*1 аlternative, for the placement suitable and until an unless for continued argument juvenile can be made. While the to obligations in relation may have some merit funding (here, Philadelphia Department contracting agency Services) in with general, system or the child welfare Human reimbursement, I would hold that medical MA respect are of an alternative level care suitability and the necessity as practice to medical standards according determined be see 55 Pa.Code regulations, provided DPW’s plainly 1101.21, validity of a successful § the absence least (an Devereux does not regulation to such effort challenge here). undertake of this join majority’s disposition appeal
I therefore for services rendered K.C. with to reimbursement respect K.T., I as I H.B.; respectfully dissent respect with in that situation as well. uphold would DPW’s denial EAKIN, dissenting. Justice Court
I would affirm on the basis of the Commonwealth I opinion. Accordingly, dissent.
855A.2d COMPANY, Appellee, AND FIRE CASUALTY MINNESOTA v. GREENFIELD, and Arlin
Michael Sharon Smith C. J. Individually Smith, and as Administrators of Angela Smith, Appellants. Estate of C.
Supreme Pennsylvania. Court
Argued 2003. Dec. Aug.
Decided *3 Fenstermacher, Mechanicsburg, Mi- Esq., John Richard Greenfield, al. chael J. et Salzer, Esq., Ann Philadel- Esq., Connelly, Kori
William T. Casualty Company. Fire and Minnesota phia, NIGRO, C.J., CASTILLE, CAPPY, BEFORE: NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN, LAMB, JJ. ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT
OPINION
OF THE COURT Justice NEWMAN. today cоmpany must an insurance owes
We decide whether wrongful indemnify a homeowner for duty defend his heroin to selling of his occasioned her. houseguest death follow, holding of affirm the For the reasons we Court, that no such grounds, albeit different obligation exists. AND HISTORY
FACTS PROCEDURAL *4 9, 1998, Angela February eighteen year-old At 8 p.m. on (Smith) home of Michael J. Greenfield Smith arrived (Greenfield) Street, Wormleysburg, North Third at 600 young some from him. Another hoping obtain heroin woman, (Broadwater), with Broadwater was Smith. Brook arrived, Mad they drinking Dog had been When Greenfield and heroin. marijuana and under the influence beer was
337 heroin,1 lost having use of stranger was no Greenfield Original from it in Rec past. times consciousness three Greenfield, (Record), of Michael J. Testimony Deposition ord (Greenfield 13, at 120-21. He Deposition), December basis. Id. at 147. He had used daily heroin on a using was before, she, too, had and become uncon with Smith heroin Id. at 121-22. Greenfield had sold twice from it. scious and was arrested in 1995 to Smith on other occasions heroin marijuana. Id. at 124. Greenfield acknowl for possession “occasionally;” out of his house drugs that he sold edged just really and “didn’t part, “mostly most sold weed” he Id. at 141-42. many people.” too sell heroin marijuana money, a small sum of exchange for some and heroin, which was with a provided bag Smith Greenfield p.m., At 8:20 Smith volun- approximately labeled “Suicide.” the heroin. From time until injected with tarily herself only in a chair and communicated when lay Smith p.m., her, some blankets for put out directly addressed. with went to on the floor. Greenfield left sleep and she Broadwater, p.m. to the 10:45 returning approximately house residence, 131. Smith and when Id. at remained a.m., still around 6:30 he found Smith Greenfield awoke work, told Id. at he left for he Smith floor. 132. When left, Id. groggily responded. door if and Smith lock the she day, home from work later that he When Greenfield came floor had left found Smith dead on the where he her was dead because “she morning. Greenfield knew she breathing.” Autopsy and Id. at 145.2 results pale was substance, pursuant is a I controlled to The Con- 1. Heroin Schedule Act, 1972, 14, Substance, April Drug, P.L. Device Cosmetic trolled 233, 14, 1972, (The seq. § § et No. eff. June 35 P.S. 780-101 Act). A Schedule I controlled substance is one Controlled Substance abuse, high potential currently accepted no medical use with “a States, accepted safety for use under medical United and a lack of 780-104(1). § supervision.” P.S. work, police Ironically, arrived from chief when Greenfield home headlight, a broken door because Greenfield had was outside his police it.” checking he] “was to make fixed [that the chief sure house, when did not that Smith dead inside chief know body, police, explaining he her did not call the Greenfield discovered *5 that showed Smith died from a heroin overdose. Greenfield friend, (Rollins), called a Robert Rollins who his came to Id. at 147. Wearing residence. want gloves because he “didn’t Greenfield, body, friend, touch” Smith’s dead with his took Id. at it in a body put and vehicle owned Greenfield. area, 148. They body drove around the and then dumped the Id. at in York County near the Yellow 257. Breeches Creek. police story Greenfield then contacted the and a concocted had a simply body the effect that he found near the creek. initially story, Rollins told the same but recanted and told the truth. day. The men were arrested later that same charged
