275 Minn. 101 | Minn. | 1966
Appeals from judgments
Appellee, Minnesota Power and Light Company, a Minnesota corporation engaged in generating and distributing electricity, petitioned the district court under Minn. St. c. 278 to change the property tax classification on certain of its lands in Carlton County for the tax years 1962 and 1963 from class 4 (Minn. St. 273.13, subd. 9, “[a]ll property not included in the preceding classes”) assessed at 40 percent of full and true value to class 3 (§ 273.13, subd. 4, “rural in character and devoted or adaptable to rural but not necessarily agricultural use,” subject to certain exceptions) assessed at 3316 percent of full and true value. The District Court of Carlton County, the Honorable Sidney E.
The lands in question, which had been designated class 3 for many years prior to 1962, are owned by appellee and comprise 11 contiguous parcels extending in a narrow strip from the east boundary of the small community of Thomson eastward through Jay Cooke State Park to a point on the St. Louis River. The lands are used for facilities which carry water diverted from the St. Louis River eastward through a canal and conduits to surge tanks, where it is stabilized and used to drive electric generators, after which it is returned to the St. Louis River.
The parcels are composed of generally rugged and rocky forest terrain. There are presently no residences upon this land, although there were about four residences used by appellee’s employees up until several years ago. There was evidence that the lands are not generally suitable for dwellings. The area is not served with municipal water, sewer, police,
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court’s finding that the property is “rural in character and devoted or adaptable to rural but not necessarily agricultural use” has reasonable support in the evidence.
Whether a parcel of land is “rural” is a question of fact. National Bank v. Banholzer, 69 Minn. 24, 71 N. W. 919. Questions of classi
Both questions raised by the statute — whether the land is “rural in character” and whether it is “devoted or adaptable to rural but not necessarily agricultural use” — involve interpretation of the term “rural.”
Although the term “rural” is sometimes employed as coterminous with “agricultural,”
The first question presented by the statute is whether the property is rural in character. The criteria traditionally employed in answering this question have been the location and general surroundings of the
The second question is whether the property is devoted or adaptable to a rural but not necessarily agricultural use. It is very arguable that the land is devoted to such a use. The use of lands for carrying water through canals and conduits to drive generators might well be deemed a use characteristic of the country as distinguished from a city or town. Such a use is clearly distinguishable from the use of property solely for residential purposes by persons engaged in city pursuits, which this court has indicated would be a nonrural use.
But it is not necessary to determine whether the property is devoted to a rural use since, if it is rural in character, it is sufficient that it be “adaptable to rural though not necessarily agricultural use.” Staples v. State, 233 Minn. 312, 315, 46 N. W. (2d) 651, 653.
Affirmed.
Appellants style their appeal as from the findings of fact, conclusions of law, order for judgment, and judgment in each case. However, Minn. St. 605.09 does not authorize appeals from findings of fact and conclusions of law, In re Settlement of Stewart, 216 Minn. 485, 13 N. W. (2d) 735; Wilson v. Tauer, 147 Minn. 466, 180 N. W. 93, and cases cited, or from orders for judgment, Shema v. Thorpe Bros. 238 Minn. 470, 57 N. W. (2d) 157, and cases cited. The other matters being nonappealable, the judgment alone is here for review. See, General Elec. Co. v. Anchor Cas. Co. 251 Minn. 305, 306, 87 N. W. (2d) 639, 641. The appeal from the judgment is not rendered ineffective because of reference in the notice of appeal to nonappealable matters. Salo v. Duluth & I. R. R. Co. 124 Minn. 361, 145 N. W. 114. Appellants are in no way disadvantaged by this ruling since on appeal from a judgment the court reviews whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact sustain the conclusions of law and the judgment. See, Olson v. Mullen, 244 Minn. 31, 68 N. W. (2d) 640, and cases cited.
Originally appellee objected also to the classification of four parcels situated in Thomson (one of which is also within Jay Cooke State Park) which parcels comprise the western portion of appellee’s canal system. But prior to the trial court’s decision, appellee withdrew its objection to the classification of these parcels.
Of course, the property is, as is all property in a county, under the protection of the county sheriff. Minn. St. 387.03.
The land for the park was conveyed as a gift to the state by a predecessor in title of the appellee, reservation being made of the lands in question.
In that case it was held that whether there are “substantial differences” between Federal savings and loan associations and credit unions, so that exempting one from income tax is not unreasonable classification, is a question of fact.
See, e. g., National Bank v. Banholzer, 69 Minn. 24, 29, 71 N. W. 919, 920 (“rural or agricultural portion of the city”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961) p. 1990 (“living in country areas: engaged in agricultural pursuits”).
Section 273.13, subd. 4, excepts from class-3 treatment rural property covered by subd. 2 (iron ore) and subd. 8a (property used exclusively for growing trees for timber, lumber, wood, and wood products). This indicates the legislature felt that, without the exceptions, iron ore and timber lands could be classified as rural property, which shows it intended “rural” to encompass more than just agricultural property.
See, 37A Wd. & Phr. (Perm, ed.) p. 683, and Supp. p. 74. See, also, Staples v. State, 233 Minn. 312, 46 N. W. (2d) 651, where the court held that although the land was rural in character and adaptable to rural use, it was not “agricultural lands” within the statute providing tax limitations for school maintenance purposes.
See, Staples v. State, supra; In re Delinquent Real Estate Taxes, 149 Minn. 335, 183 N. W. 671.
See, Staples v. State, 233 Minn. 312, 315, 46 N. W. (2d) 651, 653.
See, Staples v. State, supra; In re Delinquent Real Estate Taxes, supra; Wagner v. Commr. of Taxation, 258 Minn. 330, 333, 104 N. W. (2d) 26, 28.
See, Staples v. State, 233 Minn. 312, 315, 46 N. W. (2d) 651, 653. Appellants cite State ex rel. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Minnesota Tax Comm. 132 Minn. 93, 155 N. W. 1061, as establishing that use of property by public utility companies is necessarily nonrural. The case does not support their position. Although the ultimate result of the case was that certain telegraph company property was assessed at 40 percent of full and true value, the only question before the court was whether telegraph company property was included under the tax classification act or was outside the act because subject to a “lieu” tax. Had it been held outside the act, it would have been assessed at 100 percent of full and true value. The court’s
See, Report Attorney General, 1936, No. 353, in which it is stated: “Referring to * * * the classification and assessment of power dams and submerged land adjacent to such dam it does not follow that because these dams and submerged lands are commercial in their use that they are not rural land, that is, unplatted land within the meaning of the statute.”
Some provisions of the statute do turn upon the present use of the property. See, § 273.13, subd. 3, construed in Report Attorney General, 1960, No. 87.