MINNEAPOLIS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 59, AFL-CIO, v. PETER OBERMEYER AND OTHERS. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 v. MINNEAPOLIS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 59, AFL-CIO, AND ANOTHER.*
Nos. 40,477, 40,478
Supreme Court of Minnesota
December 9, 1966
147 N. W. (2d) 358 | 275 Minn. 347
*Certified to U. S. Supreme Court March 13, 1967.
Vennum, Newhall, Ackman & Goetz and Melvin I. Orenstein, for respondent board of education.
Samuel I. Sigal, for respondent union.
Peter S. Popovich, James E. Knutson, and Peterson & Popovich, for Minnesota School Boards Association, amicus curiae.
Roger A. Peterson and Helgesen, Peterson, Engberg & Spector, for Minnesota Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, amicus curiae.
MURPHY, JUSTICE.
These are appeals from judgments entered in declaratory judgment actions. Error is assigned in the trial court‘s holding that L. 1965, c. 839, § 7 (
The parties involved in this appeal are rival groups of public school teachers. Respondent Minneapolis Federation of Teachers, Local 59, is a trade-union-oriented organization affiliated with the AFL-CIO and hereinafter referred to as “Local 59.” Appellant, City of Minneapolis Education Association, a nonunion organization, is affiliated with the Minnesota Education Association and the National Education Association. These two organizations have deep and irreconcilable differences which give rise to a conflict between them as to the manner in which teachers should communicate and treat with school boards on subjects relating to wages and conditions of employment.1 We gather from the extended arguments submitted, the original files which constitute the record, briefs of the parties, and briefs amicus curiae that both groups seek the same objective but differ as to means. A review of the attempts of public school teachers to attain some satisfactory basis for meaningful communication with school boards by which their demands might be made known, considered, and resolved in a manner consistent with individual dignity and the ethics of their calling is a study of frustration.
Some background references should be noted. The threat of a strike as a means of dealing with employer-employee relationships in the public educational system came to the surface in January 1951, when the Board of Education of the city of Minneapolis sought an injunction restraining a threatened strike by a union composed of school mainte-
The next development occurred when President Kennedy promulgated an executive order on January 17, 1962, on “Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service.” Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 F. R. 551. This order provided definite means of communication between associations of Federal government employees and agency heads, which would make it possible to focus public attention upon the merits of employee claims. Apparently, the Minnesota Legislature intended that the 1965 Public Employees Labor Relations Act should be patterned after the proposals contained in President Kennedy‘s executive order. In amending prior laws on the subject, the legislature in L. 1965,
The part of c. 839 which gives rise to this controversy is § 7 (
The bill passed both the house and the senate, but was vetoed by the governor. Both it and c. 839 were part of a package relating to an entire field, but, because of the governor‘s veto, only one became law. In his letter informing the secretary of state that he would not sign the bill, the governor said:
“Since good results were achieved by the non-partisan committee appointed by me to recommend improvements to the public employees
With the legislation in this freak posture, where one of two concurrent bills relating to the entire field of public employees labor relations was vetoed and the other signed into law, Local 59 insisted upon proceeding to have elections held and a representative determined to negotiate in behalf of the school teachers pursuant to the provisions of c. 839. In the proceedings before the lower court, it was held that this could be done. The trial court held that § 7 was unconstitutional as an unreasonable and arbitrary classification of teachers separate and apart from other state employees and concluded therefore that in spite of the clear intent of the legislature, the governor‘s veto of the concurrent bill fortuitously brought the teachers within the compass of c. 839.
