MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL аnd Patrick Marley, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION and Stephen E. Bablitch, Defendants, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 24, Wisconsin State Employees Union, Intervenor-Appellant. LAKELAND TIMES and Gregg Walker, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES and Debra Martinelli, Defendants, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 24, WISCONSIN STATE EMPLOYEES UNION, Intervenor-Appellant, WISCONSIN SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, AFT LOCAL 3272 and Wisconsin Professional Employees Council, Local 4848, AFT-Wisconsin, AFT, AFL-CIO, Intervenors.
No. 2007AP1160
Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Decided July 15, 2009
2009 WI 79; 768 N.W.2d 700; 319 Wis. 2d 439
For the plaintiffs-respondents there were briefs (in the court of appeals) by Jennifer L. Peterson, Robert J. Dreps, and Godfrey & Kahn S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Robert J. Dreps.
An amicus curiae brief was filed by April Rockstead Barker and Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., Green Bay, on behalf of the American Legislative Exchange Counsel.
- (1) Whether courts have jurisdiction to review legislative action to determine if that action was sufficient to amend the Public Records Law; and
- (2) If so, whether the action taken by the legislature in ratifying a collective bargaining agreement between the Wisconsin State Employees Union (WSEU)1 and the State of Wisconsin was sufficient to amend thе Public Records Law.2
¶ 2. The court of appeals posed these questions in order to determine whether a provision in a ratified collective bargaining agreement, Article 2/4/4, between the WSEU and the State, which purported to prohibit the disclosure to the press of the names of WSEU-represented employees, modified the Public Records Law,
¶ 3. We conclude that courts have jurisdiction to review whether the legislature‘s ratification of a collective bargaining agreement under
¶ 4. Finally, we affirm the circuit court‘s application of the balancing test, which it appears the circuit court applied to the WSEU members as a group because that is how the issue was argued tо the circuit court. However, we do not decide what our conclusion would be if, on remand, individual record subjects intervene and request the circuit court to apply the balancing test to them, individually.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5. This case consists of two actions that were consolidated in the circuit court5 due to the identity of the legal issues presented. In the first case, Patrick Marley, a reporter from the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (Journal Sentinel), made an open records request to the Legislative Audit Bureau for the names of state employees who had been deactivated from the list of those permitted to drive state-owned vehicles. The Department of Administration (DOA) ultimately disclosed some of the requested names, but it refused to release the names of employees represented by WSEU. The DOA refused in part because of Article 2/4/4 of the
Notwithstanding the provisions of [§§] 19.31–19.36 and 230.13 Wis. Stats. and any applicable Federal laws, the Employer will not release any information relating to the names, addresses, classifications, social security numbers, home addresses or home telephone numbers of employees covered by this Agreement to labor unions, labor organizations, local unions or the press except for Council 24 and the local union treasurer for the purpose of local membership list, unless required to do so by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission or a court of law.6
In response to the DOA‘s withholding of the WSEU-represented employees’ names, the Journal Sentinel commenced an action against the DOA, pursuant to
¶ 6. In the second case, Gregg Walker, an editor for the Lakeland Times, made an open records request to the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) for the salary information of DNR‘s employees working at its Rhinelander and Woodruff facilities. The DNR provided the names and salary information of 127 of the relevant employees, but withheld the names of 95 others. The employees whose names were withheld were represented by three Unions, one of which was WSEU. As
¶ 7. WSEU and other unions8 intervened, with WSEU‘s primary basis for intervening being the newspapers’ challenge to the legal effect of Article 2/4/4 of the collective bargaining agreement. Since disclosure of the WSEU-represented employees’ names in both cases depended on the legal effect of Article 2/4/4, the parties agreed to consolidate the actions.
