do not cite any specific entries that they argue were block-billed. Contrary to defer.dantsl assertion, the majority of Mr. Neal's entries are in small increments of less than one hour, and each entry clearly identifies the work performed.
Second, the amount of hours that Mr. Neal spent working on this case was reasonable. As the Ninth C i r c ~ i t Court of Appeals noted, this case consisted of "unusual factsu presenting a "novel question" of law. Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 867
' Defendants do not object to the hourly rate requested for Mr. Iieal's law clerk and do not outline any specific objections to the number of hours the law clerk spent on this case.
(9th Cir. 2005) . Thus, it was reasonable for Mr. Neal to spend 49.6 hours performing tasks such as researching potentially rele~rant case law, reviewing and revising his law clerk's work, and responding to defendants' various motions.
Finally, I find that the rate of $295 sought by plaintiffs for Mr. IS eal ' s time is reasonable. To determine the appropriate hourly rate, the court considers the "prevailing market rates in the rele\.ant community." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984 ) Plaintiffs have submitted several affidavits and declc.rations discussing the current market rate for experienced trial attorneys in this community practicing :in specialized areas of l ~ w . Those hourly rates range from a low of $250 per hour to a high of more than $400 per hour.
In response, defendants rely solely upon the 2002 Oregon State Bar Economic Survey, which accounts only for the attorney's years of e:cperience rather than important factors such as skill and reputation. Furthermore, the survey includes hourly rates for attorneys who are part-time due to lack of legal work. ~nclusion of tkese attorneys in the survey results in an underestimation of the 1)revailing market rate for skilled full-time attorneys with good reputations. Affidavit of Phil Goldsmith, p. 5. (noting that attorneys lacking the skill and reputation to attract sufficient work at the prevailing rates will charge lower rates to obtain work). Given the bar survey's outdated figures and lack of *6 cons..deration for skill and reputation, it is of limited value in this case.
Plaintiffs have presented ample evidence that their requested hour:.y rate is reasonable and customary for attorneys in the Port:.and, Oregon, area in light of the specialized nature of the work lnvolved and Mr. Neal's skill, reputation, and experience. Therc?fore, I find that $295 is a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Neal s services.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' motions for attorney's fees and costs (docs. 56 and ! 1 7 ) are granted against defendants in the amount of $17,194.00 [ (49 6 hours x $295) + (39 hours x $60) + $222 costs] IT I!; SO ORDERED.
Dated this day of March, 2006.
4- Ann Aiken
United States District Judge