Since we hold that § 7 is a constitutional classification, it is unnecessary for us to discuss the issue of severability (
The principal issue presented is raised by the contention that § 7 is unconstitutional as denying to public school teachers employed by boards of education the statutory benefits granted to all other employees, including teachers employed by the state university and state colleges. We find no definite rule of universal application to determine whether
When the legislature has determined that a sufficient distinction exists between two classes of persons to justify applying rules to one class which do not apply to the other, such determination is binding upon the courts unless it appears that the distinction is purely fanciful and arbitrary and that no substantial or logical basis exists therefor. Classification can never be a judicial question except for the purpose of determining, in a given situation, whether the legislative action is clearly unreasonable. In the matter of classification courts have viewed the action of the legislature with great liberality. Courts are not to weigh the merits of a classification in the judicial balance and to reject it merely because they might favor a different standard. These principles are supported in numerous Minnesota authorities, including Fairview Hospital Assn. v. Public Bldg. Serv. Union, 241 Minn. 523, 64 N. W. (2d) 16; State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550, 7 N. W. (2d) 544; Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71; Eldred v. Division of Employment and Security, 209 Minn. 58, 295 N. W. 412; State v. International Harvester Co. 241 Minn. 367, 63 N. W. (2d) 547, appeal dismissed, 348 U. S. 853, 75 S. Ct. 78, 99 L. ed. 672; Arens v. Village of Rogers, 240 Minn. 386, 61 N. W. (2d) 508, appeal dismissed, 347 U. S. 949, 74 S. Ct. 680, 98 L. ed. 1096; Dimke v. Finke, 209 Minn. 29, 295 N. W. 75; Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N. W. (2d) 538; Fabio v. City of St. Paul, 267 Minn. 273, 126 N. W. (2d) 259; Kaljuste v. Hennepin County Sanatorium Comm. 240 Minn. 407, 61 N. W. (2d) 757; Williams v. Rolfe, 262 Minn. 284, 114 N. W. (2d) 671. It is unnecessary to discuss the numerous points of
It is well recognized that the legislature may classify professions, occupations, and businesses according to natural and reasonable lines of distinction, and if such legislation affects alike all persons of the same class, it is not an invalid classification. Legislation with reference to the teaching profession has generally been sustained as a valid classification. 16A C. J. S., Constitutional Law, § 496. The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that a classification of public school teachers as a distinct class for appropriate legislation “cannot be successfully challenged.” Gorham v. Teachers’ Retirement System, 27 Ill. (2d) 593, 599, 190 N. E. (2d) 329, 332. The court said in Krebs v. Board of Trustees, 410 Ill. 435, 443, 102 N. E. (2d) 321, 325, 27 A. L. R. (2d) 1434, 1441:
“The State legislature is charged with the duty of providing the residents of this State a free and public educational system. Such a system requires qualified and competent teachers. The legislature requires these teachers to have certain qualifications. The legislature, by tax laws, provides the means by which these teachers are paid during their teaching careers and thereby, at least indirectly, fixes the amount of their compensation. Under these circumstances, for the legislature to determine
that the welfare of the public school system required that a system of retirement allowances be set up for them as a group does not seem unreasonable, and there seems ample justification to distinguish them as a class for that purpose.”
In Minnesota, teachers have been treated as a separate group for the purpose of classification in numerous instances. Separate classification has occurred in the Teachers Tenure Act,
Finally, we are committed to the principle that unless a law is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, it must be sustained. The burden of proof in this respect is on the party seeking to set the law aside. In re Taxes on Property of Cold Spring Granite Co. 271 Minn. 460, 136 N. W. (2d) 782; Williams v. Rolfe, supra. Under all the circumstances, including the past and contemporary history of the legislation before us, we cannot say that the claim that § 7 is unconstitutional has been sustained.
As we view the provisions of c. 839, it covers the whole subject matter of those earlier provisions of the Public Employees Labor Relations Act which it amended; plainly shows that it was intended as a substitute for them; and consequently operates as a repeal of them. State v. Roselawn Cemetery Assn. 259 Minn. 479, 108 N. W. (2d) 305.
It is also argued that c. 839 should be construed so that with respect to teachers the provisions of the Public Employees Labor Relations Act amended by c. 839 remain in effect. It is asserted that if the provisions of the former act are construed as having been repealed, public school teachers will be left with the denial of the right to strike without
“* * * [A] strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of Government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of Government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable.”
