24 Cal. 644 | Cal. | 1864
After the cause was at issue upon the complaint and the answers first made and filed by the defendants, each of the defendants, by leave of the Court, amended his answer by adding thereto a further defense, alleging that the demanded premises was a part of the “ Rancho de San Antonio,” granted in or about the year 1820, by the Spanish Government to the said Luis Peralta, who died intestate in August, 1851, leaving him surviving children and grandchildren as his heirs at law; and that when he died he was seized in fee and possessed of the lands in controversy. That in 1852 the decedent’s sons presented to the Board of Land Commissioners appointed under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1851, the title to said rancho for confirmation, and that the same was confirmed first by the Commissioners and afterward by the United States District Court, as good and valid. That these sons, in fraud of the rights of the other heirs, by the use of a simulated, false, and fraudulent document, purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased, which was never proved nor admitted to probate, procured a confirmation of said rancho in parcels to themselves, and that the portion embracing the demanded premises was confirmed in the name of Antonio Maria Peralta. That the facts as to the means by which the confirmation was thus obtained were fully known to the plaintiff and his grantors at and before they or either of them acquired any claim or interest in the land. The amended answers also show that each of the defendants had
To the amended answers the plaintiff demurred on the grounds: First—That the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the action, or to entitle them to relief in equity. Second—That it appeared by the amended answers that there were devisees and heirs at law of Luis Peralta who were indispensable parties, but who were hot made parties thereto. Third—That more than three years had elapsed since the commission of the alleged fraudulent acts mentioned in the amended answers. Fourth—That more than four years had elapsed since the alleged cause of equitable relief accrued.
The Court sustained the demurrer, and the defendants excepted.
At the trial it appeared on the part of the plaintiff, that in 1852 Antonio Maria Peralta applied, under the Act of Congress passed on the third of March, 1851, entitled “An Act to ascertain and settle private land claims in the State of California,” for the confirmation to him of a certain and specific part of the “ Rancho de San Antonio,” embracing the land in controversy ; and such proceedings were had concerning the matter that his claim thereto was finally confirmed by the proper authorities of the United States as a valid claim, and after-wards a survey was made of the land by the Surveyor-General of the United States for California, which was approved by the United States District Court.
After the plaintiff had produced further evidence in the case and had rested, the defendants, for the purpose of showing that the daughters of Luis Peralta, deceased, through whom they respectively claimed, had a perfect legal title to an undi
And the defendants further offered to prove that Don Luis Peralta, the grantee of the lands of “ San Antonio,” died intestate in the year 1851, seized of said lands, and that he left surviving him four sons and four daughters, and the children of a deceased daughter, all of whose names are mentioned ; and following this, the defendants offered in evidence deeds of conveyance duly acknowledged and recorded, by which they succeeded to all the right, title, and interest which the daughters and grandchildren of Luis Peralta acquired in and to the demanded premises upon the death of their ancestor.
The counsel for the plaintiff objected to the evidence so offered and to every part of it, and the objection was sustained by the Court. To this ruling the defendants’ counsel duly excepted.
In reviewing this case we shall first consider the question presented by the exception to the ruling of the Court in excluding the evidence offered on the part of the defendants. It is a question of great importance and of more than ordinary interest. It involves a determination of the force and effect of a final confirmation and approved survey under the Act of Congress on the one hand, and the rights of those having perfect titles to lands in California when this territory was ceded by Mexico to the United States, who have omitted to submit them to be adjudicated upon, as indicated by the Act of Congress of 1851, on the other.
It is maintained on the part of the appellants that Luis Peralta acquired from the Government of Spain, while the
At the time of the ratification of the treaty entered into between the United States and Mexico, by which the former nation acquired California, it must. be presumed it was well known to the high contracting parties that portions of the ceded territory had become the property of individuals, and though it may not have been necessary under the circumstances of the acquisition to have provided by treaty stipulations for the protection of private property, still it was deemed but just to place the subject beyond the questioning of those who claim for conquering nations unlimited powers over and respecting the property of the citizens of the conquered country, and hence we may suppose the Mexican nation, with a deep solicitude for the welfare of its citizens who were then residents of the territories about to be ceded to the United States, proposed the Vlllth and IXth Articles of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and that the justness of the provisions therein contained was freely acknowledged and -agreed to on the part of the Government of the United States in the creation of this solemn compact.
