22 Mont. 262 | Mont. | 1899
Plaintiff, as executrix of the will of John H. Ming, deceased, owned and conducted an opera house in Helena during the year 1894; defendant was the proprietor and manager of the Marie Tavery Grand English Opera Company. On December 12, 1894, plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract, by which it was agreed that the Tavery Company should give one performance at plaintiff’s opera house on the 22nd of that month. The only provision of the contract pertinent to the matters considered in this Court is the following:
“It is agreed that Charles H. Pratt, manager of the said Marie Tavery Opera Company, is guaranteed to receive as his share not less than eight hundred and fifty (850) dollars and eighty-five (85) per cent, on all moneys received in the sale of seats for sáid engagement. * * * Settlements pro rata to the above division to be made ‘during the first act of said performance. ’ ’
The sum allowed as damages consists of two items: (1) For loss of sale of tickets, $106;* (2) for expenses of trip to Butte at defendant’s request, $21.50. The allowance of the $21.50 is not-justified by the evidence. It appears that one Hirsch, who was agent for defendant in certain matters, offered to pay the expenses of plaintiff’s representative if the latter would go to Butte and talk with defendant about the expected performance concerning which a controversy had arisen; but there is no proof tending to show that in making the offer or promise Hirsch acted within the scope of his agency, or that he even attempted to bind any person other than himself, or that defendant ratified or adopted the promise. This item should have been rejected.
As to the first item, the court found that the profit which plaintiff would have received from performance of the contract by defendant was $106; and arrived at the result by interpreting the contract as meaning that the percentage to which defendant would be entitled should be computed only on the amount of the receipts in excess of $850. In this there was error. The contract expressly provides that defendant shall have not less than $850 and 85 per cent, of all moneys received from the sale of seats. The language is clear, unambiguous, and free from any uncertainty; its obvious meaning is that defendant was to receive $850, and also 85 percent, of the gross receipts. There is nothing in the contract touching the price of the seats, and, for aught that appears, plaintiff might have fixed such prices as she desired. The contract is
The judgment and order are reversed, and the cause is remanded, with direction to the District Court to grant a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.