Nor did repeal of the statute affirming the right to join labor unions or other associations operate to their prejudice. The law in its present posture does not prohibit membership in a labor union. The right of freedom to assemble granted under the
We gather from the briefs that there is no serious controversy on these
The next point raised is whether the school board has implied power to conduct an election and bargain with elected representatives of teacher organizations. The school board possesses only such powers as are granted by statute. Board of Education v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 34 N. W. (2d) 689. There is no authority, either express or implied, by which the school board can hold an election for the purpose of designating an exclusive representative of the teachers. This subject is dealt with in an extensive annotation contained in 31 A. L. R. (2d) 1142. The decisions generally hold that the manner in which public authorities must determine the wages, hours, and working conditions of public employees is governed entirely by the Constitution, statutes, municipal charters, civil service rules and regulations, and resolutions setting out the authority of the public employer. Public employees do not have collective bargaining rights in the same sense that private or industrial employees enjoy them. There must be some statutory provision authorizing collective bargaining. The reason is that the public employer cannot abdicate or bargain away continuing legislative discretion and is not authorized to enter into collective bargaining agreements without specific authority. The fact that statutory provisions grant the right of collective bargaining to employees in private industry does not confer such right on public employers and employees. Richfield Federation of Teachers v. Richfield Education Assn. supra; Annotation, 31 A. L. R. (2d) 1170.
There is nothing to prevent the heads of governmental agencies from meeting with, or discussing wages, hours, and conditions of employment with, groups or individuals representing groups of the employee class. The question of collective bargaining for public employees generally, and school teachers particularly, was considered in Norwalk Teachers’ Assn. v. Board of Education, supra. The Norwalk teachers’ association had a membership consisting of all but two of the teachers in the school system. In the absence of express statutory procedures, the association and the board had in fact entered into an agreement. In this context
“* * * There is no objection to the organization of the plaintiff as a labor union, but if its organization is for the purpose of ‘demanding’ recognition and collective bargaining the demands must be kept within legal bounds. What we have said does not mean that the plaintiff has the right to organize for all of the purposes for which employees in private enterprise may unite, * * *. Nor does it mean that, having organized, it is necessarily protected against unfair labor practices * * * or that it shall be the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees of the unit, * * *. It means nothing more than that the plaintiff may organize and bargain collectively for the pay and working conditions which it may be in the power of the board of education to grant.”
The court there held that it was permissible to have a teachers’ organization recognized as a representative as long as it was not the exclusive representative for teachers.
It would appear that even without express statutory authority, there is nothing to prevent collective bargaining when it is entered into voluntarily and no prohibitory state statute exists. Even though courts may sanction voluntary bargaining in the absence of statute, satisfactory results can hardly be expected.3 A statute is needed to spell out procedures to be used in the determination of majority representatives in an appropriate unit. But this is a legislative concern. It may be assumed from the statement expressed in the governor‘s veto message that H. F. 1504, or some law similar to it, will at the next legislative session provide teachers with rights correlative to those given to other employees of the state. In the meantime, there is nothing to prevent the school board from meeting with representatives of both teacher groups. Certainly, in the past the school board has not dealt individually with its more than 3,000 teachers. Until the legislature provides a better method, the parties must resort to the former methods employed to solve their differences.
Reversed.
1. The right to strike is not involved in this case. Respondent Minneapolis Federation of Teachers, Local 59, AFL-CIO, in a separate action brought in the district court was enjoined from engaging in any strike. The federation did not appeal from this injunction and no issue is now presented involving the constitutionality of
It is undisputed that some 1,613 employees of Minneapolis Special School District No. 1, including clerks, stenographers, nurses, building tradesmen, part-time teacher aides, janitor-engineers, and others, are covered by the 1965 Public Employees Labor Relations Act, L. 1965, c. 839. In addition, it is not disputed that some 6,500 faculty members of the University of Minnesota and several thousand faculty members of the five state colleges and all classified employees of the state‘s public school boards are included within the act. But by virtue of c. 839, § 7 (
2. In my judgment this exclusion constitutes a discrimination against such public elementary and high school teachers and is therefore unconstitutional. The majority seeks to uphold the validity of the exclusion upon the theory that “[a] statute should not be construed so as to extend its provisions to cover that which is specifically excluded by the legislature.” While this principle is well established, it can have no application where the constitutionality of the specific exclusion is in issue. Certainly if the exclusion is of itself unconstitutional, it cannot be upheld upon the theory that the language creating it is clear and definite.
