Jеssie Minor was tried upon a charge of burglary and convicted of theft by taking. He appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and contends the evidenсe was insufficient to sustain the verdict as the State failed to prove the value of items taken was $500. Held:
1. Appellant contends the search of the van he drove was illеgal because his arrest and the subsequent search were without probable cause. We disagree. The evidence showed the arresting officer was on patrol when he stopped appellant’s vehicle at 2:30 a.m. on July 6, 1985, when it made an illegal left turn at a red traffic signal. The officer had just observed the van come out of Pine Meadow Road onto Dean Forest Road in Savannah; Pine Meadow Road is a dead-end street of only about 1,200 feet and accommodates about three businesses, аnd no residences. The officer asked about a driver’s license and appellant produced only papers identifying himself as Jessie Minor. (At the motion to suppress hеaring, the officer testified appellant could not produce a license or a temporary permit but produced citation papers indicating his licensе had been removed.) When asked why he was coming off the commercial street Pine Meadows at this hour, the driver (appellant) told the officer he and his passenger, MсCormick, had just finished cleaning up Smith Transport Company *870 warehouse. The officer looked through the doors of the van and saw no cleaning equipment such as brooms, mops, or buffers that would indicate the appellant had been cleaning the warehouse, but saw only a bunch of jumbled boxes. The officer asked what was in the boxes; appеllant opened the door and began to describe a high-backed orange chair. The officer saw also a box on the floor, opened, with pocketknives in it; оther boxes were stacked and he could not see inside them.
The officer, wanting to clear up in his mind why appellant and McCormick would be on this short commercial street at that hour with no cleaning equipment to verify their explanation, asked about the owner of the van. The passenger McCormick said the van belonged to Mr. C. Watson who owned the cleaning service they worked for; but the appellant said it belonged to his (appellant’s) brother, and that his brother did construction work and delivered boxes aftеr work; and these boxes were in the van when his brother lent it to him. At this point, having “too many unanswered questions” and conflicting stories about who owned the van, the officer advised the two of their Miranda rights. He placed an inquiry with Sgt. Young about the ownership of the van, and placed appellant and McCormick in his police car and drove them back to Smith Transрort. There, the appellant opened the combination lock and McCormick opened the gate, thus convincing the officer they had worked there or at least knew how to get in. Then, he received word from Sgt. Young that an inquiry showed appellant’s brother did own the van, but, contrary to what the appellant told the officer, the brother said there were no boxes in it when he lent it to appellant and he was “not familiar with” the contents of the van as the officer found it. It was at this time that the officer placed the two under arrest. He never did arrest them for the illegal turn at the red light. He had no word or knowledge that there had been a burglary but “[he] knew within [himself]” that some place had bеen burglarized. In fact, a report of burglary at Smith Transport was not received until about 6:00 a.m. on July 6, after the warehouse opened.
Appellant essentially contends the search was not made pursuant to a valid arrest, since the officer never arrested appellant for the illegal turn, and that the brief investigatory detention allowеd by law (see
State v. Turntime,
That the officer did not know for a fact that a particular place (Smith Transport) had been burglarized, doеs not invalidate the arrest. The facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge prior to the arrest for burglary were sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime had been or was being committed
(Elders v. State,
2. Appellant contends there was insufficient proof of value of the items taken to sustain the verdict of theft by taking, as a felony; and, further, that defense counsel should have been allowed an opportunity to argue to the jury that the amount in question was under $500. This enumeration is without merit. The appellant did not object upon any basis to the valuation of the property by thе State’s witness, but had ample opportunity to, and did, cross-examine that witness. The appellant failed to request a charge as to the establishment of value and made no attempt to argue to the jury that the value of items taken was not $500 or was not proved to be $500. Although counsel for appellant after the verdict stated that he had “tried to anticipate
*872
this situation . . . with the questions that I asked the [State’s] witness,” the conclusion is inexorable that, insofar as any argument or request to charge was concеrned, appellant made no factual issue as to whether the value of the property stolen exceeded $500, and it was therefore not required of the jury that it establish value.
Jones v. State,
Nevertheless,
after the jury had returned the verdict,
the appellant did make an issue of the value of the property, the trial judge agreed to rеsubmit the issue to the jury, and in doing so he was more than fair. We cannot see how the appellant should have been allowed to argue the point when he earlier gave it up and let it go to verdict without issue, and when it was relevant only upon the question of sentencing anyway
(Ayers v. State,
We are satisfied the trial court did more than it should have in resubmitting the question of value to the jury despite appellant’s not having made an issue of it. The evidence supports the verdict.
Judgment affirmed.