Rhonda MIMS-BROWN, Appellant v. Bessie R. BROWN, Appellee.
No. 05-12-01132-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
March 31, 2014.
Rehearing Overruled May 2, 2014.
In an effort to accommodate modern technologies and practices in payment systems and with respect to negotiable instruments, the American Law Institute (“ALI“) and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the “Commissioners“) drafted a revised version of UCC Article 3 (“Revised Article 3“), with corresponding amendments to Articles 1 and 4. . . . The American Bar Association approved the Official Text in 1991.
The Business Law Section of the State Bar of Texas formed a Commercial Code Committee in 1988 for the purpose of studying and making recommendations with respect to new and revised Articles to the UCC. . . . The committee recommendation included a complete deletion of existing Chapter 3 and adoption of a new revised Chapter 3; revisions of selected sections in Chapter 4; and conforming amendments to Chapters 1 and 9 of the Business and Commerce Code. . . . Representative Grusendorf introduced as House Bill 1728 the committee‘s recommended revisions. . . . The bill, with some amendments, was passed by the House and Senate, signed by the Governor, and became effective January 1, 1996. Act of May 29 [sic], 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, § 1, 1995 TEX. GEN. LAWS 4582.
By rendering judgment in favor of RR Maloan, the majority holds that a check-cashing company can cash a check before its due date without any inquiries to determine the instrument‘s validity. Because RR Maloan sees and hears no evil, it acts in good faith. I believe this is inconsistent with the current definition of good faith as we must construe it under the existing version of the UCC. With the change in the good-faith definition, no longer may the holder of an instrument act with “a pure heart and an empty head and still obtain holder in due course status.”3
I respectfully dissent.
Hardin R. Ramey, Ramey Law Firm, PLLC, Dallas, Rachel Varughese, Ramey Law Firm, PLLC, McKinney, for Appellee.
Before Justices MOSELEY, FITZGERALD, and EVANS.
OPINION
Opinion by Justice FITZGERALD.
This case involves a dispute over funds distributed from a joint tenancy account. Rhonda Mims-Brown, appellant, challenges the trial court‘s summary judgment in favor of Bessie Brown.1 In five issues, Rhonda contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Bessie because the account did not meet the statutory requirements for a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, Bessie‘s receipt of the funds constituted a breach of fiduciary duty and self-dealing, the wills of Bessie and her deceased husband were contractual, and Bessie‘s conduct constituted a violation of the theft liability act. Concluding appellant‘s arguments are without merit, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Bessie married Carl W. Brown in 1968. Between May 1968 and April 2000, Bessie and Carl jointly operated, managed, and/or leased certain parcels of real property (the
Carl died on April 6, 2000. Carl‘s will bequeathed all of his undivided 1/2 interest in the Brown Land to his son Wayne, and one-half (1/2) of the net income produced from the Brown Land to Bessie for the remainder of her life. On December 21, 2000, Bessie, acting in her capacity as the independent executrix of Carl‘s estate, executed an special warranty deed conveying Carl‘s undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the Brown Land to Wayne as his sole and separate property.
On or about May 15, 2003, Wayne sold the Brown Land to a third party for $332,952.04. Four days later, Wayne used the proceeds to open an account at Southwest Securities, Inc. (the “Account“). When Wayne completed the new account application, he selected “Joint Tenancy With Right of Survivorship” as the type of account he wished to open. The new account application incorporates the language in the customer information brochure as well as any amendments. Bessie was listed as the co-applicant on the Account, and the application was signed by both Bessie and Wayne. After the account was opened, Southwest Securities sent Bessie and Wayne monthly statements styled, “Wayne C. Brown/Bessie R. Brown JTWROS.”
In the ensuing years, Southwest Securities amended its customer information brochure several times. In November 2007, the customer information brochure was amended to include additional language pertaining to “Survivorship of Parties in a Joint Account.” Specifically, the amendment stated that any application in which the “Joint Tenants with Right of Survivorship” box has been marked, “on the death of any account holder, the deceased party‘s ownership of the account passes to the surviving account holders.”
Wayne died on January 18, 2008. On February 19, 2008, Southwest Securities turned the $277,831.88 balance of the Account over to Bessie.