The Minnesota Public Employees Labor Relations Act, L. 1965, c. 839, provides a mechanism whereby all public employees, except elementary and high school teachers, may participate in the formulation of personnel policies governing their employment. The purposes of the act and the public policy are defined in § 1 (
“Unresolved disputes in the public service are injurious to the public, the governmental agencies, and public employees; therefore, adequate
means should be provided for preventing controversies between governmental agencies and public employees and for resolving them when they occur. Because the paramount interest of the public and the nature of governmental processes make it necessary to impose special limitations upon public employment, it is incumbent upon governmental agencies to provide orderly procedures for the participation by public employees and their representatives in the formulation of personnel policies and plans to insure the fair and considerate treatment of public employees, to eliminate employment inequities, and to provide effective means of resolving questions and controversies with respect to terms and conditions of employment. It is the public policy of the state of Minnesota that governmental agencies, public employees and their representatives shall enter into discussions with affirmative willingness to resolve grievances and differences. Governmental agencies and public employees and their representatives shall have a mutual obligation to endeavor in good faith to resolve grievances and differences relating to terms and conditions of employment, acting within the framework of laws and charter provisions, and giving consideration to personnel policies, position classification and compensation plans, and other special rules governing public employment.”
Under these clearly expressed purposes and public policies I find no justification for differentiating between the benefited public employees and the excluded public school teachers. Many of the former are lawyers, doctors, professors, assistant professors, instructors, and administrators employed by the university and by the state colleges. They are professionals who may or may not have an interest in utilizing the protection and rights afforded by the act, but if they desire its protection, they may seek it. What valid reason is there for excluding public school teachers from these same benefits? Certainly they are in the same professional class as are teachers and instructors employed by the university or other state educational institutions.
To justify the exclusion of any particular group of citizens from the benefits of a legislative enactment, it must be shown that there is a substantial difference or distinction between the group excluded and the
“The fundamental rule is that all classification must be based upon substantial distinctions, which make one class really different from another. * * * [I]t must be based upon some natural reason, some reason suggested by necessity, by some difference in the situation and circumstances of the subjects placed in the different classes, suggesting the necessity of different legislation with respect to them. By necessity is meant practical, and not absolute, necessity; but the characteristics which will serve as a basis of classification must be substantial, and not slight or illusory.” (Italics supplied.)
3. Chapter 839 created a new public policy which made sweeping changes in the laws relative to public employees by establishing for the first time certain rights and privileges for them. Obviously, the enactment was based upon the legislature‘s carefully considered conclusion that public employees, including public school teachers, like their counterparts in private enterprise are subject to the same vicissitudes of rising prices, accident, illness, and old age. Everywhere people are seeking to assert a measure of control over the conditions under which they work and live. By its enactment of c. 839, the legislature recognized this and the right of some 160,000 public employees of the state to be represented by labor organizations of their choice in matters pertaining to their employment contracts. The exclusion of public school teachers from the benefits of this enactment, while at the same time leaving them subject to the forfeitures and penalties provided for in other statutory enactments now in effect, in my judgment constitutes a discriminatory treatment of this group which is entirely without a valid basis.
4. The majority seeks to justify this special classification for public school teachers on the ground that the “legislature has historically treated teachers as a different classification,” citing
5. It also seems clear to me that the exclusionary provision embodied in § 7 of the act constitutes a violation of the
“* * * The equal protection clause does not detract from the right of the State justly to exert its * * * power or prevent it from adjusting its legislation to differences in situation or forbid classification in that connection, ‘but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary but based on a real and substantial difference having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.‘” (Italics supplied.)
Here I can find no real and substantial difference between public elementary and high school teachers, and many of the other classifications of public employees now covered by c. 839.
6. Collective bargaining between public employees and local, state, or Federal government agencies is no longer a novelty. Under presi-
In my judgment § 7 of c. 839 is unconstitutional. Such a determination, of course, would not invalidate the remaining provisions of the act. State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 246 Minn. 181, 74 N. W. (2d) 249; Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co. 220 Minn. 318, 19 N. W. (2d) 795.