Greenfield was criminally outcome of the Smith; pled death of he guilty and was sentenced on of counts involuntary manslaughter,3 a corpse,4 abuse of and unlawful delivery of During guilty plea heroin.5 colloquy, counsel (unlaw stated that the maximum penalty felony charge substance) ful of I delivery Schedule is years cоntrolled five $15,000.00; and for the (involuntary misdemeanor one man fine; slaughter), years it is five the misdemeanor drugs, being high that he "[b]ecause was scared of and stuff. I didn't Record, reviewing know what Id. at to do.” 145-46. the entire suggest there is not one of scintilla evidence to felt personal responsibility remorse or for the of death Smith. He seems to regret transpired. have or little conscience for what manslaughter § Involuntary 3. 18 Pa.C.S. 2504.' (a) person guilty involuntary manslaughter General rule.—A doing when as a direct result of the unlawful act in a reckless or manner, grossly negligent doing or the aof lawful act in a or reckless manner, grossly negligent he death of person. causes the another (b) Grading.—Involuntary manslaughter is a misdemeanor degree. years age first care, Where victim is under 12 and is in death, custody person or control of the caused who involun- tary manslaughter felony degree. is a of the second law, provides "[e]xcept § 4. 18 Pa.C.S. as authorized a person corpse way outrage who a treats a that he knows would ordinary family sensibilities commits a misdemeanor of the second degree.” 780-113(a)(30) § provides 5. 35 Pa.C.S. following "[t]he acts causing hereby prohibited: thereof within the are Commonwealth manufaсture, delivery, possession ... with intent to manufacture deliver, by person registered substance controlled under act....” (abuse two it two corpse), years and fine. Record 77- during colloquy, Also counsel indicated that Green- (the field had in York County county been confined prison *6 found) body which the was and sent to then Cumberland County prison. County, When he on bail in York the charges there were and was dropped, he arrested Cumber- land charges. at 82. County deposition, Record At the Green- (he bail, field stated that he that “I it made testified think was $25,000.00” first $200,000.00”) and then it to “they raised and pled guilty jail, then he and went back with to two more incarcerations. Record at 155-56. Outside of sketchy these references, the Record does not contain other re- evidence garding the sentence. (the
Greenfield obtained a homeowner’s policy from Policy) (Insurance Minnesota Fire and Casualty Company Company) when purchased he his Policy residence. This was place died, when it provided Smith and as follows: II,
Section E—Personal Coverage Liability If a claim is made or is brought against a suit an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused to which coverage occurrеnce applies, we- will:
1. to pay our up liability limit of for the damages for which liable; is legally insured and 2. provide a defense at our expense by our counsel of choice, if even the suit is groundless, or false fraudulent. We may investigate any and settle claim or suit that we appropriate. decide is duty Our to or settle ends defend when the amount pay we damages resulting from the equals occurrence our limit liability.
Record, Exhibit B at 31.
The Policy defines “occurrence” as “an accident,” includ- ing exposure conditions, results, during which period, or bodily injury; Record, b. property damage. in: a. Exhibit B harm, at 22. “Bodily injury” “bodily sickness or disease, care, including required loss of services and death Id. However, result.” Policy coverage excludes in- expected
bodily injury or intended “which is Record, “arising out Bodily injury B at 32. sured.” Exhibit Id. is also of an insured” excluded. pursuits of business “trade, occupation.” profession as a “Business” defined Record, B at Exhibit Smith, 10, 1999, Arlin L. Smith and C.
On June Sharon Smith, actions wrongful death survival parents of filed of Cumber- Court Common Pleas against Greenfield (trial of all court), and on individually land behalf County Smith, as Angela C. other beneficiaries Estate alia, that: alleged, inter They administrators of that Estate. (2) of, Smith; (1) knew had heroin he sold foreseen, conse- harmful and dangerous should have Smith; (3) attempts made selling heroin to he no quences 8,1998, evening February condition during check on her (4) attempt made no following morning; he *7 instead, her, to work. leaving going revive her and Ac- Declaratory a Judgment The Insurance filed Company alia, that: inter court, tion in trial claiming, the do an the Smith trigger The not allegations Complaint Casualty the Fire to obligation part on Minnesota and allegations for indemnify [Greenfield] either defend the in the Smith sought forth The liability damages set herein. to caused the sale of by are have been Complaint alleged in death. by resulting [Smith’s] heroin to [Smith] Greenfield occurrence,” i.e., an “an allegations These do constitute event; solely premised rather the are allegations accidental act of insured of upon intentional and criminal the heroin, a selling controlled substance. ¶ Action, 12.
