Minnesota RFL Caucus v. Mike FreemanMinnesota RFL Caucus v. Mike Freeman
SMITH,
This case concerns a challenge to the constitutionality of a section of the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act (MFCPA). The plaintiffs, described as “political candidates, political associations, аnd individuals who engage in political activities relating to political elections and campaigns in Minnesota” brought this case under
I. Background
The relevant provision of the MFCPA provides that
[a] person or candidate may not knowingly make, directly or indirectly, a false claim stating or implying that a candidate or ballot question has the support or endorsement of a major political party or рarty unit or of an
organization. A person or candidate may not state in written campaign material that the candidate or ballot question has the support or endorsement of an individual without first getting written permission from the individual to do so.
The MFCPA defines “[c]ampaign material” as “any literature, publication, or material that is disseminated for the purpose of influencing voting at a primary or other election, except for news items or editorial comments by the news media.”
Minnesota law authorizes any person to file a written complaint alleging a violation of
“A county attorney may prosecute a[] violation of [§ 211B.02].”
On July 24, 2019, the plaintiffs brought this pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge to
On July 20, 2020,2 the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the county attorneys from enforcing
After analyzing the Dataphase3 factors, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion. Although it concluded that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, it determined that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the mеrits of their First Amendment claims because of their “inability to satisfy a prerequisite to their claims under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).” Id. at 10. In reaching its decision, the court observed that the Ex parte Young “exception [to Eleventh Amendment immunity] does not apply ‘when the defendant official has neither enforced nor threatened to enforce the statute challenged as unconstitutional.‘” Id. at 11 (quoting 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson (Care Committee II), 766 F.3d 774, 797 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429, 438 (6th Cir. 2000))). “Under this standard, and based on [the county attorneys‘] uncontested affidavits,” the district court held that the “[p]laintiffs have not shown that [the county attorneys] are ‘about to commence proceedings’ against them.” Id. at 13 (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 156). The court acknowledged that the county attorneys’
The court also determined that the plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm. It cited “the absence of threatened, much less imminent, enforcement by [the county attorneys]“; the plaintiffs’ failure to “seek a preliminary injunctiоn until almost one year” after filing their complaint; and the fact that “the harm [p]laintiffs identify as being attributable to [the county attorneys] seems slight—not irreparable—when one considers that
II. Discussion
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its discretion in denying their preliminary-injunction motion. First, they challenge the district court‘s determination that they are not likely to prevail on their First Amendment claims because the county attorneys are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Second, they argue that the district court erred in determining that they failed to prove irreparable harm. “As to the remaining preliminary injunction factors,” they assert that “the district court did not view the balance-of-harm factor as it would apply to First Amendment freedoms” and failed to consider that “the public interest favors protecting core First Amendment freedoms.” Appellant‘s Br. at 25-26 (quoting Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir. 1999)).
We review for an abuse of discretion the district court‘s deniаl of the plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion. See Phyllis Schlafly Revocable Tr. v. Cori, 924 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir. 2019). “A district court abuses its discretion if it ‘rests its conclusion on clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal conclusions.‘” Id. (quoting Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 315, 320 (8th Cir. 2013)). We review de novo a district court‘s Eleventh Amendment immunity determination. See Balogh v. Lombardi, 816 F.3d 536, 541, 544 (8th Cir. 2016).4
“Generally, States are immune from suit under the terms of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovеreign immunity.” Whole Woman‘s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 532 (2021). The Supreme Court has “recognized a narrow exception grounded in traditional equity practice—one that allows certain private parties to seek judicial orders in federal court preventing
In Care Committee I, the plaintiffs brought a First Amendment challenge to
“[W]e held that thе attorney general was a proper defendant under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Care Committee II, 766 F.3d at 796 (citing Care Committee I, 638 F.3d at 632). We explained that “some connection [must exist] between the attorney general and the challenged statute” and that such “connection does not need to be primary authority to enforce the challenged law.” Care Committee I, 638 F.3d at 632. Moreover, “the attorney general need [not] havе the full power to redress a plaintiff‘s injury in order to have ‘some connection’ with the challenged law.” Id. at 633. We identified a three-fold connection6 between the Minnesota attorney general and the statute‘s enforcement and held that it “was sufficient to make the attorney general amenable to suit under the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Care Committee II, 766 F.3d at 796 (citing Care Committee I, 638 F.3d at 633).
County attorneys, not the attorney general, prosecuted violations of the statute. Id. (citing
The Minnesota Attorney General, through a Deputy Minnesota Attorney General, stated in an affidavit that the office of the attorney general “ha[d] never initiated a prosecution” under
We agreed with the attorney general and found that the attorney general was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Based on that conclusion, we dismissed the action as against the attorney general. Our decision rested on the attorney general‘s declared “unwillingness to exеrcise her ability to prosecute a § 211B.06 claim against Appellants.” Id. We explained, “Now that the attorney general has testified with assurances that the office will not take up its discretionary ability to assist in the prosecution of § 211B.06, Appellants are not subject to or threatened with any enforcement proceeding by the attorney genеral.” Id.
Here, just as in Care Committee I, plaintiffs seek prospective relief, and the core question is whether the plaintiffs proved that the county attorneys “engaged in an ongoing violation of federal law.” Care Committee I, 638 F.3d at 632. In answering this question, the state of the record at this procedural stage of the case is dispositive. See Care Committee II, 766 F.3d at 797 (“At this stage in the proceedings we are no longer cоncerned with who is ‘a potentially proper party for injunctive relief’ but rather who in fact is the right party.” (quoting Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 428 F.3d 1139, 1146 (8th Cir. 2005))).8
The record here shows that the defendants have not enforced nor have threatened to enforce the challenged statute. After the motion-to-dismiss stage аnd in response to the plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion, the four county attorneys
The plaintiffs, however, assert that the present case is distinguishable from Care Committee II because, unlike the Minnesota Attorney General in that case, “the [c]ounty [a]ttorneys have not disavowed any future prosecutions of § 211B.02.” Appellants’ Br. at 19 (emphasis added). The plаintiffs argue that the “County Attorney declarations do not represent a policy disavowing the enforcement of § 211B.02,” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 3, because they “have not declared that they have ‘no intention to ever’ prosecute ‘any of the activities’ the [plaintiffs] would engage in under § 211B.02,” id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
True, in Care Committee II, the Minnesota Attorney General did aver that the “the attorney general‘s office never has filed, and has no intention of ever filing, a complaint with the OAH alleging a violation of § 211B.06.” Care Committee II, 766 F.3d at 796–97 (emphasis added). By comparison, the county attorneys here averred that they have “no present intention” to commence proceedings. But their failure to disavow future prosecutions is not fаtal to their claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The proper standard in assessing their entitlement to such immunity is whether the county attorneys’ affidavits establish their “unwillingness to exercise [their] ability to prosecute a § 211B.0[2] claim against Appellants.” Care Committee II, 766 F.3d at 797. “The Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply when the defendant official has neither enforced nor threatened to enforcе the statute challenged as unconstitutional.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc., 226 F.3d at 438). Here, the county officials’ affidavits all show that they have not enforced or threatened to enforce
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.