*1 MINING AND MANUFAC- MINNESOTA COMPANY, Plaintiff,
TURING INDEMNITY TRAVELERS COMPA-
NY, Compa- Insurance Great American
ny, Anchor in interest successor Paul,
Casualty Company Minne- of St.
sota, Insurance Commercial Union
Company, interest as successor Corpo-
Employers Assurance
ration, Company of North Insurance
America, Inc., National Northwestern Company, Defendants.
Insurance CORPORATION, Plaintiff,
JOSLYN INSURANCE
LIBERTY MUTUAL
COMPANY, Defendant, Minnesota, Through its At-
The State
torney and its Pollution General Agency, Intervenor-Plaintiff.
Control CASUALTY
BITUMINOUS
CORPORATION, Plaintiff, CORPORATION, Defendant
TONKA Counterclaimant, Company, Riv- North
Travelers Insurance Company, In-
er Insurance Industrial
demnity Company and United States Company, Ameri-
Fire Insurance Great Company, Insur-
can Insurance Zurich Company, Fireman’s Fund Insur-
ance Company, Insur- Mission National
ance City Company, Twin Fire Insur-
ance Company, Defendants Additional
on Counterclaim. C4-88-1931,
Nos. C9-88-2296
and C1-88-2244.
Supreme of Minnesota. Court 8, 1990.
June *2 Herr, Gilmore, Maslon,
David H. F. John Edelman, Borman, Brand, Minneapolis, & Corp. for Tonká Neimann, Barnett, Paul G. Moss & Min- neapolis, for Ins. Co. Travelers Erstad, Chadwick, Leon R. Johnson & Condon, P.A., Minneapolis, for North River Ins. et al. Maun, Green, Mulrooney,
Garrett E. Simon, Brehl, Hayes, & St. Johanneson Barrett, Whitehead, Thomas J. G. Marc Paul, Bates, Jr., Phelan, and Robert J. Mielenhausen, Haik, Popham, Thomas C. Ill., Pope John, Chicago, & for Zurich Ins. Kaufman, Ltd., Minneapolis, Schnobrich & Co. LaTorre, Heintz, Washing- John E. Lisa I. Urness, Gay Neary, B. Miller & Minne- ton, D.C., Mfg. Min. for Minnesota Co. Savino, apolis, Gary M. D. William Plant, Coyne, Gray, Mooty, David M. Centola, Rivkin, Radler, Eagle, Alan C. Bennett, P.A., Minneapolis, for Mooty & Uniondale, N.Y., Bayth, Dunne & for Fire- Corp. Joslyn man’s Fund Ins. Co. Gen., III, Humphrey, Atty. Hubert H. McGuire, Burke, A. Robert J. Barbara Shea, Gen., Sp. Atty. Asst. St. Ann M. McGuire, Cousineau, Shaughnessy & Paul, intervenor-plaintiff, for State Anderson, Minneapolis, for Mission Nat. Minn., et al. Ins. Co. Peterson, Hunt, Kay Nord Thomas E. Gillen, Hade, Jardine, Charles E. Sean E. Searls, Lommen, Nelson, & James C. Cole Paul, Logan O’Brien, City & St. for Twin P.A., Stageberg, Minneapolis, Bitumi- for Fire Ins. Co. nous Cas. Bassford, Heckt, Lundberg, Charles E. Peters, Keppel, Scott H. William J. Dor- Lockhart, P.A., Briggs, Truesdell & Minne- sey Whitney, Minneapolis, & for Travelers Brunner, M. apolis, and Thomas W. James Indem. Co. Johnstone, Lawrence, Wiley, R. Robert Q. McShane, Kull, Marcia John M. Bow- D.C., Fielding, Washington, amicus Rein & Brooke, Minneapolis, man & and Jerome C. curiae, Litigation for Ins. Environment Lane, Randolph, Keating, Donald A. Ass’n. Cincinnati, Ohio, Meuthing Klekamp, & Leonard, Lillehaug, L. Street & David Great American Ins. et al. Deinard, (Joanne Minneapolis, and B. Martin, Gislason, T. Martin & Grossman, Bosset, James Covington Eric C. & Varpness, Minneapolis, D.C., counsel), for CommercialUn- Burling, Washington, ion Ins. et al. curiae, Institute, amici American Petroleum et al. Neimann, Shroyer, Paul J. G. Thomas Barnett, Minneapolis, III, Gen., Dennis Humphrey, Atty.