¶ 8. After consolidation, the newspapers and WSEU filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In resolving these motions, the circuit court focused on the following three issues: (1) whether the legislature‘s ratification of the collective bargaining agreement, without introducing companion legislation, amended the Public Records Law; (2) if not, whether
¶ 9. The parties initially briefed and argued the first and second issues. On October 13, 2006, relying on the court of appeals’ decision in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission, 103 Wis. 2d 545, 309 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1981), the circuit court concluded that the legislature‘s
¶ 10. The circuit court reasoned that ratification of the collective bargaining agreement was insufficient to amend the Public Records Law because the Joint Committee on Employment Relations (JCOER) did not comply with the requirements of
¶ 11. Regarding the second issue, the circuit court concluded that Article 2/4/4‘s prohibition on disclosure of the employees’ names did not constitute a “condition of employment” under
¶ 12. Because the circuit court concluded that ratification of the collective bargaining agreement did not cause Article 2/4/4 to become an exception to the Public Records Law, the parties briefed and argued application of the balancing test. The circuit court granted the newspapers’ motions for summary judgment. The circuit court concluded that the public interests favoring disclosure set forth in
¶ 13. The WSEU appealed.10 The court of appeals certified the appeal, which we accepted pursuant to
Notes
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 14. “We review a summary judgment decision independently, employing the same methodology as the circuit court,” but benefitting from its analysis. Blunt v. Medtronic, Inc., 2009 WI 16, ¶ 13, 315 Wis. 2d 612, 760 N.W.2d 396 (citing Acuity v. Bagadia, 2008 WI 62, ¶ 12, 310 Wis. 2d 197, 750 N.W.2d 817). The interpretation of statutes and the Wisconsin Constitution and their applicatiоns to undisputed facts present questions of law that we review independently. County of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶ 14, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 (citing Watton v. Hegerty, 2008 WI 74, ¶ 6, 311 Wis. 2d 52, 751 N.W.2d 369; Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶ 19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110) (interpreting and applying statutes independently of the circuit court and court of appeals); Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H&S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, ¶ 7, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177 (citing State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶ 18, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526) (interpreting and applying the Wisconsin Constitution independently of the circuit court and court of appeals). Finally, application of the balancing test for disclosure of public records is a question of law that we review independently. Wis. Newspress, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Sheboygan Falls, 199 Wis. 2d 768, 784, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996).
B. As Otherwise Provided by Law
¶ 15. Under the Public Records Law,
¶ 16. In response, the newspapers argue that the legislature failed to comply with certain requirements of
¶ 17. The parties do not dispute that no companion bills were introduced to amend the Public Records Law at the time of the collective bargaining agreement‘s ratification. However, WSEU argues that
1. Court jurisdiction to review
¶ 18. WSEU first argues that we do not have jurisdiction to review the legislature‘s compliance with
¶ 19. Here, we need not decide whether
¶ 20. Therefore, because both
2. Constitutional requirements
¶ 21. We begin by examining whether, under the relevant constitutional provisions, Article 2/4/4 is a “law.” As we have previously explained, an act of the legislature that is not authorized by the constitution is not a law. State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 16, 21, 288 N.W. 454 (1939). Here, the operative provision of the Wisconsin Constitution,
a. Enacted by bill
22. The first requirement of
i. 2003 Wisconsin Act 319
23. Before ratification of the collective bargaining agreement, JCOER conducted a public hearing on
The people of the state of Wisconsin, represented in senate and assembly, do enact as follows:
Section 1. Agreement ratified. The legislature ratifies the tentative agreement negotiated for the 2003-05 biennium between the state of Wisconsin, the office of state employment relations, and the Wisconsin State Employees Union . . . , as approved by the employees of the professional social services collective bargaining unit and approved and recommended by the joint committee on employment relations, and authorizes the necessary expenditure of moneys for implementation . . . . The director of the office of state employment relations shall file an official copy of the agreement, certified by the co-chairpersons of the joint committee on employment relations, with the secretary of state. No formal or informal agreement between the parties that is not a part of the official copy is deemed to be approved by the legislature under this act.
That 2003 Wisconsin Act 319 was later published is not in dispute. The parties further agree that no other bill relating to WSEU‘s collective bargaining agreement was enacted by the Wisconsin Legislature.