In August of 2010, Rhonda filed the underlying lawsuit against Bessie. Rhonda asserted claims for malicious conversion, violation of the
Bessie answered the lawsuit and filed a counterclaim for declaratory relief. Rhonda filed a motion for partial summary judgment and Bessie filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment. The parties each filed objections to the other party‘s summary judgment evidence. After conducting a hearing, the trial court signed an order granting Bessie‘s motion and objections and denying Rhonda‘s motion and objections.
Rhonda subsequently moved for rehearing of the summary judgment rulings and also filed a motion for judgment. Bessie responded. The court conducted an additional hearing and denied Rhonda‘s motions. Bessie nonsuited her counterclaim, and the court entered a final judgment as to Rhonda‘s claims.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
All of Rhonda‘s appellate issues challenge the trial court‘s summary judgment in favor of Bessie. We review the trial court‘s decision to grant summary judg
The movant for traditional summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning one or more essential elements of the plaintiff‘s claims and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
When a party moves for both a no-evidence and a traditional summary judgment, we first review the trial court‘s summary judgment under the no-evidence standard of Rule 166a(i). Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W. 3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). If the no-evidence summary judgment was properly granted, we do not reach arguments under the traditional motion for summary judgment. See id.
Did the Account Meet the Statutory Requisites for Joint Tenancy with Right of Survivorship?
In her first two issues, Rhonda asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Bessie because the Account did not meet the statutory requirements for creation of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Rhonda also contends the trial court erred in determining that section 440 of the probate code is inapplicable to the facts of this case.2
The creation of a right of survivorship to a joint account requires (1) a written agreement, (2) signed by the decedent, (3) which makes his interest “survive” to the other party. In re Estate of Dellinger, 224 S.W. 3d 434, 438 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.); Chopin v. Interfirst Bank Dallas, 694 S.W. 2d 79, 83 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
The parties to the account own the account in proportion to the parties’ net contributions to the account. The financial institution may pay any sum in the account to a party at any time. On the death of a party, the party‘s ownership of the account passes to the surviving parties.
See
It is undisputed that the Brown Land that Wayne inherited from his father was Wayne‘s sole and separate property. It is also undisputed that the proceeds from the sale of that property were Wayne‘s sole and separate property subject to Bessie‘s right to half the net income. The summary judgment evidence reflects that Wayne opened the Account with the proceeds from the sale of the property. Bessie was listed as the “co-applicant” on the Account. Both Wayne and Bessie signed the new account application. The application included fourteen choices for the type of account to be created; Wayne and Bessie selected “Joint Tenants with Right of Survivorship” by placing an “x” in the box next to this account designation. The remaining thirteen boxes next to the other types of accounts were left blank.
The new account application incorporates by reference the customer information brochure. Wayne and Bessie acknowledged their understanding of this with their signatures. The customer information brochure provides, in pertinent part:
You understand and acknowledge that SWST may modify and change the terms and conditions set forth herein without notice.
Binding Upon Customer‘s Estate. Customer hereby agrees that this Agreement and all the terms thereof shall be binding upon the customer‘s heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, and assigns.
The customer information brochure further states that, “[t]he authority hereby conferred shall remain in force until your broker receives written notice of the revocation.” There is nothing in the record to suggest that Wayne or Bessie ever provided the broker with such revocation, nor is there anything to suggest that the type of account was changed.
When the Account was opened, Wayne and Bessie also signed a “checking application and agreement.” The document includes the designation, “Wayne C. Brown/Bessie R. Brown JTWROS.” The
In 2007, Southwest Securities amended the customer information brochure to include additional language concerning joint accounts. The amendment stated:
If the Joint Tenants with Right of Survivorship box has been marked, on the death of any account holder, the deceased party‘s ownership of the account passes to the surviving account holders.
All that is required to make an interest “survive” to another party is a word or phrase expressing that the interest of the deceased party will survive to the surviving party. See In re Estate of Wilson, 213 S.W. 3d 491, 494-95 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2006, pet. denied). Significantly, both section 439(a) and section 439A contemplate that the exact language of the statute need not be employed. In this regard, section 439(a) provides:
[A]n agreement is sufficient to confer an absolute right of survivorship on parties to a joint account . . . if the agreement states in substantially the following form . . . .
A contract of deposit that contains provisions substantially the same as in the form provided . . . establishes the type of account selected by the party.