Moss & Hubert H. Blackmer, Wilmer, Shakman, Shea, Flannery, M. W. Scott Ann Sp. Steven M. Asst. D.C., Pickering, Washington, Gen., Paul, curiae, for Attys. Cutler & amici St. America, Inc., Minn., of North et al. Co. State of et al. Burke, Nygaard, Richard J. Patricia Ann Bennett,
Rider, Arundel, Egan Minne- &
apolis, for Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. KEITH, Justice. Bartz, Stich, Angelí, Terry F. J.
John Muth, P.A., Angelí, present Minne- These three cases certified Kreidler & III, Whitters, questions from district court in apolis, and James P. Lee H. the federal Boston, Glickenhaus, Snow, requiring us to decide Gaston & Minnesota Mass., is- Liberty complying Mut. Ins. the costs of with directives Co. penses state federal environmental associated with sued effort. agencies agencies up groundwater exchange, to clean contam- released 3M pollution liability pollu- un- under state and ination caused federal covered statutes, comprehensive general including der the insureds’ Minnesota Envi- Response Liability (“MER- ronmental Act LA”), 115B, ch. Minn.Stat. and from all present similar factual back- common law liabilities. (“Tonka”), Corporation grounds. Tonka *3 Tonka, Corporation (“Joslyn”) Joslyn and In the Joslyn Minneso- cases and the Manufacturing Mining Company pursuant and MPCA to MERLA ta issued a Re- (“3M”) by quest Response (“RFRA”) the Action have been insured various which companies involved these directed the insureds insurance conduct an investi- gation groundwater comprehensive general liability soil and cases under the contam- (“CGL”) dating ination at and policies prepare insurance back sev- their sites then to implement response plan policies The each instance and a eral decades. by nearly language the contamination. The
contain identical which RFRA also ad- company vised the that their particular the insurance involved insureds failure to take pay requested the the agreed “to insured all action would result on behalf undertaking legal- cleanup, the shall become MPCA the after sums which insured obligated because of which it ly would seek recover its costs * * * insureds, property damage to this insur- from the or it could which seek a court by compel order to them to applies, caused an occurrence.”1 clean the site ance years impose penalties. and During policies the were ef- civil The insureds fect, cases also the insureds in these were en- were advised could be liable manufacturing operations permanent damages gaged in which caused to the natu- state, chemical wastes. Like ral resources of the and that produced hazardous time, many at the the MPCA would seek reimbursement of its other manufacturers expenses. Joslyn con- disposed of these wastes un- own entered into a insureds settling sent order the MPCA in it derground burial or the use with agreed investigate suspected pools. years Over the the chemical contamina- wastes tion, soil, implement cleanup plan, escaped contaminating develop and have into expenses. The and the MPCA for its groundwaters. the soil and Minne- reimburse return, (“MPCA”) agreed that Agency In it not sota Pollution Control MPCA pursue any statutory or common law investigating soil of its has become involved Joslyn. groundwater against remedies Tonka has and contamination at order, complied disposal by the in entered consent but has sites used insureds waste taking requested cases. with RFRA actions. by 3M, disposal In the used site spent has requested Each of insureds considera- participate that 3M in a
MPCA
investigating the
financed
amounts
extent
hydrogeologic study. 3M
much
ble
ap-
complying
study
contamination and
and later commissioned surface
consent
plicable
orders.
cleanup
deteriorating
drums
the site.
RFRAs
brought
in federal
separately
consent
insureds
suit
In
3M entered a
order with
companies
court
who
MPCA and the United States Environ-
(“EPA”)
policies during the
agree-
sold the
Agency
CGL
mental Protection
groundwater
years
groundwater contamination
ing to
the soil
companies
occurring. The insurance
sites and to reimburse was
contamination at the
summary
brought motions
in each
agencies
past
for the
and future ex-
case
an "accident.”
Gordon
slight
rence” rather than
variations in
1.