24. We conclude that the mere enactment of 2003 Senate Bill 565 and publication of 2003 Wisconsin Act 319 was not sufficient to cause the provisions of Article 2/4/4 of the collective bargaining agreement to become a law enacted by bill under
25. If a right is given to the public by statute, such as the right to seek disclosure of public records, the legislature generally may take that right away through legislative action in compliance with constitutional mandates. However, since Article 2/4/4 of the collective bargaining agreement was not enacted by bill, it remains a contractual provision. It is not “law” under
ii. incorporation by reference
26. Amicus OSER, arguing in support of WSEU, anticipates our concern with respect to the constitutional requirement that laws be enacted by bill. In response, OSER argues that because 2003 Wisconsin Act 319 references the collective bargaining agreement, and the collective bargaining agreement contains Article 2/4/4, Article 2/4/4‘s prohibition on the disclosure of the employees’ names is a statutory amendment incorporated by reference.
27. We acknowledge that, under certain circumstances, incorporation by reference may be effective to work a change in the law. See, e.g., George Williams College v. Village of Williams Bay, 242 Wis. 311, 316, 7 N.W.2d 891 (1943) (discussing doctrine of “legislation by reference“); Gilson Bros. Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 220 Wis. 347, 352-53, 265 N.W. 217 (1936) (noting one statute‘s necessarily implied adoption of limits contained in another statute). However, our cases recognizing incorporation by reference have generally dealt with incorporating the provisions of other published statutes. See Williams Bay, 242 Wis. at 316; Gilson Bros., 220 Wis. at 352-53. In those instances, the constitutional procedures set forth in
28. OSER cites State v. Wakeen, 263 Wis. 401, 57 N.W.2d 364 (1953), which dealt with
29. Wakeen is distinguishable. First,
30. However, although we discuss the constitutional requirements implicated here and their potential effect in Wakeen, the documents referenced by
31. Here, Article 2/4/4 is not being characterized as a “standard” being incorporated by reference in 2003 Wisconsin Act 319. Instead, WSEU is arguing that Article 2/4/4 is “law,” such that its prohibition on the disclosure of WSEU-represented employees’ names is
b. Publication
32. Publication is the other requirement of
the protection of the people, by preventing their rights and interests from being affected by laws which they had no means of knowing. But all are bound by, and are bound to take notice of public statutes. . . . [If the publication requirement is not enforced,] it is manifest that the object of this clause of the constitution is in a great measure defeated. And the people are liable to act blindly with reference to their most important interests, and to have their rights sacrificed by the operation of laws which they are bound to know, but have no means of knоwing. Such a result is in conflict with the first duty which a state owes to its people.
Clark v. City of Janesville, 10 Wis. 119 (*136), 141-42 (*181) (1859). General notice to the public of laws by which all will be bound is the policy that drives publication. Id. Accordingly, if some action is argued to be sufficient to constitute publication, that action must be evaluated in light of the purpose publication seeks to achieve, i.e., was the public provided with sufficient notice of the law that is being enacted or amended.
33. We have addressed methods by which the constitutional publication requirement may be satisfied:
While it is true that the employment of the art of printing is the best means of publication, still publication cannot be confined to the limited signification of mere printing, but comprehends the exercise of additional labor and skill. This provision implies a discretion to be exercised in the method of publication; for instance, — that the general laws which cannot be in force until published, shall be published in the public journals, that being the most speedy method; or in pamphlet form, that being more convenient for many purposes; or even by proclamation at the door of the court house in each county . . . . All these would be different forms of publication, and all would answer the constitutional requirement . . . .
Sholes v. State, 2 Pin. 499, 511-12 (Wis. 1850) (emphasis in original). It is apparent from this discussion that the legislative branch, which has been vested with the legislative power under the Wisconsin Constitution, has discretion in choosing how to comply with the publication requirement. However, it is also apparent that, despite this discretion, the legislature may not ignore the constitutional publication requirement altogether. While we are conscious of the substantial deference wе owe to the other independent branches of government in the exercise of their constitutional responsibilities, we are also conscious of our own responsibility to determine whether the provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution have been followed.