The portion of the Vlllth Article of the treaty which par
“ Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico, and which remain for the future within the limits of the United States, as defined by the present treaty, shall be free to continue where they now reside, or to remove at any time to the Mexican Republic, retaining the property which they possess in the said territories, or disposing thereof and removing the proceeds wherever they please without their being subjected on this account to any contribution, tax, or charge whatever.”
By the IXth Article, the same care was manifested for securing the rights of Mexicans who might, in consequence of the transfer of the dominion and property of the territories about to be ceded, lose the character of citizens of the Mexican Republic before they were admitted “to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States according to the principles of the Constitution.” It was therefore stipulated that during the contemplated interval such Mexicans “ shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property, and secured in the free exercise of their religion without restriction.”
That it was intended by the treaty that Mexicans then established in California, and having property therein, should retain and enjoy it or dispose of it as to them might seem proper, the language of the treaty places beyond controversy.
Then, did the Congress of the United States intend, by the Act of March 3d, 1851, to compel persons of the class mentioned in the treaty, who at that time held lands in possession by perfect titles, derived from the source of paramount proprietorship, to submit them to the Board of Commissioners appointed under that Act, or else to forfeit their lands to the ■ G-overnment?
In Strother v. Lucas, 12 Peters, 438, the Supreme Court of the United States said, that “ in following the course of the law this Court has declared that even in cases of conquest the conqueror does no more than displace the sovereign and assume
The law deems every man to be in the legal seizin and possession of land to which he has a perfect and complete title; this seizin and possession is co-extensive with his right, and continues until he is ousted thereof by an actual adverse possession. This is a settled principle of the common law. (United States v. Arredondo, 6 Peters, 743; Mitchel v. United States, 9 Peters, 734.)
The cases of Arredondo and Perchman involved the construction of the treaty between Spain and the United States, by which Florida was ceded to the latter, relative to grants of land in the ceded territory, made by the King of Spain, or by
In Foster and Elam v. Nelson, 2 Peters, 314, the Court considered the words, “shall be ratified and confirmed,” as importing contracts, and in that case the same illustrious Judge said: “ Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an Act of the Legislature, wherever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of stipulation import a contract, where either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political not the judicial department; and the Legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule of the Court.” And he further said, had the Article declared that all the grants made by his Catholic Majesty before the 24th of January, 1818, shall be valid to the same extent as if the ceded territory had remained under his domin
In United States v. Wiggins, 14 Pet. 349, Mr. Justice Catron said: “ The object of the Court in the cases of Arredondo and Perchman was to exempt perfect titles from the operation of the VIIIth Article of the treaty under consideration' in these cases, for the reason that they were perfect titles by the laws of Spain when the treaty was made ; and that when the soil and sovereignty of Florida were ceded by the lid Article, private rights of property were by implication protected;” and he further said: “ The Court, in its reasoning, most justly held that such was the rule by the laws of nations, even in case of conquest, and undoubtedly so in case of cession; therefore, it would be an unnatural construction of the VIIIth Article to hold that perfect and complete titles at the date of the treaty should be subjected to investigation and confirmation by the Government; and to reconcile the Article with the laws of nations, the Spanish side of the Article was referred to in aid of the meaning of the American side, when it was ascertained that the Spanish side was in the present tense; whereupon the Court held that the implication resulting from the lid Article, being according to the laws of nations, that and the VIIIth Article were consistent, and must be so recognized by the United States in its Courts.” And further on he used this language : “ That the perfect titles made by Spain before the 24th of January, 1818, within the ceded territory, are intrinsically valid and exempt from the provisions of the VIIIth Article, is the established doctrine of this Court, and that they need no sanction from the legislative or judicial departments of this country.”
Where the claim of an individual to lands was of the nature of an inchoate or incomplete grant, which was of such
It is argued by the counsel for the plaintiff that as the Constitution of the United States provides that “ the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the' territory or other property belonging to the United States,” and as the sole power of providing for the primary disposition of the public lands devolves upon Congress, that therefore, in order to ascertain what is and what is not public land, Congress can exercise the means that may be necessary for such purpose, and that the Act of 1851 prescribed the means for the ascertaining not only who had the legal titles and merely equitable claims to lands, but thereby provided the mode by which thé Government could ascertain the limits and extent of its own lands ; and he further argues
That the citizen of the Mexican Republic who was seized in fee simple absolute of lands in California at the date of treaty, and who thereafter elected, according to its provisions, to become a citizen of the United States, could, if he chose to do so, have submitted his title and claim to such lands to be passed upon by the Commissioners and the proper Courts, under the Act of 1851, we have no doubt; but that he was bound to do so or lose his lands, we cannot believe was intended by the Act of Congress, nor do we conceive that a construction of the Act which would so result is authorized by its language or spirit.