Westendorf, Liability Coverage
analysis.
Toxic
policies
specific
not affect our
do
Tort,
Disposal
Pollu-
provided indemnity
and Other
policies
Waste
issued before 1966
Hazardous
(1988-
Exposures,
bodily
L.Rev.
tion
89).
25 Idaho
analy-
change
policies
our
also
affect
In 1966 the
This
an "accident.”
changed
provide
sis.
for an “occur-
essence, they
arguing
are
that claims
seeking declarations
judgment
policies
mandated
“damages”
costs
as used in the CGL
for environmental
are not covered
injunctive
the MPCA
a distinction between
embodies
policies.
of the CGL
relief,
within the
equitable
or other forms of
these costs
the issue of whether
each case
damages. They argue that
monetary
of the insur-
under the terms
are covered
in these
the MPCA
the actions taken
court
certified to this
has been
relief, including resti-
equitable
seek
applicable Minnesota
for resolution
tutionary relief and therefore are not cov-
law.2
ered under
companies argue that the
The insurance
authority for their
The insurers cite as
only
indemnify the insureds
v. Northeast
position Continental Ins. Co.
legally obligated
when the
Co., & Chem.
ern Pharmaceutical
party. They
“damages” to a third
(8th Cir.) (en banc) sub nom.
F.2d 977
term
should be
assert that the
denied,
Ins., cert.
Missouri v. Continental
policies to con-
interpreted in the insurance
*4
Ins. Co. v.
duty
no
defend because the action
236, 244-45, 199
294 Minn.
N.W.2d
for a
not an
writ mandamus was
action
terms
an insurance
If the
“damages.”
seeking
Id.
276.
Thief
defined,
specifically
must be
controlling
River Falls is not
these
ordinary
popular
given
plain,
cases,
presented
we are
with dif-
meaning.
Paul
& Ma
Smith
St.
Fire
types
ferent
of claims asserted
(Minn.
rine
N.W.2d
expectations
different sets of
1984). Ambiguous
in an insurance
terms
by the insurers and the insureds. Unlike
insur
policy are to
resolved
Falls,
River
has
Thief
and in
the reasonable
er
accordance with
given
cases which has
occurred
*5
expectations of the insured. Columbia
against
rise to claims
the insureds that
Motors,
Heights
Inc. v. Allstate Ins.
require
pay
them to
amounts to reimburse
(Minn.1979) (citations
275 N.W.2d
out-of-pocket
the MPCA and to make
ex-
omitted). Ambiguity
if
exists
the
pay
penditures to
contractors or their own
policy reasonably subject
of the
is
to more
pre-
to its
employees to restore
interpretation.
than one
Id. at 34.
Falls,
In
polluted condition.
River
Thief
companies
required only
The insurance
assert that
against
the
the insured
claim
“damages”
city
the term
as used in the CGL
insured
commence condemna-
Moreover,
if
proceedings.
even
policies unambiguously embodies a distinc
tion
required
pay money
city eventually
legal
equitable
tion between
remedies.
award,
of a
form
condemnation
argument
unpersuasive.
is
This
Minnesota
money
merely
exchange
an
of
places
antiquated
law
little value on
distinc
equal
property of
value and was
made
legal
equitable
tions between
injury
claimant for
compensate
persisted
sep
from the historic
which have
property.
chancery. Eq
of
aration of courts
law and
uity
chancery jurisdiction
abol
were
context,
present
ished,
equity
and actions in law and
“damages”
ambiguous as it is
the term
is
the Territorial
combined
an act of
As
susceptible
than
to more
one reasonable
sembly
March
ch.
in 1853. Act of
interpretation.
policy language, “all
19-33,
480-82.
1849-1858 Pub.Stat.
legal-
the insured shall become
§§
sums which
“damages”
hold
as used
We
ly obligated
pay
damage,”
reasonably
in the CGL
can
be inter-
unambiguous
have an
technical
preted
cover
claim asserted
industry
arising
insurance
which draws
dis
out of
dam-
the insured
seeking purely
age,
requires
expenditure
tinction between actions
which
monetary
seeking
money, regardless
forms
whether the claim can
relief and actions
equitable in
urged
equitable
position
relief.
characterized as
be
supported by
interpretation
companies
contrary
is
to our
This
is
nature.