Complaint Equity—Declaratory Judgment in legal that it had no alleged further Company Insurance indemnify ground obligation to defend or Greenfield on Com- public coverage that bars the asserted. policy insurance ¶ Action, 19. in plaint Equity—Declaratory Judgment 14, 2001, parties' On March the trial court ruled on the which sum- Summary sought for Judgment, Cross-Motions Company mary regarding duty of the Insurance judgment
341 and wrongful death indemnify and Greenfield defend Insur- Accident held General action. Our Court survival Allen, 693, 1089, 1095 692 A.2d 547 Pa. America v. ance Co. of that would ... facts (1997), avers complaint that “[i]f coverage then policy, under the recovery covered support until such time duty has a to defend insurer triggered does recovery policy to a claim is confined that the Allen, trial court application on its not cover.” Based the case defend Company the Insurance ordered Trial Court liability. Opinion ultimate any sustain Automobile Associa- Services 2. The court cited United page (1986), peti- 982 517 A.2d Elitzky, Pa.Super. v. 358 tion denied, Pa, 600, 601, 528 A.2d 515 appeal allowance tion (1987), a homeowner’s which involved presently to the one exclusionary clause identical with Court; i.e., liability bodily it did not cover before the the insured.” or intended injury expected “which exclusionary applies clause that “the the court stated Elitzky, a harm. Insurance intends to cause when the insured only actions are the insured’s is not excluded because coverage Id. damage.” the resultant he also intended intentional unless that, judice case sub trial court Relying at 987. act an intentional Complaint alleged although found that Smith, no Greenfield, i.e., there were heroin supplying inferring alleging reasonably averments respect to cause her death. With expected or intended court Mutual the trial cited indemnify, to defend duty Haver, Pa. 725 A.2d v. Insurance Benefit of action (1999), cause particular “[t]he which noted *8 of whether is not determinative complainant pleads that a necessary it is to look has Instead coverage triggered. been Id. at complaint.” in factual contained allegations at the con- and Complaint alleged negligence that the Finding to cause the that Greenfield intended tained no averments Smith, Compa- trial court that the Insurance of held death wrongful to him in the death duty had the defend ny recovery claim to a it could confine the survival action until Policy. scope not within the Opinion and Order of the trial court denied the Insur- Company’s
ance
Motion for Summary Judgment, applying the
“view,
standard of review that
it
requires
the record
light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as
genuine
the existence of a
issue material fact must be
against
resolved
moving party.” Opinion
and Order of the
Baxter,
Trial
(citing
Court at 9-10
Washington v.
553 Pa.
(1998)).
The Superior Court reversed and
determined
two
(1)
precluded
factors
coverage:
expanded
its
doctrine of “in-
intent,”
ferred
which had been applied previously in Pennsyl-
only
vania
involving
cases
child abuse. Minnesota Fire
Casualty
(Pa.Su-
Company Greenfield,
v.
Relying
Aetna Casualty
Roe,
and Surety Company v.
Pa.Super.
(1994),
A.2d 94
which adopted in
Pennsylvania the idea of
cases,
inferred intent in child abuse
Superior
Court
the instant matter stated that “[in-
ferred intent results when there is an
act
intentional
on the
part of the
it
insured and
inherent
that act that harm will
cases,
occur.
In child abuse
the actor’s
will
abuse
frequently
cause long-term harm to the child.” Greenfield,
Greenfield filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal with this Court, issue, raising one which was whether the Superior Court erred in extending the concept of inferred intent to n involving general cases liability coverage. We granted allocatur on April 2003. For the reasons that follow, we determine that although the Superior Court erred in expanding doctrine, the inferred intent it reached the correct result in determining public policy precludes the Company Insurance from any duty defend or indemnify Greenfield.
DISCUSSION As explained, we question before us is whеther the Company Insurance must indemnify defend or Greenfield wrongful death of Smith resulting from heroin that he sold to her. case,
In this Insurance filed declara tory action, judgment which the trial court pursuant addressed to Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment filed both par ties. The court denied the Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment, granted the Motion of the defendants regarding the Insurance Company’s duty Greenfield, to defend and denied the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment seeking indemnification of the Insurance Com pany. Our scope review an order granting summary judgment plenary, and we will reverse the order a trial court only where the court committed an error of law or clearly abused its discretion. Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., (2002). 571 Pa. 812 A.2d 1218 reviewing When an order granting summary judgment, reviewing “[t]he court to the light most favorable
must view the record as of a resolving doubts to the existence nonmoving party, all *10 Id. against moving party.” of fact the genuine issue material omitted). (internal at 1221 citations regard an contract interpretation The of insurance is coverage “generally of the existence non-existence ing Allen, a 692 at 1093. “Where performed by court.” A.2d the to be policy provision of a is the is provision policy ambiguous, and the insurer.... against in favor of the insured construed Where, however, is and of the contract clear language the to to that lan give a court is effect unambiguous, required Builders, Pennsylvania v. Harvey Gene & Inc. guage.” 420, 512 Pa. Company, Association Insurance Manufacturers’ 910, (1986). fact that the light 517 A.2d 913 of the law, Policy of a of poses question construction the appropriate is v. H.H. Knoebel plenary. Sahutsky our standard review (2001). Sons, Pa. A.2d 996 trial court analysis, on our we conclude that the erred Based it that Company as when found the Insurance a matter law public and it held that required defend Greenfield when the insurance death prohibit coverage does not reject Smith. We the Court’s extension Superior mat- liability intent to general doctrine inferred unnecessary of this ters as the resolution inappropriate agree Superior the that Court case. We with result court; however, only we affirm reversing reached trial holding public policy that that part its determines precludes Policy. under coverage Superior reversing two reasons
The
Court asserted
(1)
intentionally
Smith with
supplied
trial court:
and,
he
although
may
that caused her death
the heroin
death,
make
knоwn risks of heroin use
have intended her
(2)
occurrence;”
an
“expected
“[i]t
an adverse reaction
not be
of this
public policy
should
Commonwealth
notoriously
illegal
dangerous
insure the
of such
sale
narcotic,
by
express
denying
clause
such
only
limited
an
805 A.2d at
coverage.” Greenfield,
raised,
parties
only the issues
will address
We
on contract
an
based
argument
to be
although
appears
there
not advance.6
did
Company
the Insurance
interpretation
Concurring Opinion that it
in his
Castille articulates
6. Mr. Justice
principles
of contract
preferable
resolve this matter
would be
Policy
of "occurrence” in
He notes that the definition
construction.
