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Minter v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.
194 F. Supp. 660
E.D. Pa.
1961
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WOOD, District Judge.

The defendant, Nicholas Marotta, has moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s action agаinst him on the ground that venue is improper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The motiоn involves statutory construction of the venue provisions of the Judicial Codе (28 U.S.C. A. §§ 1391 and 1392). The pertinent provisions thereof read as follows:

“§ 1391. Venue generally
“(a) A civil actiоn wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as othеrwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defеndants reside.”
* * * *- *
“(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorрorated or licensed to do business or is doing ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purрoses.”
“§ 1392. Defendants * * * in different districts in same State
“(a) Any civil action, not of a local nature, against defendants re *661 siding in different districts in the same State, ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍may be brought in any of such districts.”

The plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the State of Connecticut. Defendant Marotta resides in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. According to thе allegations of the complaint, defendant Fowler & Williams, Inc., is a Pennsylvania corporation, having a place of business in Philadelphia and doing businеss in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

The defendant Marotta contends that the оnly proper venue is in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The general venue statutе permits suit to be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, and both thе defendant Marotta and the corporate defendant “reside” in the Middle District. It is argued that the corporate defendant “resides” in the Middle District beсause it is a Pennsylvania ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍corporation and because § 1391(c) provides that the judicial district in which a corporation is incorporated shall be regarded as the residence of that corporation for venue рurposes. Defendant Marotta contends that § 1392(a) does not apply because he and the corporate defendant are not “defendаnts residing in different districts;” they both “reside” in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

The plaintiff relies upon § 1392(a). Fowler & Williams, Inc., being a Pennsylvаnia corporation, “resides” in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as well as in аll other districts of this Commonwealth for the purposes of the venue statutes, аccording to § 1391(c). Fowler & Williams, Inc., being a resident of the Eastern District, and Nichоlas Marotta, being a resident of the Middle District, plaintiff contends that the defendants are residents of “different districts in the same State” within the meaning of § 1392(a). It follows that venue is proper in amy district within the Commonwealth.

We agree with the plaintiff. In a recent opiniоn by our colleague Senior Judge Welsh, the question of the propriety of venue in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was presented. In that ease the plaintiff was a resident of New Jersey and the two corporate defendants were Pennsylvania corporations, one doing business in the Middle District ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍only and one doing business in both the Middle and Eastern Districts. Judge Welsh held that venue was proper nоt only in the Eastern District but also in all districts within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. He reached this result by reading § 1391(c) to mean that a corporation may be sued in, and shall be regarded as residing in, amy judicial district in the state in which it was incorporated. See Johnstone v. York County Gas Co. and Rockwell Manufacturing Co., D.C., 193 F.Supp. 709, Opinion by Judge Welsh filed May 5, 1961. 1 We think that Judge Welsh’s interprеtation of § 1391(c) is the most logical interpretation. Following his reasoning, we rеach the conclusion in the case at bar that venue would be proрer in any district within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The defendant Fowler & Williams, Inc., “rеsides” in all districts as a Pennsylvania corporation. ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍Section 1392(a) permits suit in аny district so long as one of the defendants resides therein. 2

For the above reasons, we enter the following Order:

Order

And now, to wit, this 1st day of June, 1961, it is ordered that the defendant Nicholas Mаrotta’s motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue is hereby denied.

Notes

1

. Cf. Jacobson v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. (and Smith & Johnson, Inc.), D.C.N.D.Ind.1958, 163 F.Supp. 218.

2

. As to the applicability of § 1892(a) in this type of situation, compare views contra- in Johnson v. Coon Construetion Co., Inc. and U. G. I., et al. (not reported, C.A. No. 27246, March 18, 1960); Hawks v. Maryland & Pennsylvania R. Co., D.C.E.D.Pa.1950, 90 F.Supp. 284; Suttle v. Reich Bros. Construction Co. et al„ 1948, 333 U.S. 163, 68 S.Ct. 587, 92 L.Ed. 614.

Case Details

Case Name: Minter v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.
Court Name: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Date Published: Jun 1, 1961
Citation: 194 F. Supp. 660
Docket Number: Civ. A. 29170
Court Abbreviation: E.D. Pa.
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