MIRACLE KIDS SUCCESS ACADEMY, INC., Appellant v. Marvin MAURRAS, Appellee
No. CV-16-104
Court of Appeals of Arkansas, DIVISION III.
September 28, 2016
2016 Ark. App. 445
Fuqua Campbell, P.A., by: Phil Campbell, Little Rock, and Chris Stevens, for appellee.
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellant Miracle Kids Success Academy, Inc., appeals after the Pulaski County Circuit Court granted appellee‘s motion for partial summary judgment on count
Appellee Marvin Maurras filed his complaint against appellant on July 17, 2014. Appellee requested that (1) in Count I appellant repay a loan made by him with interest, (2) in Count II appellant be required to furnish him with a Schedule K-1 for 2013 and all related documents, and (3) in Count III appellant be enjoined from performing any further corporate acts that require approval of the board of directors without holding a meeting of the board of directors and providing notice of such meeting to all directors. The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. A hearing was held on the motions, and after the circuit court orally ruled that it was granting appellee‘s motion for partial summary judgment on count one of appellee‘s complaint, appellee requested that the other counts be dismissed. In an October 14, 2015 order, the circuit court found that appellee had loaned appellant the principal sum of $150,000 at five percent annual interest; that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding count one of appellee‘s complaint; that appellee was entitled to a judgment in the amount of $197,627.93 with a postjudgment interest rate of ten percent on count one; and that counts two and three were dismissed without prejudice. A judgment conforming to the circuit court‘s order was also filed the same day.
While no party has raised this issue, whether an order is final for appeal purposes is a jurisdictional question that this court will raise sua sponte. Hotfoot Logistics, LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., Inc., 2012 Ark. 76.
In this case, the circuit court‘s order specifically dismissing counts two and three without prejudice is not a final order or an adjudication on the merits because the merits of the cause are not finally determined. See Beverly Enters.-Ark., Inc. v. Hillier, 341 Ark. 1, 14 S.W.3d 487 (2000);
Dismissed without prejudice.
VAUGHT and BROWN, JJ., agree.