The eighth section of the Act of 1851, it is true, provides that “ each and every person claiming lands in California by
The language of these sections seems sufficiently comprehensive to include titles and claims of all possible classes, and if these sections of the Act were to be interpreted without reference to other portions of it, or to the treaty or the law of nations affecting the subject, or could be considered independently of the principles of common right or right by the common law, we should not hesitate in coming to the conclusion that all titles and claims to lands, whether perfect or imperfect, were inexorably required to be presented to the Commissioners sitting as a Board, in order to save their forfeiture to the United States.
That Congress could select the means and prescribe the mode for perfecting just claims to lands that were imperfect and incomplete, in fulfilment of the Government’s obligations, and could limit the holders of such claims to the means and mode provided, no one, we apprehend, for a moment would suggest a doubt. It may be observed that the many Acts that have been passed by Congress establishing Commissioners for the ascertainment and settlement of land claims in territories acquired by the United States by cession, have been passed for the benefit of persons whose claims to land were of that' inchoate and incomplete character that required action on the part of the Government before they could become invested with the legal title thereto.
In Henderson v. Poindexter, 12 Wheat. 54-3, the Court considered the effect of certain Acts of Congress requiring per
In Strother v. Lucas both parties claimed under the same inchoate or incomplete title, and one of them had obtained under the Act of Congress a confirmation of his claim, while the other failed to present his to the Commissioners. In reference to his omission to present his claim to the Commissioners, Mr. Justice Baldwin said: “ We find by various Acts the time of filing such claims is limited, after which they are declared void so far as they depend on any Act of Congress, and shall not be received in evidence in any Court against any person claiming by a grant from the United States. These,” he said, “are laws analogous to Statutes of Limitations for recording deeds or giving effect to the awards of Commissioners for settling claims to land under the laws of the States;
The case of Barry v. Gamble, 3 How. 32, is similar to that of Strother v. Lucas, and the Court decided that the claim of the party who relied upon an incomplete foreign title became barred by neglecting compliance with the requirements of the Act of Congress to deliver to the proper officer by a given day and year a prescribed notice with the muniments of his right, to be recorded.
It will be seen by a careful examination of these authorities, and others of a like character, that the Court was dealing with imperfect titles. In one case they were said to have “ no intrinsic validity,” (12 Wheat. 543) and in others they were denominated “inchoate and incomplete;” and we have not been able to find a case, nor has the learned counsel for the plaintiff, than whom no one is more thorough is his researches, furnished us with one where the question was involved, in which it was held that a perfect title could become extinguished and its holder divested of his property by omitting to submit it for adjudication to a Board of Commissioners or to a Court appointed for the purpose. In Clarke's Case, 8 Peters, 444, in which it was said: “ The grant which constitutes the foundation of the petitioner’s claim is a complete title, subject to no condition whatever,” which had been presented to a Board of Commissioners, the Chief Justice, while approving of the Acts of Congress appointing Boards of Commissioners for the purpose of ascertaining and determining as to the validity of titles to lands, in order that there might be no conflict between these and those which might be acquired under the United States, said: “But neither the law of nations,
It must be admitted that if a perfect title be required to undergo the ordeal of a Board of Commissioners, it might be declared invalid, notwithstanding it, before then, stood confirmed by the treaty; and'hence it is that the Supreme Court of the United States, respecting the obligations of treaties and the binding force of law, as well as the rights of the citizen, have uniformly maintained that persons holding perfect titles to lands could not be deprived of their property otherwise than by due course of law; and to attribute to Congress the intention of'imposing upon persons having perfect titles to lands in California at the date of the treaty, and who in due time became citizens of the United States, the necessity of submitting them to the Board of Land Commissioners to save their property from forfeiture to the United States, we should deem a grave charge, unsupported by a fair construction of the Act of 1851.
