This dеcisive question is presented for determination: Was the chauffeur’s license of petitioner
suspended
by the Statе Department of Motor Vehicles pursuant to the provisions of G. S. N. C. 20-16, or was his license
revolted
under the mandatory рrovisions of G. S. N. C. 20-17 ? If the Department acted pursuant to G. S. N. C. 20-16, the case of
Winesett v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles,
*271 G. S. N. 0. 20-16 is captiоned: “Authority op Department to Suspend LiceNse,” and provides: “(a) The Department shall have authority to suspend the license of any operator or chauffeur without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its rеcords or other satisfactory evidence that the licensee: 1. Has committed an offense for which mandatory revocation of license is required upon conviction; 2. Has been involved as a driver in аny accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another or serious property damage, which аccident is obviously the result of the negligence of such driver . . .” Subsection (c) of this section provides that uрon a suspension of license of any person by the Department, the person, whose license; wаs suspended, upon request shall be given a hearing, and upon such hearing, after hearing the evidence, thе Department shall either rescind its order of suspension, or good cause appearing therefor, may extend the suspension of such license.
G. S. N. C. 20-17 is headed: “Mandatory Eevocation oe License by Dеpartment” and reads r “The Department shall forthwith revoke the license of any operator or chauffeur upon receiving a record of such operator’s or chauffeur’s conviction for any оf the following offenses when such conviction has become final: 1. Manslaughter (or negligent homicide) resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.” Other cases specified in this section requiring mandatory revocation are omitted as not relevant.
It is true that the Official Notice and Eecord of Eevoсation of License mailed to the petitioner does not state that the Department acted undеr G. S. N. C. 20-17, but throughout the word,
re-vocation, and not suspension,
is used, and the reason specified for the revocation is
conviction of involuntary manslaughter
7 January 1954, Superior Court, Burgaw, North Carolina: these words conform with the language of G. S. N. C. 20-17 and not with G. S. N. C. 20-16. A plea of
nolo contendere
has all the effect of a conviction by a jury, or a plea of guilty, for the purposes оf that case only.
Fox v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, supra;
and
Winesett v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, supra.
The petitioner makes no contention that his conviction had not become final. We take judicial notice that Burgaiv is the county seat of Pender County.
Baker v. Varser,
*272 The Record in Winesett v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, supra, shows that Winesett in his Petition, paragraph 5, alleged: that the Department sent him notice in writing through the U. S. Mails “that his said operator’s license to oрerate motor vehicles on the public highways of North Carolina was suspended,” and that “said notice stated that the cause of suspension was G. S. 20-16(1) . . .” Scheidt, the respondent, in his answer to the Petition, paragraph 5, stated: “That the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of the Petition are admitted.”
We said in
Fox v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, supra:
“G. S. N. C. 20-25, which gives the right of appeal, expressly excepts a right of appeal when such cancellation is mandatory. ‘No right accrues to a licensee who petitions for a review of the order of the Department when it acts- under the terms of G. S. 20-17, for then its action is mandatory.’
In re Revocation of License of Wright,
Although the Department gave petitioner a hearing under G. S. N. C. 20-16(c), such a hearing was not authorized by law, because that subsection applies to a suspеnsion of a driver’s license under G. S. N. C. 20-16, and not to a mandatory revocation under G. S. N. C. 20-17.
The right of appeal tо the Court under G. S. N. C. 20-25 is granted only when the Department exercises its discretionary power.
In re Revocation of License of Wright,
The revocаtion of the chauffeur’s license of the petitioner by the Department under the mandatory provisions оf G. S. N. C. 20-17 was the exercise of a governmental or sovereign right prescribed by the General Assembly in the interests of public safety upon the highways of the State, and respondent is not estopped by the letter of the Dеpartment dated 3 March 1954 granting petitioner a hearing from asserting that the revocation was done undеr the mandatory provisions of that section.
Henderson v. Gill, Comr. of Revenue,
When the Department of Motor Vehicles suspends or revokes a driver’s license to operate a motor vehicle, all its records, including the notice mailed to, or served upon, the licensee, should state explicitly whether it acts under the provisions of G. S. N. C. 20-16, or the provisions of G. S. N. C. 20-17.
The recent decision of Fox v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, supra, is controlling. Under its authority the judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the proceeding will be dismissed with the costs taxed against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Reversed.