158 Ky. 210 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1914
Opinion of the Court by
-Affirming.
Defendant, Chester Minniard, was convicted of murder and given a life sentence in the penitentiary. He appeals.
Briefly stated, the facts are as follows: During the fall of 1912 the Lexington & Eastern Ry. Co. was engaged in construction work in Letcher and Perry coun
The same evening a large number of people came to the tunnel on a special train; the body was removed. On examination it was found that there was a wound jus.t above and a little behind the right ear. There was also a wound on the top of the head. The base of the man’s skull was crushed. In no place was the skin broken. Between the time that Combs found the body and the appearance of the crowd in the evening, the piece of pipe and the hand-spike disappeared. When the body was first examined no one knew who the deceased was; it was afterwards definitely ascertained that the deceased] was Albert Bowman.
At the March (1913) term of the Perry Circuit Court defendant was indicted for the murder of Albert Bow
According to the defendant’s evidence he and Bowman had some trouble but were friendly at the time of the alleged crime. He denies that Bowman showed him any money. On going to Marion Campbell’s store he called for a package of peanuts. His purpose was to get the check cashed. Campbell, said he could not cash it; defendant then returned the peanuts. After leaving Campbell’s store he and Bowman walked up to the trestle. Bowman tried to get defendant to go up on Second Creek after some liquor. Defendant declined to go; thereupon Bowman left him. Defendant then passed through the tunnel, saw the flagman Dobbs below the tunnel about a hundred yards. In passing through the tunnel he saw a crew of men coming through with a car-load of steel. Albert Bowman was not with him as he went through the tunnel. The tunnel is a little bit dark, but you can walk through it in the day-time without a light. After passing through the tunnel he saw another crew of men about 150 yards from the mouth of the tunnel. He then went to Mack Eversole’s and -purchased some cartridges. Leaving there he crossed the river. He saw Elizabeth Feltner and another woman; made no remark to her in regard to Bowman not paying his bill, nor^did he refuse to help her carry anything. Had she requested it he would have assisted her. Never injured or struck Bowman in any way; never knew how he came to be injured. He afterward went to his boarding-house; went to the bridge and bought a pistol. Swapped his watch for it and paid $5.00 boot. At the time he had about $40.00 which he had saved up; had shown the money to his mother and the youngster^. Went to Si Feltner’s, got his suitcase and paid his board; it amounted to $2.65. When
There was also evidence to the effect that the roof of the tunnel was dangerous, and that rocks wouíd frequently fall from the tunnel. Several witnesses testified to seeing them fall and one or two that they themselves had been injured. There was also evidence tending to show that where a ear loaded with steel rails was taken through the tunnel the rails would be about as high as a man’s shoulder. It was further shown that it was practically impossible for William Engle to have seen the boys from the point where he was standing. It was also shown that he had remarked to two witnesses that he never saw the boys any more after they left Campbell’s store. Newton Stacy, though introduced by the
It will bé observed that the evidence for the Commonwealth tends to establish the following: (1) defendant and Bowman had had previous' quarrels and difficulties and defendant had threatened to kill Bowman; (2) they left Marion Campbell’s grocery and started in the direction of the tunnel; (3) they were seen approaching the tunnel; (4) they were also seen in'the tunnel; (5) defendant came (nit of the tunnel alone; (6) the body of the deceased was found near the center of the tunnel and at a place where it was quite dark; (7) deceased had considerable money before he started toward the tunnel. When his body was found he had only a small check and $1.00; (8) when Campbell refused to cash defendant’s check, defendant returned the peanuts; (9) defendant told Mrs. Feltner that deceased would not return to pay his board; (10) shortly after passing through the tunnel defendant left the community. After going from place to place he learned Bowman’s body had been discovered and a Minniard had been accused of murder, and he immediately changed his name; (11) the deceased was last seen alive on Thursday afternoon and defendant was the last person seen with him. No person ever saw deceased from that time until his body was discovered on the following Sunday.
It is well settled that a judgment of conviction will not be reversed on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to support it, unless the verdict is palpably against the evidence, and this rule applies to circumstantial evidence as well as to direct evidence: Hall v. Commonwealth, 152 Ky., 812. While it is true that there was no eye witness to the homicide and' that the evidence for the Commonwealth is purely circumstantial, yet we cannot say the verdict was flagrantly against the evidence. On the contrary, the proven facts make out an unusually strong case against the defendant.
But it is insisted that the court improperly excluded certain evidence offered to be given by Katie Fugate and also the affidavit of the defendant to the effect that Plarrison and Rébecca Eversole would testify to the same facts. The rejected evidence was to the effect that on Tuesday following the murder Katie Fugate was at the home of Harrison and Rebecca Eversole. While there
The court instructed the jury on the law of murder, manslaughter and self-defense, but it is insisted for the defendant that he was entitled to an instruction on accidental killing. There are instances where an instruction on accidental killing is proper but this rule is confined to cases where the defendant admits the killing and justifies on the ground of accident. In this case there was no testimony on the part of the defendant that he killed' Bowman but that the killing was accidental. It is simply a case where there is' testimony tending to show that Bowman might have been killed by the fall of a rock or been struck by a rail on a passing car. Under the instructions given by the court a conviction was not authorized unless the jury believed from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant killed deceased. Unless they so believed, they were required to acquit. While the evidence in regard to accidental death was competent as tending to show that defendant did not kill deceased, yet we conclude it was not error to refuse a separate instruction covering this phase of the case, in view of the fact that the real issue was whether the defendant did or did not kill the deceased, and this was
The court gave the following instruction on reasonable doubt: “The law presumes the innocence of the defendant until his guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and if upon the whole case the jury should have a reasonable doubt from all the evidence as to whether or not the defendant has been proven guilty, they will find him not guilty.”
It is insisted that the foregoing instruction is erroneous and that in lieu thereof the court should have given the following instruction: “The law presumes the inno- ' cence of the defendant until his guilt has been established by the evidence to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, and it is the duty of the jury, if it can reasonably do so, to reconcile all the facts and circumstances proven by the evidence in this case with that presumption, and if upon the whole case the jury should have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s having been proven guilty, then they should find him not guilty.”
It is true that the last instruction is approved by some courts and that others go even still further: State v. Blydenburg, 135 Ia., 264; 14 A. & E. Ann. Cases, 443; State v. Crabtree, 170 Mo., 642, 71 S. W., 127.
Sec. 238 of the Criminal Code provides, “If there be a reasonable doubt of the defendant being proven to be guilty, he is entitled to an acquittal.”
We have held in a number of cases that not only is an instruction in the language of the code sufficient, but it is the better practice to follow the language of the code: Mickey v. Commonwealth, 9 Bush, 593; Ward v. Commonwealth, 14 Bush, 233; Ireland v. Commonwealth, 22 R., 478, 57 S. W., 616; Brady v. Commonwealth, 11 Bush, 282; Payne v. Commonwealth, 1 Met., 370; Tetterton v. Commonwealth, 89 S. W., 8, 28 R., 146; Howell v. Commonwealth, 104 S. W., 685, 31 R., 983; Gatliff v. Commonwealth, 107 S. W., 739, 32 R., 1063.
It has also been held that circumstantial evidence, like direct or positive evidence, should be left to the consideration and determination of the jury without caution or suggestion on the part of the court as to its value or the necessity of scrutinizing it closely: Brady v. Commonwealth, 11 Bush, 282; Stickler v. Commonwealth, 7 R., 226. As the instruction given by the court follows substantially the language of the code, it was not error to refuse the offered instruction.