19 S.D. 602 | S.D. | 1905
This is an action by the plaintiff school district to recover of the defendant certain moneys alleged to have been collected by it and withheld from the plaintiff, Findings and judgment being in favor of the plaintiff, the de fendant has appealed.
The facts presented by the findings of the court may be summarized as follows:. The plaintiff is an incorporated school district, and within its boundaries is the Harney Peak- Mining, Milling & Manufacturing Company, owning certain tin mines and personal property. In the years 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896, certain personal property taxes were assessed against said company, including taxes to the amount of about $3,300 for school purposes. The Harney Peak Company refused to. .pay said taxes, and the treasurer of Pennington county attempted to collect the same by levy and sale of its pesonal property. An action was commenced in the United States Circuit Court by the Harney Peak Company to restrain the treasurer from proceeding to collect these taxes, and the county, in order to protect its interest, employed attorneys and incurred, expense amounting to about $1,100 in defending said litigation. .Subsequently such proceedings were had by the county commissioners of Pennington county that the Harney Peak Company consented to pay and did pay the original amount of its personal property taxes, less penalty and interest. The plaintiff school district was thereupon credited with the amount collected as its proportionate share due it of the said $3,300 levied, as aforesaid for school purposes,. The county paid over to the
Under the law as it existed at the time these taxes were levied, the school district was authorized to levy taxes upon the-property within its district for the support of:the common schools, aad report that amount to the county auditor, who was required to include it as a part of the taxes to' bé collected by the county treasurer. Section 1, subc. 5, c. 57, p. 131 s Laws 1897. It is further provided that the county treasurer shall be the collector'and receiverof all' taxes extended upon the tax list of the county, and all delinquent’taxes, whether levied for county, state, city, town, school,; poor, ’bridge, road, Or other purposes, and he shall proceed to. collect the sameac-cording to law, and to place the same,, when collected", to the credit of the proper fund. Section 79, c. 28, p. 60, Sess. Laws 1897, constituting section 2145 of the Revised Political Code. By section 95, c. 28, p. 65, of the act of 1897, it is further provided: ‘‘The county treasurer shall immediately, after each settlement pay over to the treasurer of any municipal corporation or any organized township, or any body politic, on the order of the county auditor, all moneys received by him aris* ing from taxes levied and collected, belonging to such municipal corporation or organized township, body politic, or school township or district, and shall require said treasurer to whom such payment is'made to receipt upon the back of said order for the same.” This section constitutes section 2158 of the Re.vised Political Code.
It will'thus be seen that the management of the financial affairs of the school district, and the levy of the taxes for the
The court was clearly right, therefore, in its conclusions of law that the school district was entitled to recover the amount so retained by the county treasurer. The money- collected belonged to the school district, and, there being no statutory authority for retaining any portion of it for expenses of litigation, the county treasurer was required to pay it over to the school district treasurer; and, the same having been retained in the county treasury, the county was clearly - liable therefor. The contention of the appellant that the county had an equitable right to retain this amount cannot be maintained, as it could only retain such sum as it was authorized so to do by law. The question is not one coming within the principles of equity jurisdiction, as the rights of- the parties are solely governed by the provisions of the statute. No authorities are cited by the appellant, and we think that none can be found, which would authorize the county to withhold from the, plain, tiff any portion of the amount collected for the plaintiff.