“damages”
dictionary
definition
interpretation
contract
rules
dam-
an insured
reimbursement
makes no distinction between
which
equity.
ages
actions
See
expenses
at law and
associated with
inves-
own
International Dictio-
Third New
tigation
Webster’s
of a contaminated site.
(1961) (“damages”
nary Unabridged 571
115B.17, subd. 6. The
See Minn.Stat. §
money
reparation in
are “the estimated
compel
insured to
claim seeks to
compensa-
injury
sustained:
detriment
compensate
agency for
money to
imposed by
for a
or satisfaction
law
the contam-
amounts it has lost because of
of a
wrong
violation
interpret
ination.
It is reasonable to
NEPACCO,
case
legal right.”)
Even
provide
insurers,
con-
upon by the
the court
relied
However,
claim for reim-
such a claim.
“damages”
that the term
was am-
cluded
expenses
also can be charac-
bursement
lay
biguous
standpoint
equitable
an
claim for restitution
terized as
NEPACCO,
183 prop- groundwater imposed early as 1895 monetary compensation for to of erty. Berger Minneapolis Gaslight construction v. 60 This 296, 298, 300, The issue of cover- 336, is too narrow. 62 Minn. N.W. 336-37 merely age depend on the form (1895). prohibited pollution The state has Surely against taken the insured. action including drinking supplies, water legal proceedings commenced the groundwater, since 1885. See Act of equally coer- against the insureds MPCA 7, 1885, 225, March ch. 1885 Minn.Gen. in- judgment the cive as a civil (codified 6 Laws 296 at Minn.Stat. ch. 99a § MERLA, Because of the insureds sured. 2)). (1879-1888 Supp.Vol. This act also em- obligation expend to legal a are under agency, among powered a state other remedy the injuries to to state’s amounts compel things, party responsible to for fact the resources. The natural drinking pollution supplies the water form of a consent order obligation the “remedy pollution, puri- or to cleanse or by a RFRA rather than or is mandated Id.; fy polluting see also substances.” change the nature judgment does not civil (1905). 2147 Minnesota Revised Laws § merely the obligation. These are Thus, parties in were aware compel forms used MPCA potential liability groundwater for up site. The consent of a contaminated contamination at the time entered legal obligation on the impose a orders at issue these cases. v. Jostens Inc. CNA insureds. See The advent of MERLA and other environ- Co., 403 N.W.2d Ins./Continental changed merely mental statutes have (settlement 625, (Minn.1987) agreement 631 liability groundwater pollu- form of the insured). legal obligation on imposed liability. In- tion, not the of that nature availability by the The RFRAs are backed deed, conceded that insurers have the insureds judgment of a civil asserted the MPCA under MER- compel to conduct the clean the insureds damages resources of LA for natural compel reimbursement MPCA’s under the state covered cleaning up the contamination expenses (1988). 115B.04, 1(c) subd. Minn.Stat. See § 2; 115B.18, Minn.Stat. subd. itself. §§ merely update remedies MERLA 115B.17, e.g., Intel subd. 6. liabilities, statutory common old law Co., 692 & Indent. Accident Hartford. for the proved to be ill-suited which have 1171, 1190, (N.D.Cal. 3 F.Supp. n. 1190 injuries. tort prompt toxic resolution 1988); v. Lumber Ins. Co. Centennial Co. v. Continental See CPS Chem. 342, 349- F.Supp. 677 Cos. mens Mut. 811, 175, 189, N.J.Super. 536 A.2d 222 (E.D.Pa.1987); 23 Fireman’s 350 n. (1988). Corp., Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Fund (E.D.Mich.1987); F.Supp. Broadwell remedy imposed by MERLA Finally, the Servs., Fidelity & Cas. Co. Realty Inc responsible party clean requiring 516, 527, N.Y., N.J.Super. 