111 Iowa 725 | Iowa | 1900
Plaintiff, as we have said, sued defendant, Rhynders, for a partnership accounting, alleging that • certain horses which we will denominate as the “Postville horses,” were purchased by defendant with partnership funds, asking the dissolution of the partnership, the appointment of a receiver, and general equitable relief. Defendant answered, denying the partnership, and that plaintiff had any interest in the horses in controversy. He alleges that he purchased and paid for the horses, and that they are his individual property. The intervener claims that it furnished the money with which the horses were purchased under an agreement with defendant by the terms of which it was to furnish defendant Rhynders with money with which to buy horses; that he (Rhynders) should buy horses with the money so furnished, ship them, bring back the proceeds, and that the horses should belong to the bank, until sold and the proceeds returned; that, in virtue of this agreement, it had a lien on the horses, and on the proceeds thereof now in the hands of the receiver appointed in the main suit. Plaintiff denied the allegations of the intervener’s petition, and says that the horses were purchased with partnership funds. Shortly before the case was brought on for trial, defendant Rhynders filed an answer to the petition of intervener, in which he practically denied all the allegations thereof. He further pleaded that he and plaintiff formed a partnership in February, 1893, for the purchase and sale of horses; that the horses in controversy were purchased by the partnership with funds belonging to it, and belonged to the firm. A stipulation between plaintiff and defendant was filed, in which it was agreed that there was a partnership existing between them, finding the amount due plaintiff, and agreeing to judgment for the amount thereof. It was also agreed that the horses in controversy, and the funds derived from the sale thereof, belonged to the firm. A decree was entered pursuant to this stipulation, and the case was then tried to the court on the issue between the intervener and plaintiff, and defendant, resulting in the decree hitherto mentioned.
From a careful consideration of the evidence, we are led to the conclusion that the intervener made an arrangement with defendant some years before plaintiff entered into a partnership with him (defendant), by which the bank agreed to advance defendant money with which to buy horses; defendant agreeing that he would buy horses, ship them to market, and bring back the proceeds, and that the horses so bought should belong to the bank until sold and the proceeds returned. At the time this arrangement was made, Rhynders was owing the bank six hundred and seven dollars, and the agreement was made in order to give him (Rhynders) an opportunity to pay this debt. The debt was paid within a year after this arrangement was made. But defendant contined to borrow money from time to time thereafter. No further arrangement was made, and for a part of the time, after the agreement was entered into, defendant bought horses on commission, and a part of the time he bought with money furnished by the bank. Long after the original agreement was made, plaintiff and defendant entered into partnership for the buying and shipping of horses, and the “Postville horses” were acquired by this partnership. It may be that the bank furnished the drafts with which these horses were purchased', but that the money was loaned by. the bank for this purpose is extremely doubtful. In any event, as the purpose of the original agreement had been fulfilled, the bank became a simple creditor of the defendant for money thereafter advanced.
It would not have a lien for money furnished without express contract, and we are constrained to hold that the original contract giving the right had expired by its terms. Confirmation of this view is found in the fact that intervener, at one time, commenced an attachment suit against defendant, in which it claimed judgment for balance due, and asked an attachment against defendant’s property. Nothing was said in this petition about any lien on property. But, if mistaken in this view, still intervener is not entitled to 1-ecover.