“accident,"
between Green-
requires
and that the heroin transaction
an
Although
argument
appeal-
his
Smith was not an accident.
field and
only
sought
appeal
one
allowance of
on
ing,
issue,
fact is that Greenfield
extending
alleged
Superior
error of the
Court
which was the
appeal
intent to this matter. The Court
the doctrine of inferred
1115(a)(3).
only questions set forth in the Petition. Pa.R.A.P.
considers
Further,
relatively simple
case of contract
what could have been
complicated unnecessarily
failure of the
interpretation
been
has
argument
Company
adequate
manner an
to advance
Insurance
it was not an
was not an occurrence because
that the death of Smith
parties
Superior Court focused on whether or
and the
accident.
However,
intended the death of Smith.
not Greenfield
key
determi-
the Insurance
have overlooked
Court and
*11
by
coverage cited Mr. Justice Castille.
nant of
Declaratory Judgment Action that the
initially appeared from the
It
argument,
making
when it stated
Company would be
this
Insurance
that:
trigger
obligation
allegations
Complaint
an
of the Smith
do
The
Casualty
part Minnesota Fire and
to either defend
on the
of
liability
indemnify
allegations
set forth therein.
for the
of
[Greenfield]
sought
Complaint
alleged
have been
damages
in the Smith
are
The
resulting
by
by the
heroin Greenfield to the decedent
caused
sale of
allegations
"an occur-
the decedent’s death. These
rence,” i.e.,
do not constitute
rather,
event;
allegations
premised
accidental
are
selling
solely upon
of
the intentional and criminal act of the insured
heroin, a controlled substance.
Action,
However,
Judgment
Complaint Equity-Declaratory
position
Company failed to brief the
that there is no occur-
Insurance
accident;
instead,
language
it relied on the
in the
rence if there is no
by
"expected
exclusions section that the death was not
or intended
insured.”
requires
held before that an occurrence
an accidental
This Court has
Restaurant,
Company,
event. See Gene’s
Inc. v. Nationwide Insurance
(1988) (where
and malicious
519 Pa.
When
Court first considered the effect of a similar
exclusionary
in a
policy,
clause
homeowner’s
we stated that
majority
“the vast
of courts which have
such
considered
provision
exclusionary
[an
have reached the conclusion
clause]
it
may validly
liability,
before the insurer
disclaim
must
shown that
his
produce
be
the insured intended
act to
which
in fact occur.”
damage
Hornberger,
did
Eisenman v.
(1970) (internal
omitted).
438 Pa.
The trial court
found
“the facts
support
averred
allegation
Smiths’
Angela
the death of
Smith was caused
by Greenfield’s negligence.” Oрinion and
of
Order
the Trial
5. It
in
Court at
of this jurisprudential
context
back-
ground that
Superior
Court extended and
applied
intent,
doctrine of inferred
presumably
the reason that it
intent,
was
unable
establish
given
actual
absence
allegations that Greenfield
expected
intended Smith to lose
consciousness
die. The earlier
ruling
Court
in
which
Elitzky,
clause,
involved an
exclusionary
identical
consistent with our articulation of
in
the standard
Eisenman.
“An
only
insured will
if
be covered
he
causes
harm of a
generally different type than that which he set out to cause.”
Elitzky,
The Superior Court stated that “the notion of inferred
intent is
accepted
Pennsylvania,” Greenfield,
Jurisprudence in Pennsylvania does not support extension inferred intent to cases other than exceptional *13 348 this Court is not Although abuse. involving
ones child sexual subsequent diversity in a by precedent bound established that the Third note Pennsylvania, based the law we case has the doctrine of inferred intent Circuit refused extend college a female coverage for harm suffered preclude son. a assault homeowner’s student after sexual 33 Barthelemy, F.3d v. Casualty Aetna Life (3d Cir.1994), an contained policy 189 the homeowner’s exclu- in judice. one case sub The sionary clause identical to the liability coverage from policy personal Aetna excluded ... is or injury damage expected or which “bodily property ” Id. at 191. The court stated by any insured.... intended that: an begin analysis law teaches us how to
Pennsylvania case in exclusionary type contained the Barthe- clauses lemy’s policy: homeowner’s state, only when thе exclusionary applies In our clause coverage a harm. Insurance is not insured intends to cause insured’s actions are intentional unless excluded because the is damage. also intended the resultant The exclusion he reasonably if insured should have inapplicable even Elitzky, which his actions caused. injury foreseen (citation omitted). A.2d at 987 homeowner’s damage bodily injury this case which property excluded expected by any is intended insured.
[*] [*] [*] subjective analysis intent Although Elitzky mandates clause most determining coverage exclusionary under cases, analysis Pennsylvania applied different child abuse. exceptional involving those cases sexual cases, many In those Wiley, exceptional F.2d at 460. jurisdictions what called the inferred intent adopted have This rule a court to an actor’s intent from rule: allows infer nature and of his or acts and establish character her conclusively of intent to harm as a matter of existence ‘notwithstanding law. Id. This is conclusive presumption subjective the insured’s of an absence of intent assertion degree if the only inferred may Id. Intent be harm. *14 injury sufficiently conduct will cause certainty that the as a matter of injure to justify inferring to intent great is to from certain likely harm result law.... more [T]he be conduct, likely may intent to harm the more intentional (internal quotation at 462 of law.’ Id. as a matter inferred omitted).