34. WSEU argues17 that the publication of 2003 Wisconsin Act 319, which ratified the collective bargaining agreement, satisfies the publication requirement with respect to Article 2/4/4. Alternatively, WSEU argues that the public hearings conducted by JCOER prior to introducing 2003 Senate Bill 565 to the legislature were sufficient to constitute publication. However, although it is true that the public may have had the opportunity for input in the ratification of the agreement at the public hearings, and some citizens may thereby have been put on notice of the collective bargaining agreement‘s terms, the mere fact of a public hearing is insufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of publication. This is so because the purpose of publication is to give sufficient notice to the general public that the legislature has enacted new law. Clark, 10 Wis. 141-42 (*181). A hearing does not accomplish this purpose.
3. Wisconsin Stat. § 111.92(1)(a)
36. Finally, we interpret
Any tentative agreement reached between the office, acting for the state, and any labor organization representing a collective bargaining unit specified in s. 111.825(1) or (2)(a) to (e) shall, after official ratification by the labor organization, be submitted by the office to the joint committee on employment relations, which shall hold a public hearing before determining its approval or disapproval. If the committee approves the
tentative agreement, it shall introduce in a bill or companion bills, . . . that portion of the tentative agreement which requires legislative action for implementation, such as . . . any proposed amendments, deletions or additions to existing law.
37. The provision on which the newspapers focus is
38. We begin by noting that
39.
40.
41. Our interpretation of the term “bill or companion bills” in
C. Condition of Employment
42. Having determined that the legislative ratification of the WSEU collective bargaining agreement containing Article 2/4/4 was insufficient to amend the Public Records Law, we now proceed to determine whether Article 2/4/4‘s prohibition on the disclosure of WSEU-represented employees’ names may nevertheless be enforced under
43.
[I]f a collective bargaining agreement exists between the employer and a labor organization representing employees in a collective bargaining unit, the provisions of that agreement shall supersede the provisions of civil service and other applicable statutes . . . related to wages, fringe benefits, hours, and conditions of employment . . . .
WSEU contends that the agreement not to disclose employees’ names falls within the term, “conditions of employment,” in
44. The term “conditions of employment,” although frequently used in the Wisconsin Statutes, is not defined either in
45. The court of appeals, in applying the ejusdem generis canon to
46. The court of appeals also addressed the meaning of “conditions of employment” in Madison Teachers, Inc. v. WERC, 218 Wis. 2d 75, 580 N.W.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1998). There, the parties agreed that “conditions of employment” for a teacher in a classroom environment included “matters such as the quality and safety of the work environment, the work load for the time allotted, the stressfulness of assignments, and the potential for disciplinary problems with students.” Id. at 89; see also Blackhawk Teachers’ Federation Local 2308 v. WERC, 109 Wis. 2d 415, 442, 326 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1982) (concluding that the possibility of discipline or censorship is related to a teacher‘s working conditions).
47. In light of Madison Teachers, WSEU argues that Article 2/4/4‘s prohibition on the disclosure of names is a “condition of employment,” superseding the Public Records Law‘s disclosure requirement as set forth in
48. In response, the newspapers contend that the question is not whether Article 2/4/4 of the collective bargaining agreement relates to “conditions of employment.” Rather, the question is whether the “other applicable statutes,” which are purportedly superseded by the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, relate to “conditions of employment.” We agree that this is a more reasonable interpretation of
49. Read as a whole,
50. Under the Bldg. Trades definition of “conditions of employment,”
51. In addition to the other arguments addressed above, the newspapers contend that the policy of promoting the public interest is served by their interpretations of both the Public Records Law and statutory collective bargaining procedures. The newspapers begin with
The public policy of the state as to labor relations and collective bargaining in state employment . . . recognizes that there are 3 major interests involved: that of the public, that of the employee and that of the employer. These 3 interests are to a considerable extent interrelated. It is the policy of this state to protect and promote each of these interests with due regard to the situation and to the rights of the others.
