17 F. Cas. 447 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota | 1876
It is well settled by the authorities in this country, and sustained by the later English decisions, that there is no difference in the rules governing the negotiation of contracts by corespondence through the post-office and by telegraph, and a contract is concluded when an acceptance of a proposition is deposited in the telegraph office for transmission. See 14 Am. Law Keg. 401, “Contracts by Telegraph,” article by Judge Kedfield, and authorities cited; also, Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307.
The reason for this rule is well stated in Adams v. Lindsell, 1 Barn. & Ald. 681. The negotiation in that case was by post The court sain: “That if a bargain could not be closed by letter before the answer was received, no contract could be completed through the medium of the post-office; that if the one party was not bound by his offer when it was accepted (that is, at the time the letter of acceptance is deposited in the mail), then the other party ought not to be bound until after they had received a notification that the answer had been received and assented to, and that so it might go on ad infinitum.” See, also, 5. Pa. St. 339; 11 N. Y. 441; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103; 48 N. H. 14; 8 C. B. 225. In the case at bar the delivery of the message at the telegraph office signified the acceptance of the offer. If any contract was entered into, the meeting of minds was at 8:53 of the clock, on Tuesday morning, August 3d, and the subsequent dispatches are out of the case. 1 Pars. Cont. 482, 483.
This rule is not strenuously dissented from on the. argument, and it is substantially admitted that the acceptance of an offer by
It is undoubtedly the • rule that when a proposition is made under the circumstances in this ease, an acceptance concludes the contract if the offer is still open, and the mutual consent necessary to convert the offer of one party into a binding contract by the acceptance of the other is established, if such acceptance is within a reasonable time after the offer was received.
The better opinion is, that what is, or is not, a reasonable time, must depend upon the circumstances attending the negotiation, and the character of the subject matter of the contract, and in no better way can the intention of the parties be determined. If the negotiation is in respect to an article stable in price, there is not so much reason for an immediate acceptance of the offer, and the same rule would not apply as in a case where the negotiation related to an article subject to sudden and great fluctuations in the market. ■ ■
The rule in regard to the length of the time an offer shall continue, and when an acceptance completes the contract, is laid down in Farsons on Contracts (volume 1, p. 482). He says: “It may be said that whether the offer be made for a time certain or not, the intention or understanding of the parties is to govern. * * * If no definite time is stated, then the inquiry as to a reasonable time resolves itself into an inquiry as to what time it is rational to suppose the parties contemplated; and the law will decide this to be that time which as rational men they ought to have understood each other to have had in mind.” Applying this rule, it seems clear that the intention of the plaintiff, in making the offer by telegraph, to sell an article which fluctuates so much in price, must have been upon the understanding that the acceptance, if at all, should be immediate, and as soon after the receipt of the offer as would give a fair opportunity for consideration. The delay here was too long, and nihnifestly unjust to the plaintiff, for it afforded the defendant an opportunity to take advantage of a change in the market, and accept or refuse the offer as would- best subserve its interests.
Judgment will be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the amount claimed. The counter-claim is denied. Judgment accordingly.