[*]
[*]
[*]
in
We noted
strong
to harm is
medicine.
Inferring intent
Id.
cautioned
We
applicability.
that it has narrow
Wiley
child
that, in
that do not involve sexual
cases
repeatedly
a
standard
abuse,
general liability
has
Pennsylvania
adopted
this
that
specific
of
intent
determining
for
the existence
subjective
Id. at 460.
actual
intent.
looks to the insured’s
Barthelemy,
As in
there are
We cannot know with certainty what
Greenfield’s state
was,
mind
a fact neither
necessary
dispositive
nor
of our
ratify
decision. We do
existing principles of our jurisprudence
and,
so,
reject
by doing
we
the Superior Court’s extension of
intent,
established,
law,
inferred
which
as a matter of
the harm that
intended
befell Smith.
that, however,
Having said
Superior
Court’s deter
mination that
the Insurance
is not
required
defend or indemnify
Policy
under the
In
correct.
addition
applying
expanded
doctrine,
inferred intent
the court
based its determination on the “compelling public policy rea
sons for denying
[where,
effect,
a claim such as this
i]n
courts
being
are
asked to help provide insurance for heroin
dealers.” Greenfield,
11. 18 Pa.C.S.
that:
person
13(a)(14), (30)
(37)
A
who
violating
is convicted of
section
Substance,
Drug,
The Controlled
Device and Cosmetic Act where
shall,
the controlled
containing
substance or a mixture
it is heroin
conviction,
upon
be
paragraph:
sentenced as set forth in this
(i)
aggregate weight
when the
compound
of the
or mixture contain-
ing
gram
the heroin
grams
involved is at least 1.0
but less than 5.0
mandatory
sentence shall be a
years
minimum term of two
$5,000
prison
larger
and a fine of
or such
amount as is sufficient to
exhaust
the
howеver,
proceeds
assets utilized in
illegal
and the
from the
activity;
if
sentencing
at the time of
the defendant has been
drug
convicted of
trafficking
another
mandatory
offense: a
minimum
$10,000
years
prison
term of three
larger
or such
amount as is
sufficient to exhaust the
proceeds
assets utilized in and the
from the
illegal activity;
(ii)
aggregate weight
when the
compound
or mixture contain-
ing the
grams
heroin involved is at
grams;
least 5.0
but less than 50
mandatory
years
minimum term of
prison
three
and a fine of
$15,000
larger
or such
amount as is sufficient to exhaust the assets
*16
however,
proceeds
utilized in and the
illegal
from the
activity;
if at
sentencing
the time of
the defendant has been convicted of another
drug trafficking
mandatory
offense: a
years
minimum term of five
in
$30,000
prison
larger
and
or such
amount as is sufficient to exhaust
proceeds
assets utilized in and
illegal activity;
from the
and
(iii)
aggregate weight
when the
compound
or mixture contain-
ing
grams
the heroin
greater:
involved is 50
mandatory
or
a
mini-
$25,000
years
prison
mum term of five
in
larger
and a fine of
or such
amount as is sufficient to exhaust the assets utilized in and the
however,
proceeds
illegal activity;
from the
if at the time of sentenc-
ing the defendant has been
drug trafficking
convicted of another
mandatory
offense: a
years
minimum term of
prison
seven
in
$50,000
larger
or such
amount as is sufficient to exhaust the assets
proceeds
utilized in and the
illegal activity.
from the
which
overriding public
with any
policy
we are
confronted
Eisenman, recovery.”
would
A.2d at
preclude
in that
that an insurance
Our decision
case determined
by
against
losses caused
a
company
required
indemnify
was
carelessly
teenagers
that was
when
were
dropped
lit match
our
on two bases:
supported
holding
a home. We
burglarizing
(1)
that
insurer
accepted principle
may
“before the
widely
liability, it must
shown that the insured
validly disclaim
be
in
did
fact
by
produce
damage
intended
his act to
which
occur[;]”
(2)
policy”
any “overriding public
the absence of
Eisenman,
(internal
recovery.
Using in Ei year-old holding of our thirty-four further refinement senman, damages that recovery precluded find that we acts a I regarding arise out of an insured’s criminal Schedule substance, Therefore, of overriding policy. as a matter public act, a with an commits criminal situations when insured substance, I respect a controlled and unintended Schedulе result, injuries or occur as a whether unexpected by losses coverage public policy accident will not allow negligence, under the contract of insurance.
However, by that act in cases do not involve criminal substance, with to a I our respect insured Schedule controlled Eisenman, traditionally test re- reiterating decision liability; for an insurer to disclaim i.e. insurer must quired that produce insured his act to prove intended occur, its damage actually validity. which did retains in Eisenman lack of at the Court distressed It violation of law clause the insurance there.12 wrongly majority "super- 12. The casts into the role of a dissent scrivener,” damages holding arising from an in- based on our excluded, specific sured’s criminal are even when the crimes are acts Dissenting Opinion policy. not listed name in the 855 A.2d recognize legislature at 872. it is the This view fails has acts, scrivener, by criminalizing specific which is acted as one of use, possession, Although or sale of heroin. Insurance may reap holding, our alone the Court a benefit from cannot allow
358
to
designed
protect
is not
policy
that a homeowner’s
obvious
heroin that
liability
supplying
for
personal
from
dealer
drug
dominant
“Only
houseguest.13
of his
in the death
results
of a contract on the
invalidating
justifies the
public policy”
of that
such indication
one
public policy,
basis of
Property
v. Prudential
Burstein
“statutory enactments.”