52. Under the Public Records Law itself, the public has a very strong interest in becoming an informed electorate through the disclosure of public records.
In recognition of the fact that a representative government is dependent upon an informed electorate, it is declared to be the public policy of this state that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those officers and employees who represent them. Further, providing persons with such information is declared to be an essential function of a representative government and an integral part of the routine duties of officers and employees whose responsibility it is to provide such information. To that end, [the Public Records Law] shall be construed in every instance with a presumption of complete public access, consistent with the conduct of governmental business. The denial of public access generally is contrary to the public interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be denied.
53. In light of these express statutory policies, we cannot accept WSEU‘s argument that parties may, through the collective bargaining process, contract away the public‘s rights under
D. The Balancing Test
54. We have concluded that Article 2/4/4 is not an exception to the Public Records Law because its provisions are not “otherwise provided by law” within the meaning of
55. The balancing test involves balancing the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in non-disclosurе. Wis. Newspress, 199 Wis. 2d at 786-88. This test should be applied when the record custodian has refused to produce the record, in order to evaluate the merits of the custodian‘s decision. Id.
56. When courts balance the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in non-disclosure, generally there will be no “blanket exceptions from release.” Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶ 10 (citing Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 183, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996)). Accordingly, the balancing test must be applied with respect to each individual record. Wis. Newspress, 199 Wis. 2d at 780 (concluding that “the balancing test must be applied ‘on a case-by-case basis’ . . . in order to determine whether a particular record should be released.” (quoting Law Offices of William A. Pangman & Assoc. v. Stigler, 161 Wis. 2d 828, 840, 468 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1991))); Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2005 WI 120, ¶ 62, 284 Wis. 2d 162, 699 N.W.2d 551 (concluding that the balancing test does not create a “blanket rule excepting the disclosure of any . . . personnel records[;] . . . [e]ach request will lead to a fact-intensive inquiry“); State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 682, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965) (concluding that the determination of when “harm to the public interest would justify refusal to permit inspection . . . is . . . best . . . left to case-by-case decision[s]“).
57. Here, it appears that the circuit court applied the balancing test to the WSEU members as a group because that is the manner in which WSEU presented the issue to the circuit court. For example, the circuit court related:
Many of the employees represented by WSEU whose names were not disclosed are employed by the Department of Corrections and supervise inmates or criminal defendants on probation, parole or extended supervision. Those employees are concerned about retaliation or harassment at the hands of these offenders who bear animosity toward the DOC emрloyee. For these reasons, WSEU‘s counsel writes, “Many Agents take extraordinary measures to prevent offenders they supervise to know their correct names and home addresses or any other identifying information.”
I am confused by WSEU‘s argument. WSEU says that many DOC agents take extraordinary measures to keep their correct names from offenders. I see two possibilities. A given offender either knows her agent by the correct name or the offender knows the agent by some other name. Disclosure of the employees’ names in this case changes nothing for the first offender. I fail to see how disclosure to the second offender creates any danger, since the second offender only knows the agent by some other name.
58. We do acknowledge that the circuit court may have considered each record request individually, but that is not apparent from its written decision. It may be that the circuit court‘s analysis was primarily guided by the parties’ briefs for and against the cross-motions for summary judgment. Alternatively, it may be that the factual record before the circuit court was not sufficiently developed with respect to each individual record request, such that it was not feasible for the circuit court to apply the balancing test individually.
59. Nevertheless, to the extent the circuit court applied the balancing test to WSEU members in the manner WSEU requested, we affirm that application. We note that there is a strong, legislatively-created presumption in favor of disclosure. Hempel, 284 Wis. 2d 162, ¶ 28. Although WSEU argues that there is no public interest served by disclosure of these records, we reject this argument, noting that
[t]he public records law reflects a legislative determination that the public interest favors inspection of public records . . . . The law was intended to be a means by which citizens could more effectively monitor the activities of government. . . . There can thus never be occasion for finding “no public interest” in disclosure of such documents; the interest is legislatively presumed.