528 A.2d nov- contaminated to the insured or el or unforeseeable companies. This has ex- groundwater contamination moreover, and, prior statutes isted many recognized in Minnesota has been origi- restoring its property to the costs of one of the first years. Minnesota was long-recognized nal condition has been adopt the strict jurisdictions American pollu- law damages common measure Rylands, 1 liability rule Fletcher Minneapolis, St. Heath v. cases. See (1865, 1866) (imposing Exch.L.R. 470, 475, 148 Co., 126 Minn. P. & S.S.M.R. any liability for strict the com- Under N.W. thing on kept one’s law, typically this kind are mon escaped), aff'd, naturally if it cause harm diminution value limited Fletcher, (1868) 3 H.L. 330 L.R. Rylands v. restoring if the cost of 292, damaged property Eastman, (cited Minn. Cahill v. original condition would 293-94, 306, (1872)). Strict Dobbs, Id.; D. Hand- value. exceed that contamination specifically *9 * * * Remedies, 146, sources, book the Law “damages are because of up requirement MERLA clean property damage” the meaning within expand did not the common law comprehensive general liability insur- pollution an so that order to policies issued these defendants. the contamination would not be questions The certified are affirmatively expectation within the reasonable answered. insured. policy language We conclude that KELLEY, SIMONETT, COYNE and * * * “damages because of dam- JJ., opinions. dissent with age” ambiguous regard is to the costs KELLEY, (dissenting). Justice cleanup. of the MPCA-mandated The am- biguity in this context must be construed respectfully I comprehen- dissent. The give the insurers to effect to the sive involved in expectations of reasonable the insureds. substantially these cases contain identical door,” “opening We are not as the language obligating the insurer involved assert, insurers to insurance pay “to on behalf of the insured all sums expenses all business mandated which the legally insured shall become obli- * * * government, such as the cost of gated pay damages as because of complying regulations safety with OSHA property damage to which the insurance or an order a fire marshall to make applies, (Em- an occurrence.” owned the insured safer phasis added). The construction of that against the risk of types fire. These insuring agreement adopted by majori- costs are not poli- covered ty completely ignores the as damages simply cies no property damage because phrase and changes the whole meaning of has occurred. The only provide insuring agreement from one in which coverage for sums which the insured be- the insurer pay assumes the risk to dam- legally obligated comes pay because of ages obligating to one it to all sums property damage. Purely preventative or otherwise. To afford measures are not covered the absence of the word employed property damage. insuring agreement literally the broad and
Because of the limited factual record be- boundless connotation that
the majority
us,
fore
it,
we cannot undertake to
give
words,
used,
decide the would
become
scope
coverage provided
exact
by the
surplusage
mere
obligation
policies. We leave to the federal
district
would be covered no matter how it
court
determining
task of
precisely
arose or what it was intended to cover.
which costs
associated with the clean
Maryland
Armco,
Casualty
Inc.,
Co. v.
1348,
contaminated sites will
(4th Cir.1987),
be covered. We 822 F.2d
cert.
presented
questions
denied,
1008,
with certified
484 U.S.
108 S.Ct.
asking broadly whether any
of the clean L.Ed.2d
agree
I
with the hold
up costs are
poli-
ing
covered under the
Continental
v.Co. Northeast
cies.
expenditures
We hold that
mandated
ern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
by the Minnesota
Agency
(8th Cir.) (en banc),
Pollution Control
denied,
F.2d 977
cert.