204,
177,
207
809 A.2d
Company,
Insurance
570 Pa.
Casualty
omitted).
(internal
criminalization of
explicit
If the
citations
potential
a high
that have
drugs
sale
possession
use
in the
abuse,
medical use
United
currently accepted
no
for use under medical
States,
safety
lack of accepted
public
inter
convincing proof
not manifest
supervision does
‘violation
est,
[a
“loath
insert
what would? While we were
of the insurer”
greater protection
for the
clause
law’]
Eisenman,
and in
that we do so now
demands
public policy
commis
has
from the insured’s
every case where
loss
arisen
sale, use, or
of a
possession
involving
sion of a crime
Id. at 675.14
I
substance.
controlled
Schedule
damages arising
require
out of
lend
efforts to
reimbursement
its
illegal.
legislature
policyholder that our
has defined as
the conduct of a
duty
interprets
policy, it is our
an insurance
13. When this Court
language
by
parties
as manifested
“ascertain the intent of
Haver,
(quoting
Vene-
agreement.”
A.2d at 746
Standard
written
725
563,
300,
(1983)).
Company,
Green-
503 Pa.
469 A.2d
tiаn Blind
purchase
bought
Policy
required it to
because the lender
field
Record,
H,
Testimony
Deposition
of Michael J. Green-
home.
Exhibit
field,
(Deposition)
also testified
at 119. Greenfield
December
purchased
purpose
prior
policy he
for an earlier
that the
of a
renter’s
H,
Record,
things
Exhibit
to cover
that were stolen.
residence was
purchased
party
argued
Deposition at 115. No
has
against injuries
heroin. Fur-
Policy
or death occasioned
to insure
ther,
Saylor
Concurring Opinion, “it
in his
as noted Mr. Justice
reasonably
parties to the insurance
maintained that the
cannot be
drug
anticipated
involvement
that the homeowner’s
contract
Concurring
give
would
rise to a covered risk.”
overdose of another
(citing
Opinion
Dauphin,
sought
the School District
to recover from its insurance
required
carrier
taxpayers
monies it was
to return to
as a result of an
illegal tax it had levied on them. We stated in BLaST that while
statutory
"BLaST’s
violation can not be condoned ...
it does not raise
public policy
Dauphin
the same
concerns as the Central
School Dis-
BLaST,
taxing
Regarding
trict’s unlawful
measure."
Id. at 747 (emphasis This Court determined that the company was not required indemnify the pharma cist, stating that believe that it was beyond “[w]e the contem plation of the parties that the would cover a pharmacist who continuously dispenses drugs to an individual without a prescription despite contrary advice from the individu *19 al’s personal physician.” Id. at 747 n. 3. Given this determina tion with respect to drugs that could prescribed be in legally appropriate circumstances, the no there is doubt that the. in judice the case sub Poliсy is not intended to cover sales of heroin.15 Haver facts in
Salient sadly are analogous to the ones regarding case, Greenfield and Smith. In that the victim who participated in illegal the drug transaction was a substance abuser who had dealt with the pharmacist previously, and her conduct, as well as that of pharmacist, the illegal. was While we do not wish to diminish pain and horror that result from the death of an heroin, eighteen-year-old from the record reflects that she and Greenfield had a of history trading drugs with each other since 1994 and that she came of home Greenfield seeking heroin on night of her death. Similar Haver, to the victim in Smith a willing in participant criminal transaction.
“Only cases, therefore, clearest may a court make an alleged public policy judicial the basis of decision.” Hall v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company, 337, 538 Pa. 648 Haver, concurring I wrote a opinion joined by then Chief Justice Flaherty express my opinion "regardless of the averments in the insurance, complaint language policy or the against public of it is policy coverage to allow illegal drug for an transaction." Id. at.748.
356 (1994) Genoe, 320, 755, 340 Pa. v. (quoting A.2d Mamlin (1941)). the insurance 407, Regardless of whether 17 A.2d use sale of heroin as contract listed possession, exclusion, has legislature the fact is that the criminalized damages in the instant matter. conduct that resulted exemplifies cases. This the clearest Moreover, public policy Company argued the Insurance among citing, other Policy, indemnification under prohibits Act, statutes, which criminalizes the Controlled Substances use, felony of heroin as a violation or transfer possession, health, morals, and public welfare. infringing upon safety, comports requirement 22. This with our Appellee Brief of than violation of a possible A Plaintiff must do more show a own interest. The implicates only personal statute that her way allege Plaintiff some must that some public policy undermined, or implicated, violated Commonwealth employee. termination of the employer’s because that, just policy must be the Commonwealth Public policy of the Commonwealth. Inc., 561 Pa.