Milwaukee Journal v. Call, 153 Wis. 2d 313, 321, 450 N.W.2d 515 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984); Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 438, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979); Michael J. Fitzgerald, Public Access to Law Enforcement Records in Wisconsin, 68 Marq. L. Rev. 705, 714 (1985)). That is, our determination does not hinge on whether there is some interest sufficient to justify disclosure. The legislature has already answered that question. Id. Instead, the inquiry is “whether the strong presumption favoring access and disclosure is overcome by some even stronger public policy favoring limited access or nondisclosure.”
Hempel, 284 Wis. 2d 162, ¶ 28 (citing Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶ 11; Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 192-93).¶ 60. Here, WSEU‘s arguments in this respect relate primarily to employees of the Department of Corrections, parole agents and DNR wardens. Specifically, WSEU argues that the release of these employees’ names will lead to potential embarrassment, as well as endangering these employees by making it possible for individuals with whom they have interacted in the past to track them down and cause them harm. According to WSEU, these concerns present policies sufficient to overcome the strong presumption in favor of disclosure of these records.
¶ 61. We reject WSEU‘s arguments for several reasons. First, these names are already publicly available in a 269-page alphabetical directory, so it is difficult to contemplate how release of the names here will actually change anything.18 Accordingly, the fact that the names are already publicly available weakens any argument WSEU sets forth that disclosure here will detrimentally affect the employees to an extent that the publicly available directories have not already.
¶ 62. Second, we have held in the past that the potential for embarrassment is not a basis for precluding disclosure. Zellner, 300 Wis. 2d 290, ¶ 50 (“[T]he public interest in protecting individuals’ privacy and reputation arises from the public effects of the failure to honor the individual‘s privacy interests, and not the individual‘s concern about embarrassment.” (quoting Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶ 31)).
¶ 63. Finally, we note that the safety concerns set forth by WSEU with respect to correctional employees, parole agents and DNR wardens in general, when examined as a group, are not concerns different from those faced by other groups of employees of the State of Wisconsin. Nearly all public officials, due to their profiles as agents of the State, have the potential to incur the wrath of disgruntled members of the public, and may be expected to face heightened public scrutiny; that is simply the nature of public employment. Wis. Newspress, 199 Wis. 2d at 787 (citing State ex rel. Bilder v. Township of Delavan, 112 Wis. 2d 539, 557, 334 N.W.2d 252 (1983); Wis. State Journal v. Univ. of Wis.-Platteville, 160 Wis. 2d 31, 41, 465 N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1990)) (“[A] prominent public official, or an official in a position of authority, should have a lower expectation of privacy regarding his or her employment records.“); see also Zellner, 300 Wis. 2d 290, ¶ 53 (“The public [] has an interest in knowing how the government handles disciplinary actions of public employees. . . . ‘All officers and employees of government are, ultimately, responsible to the citizens, and those citizens have a right to hold their emрloyees accountable for the job they do.‘” (quoting Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶ 28)).
¶ 64. We note that this public need for heightened scrutiny of public officials as a result of public employment has been expressly recognized with respect to police officers, who, as a group, share many of the same safety concerns advanced here by WSEU on behalf of correctional officers, parole agents and DNR wardens, yet their records are still generally subject to disclosure under the Public Records Law. See State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Arreola, 207 Wis. 2d 496, 515, 558 N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Wis. Newspress, 199 Wis. 2d at 788; Wis. State Journal, 160 Wis. 2d at 41) (“When individuals accept positions as police officers, they necessarily relinquish certain privacy rights and must be subject to public scrutiny. . . . As a result of their public employment, police officers have a lower expectation of privacy.“).
¶ 65. As a result, accepting WSEU‘s safety-based arguments as exempting the entire group of WSEU‘s members here casts too broad a net, given the presumption of access to public records set out in
¶ 66. Accordingly, we reject WSEU‘s arguments when applied to the WSEU members as a group and conclude that the public policy favoring disclosure is not overcome here by a more compelling public policy favoring non-disclosure. We therefore affirm the circuit court‘s application of the balancing test concluding that when these records are reviewed as a group, they should be released.