pursuant to the
Minnesota Environmental
488 U.S.
109 S.Ct.
185 may inappropriate reference was though the abstract be con- the term, ambiguous questioned of phrase to be an when struction the in the considered comprehensive No policies. poli- is inserted in a evidence exists that the word the on a liability policy in context of cies were issued “take it or it” leave scope the basis. From the limited sentence which defines evidence surround- ing policies, the liability “to all sums execution of these as one it clear- insurer’s legally ly appears to me insured shall obli- that it is much more which the become ** * policies in damages probable question of gated were * * * ” damage longer negotiated large corporations, it is no between sophisticated the term each of had ambiguous. plain of which access legal damages, departments insurance and or employed so refers advice. equitable-like remediation dam- I submit such circumstances the invoca- and not to respectfully majority I of ages. Accordingly, dissent. the construction precept sometimes referred to as contra comprehensive gen- holding By that preferentem, ambiguous language that pro- policies here involved eral against the construed insurer in accordance coverage corporate pollu- to reimburse vide expectations the reasonable of in- costs, of response clean-up some ters sureds, inapt. The fact of the is matter voluntarily they more or less as- negotiated that when these by agreement with the state without sumed ago party decades neither had idea upon consent of the concerned insurers legislation superfund similar reimbursement, they whom now call for impose laws unlimited such liabilities opinion, me, majority seems to dis- it polluters clean-up on for remediation or long policy regards established insurance costs; contemplated risk neither rules. These rules construction assumption by nor was its the insurers prohibit reading ambiguity into courts from bargained premium set. when the plain language policy simply superfund Long provide coverage. e.g., Far before advent order laws, owners had tort Accident & Indem. kas Hartford 24 con- Minn. others activities 173 N.W.2d Motors, property. (1969), Heights on their The insurance Inc. ducted Columbia (Minn. clearly con- involved these cases Allstate Ins. N.W.2d 1979). templated shifting doing, majority am- owners’ In so finds insur- biguity, type the term risk for that to the not with reference how ers, issue in these three employed in context of and were that the cases, unanimity I am sure would dictate language, but rather in reliance paying those insurers bore the risk on definitions of the term “dam- abstract damages. federal and types A Both the ages” found standard dictionaries. superfund provisions laws contain al- state argument could be advanced valid lowing damage, recovery type for that might this such reference be relevant 9607(a)(4)(C) Minn.Stat. had insureds in these U.S.C. construction issue see § 115B.17, (1988), differ- lay unsophisticated in and both persons, subd. cases been § damage and type such acquisition liability insurance cover- entiate between cleanup Compare, e.g., liability remediation costs. age, they and had been afforded 115B.17, 9606(a) coverage and Minn.Stat. more or less on a “take it leave U.S.C. § § resulting in But in these cases none subd. 6 it” basis circumstances seeking indemnity cov- plaintiffs are might to be a contract what be considered however, damages. view, erage type such Rather my of adhesion. cases, slightly my more state census reveals that Universal Ins. 804 F.2d Canadian Mraz (4th Cir.1986); the Fifth Circuit con- than of the state courts have likewise half Hanna, Casualty Surety "damages” Co. v. Aetna & “response with- costs" are not cluded Cir.1955), (5th many have state courts F.2d 499 compre- cited clause Although I am not likewise addressed the issue. general liability insurance hensive my all of the certain that research has included remediation response insuring agree- seek that a construction of the upper limit of costs which have “no liabili- ments at issue would not afford Brett, ty.” Insuring Against the Innova- unilaterally for remedial measures under- by industry tive Liabilities and Remedies Created taken with neither notice to nor *11 Superfund, Pol’y 6 U.C.L.A. J. Envtl. L. & participation by insurers, respectfully I (1986). 1, 53 As Professor Kenneth S. dissent. Abraham, wrote: insuring agreement compre- in the impose liability cleanup expenses [T]o general liability hensive insurance issued before enact- obligates in these involved insurers that ment of the statutes created such pay on behalf of the insured all sums “[t]o ignore liability is to the calculations that legally which the insured shall become obli- pricing policies, entered into the of those gated damages bodily to as thereby ignore underlying and to property damage to which the purpose provisions of the whose applies,” an “occur- is at issue. The result twofold: or, in policies, by rence” the older an “acci- insureds, windfall who receive bene- added). (Emphasis agree dent.” I they paid, fits for which never and still Kelley majori- view Justice regarding another set of uncertainties ty’s insuring agree- construction of those magnitude liability of the an insurer completely ignores ments damages the as providing environmental cover- phrase and alters the entire of the age may face. insuring agreed agreement. The insurers
Abraham, Environmental paying damages to undertake the risk of Insurance, 88 the Limits Col.L.Rev. legally obligated which the insured is to pay, not to assume a broad and indefinable submit,