The 2007 amendment to the customer information brochure, which stated that “the deceased party‘s ownership of the account passes to the surviving account holders” is substantially the same as the statutory language in section 439(a) (stating “all sums in the account on the date of death vest in and belong to the surviving party“) as well as section 439A (stating “the party‘s ownership of the account passes to the surviving parties“). The account application expressly provided that the customer information brochure was incorporated into the terms of the account and that Southwest Securities could change the terms and conditions of the account without notice. “It is uniformly held that an unsigned paper may be incorporated by reference in the paper signed by the party sought to be charged.” McNeme v. Estate of Hart, 860 S.W. 2d 536, 541 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ). Bessie and Wayne both signed the account application. Thus, the incorporated language of the 2007 customer information brochure, together with the account application and account documents describing the account as “JTWROS” were sufficient to confer a right of survivorship. See Dellinger, 224 S.W. 3d at 438.
We reject Rhonda‘s assertion that section 440 precludes consideration of the 2007 amendment to the customer information brochure in conjunction with the other account documents. As the trial court properly concluded, section 440 is inapplicable to the instant case.
Section 440 provides:
The provisions of Section 439 of this code as to rights of survivorship are determined by the form of the account
at the death of a party. Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, this form may be altered by written order given by a party to the financial institution to change the form of the account or to stop or vary payment under the terms of the account. The order or request must be signed by a party, received by the financial institution during the party‘s lifetime, and not countermanded by other written order of the same party during his lifetime.
Because the summary judgment conclusively demonstrates that the Account was a joint tenancy with right of survivorship and section 440 does not apply, the trial court did not err in granting Bessie‘s motion for summary judgment on these issues. Rhonda‘s first two issues are overruled.
Did Bessie Breach a Fiduciary Duty by Engaging in Self-Dealing?
Bessie was the executrix of the estate of her husband Carl, and Wayne was a beneficiary of Carl‘s estate. Rhonda asserts, in her capacity as the executrix of Wayne‘s estate, that the creation of the Account and the acquisition of the proceeds occurred when Bessie was the executrix of Carl‘s estate, and therefore Bessie breached her fiduciary duty to Wayne by engaging in self-dealing. Bessie contends, inter alia, that summary judgment was appropriate because there is no evidence she owed a fiduciary duty to Wayne at the time the Account was created or when the proceeds of the Account were distributed.3
The elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim are: (1) a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and defendant; (2) the defendant must have breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant‘s breach must result in injury to the plaintiff or benefit to the defendant. Jones v. Blume, 196 S.W. 3d 440, 447 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied). The fiduciary duties of an executor of an estate are the same as the fiduciary duties of a trustee. Humane Soc‘y of Austin & Travis Cnty. v. Austin Nat‘l Bank, 531 S.W. 2d 574, 577 (Tex. 1975). As trustee of the estate‘s property, the executor is subject to high fiduciary duties. Id. at 577. As a fiduciary, an executor has a duty to protect the beneficiaries’ interest by fair dealing in good faith with fidelity and integrity. Geeslin v. McElhenney, 788 S.W. 2d 683, 685 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ). His personal interests may not conflict with his fiduciary obligations to the estate. See Humane Soc‘y, Etc., 531 S.W. 2d at 577.
Self-dealing can be generally defined as an occurrence in which the fiduciary uses the advantage of his position to gain a benefit at the expense of those to whom he owes a fiduciary duty. See Slay v. Burnett Tr., 143 Tex. 621, 187 S.W. 2d 377, 388 (1945);
Rhonda relies on testimony from Bessie‘s deposition to establish that as the executrix of Carl‘s estate Bessie remained in a fiduciary relationship with Wayne, a beneficiary of the estate. During her deposition, Bessie acknowledged she never resigned as the executrix of Carl‘s estate or formally requested closure of the estate. In response to Rhonda‘s argument, Bessie maintains that formal closure of the estate was not required.
When there is no pending litigation, an independent executor may close an independent administration by filing a formal account verified by affidavit. See In re Estate of Bean, 206 S.W. 3d 749, 759 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied). These statutory closing procedures, however, are not mandatory; the final distribution of an estate‘s assets after all debts and claims against the estate are paid results in the closing of the estate. Interfirst Bank-Houston v. Quintana Petroleum Corp., 699 S.W. 2d 864, 874 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref‘d n.r.e.).