¶ 67. As we noted above, it does not appear that the circuit court applied the balancing test individually to each employee‘s record. Accordingly, we do not opine on what the result would be if individual WSEU members intervene on remand and request the circuit court to examine the circumstances attendant to the release of individual names.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 68. We conclude that courts have jurisdiction to review whether the legislature‘s ratification of a collective bargaining agreement under
¶ 69. Finally, we affirm the circuit court‘s application of the balancing test, which it appears the circuit court applied to the WSEU members as a group because that is how the issue was аrgued to the circuit court. However, we do not decide what our conclusion would be if, on remand, individual record subjects intervene and request the circuit court to apply the balancing test to them, individually.
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is affirmed and the cause remanded to the circuit court.
¶ 70. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring). I write separately to concur with the mandate of the majority. I reach the same conclusion but rest on a different analysis.
¶ 71. Before delving into the question of whether the collective bargaining agreement is a law, it is necessary to address a threshold question: whether
¶ 72. I agree with the dissent that this is a close case, and that “there is no simple way of distinguishing in close cases between a rule of legislative proceeding and a rule relating to non-procedural matters.” See
¶ 73. It acknowledges that several significant factors weigh in favor of concluding that this is not a rule of legislative proceeding: “fairness requires notice“; “the public policy embodied in
¶ 74. Nevertheless, the dissent also observes that several other factors provide a countеr-balance. Ultimately, it concludes that the balance tips in favor of the court‘s restraint. Dissent, ¶ 107.
¶ 75. I see the balance differently. In a close case, I conclude that the weighty public policies of notice and transparency in government tip the scale. I would therefore determine that
¶ 76. I turn then to the statute to determine whether the collective bargaining agreement was properly ratified.
If the [joint committee on employment relations] approves the tentative agreement, it shall introduce in a bill or companion bills, . . . that portion of the tentative agreement which requires legislative action for implementation, such as . . . any proposed amendments, deletions or additions to existing law.
The portion of the collective bargaining agreement that provides that the State will not release employee information to the press creates an amendment to the open records law. Thus, I must determine whether the legislature followed the dictates of
¶ 77. I determine that it did not. Nothing in 2003 Wis. Act 319 explicitly sets forth any portion of the tentative agreement at all. Certainly, nothing in the text of the Act sets forth an amendment to the public records statute requiring legislative action. I thus determine that the directives in
¶ 78. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
¶ 79. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (dissenting). The newspapers (the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and the Lakeland Times) argue that this court should interpret and apply
¶ 80. If
¶ 81. If
¶ 82. The majority opinion concludes that
¶ 83.
¶ 84. The Joint Committee on Employment Relations did introduce a bill relating to the collective
The legislature ratifies the tentative agreement negotiated for the 2003-05 biennium between the state of Wisconsin, the office of state employment relations, and the Wisconsin State Employees Union. . . . The director of the office of state employment relations shall file an official copy of the agreement, certified by the cochairpersons of the joint committee on employment relations, with the secretary of state.
¶ 85. The newspapers contend that the Act is invalid as a violation of
¶ 86. As is obvious from the text of the Act, nothing in the Act explicitly sets forth any portion of the tentative collective bargaining agreement at all, let alone any portion that requires legislative action. The Act does not refer to any statute; it does not refer to the public records statute; and it does not explicitly exempt information about state emplоyee records from press access. The Act merely refers to and ratifies the collective bargaining agreement as a whole and requires that the agreement be filed with the Secretary of State.
¶ 87. I answer the issue presented, guided by these three legal principles:
(1) Courts have the authority to review legislative acts to determine whether they conflict with the United States or Wisconsin constitution.
(2) Courts have the authority to interpret statutes
(3) “[T]he legislature‘s adherence to rules or statutes prescribing legislative procedure is a matter entirely within legislative control and discretion, not subject to judicial review unless the legislative procedure is mandated by the constitution.”2 If the legislature fails to follow self-adopted procedural rules, including a procedural rule in the form of a statute, the legislature is viewed as accomplishing “an implied ad hoc repeal of such rules.”3
¶ 88. Because the first and third legal principles above relate to the Wisconsin constitution, I set forth the three relevant Wisconsin constitutional provisions.