In addition to the provisions of the Act of 1851, to which we have already directly referred, we must, in the construction of the Act, consider all its provisions, and determine from it as a whole its meaning and intent. By the fifteenth section it is provided “ that the final decrees rendered by the said Commissioners, or by the Distict or Supreme Court of the United States, or any patent to be issued under this Act, shall be conclusive between the United States and said claimants only, and shall not affect the interests of third persons.”
If such only can be the effect of decrees and patents, and the interests of third persons are not to be affected thereby, then who are these third persons, and what is the character of the interests that stand unaffected ? Third persons must be regarded to be all persons who were not parties to the proceeding before the Land Commission, or standing in any such relation with those who were parties thereto, as to
We are aware that the impression prevails to some extent that the same learned Judge, in Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 269, gave countenance to the idea that all land claims, whether resting on perfect or imperfect grants, had to be presented to the Commissioners in order to save such lands from passing to the United States; but we think such an impression is not justified by his opinion in that case, for he was then dealing with the question as involved in a case arising upon the failure of Estrada to present an imperfect or inchoate title to the Land Commission; and after having referred to the language of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of Fremont and Fossatt, suggested that doubts might exist as to the validity of the legislation of Congress, so far as it required the presentation to the Board of claims where the
It may, perhaps, be supposed that the observations of the Chief Justice in the case • of Fremont, 17 How. 553, and of Mr. Justice Campbell in the case of Fossatt, 21 How. 447, are opposed to the views we have expressed as to the import and effect of the eighth and thirteenth sections of the Act of 1851. In the former case, the Chief Justice, after observing that the eighth section embraces not only inchoate or equitable titles, but legal titles also, and requires them all to undergo examination and to be passed upon by the Court, says: “The object of this provision appears to be to place the . titles to lands in California upon a stable foundation, and to give to the parties who possess them an opportunity of placing them on the records of the country in a manner and form that will prevent future controversy.” And in Fossatfs Case, in reference to the same subject, Mr. Justice Campbell says that the claims to be submitted to the inquiry and 'determination of the Board of Commissioners, it will be understood, comprehended all private claims to land in California, and that the effect of the inquiry and decision of these tribunals upon the matter submitted is final and conclusive, and referring to the Acts of Congress on the subject, he says : “ These Acts of Congress do not create a voluntary jurisdiction that the claimant may seek or decline. All claims to land that are withheld from the Board of Commissioners during the legal term for presentation are treated as non-existent, and the land as belonging to the public domain.”
It will be observed, by reference to the history of those cases, that both the claims of Fremont and Fossatt were of the class that required action on the part of the Government before they could become perfect and the land to which the claimants were respectively entitled could be segregated from the Government domain ; and the question that exists in the case under consideration was in nowise involved in the determination of those cases.
If the opinions thus expressed in the cases of Fremont and
It is true, as we have already observed, that the language of the eighth section of the Act is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all classes of titles, and that titles not submitted to the judgment of the Commissioners should, by the thirteenth section, be deemed, held, and considered a part of the public domain; but, as we have seen, the fifteenth section provides that neither the final decrees rendered nor any patent issued shall conclude third persons or affect their interests. That the fifteenth section contemplated the existence of a class of persons and a quality of interests that could be conserved by its saving provisions, there can be no doubt; otherwise we would be inevitably impelled to the conclusion that this section was without design.
The Act of 1851 nowhere provides, as was the case by the Acts considered in Henderson v. Poindexter, and Strother v. Lucas, that by failing to present his claim to land to the Commissioners the possessor of the title should not be permitted to use it as evidence in an action for the maintenance of his right; and no other consequence for the omission is declared by the thirteenth section than that the land shall be deemed, held, and considered as part of the public domain. If it were necessary to construe this provision as working an annulment of a perfect title, we should be compelled to hold it to be repugnant to the stipulations of the treaty, which are of paramount obligation ; and we believe it would be so held by the Supreme Court of the United States, if directly presented to that tribunal.
The decisions to which we have referred, and to which others might be added, we regard as declaring principles and
We think the original and amended answers filed by each of the defendants constituted a defense to the action of the plaintiff, and that the Court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the amended answers, and, also, in refusing to admit the-evidence offered by the defendants in their defense; and that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
There are other points presented by the record as grounds on which the defendants ask this Court to reverse the judgment, respecting which it is not necessary to say more than that the ruling of the Court on such points was correct.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.