110 Ala. 577 | Ala. | 1895
The bill is to enforce the vendor’s lien on land. It is in the nature of a bill for specific performance. The facts, as shown by the bill as amended, are, that Ellis Phelan owned the lot in question, and on the 25th day of November, 1886, sold and conveyed it by deed to D. W. Austin, who executed to Phelan his four notes for the purchase money, each for the sum of $300, and payable, with interest, one, two, three and four years after date, respectively. On February 1, 1887, Austin sold the lot to John C. Westbrook, at the price of $2,100, of which a part was paid in cash ; and, for the balance, Westbrook assumed, and agreed to pay, the said four notes given by Austin to Phelan ; and, besides, executed to Austin his two notes, each for $150, payable, with interest, one and two years after date, respectively; and to secure the payment of said four assumed notes and said two other notes, he executed to Austin a mortgage on said lot. It does not appear that Austin made any deed to Westbrook. After this sale, Westbrook, by parol, agreed with Samuel Torrey and S. J. Darby, acting for himself and his brother, J. I. Darby, that the said Torrey and the two Darbys should each purchase and acquire an undivided one-fourth interest in said lot, by each paying one-fourth of the cash payment which Westbrook had made to Austin, and assuming to pay one-fourth of the deferred payments owing to Phelan and Austin, viz., the said four notes to Phelan, assumed by Westbrook, and' the said two notes for $150, each, given to Austin by Westbrook. After-wards, said J. I. Darby declined to carry out the agreement, on his part, and thereupon the said S. J. Darby assumed the obligations of his brother, and paid two-fourths of the said sum which was to be paid to West-brook instead of one-fourth ; so that,by this arrangement Torrey purchased and acquired one-fourth interest in the
We think it is plain that the bill is without equity, and subject to several grounds of demurrer which were overruled. As we have said, it is a bill in the nature of a bill for specific performance, by vendor against vendee. The facts stated show that the complainant and his intestate's co-vendors have no title whatever to the land, and it is not pretended or proposed that they can or will, at any time, obtain and convey to their vendee any title whatever. It is, therefore, most obvious upon reason, and settled by all authority upon the subject, that the vendee Mims, who has never taken possession of the land, nor enjoyed any benefit of the purchase, is under no legal duty or obligation to pay the agreed purchase money to complainant and his intestate’s co-vendors ; yet this bill seeks by the decree of the chancery court, to judicially establish his liability to pay the same, and the amount thereof, and for the payment thereof, to enforce their alleged lien on the land; thus precluding Mims from all defense against any action which might be taken or brought against him to enforce his personal liability for the purchase money. See Code,section 3605. Thus it is, if the relief sought by the bill be granted, and the land, on sale under decree, should be exhausted in the payment of the prior incumbrances, leaving the demand of the complainant and the co-vendors unsatisfied, Mims would be without the possibility of obtaining the land he had bargained for, and yet bound, beyond the power of any defense, to pay to his vendors the purchase money he had agreed to pay. Equity cannot lend its aid to the' accomplishment of such ends.
Again, it is a principle well settled in this court,under our recent decisions, that a junior incumbrancer will not be permitted to go into equity to enforce the incumbrance of the senior and his own,for the payment first,of the demand of the senior,and,next,his own. His remedy is to redeem the land from the senior incumbrance,and then proceed to enforce his lien upon the land for his reinbursement of
Upon these considerations, without noticing other questions raised by the demurrer, we hold that the city court erred in overruling the demurrer, and a decree will be here rendered reversing its decretal order sustaining the demurrer, and remanding the cause.
Reversed, rendered and remanded.