McLaughlin Specialists, v. Gastrointestinal (2000).16 750 A.2d Commonwealth, legislature Secretary from the to the
Our Health, on the of heroin abun- illegality has made its abuse, has no dantly high potential clear: “heroin has States, and ... within the accepted medical use United *20 Greenfield, mеdical supervision.” unsafe use even under A.2d at 627. regarding of policy this clear enunciation public Given substances, I we that the Insurance controlled find Schedule indemnify against is defend or required its insured’s criminal acts damages arising out of where illegal in an voluntary participation of the victim heroin- transaction caused her death. challenge employer's case to an termination of an at-
16. This involved a argued public employee, contract. Plaintiff will rather than a The allegedly prohibited discharge of her of policy her as a result claims violations. OSHA
CONCLUSION Commonwealth, in our as articulated policy public sale, and use of heroin are possession, is clear: legislature, recovery not allow under an insur- Public does illegal. in this frequent participant willing ance contract where as a result. This is true activity of criminalized dies type victim intended to die whether regardless of whether the death, not countenance criminal for we will intended I regarding activities Schedule controlled turning illegal reject Although into occasions. we money-making substances the doc- Superior of the Court extended reasoning affirm general liability policies, intent to wе trine inferred on its articulation of Court based the Order public policy. participate
Former Justice LAMB did not the decision this case. a concurring opinion.
Justice CASTILLE files concurring opinion. Justice SAYLOR files a in which dissenting opinion Chief Justice CAPPY files joins. Justice NIGRO CASTILLE, concurring.
Justice I concur in but not in opinion, the result the lead its I reasoning. seriously do not doubt that considerations of here, coverage would warrant public policy denying where premised putative would be insured’s delib liability upon view, criminal conduct in selling my erate heroin.1 howev er, resolvable, same, this case the result resort of contract construction. I principles Specifically, to bedrock here, would find that the deliberate conduct which would form not consti- liability, basis for homeowners’ insurance did question public policy narrowly I view the exclusion more than the question, plurality Were I to reach the I would be more inclined does. expressed appears view in Mr. Justice to what to be narrower Saylor’s Concurring Opinion. *21 tute an “accidental occurrence” which trigger coverage would plain language policy.2 under the notes, As lead opinion policy the homeowners’ at issuе for, alia, here promises personal liability coverage bodily inter injuries which caused aby are covered “occurrence.” The unambiguously then defines an occurrence as “an acci- bodily dent” which results in injury property damage. The case, Smith, teenage unfortunate victim in this Angela did not home, trip down the stairs Michael or fall upon Greenfield’s knife, Rather, die a fire. Smith and Greenfield common, engaged commercial transaction of a criminal nature, just which to occur in happened the home: Greenfield- to in exchange delivered heroin Smith for a quantity and, marijuana possibly, a small amount cash. Smith then injected heroin, voluntarily thereby herself with the causing her own death from heroin intoxication. Greenfield did not inject instead, drug; Smith with the liability the basis his premised upon simple fact of his delivering the plurality acknowledges 2. The interpretation this issue of contract but appellee specifically declines to reach it because does not forward it now, although argue Plurality slip op. it did the issue below. 11-12 question n. 6. The of whether there was a covered "occurrence” under however, policy, appellants' argument. Appellants go lead length argue some decedent's death was a covered occur- moving rence party because it was an "accident.” Since the has issue, squarely joined appellee prevailed below and therefore is claim, obliged any question to forward I believe this of contract interpretation adequately presented though appellee has been even has extreme, defending confined itself to the more extra-contractual inter- pretations accepted by Court. Moreover, possible, where I think upon it better to decide cases grounds "public policy,” narrower than permit and I would not litigation parties oblige weigh decisions of the us to in on avoidable questions public policy. I liken this restraint to the settled rule applies presents which when a case both constitutional and non- decision; instance, grounds constitutional in that courts will decide ground possible. E.g. matter non-constitutional where v.Wertz Chapman (1999) ("It Township, 559 Pa. 741 A.2d basis, axiomatic if an issue can be resolved on a non-constitutional follow”-). jurisprudentially path that is the more sound I realize that questions sion; nevertheless, public policy necessarily are nоt of constitutional dimen- questions require judiciary since such to look to external, matters, subjective, oftentimes and debatable we better serve decision-making, to confine ourselves to record-based when such is possible. *22 Smith, it her later from still in dying narcotic and while home.3 Greenfield’s to Smith delivery may
Whatever else Greenfield’s have been, heroin; it was not an accident. Smith wanted Green- it to Smith’s field accommodated and delivered her. decision heroin, inject past, herself with the as she had done too, act, was not an “accident” for that was deliberate likewise voluntary. Following upon and the intentional heels Smith, illegal fortuity activities of both Greenfield and overdose, hardly of the fatal can fall into tragic, while of a category covered “accident.” As appellants themselves note:
“Accident” has defined in context of been contracts as “an or happening event without human agency or, if which, such happening through agency, an event under circumstances, is unusual and not expected person (6th ed.1990). whom it Black’s happens.” Dictionary Law has “Accident” also been as an defined “unintended and injurious unforeseen Black’s Law occurrence.” Dictionary (7th ed.1999). Superior Court has defined an accident unexpected as an “untoward or happening.” omitted). of Appellants, (Superior Brief 10 Court citation The overdose human plainly here resulted from agency. Moreover, intoxication, of heroin prospect including death intoxication, from heroin was no less plainly foreseeable. Al- though overwhelming majority heroin users do not die narcotic, a single injection from of the it is nevertheless inherently dangerous drug and risk of such lethal result certainly Bowden, is foreseeable. See Commonwealth v. (1973) Pa. 309 A.2d (plurality opinion) (“although recognize heroin truly dangerous drug, we we also recog- that injection nize of heroin body into the not does death”). generally cause The intravenous self-administration Appellants alleged negligent also to the extent he did evening morning, not care for Smith later that next although they pursue point grounds separate do not as for limited event, any inquire relief. Greenfield's failure to after Smith’s condi- indifferent, may tion or to seek assistance for her have been or even callous, hardly but it was “accidental." (here, ironical bag heroin in a illegally-purchased packaged “Suicide”) labeled, is a form of Russian roulette. modern ly Indeed, drug is outlawed that is one reasons the distribution, heavily puni use, its than its so why no less shed.4 “accident,” no no covered
There been there was having agree plurality’s I with the determina- occurrence. therefore holding tion to that Minnesota affirm the Court’s Greenfield, duty indemnify does have a to defend or Fire I I only albeit concur because arrive the result construction, than conclusion a matter of contract rather as *23 decision, ground public for such as resorting to an external policy. SAYLOR,
Justice concurring. its join I and core of opinion’s disposition lead case, analysis, that on facts of this namely, particular may deny be invoked to a and indemnifi- public policy defense liability re- policy cation a homeowner’s insurance for under a sulting ingestion powerful from criminal of delivery not, narcotic such as This conclusion does substance heroin. view, in to my improperly unfairly policy or rewrite the exclusion, of an particularly correct absence appropriate it to reasonably parties since cannot be maintained that the in- that the anticipated the insurance contract homeowner’s give of would drug volvement in the overdose death another to a risk. See generally rise covered (Second) Restatement 178(2)(a) that, § in weighing (providing of Contracts in with enforcement of a contractual connection provision justifiable expectations public policy grounds, parties’ considered). lead, must be I this strongly prefer Like the Assembly has I controlled The General classified heroin as Schedule substance, designations, the most carries the which is serious of 780-104(l)(ii)(10). drug § A falls punishments. heaviest of See 35 P.S. abuse, “high potential no cur- within this schedule because of its States, accepted rently accepted medical use the United and a lack of 780-104(1). safety § supervision.” medical Id. use under
361
attribution
in this case over the
the result
support
rationale to
Indeed,
effect,
to Greenfield.
intent”
of “inferred
an
to
merely
represent
to me
seems
approach
intent
inferred
strained route
and somewhat
unnecessarily indirect
judicial,
exclusion.
public
of
implementation
case, my
of the
coverage aspect
the contractual
Regarding
pleas
with that of the common
closely aligns
most
position
I
Court.
believe
Judge
court and
Olszewski
that, although
in apprehending
jurists were correct
that these
act
Greenfield
an intentional
complaint alleged
Appellee’s
Smith),
absence
averments
(providing heroin
expected
reasonably implying
alleging
death,
this
should be deemed
her
result
intended
cause
than
with intention.
rather
one caused
accidental occurrence
view,
with the line
approach
comports
best
my
deemed
that an insured’s acts are
be
establishing
decisions
damage
aims to
the resultant
when he
cause
only
intentional
see
Serv. Auto.
general type,
same
United
or harm of the
371-73,
982,
362,
517 A.2d
Elitzky,
Pa.Super.
v.
358
Assoc.
(1986)
458
Reading,
Mohn v. Am. Cas. Co.
(citing
987-88
(1974);
Hornberger,
Eisenman v.
A.2d 346
Pa.
(1970)),
the role of
constraining
Pa.
264 A.2d
(as
certainty
to substantial
foreseeability
opposed
reasonable
result)
occur
accidental versus intentional
in terms
*24
371-73,
at
Finally, I would not undertake to altering consider these fundamental, guiding on principles strength present submissions, which, notes, as the lead opinion are focused the discrete public inferred intent and policy doctrines as they (observ- relate to unique circumstances. Accord id. at 630-31 ing that charged presented circumstances in this case create potential for undue distortion of the essential contract analysis). CAPPY,
Chief Justice dissenting. Because I cannot agree with majority’s decision to issue, rewrite the insurance at I must respectfully dissent.
We are not here confronted with question whether may insurer enforce an exclusion which excludes from cover- age damages arising out of the sale of heroin or any other Rather, illegal drug. insert, issue is may whether court via invocation public policy, such an exclusion into an policy. majority finds that this court may rewrite the contract on the basis that an insured should be precluded from receiving coverage damages where from result criminal insured’s act. *25 In my opinion, this court should not rewrite the contract for company. insurance The Minnesota Fire and Casualty Company drafted thе insurance It policy. beyond cavil that it capable of writing an exclusion which exempt would from coverage damages arising out of the sale of illegal narcotics, yet it did not do so. Arguably, this was a failing part Yet, company. insurance is it the role of this court to act as super-scrivener, correcting the apparent errors in business judgment committed insurers? With all respect due submit majority, I that this is not a proper role for this body.
Furthermore,
I am concerned about
potential
sweeping
reach of majority’s
decision and
grave
have
concerns about
its application to future cases. While the majority purports to
limit its public policy exception to situations in which an
insured engages in illegal activity regarding Schedule I con-
substances,
trolled
its underlying rationale for creating that
limited exception could easily be extended to
exceptions
create
Indeed,
other illegal acts.
the majority suggests in a
footnote that this court should not require an
com-
pany to reimburse a policyholder for damages arising from
any “conduct ...
that our legislature has
illegal.”
defined as
Maj. Op.
at 352-53 n.
For foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. joins
Justice NIGRO this dissenting opinion.