But neither Bessie‘s nor Rhonda‘s contentions resolve the issue. Here, there is no evidence that the estate was formally closed or that the final distribution of all assets and payment of all debts occurred. Nonetheless, despite the lack of evidence to demonstrate whether Carl‘s estate remained open or had been closed by operation of law, there is nothing to establish a fiduciary relationship between Wayne and Bessie at the time the Account was opened or when the proceeds were distributed.
The relationship between an executrix and the estate‘s beneficiaries is one that gives rise to a fiduciary duty as a matter of law. See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W. 2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996). This duty arises from the executrix‘s status as trustee of the property of the estate. Humane Soc‘y, 531 S.W. 2d at 577. The executrix‘s right to possession of estate property exists as to “the estate as the estate existed at the death of the testator or intestate.”
It is undisputed that Bessie conveyed the interest in the Brown Land—the property of the estate over which she had control and was required to distribute—to Wayne in 2000 in accordance with the express terms of Carl‘s will. It is also undisputed that the Brown Land then became Wayne‘s sole and separate property. As such, it was no longer an asset of the estate, and therefore no longer entrusted to Bessie for safekeeping. Wayne sold the Brown Land and established the Account in 2003. Bessie received the proceeds of the Account in 2008. Neither of the latter two transactions occurred in the context of administration of Carl‘s estate.
There is no evidence concerning any creditors’ claims or unpaid debts remaining for Carl‘s estate. Rhonda cites no authority, nor are we aware of any, that would continue the fiduciary‘s obligation with regard to estate property not subject to creditors’ claims years beyond the time the property is distributed to the beneficiary and after the very character of the original asset has changed to that of a non-
A fiduciary duty may arise from a formal relationship or from an informal relationship involving a high degree of trust and confidence. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W. 2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1997). Although Rhonda‘s fiduciary duty argument is premised on a formal relationship (Bessie‘s role as the executrix of Carl‘s estate), Rhonda also cites numerous cases involving a fiduciary duty arising out of an informal special relationship. To the extent Rhonda intended to argue that a fiduciary duty existed by virtue of some informal relationship of trust and confidence, we reject the argument. There is no evidence of such a relationship here.
Because there is no evidence of a formal or informal fiduciary relationship between Bessie and Wayne at the time the Account was created or when the funds were distributed, there is no evidence to support the existence of a fiduciary duty. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Rhonda‘s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and self-dealing. Rhonda‘s third issue is overruled.
Was Rhonda Entitled to Declaratory Judgment?
In the court below, Rhonda sought a declaratory judgment that the wills of Carl and Bessie constituted “mutual and contractual wills” and became an enforceable contract once Carl‘s will was admitted to probate. Rhonda asserted that Wayne, as a beneficiary of Carl‘s will, is entitled to seek enforcement of the contract, and requested a declaration that Bessie may not dispose of her estate during her lifetime in a manner that is inconsistent with the terms of her contractual will with Carl. In her fourth issue, Rhonda argues the trial court erred in denying her request for declaratory relief.
The
Initially, we observe that Rhonda fails to explain how she is an “interested person” in “an estate being administered.” There is no evidence that Carl‘s estate is
But even if Rhonda were an interested person, there is nothing to establish the existence of any real controversy to be resolved by the court. A declaratory judgment is appropriate when a real controversy exists between the parties and the entire controversy may be determined by judicial declaration. Public Util. Comm‘n v. City of Austin, 728 S.W. 2d 907, 911 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref‘d n.r.e.). To constitute a justiciable controversy for declaratory judgment purposes, there must be a real and substantial controversy involving a genuine conflict of tangible interest, rather than a theoretical one. See Scurlock Permian Corp. v. Brazos Cnty., 869 S.W. 2d 478, 487 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). Courts may not give advisory opinions or decide cases upon speculative, hypothetical, or contingent situations. Coalson v. City Council of Victoria, 610 S.W. 2d 744, 747 (Tex. 1980).
Here, Rhonda does not identify any controversy with respect to Carl or Bessie‘s will that is appropriate for declaratory resolution. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Bessie on Rhonda‘s request for declaratory relief. Rhonda‘s fourth issue is overruled.
Did Bessie‘s Conduct Constitute a Violation of the Texas Theft Liability Statute?
In her fifth issue, Rhonda maintains the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her claim against Bessie under the
Having resolved all of Rhonda‘s issues against her, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
Gid PORTER, Appellant
v.
SOUTHWESTERN CHRISTIAN COLLEGE, Jack Evans, and Herbert Evans, Appellees.