- No law shall be enacted except by bill.
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 17(2) . - No law shall be in force until published.
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 17(2) . - Each house may determine the rules of its own proceedings.
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 8 .4
¶ 89. 2003 Act 319 satisfies the first two constitutional provisions; it does not run afoul of
¶ 90. Nothing in the Wisconsin Constitution requires that a bill ratifying a collective bargaining agreement contain language other than the language required to be in all acts under
¶ 91. I now turn to the third Wisconsin constitutional provision relating to the right of each house to determine the rules of its own proceedings. A court decides whether
¶ 92. Neither the parties nor the amici curiae furnish a good definition or description of what is
¶ 93. The newspapers argue that the language at issue in
¶ 94. Section 111.92(1)(a) does not, however, specify in what way a bill must set forth that portion of the tentative agreement that requires legislative action. Section 111.92(1)(a) is silent on the method of including that portion of the tentative agreement in a bill.
¶ 95. The court of appeals in Board of Regents v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission, 103 Wis. 2d 545, 309 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1981), repeatedly refers to
¶ 96. The Board of Regents decision is, however, not helpful in deciding the present case. The parties’ briefs in Board of Regents did not address the applicability of
¶ 97. It seems to me that the precise language to be inserted in the Act to satisfy the content requirement of
¶ 98. Anyone reading the collective bargaining agreement in the present case would know that the agreement adopts an exception to the public records statute. Article 2/4/4 of the agreement ratified under 2003 Act 319 explicitly provides that “[n]otwithstand-
¶ 99. Although it may be argued that it is for the court to interpret
¶ 100. I acknowledge that there is no simple way of distinguishing in close cases between a rule of legislative proceeding and a rule relating to non-procedural matters under the Wisconsin constitution, and the instant case is a close case. When a legislative act dоes not violate a constitutional provision and there is a reasonable doubt about whether an applicable statute presents a rule of legislative proceeding, I must weigh the various interests involved.
¶ 101. As a member of the judicial branch, I am accustomed to the concept that the words of a statute should be followed and to the concept that fairness requires notice. I would also be more comfortable if the legislature spelled out exactly what statutes it intends to modify when ratifying a collective bargaining agreement. “Such a procedure is endowed with the virtue of avoidance of complex judicial and administrative statu-
¶ 102. I am therefore persuaded that the public policy embodied in
¶ 103. I am also persuaded that the legislature has made transparency in government a dominant public policy in this state. Wisconsin prides itself on open government proceedings and open public records. Sunshine is a great disinfectant.
¶ 104. These factors point to holding in favor of the newspapers’ position.
¶ 105. Factors exist, however, pointing in the other direction as well. The legislature has used the same kind of language over several years to ratify collective bargaining agreements under
¶ 106. The final factor is the weight to be accorded to each of the equal, coordinate three branches of government. Just as there are realms of exclusive judicial power into which the legislative and executive branches should not enter, so too are there realms of legislative power that are exclusively in the legislature‘s domain. The Wisconsin Constitution (and our case law) make clear that rules of legislative proceeding are the exclusive domain of the legislature.
¶ 107. In considering all these factors in this close case, I conclude that the balance tips in favor of holding that a court should refrain from interfering with the legislature in the present case under the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the Wisconsin Constitution and the principle of comity. The legislature‘s adherence to rules or statutes prescribing legislative procedure (even those regarding the method for satisfying a statute regulating the content of a bill or act) is a matter entirely within legislative control and discretion, not subject to judicial review unless the legislative procedure is mandated by or violates the constitution.16
¶ 108. It is not the role of the court to sit in judgment of the legislature when the legislature‘s own rules of procedure are at issue and the constitution has not otherwise been violated. Respecting this limit on
¶ 109. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
The Board of Regents court of appeals stated that in