Finally, majority holding I sums, obligation pay any to and all whether public policy contravenes state to damages characterized as or otherwise. responsible polluters obligation hold to the By refusing apply insuring agree- to damages to clean the environmental according terms, majority ment to its “ * * * activities, have caused limitations, ignor- has exceeded definitional contrary public policy it is to allow a ing plain, ordinary traditionally ac- responsible party pass on the cost of cepted meaning of the term * * * carrier, to its insurance “only payments persons to third when thereby having retain the benefit anoth- persons those have a claim for dam- * * perform public duty having er without ages Casualty *.” Aetna & Sur. Co. Brett, paid Insuring Against for it.” Hanna, (5th Cir.1955). 224 F.2d by Super- Innovative Remedies Created important recognize although It is fund, Pol’y 6 U.C.L.A. J. Envtl. L. & 52 both state and federal statutes differenti- corporate polluters As between damages, ate between costs and stockholders, policyhold- and their and the sought neither the MPCA nor the EPA comprehensive general ers of Mining from Minnesota & Manu- policies, public policy it seems to me the facturing Company any of the other place this state should the onus of remedia- respondents here. important This factor is upon corporate polluters have who parties’ obligations because the are con- indemnification, paid not rather than trolled of the insurance upon pre- insurers who have not received contract is here written terms of mium cover its cost. sought, the relief terms of the form reasons, For these I would each answer Maryland cause of action. See questions negative. of the certified Armco, Inc., Co. v. 822 F.2d (4th Cir.1987). simply, More the contract
COYNE, (dissenting). Justice specifically refers which the I, too, expressed Because am of required the view insured is and not to other majority imposed by gov- of federal circuit courts liabilities on the insured agencies during the course of ronmental harm from these activi- business emmental any contemplation protecting negotiated remedial efforts. I share the ties or in- dustry it of the fourth circuit when rea- costs associated with them. wariness significantly, accept More it is difficult to soned follows: sophisticated parties claim assuming the costs [E]ven they “reasonably expected” coverage and regardless of defendant are the same delayed then period for a from four to government for restitu- whether the sues eight informing years in their insurers of damages, tion or for thus some sense ongoing investigations nego- either the govern- rendering the decision tiations with the state or elimi- regarding ment dam- sue nate environmental harm occasioned fortuity,” “mere it ages or restitution a *12 compli- their or their unilateral activities one, dangerous great step, is a governmental cleanup ance with directives. begin to construe insurance courts matter, As a practical the actions of the encompass compliance policies to costs of wholly are their insureds inconsistent with injunctive and reimbursement relief. coverage contemplated. claim that Therefore, I find Id. at 1353. while no “legal” summary, by major- I am critical distinction between the as troubled “equitable” proceed- ity’s efforts to cost opposed to nature shift considerable industry ings, scrutiny I am that careful burden from the intentional convinced whose agreement requires insuring a focus activities have sullied the environment to guise sought. of a on the nature of the relief insurer under claimed insuring ambiguity of the opinion remediation I am of the or agreements. I majority further caution cleanup properly costs are more character- on the cases are before this court governmental obligations imposed ized as questions certified the federal court and mitigate pollu- prevent environmental limited to an our consideration should be industry either as tion and incurred are inquiry of whether costs “dam- doing business or as an economic cost ages” compre- within activity. loss associated with the business general policy. We are not hensive pro- here directed take are questions asked to and cannot address such any pol- phylactic measures to assure that damage property there is whether (often specified infecting lution applies, it policy which the own) escape not be allowed or an “accident” an “occurrence” bodily or dam- the confines to cause any policy of the within the age to If of others. those applicable relating to statutes matters inadequate bodily injury measures notice provision or the limitation occurs, to the others response to the insured to the insurer. coverage language policy may questions certified is but one of series applicable any legal well re- questions, the accumulated threshold persons; it to me awarded third seems sponses lead to the ultimate to which will only fitting applicable coverage is avail- determination whether previously not have exhausted ex- been incomplete able our record a risk pending it on outside cov- these other matters. erage. analysis in Finally, majority casts its SIMONETT, (dissenting). Justice expectations” terms the “reasonable Kelley join I Justice dissents of designed apparently parties, inquiry an Coyne. and Justice agreements yesterday’s and in- to construe analysis by today’s tentions events. First, important respects.
flawed two executed, agreements
the time these perhaps little or no under-
there was
standing potential substantial envi-
