*2 Thе jury returned a liability verdict DUSEN, and ALDI- Before VAN BIGGS against By special Farrell. interrogatories SERT, Judges. Circuit it determined that Marant was not contrib- utorily negligent, that Lavino and Farrell negligent, were both and that each THE had OPINION OF COURT percent contributed 50 happening to the ALDISERT, Judge. the accident. Damages stipulated were $20,000and the judg- district court entered dispositive The central ap- issue on this favor of against Marant and peal question is of the relative Far- responsi- rell in that amount. Farrell’s bility shipowner of stevedore and for motion long- for judgment notwithstanding safety shoreman under the 1972 Amend- the verdict or Longshoremen’s for a new trial was ments to and Harbor denied. (LHWCA), Act Workers’ Farrell raises the following points ap- Marant, seq. longshore- 901 et U.S.C. peal: injured unloading cargo, brought man (1) Under 1972Amendments to the Lines, negligence against action Farrell LHWCA, the primary stevedore has the shipowner. charged The trial court longshoremen’s for responsibility safety shipowner stevedore
jury that had con- duty and the vessel’s to disclose responsibility longshoring safe- current knowledge. latent defects which it has verdict, jury, by special ty and found law and Under this the factual circum- shipowner equally the stevedore stances, the district court erroneously causing injury. Damages fault were failed to direct a verdict for Farrell. judgment stipulated the full addition, incorrectly charged jury against entered was Farrell. Far- amount duty as to Farrell’s under the law and appealed. We reverse. rell compounded that error repeating the original confusing charge verbatim
I asked the jury for clarification of the relative duties of vessel and stevedore. longshoreman as a employed Marant was (2) Shipping Company, Lavino an inde- Under by the LHWCA, stevedoring contractor hired a vessel cannot pendent be held liable discharge Lines to a cocoa bean Farrell where the stevedore to a contributed vessel, cargo longshoreman’s from its the S.S. African injury. verdict intention of the Act to clearly was
(3) jury primary re- of the weight sponsibility evidence. on the stevedore. against the found (4) jury that Farrell’s Where principle joint concurrent or re- percent negligence contributed sponsibility as the first stated substan- accident, Farrell happening should legal precept the charge. tive It was percent, $10,000, only 50 be assessed *3 later reiterated court told the $20,000. damages of stipulated job that it was jury their to decide if the was or “solely
stevedore concurrently” re- (548a), was, it sponsible at least II implication, reinforced when the court matter, we preliminary As a will charged duty that to provide a rea- “[t]he for a directed deny request Farrell’s verdict sonably place safe work can rest upon say, in its cannot as a favor. We matter of and it party, more than one includes the law, “critically is that the record deficient (549a) of the vessel.” owner After being quantum of evidence from of that minimum deliberate, the jury sent out to returned to reasonably jury might a afford re court, ask inter alia: “Is it the ship’s Siegel, Denneny 407 F.2d lief.” v. provide a safe responsibility and reasona- 1969). (3d Cir. ble for the men to work in the hold as charge?” (569a-570a) per your The court challenged has specifically Farrell answered repeating verbatim the pоrtion the trial portion charge that court’s charge beginning: of its jury that respon which informed the “[t]he your You have for determination the safety longshoreman for the of the sibility that the owner of claim the vessel or its jointly with the concurrently long lies or agents negligent plaintiff, were toward a and with the employer, ship shoreman’s longshoreman. shipowner, The for its (546a-547a) Farrell asserts that owner.” plaintiff’s denied part, allegation negli- statement of the rela this is an inaccurate gence. responsibilities imposed by the 1972 tive for responsibility safety of a to the LHWCA and that the longshoreman lies charged, concurrently jointly or trial court should have as Farrell longshoreman’s with the employer and (405a), primary responsi requested that shipowner. with the safety bility longshoremen’s was on the for court, A decision of this stevedore. recent (570a) way We have no knowing, district not available to the court at the course, but it unlikely seems not that the case, trial of this po substantiates Farrell’s equal responsibility portion of jury in- on the Accordingly, sition. basis of Brown played part, least, structions a in the Rederi, (3d 1976), 545 F.2d Cir. jury’s decision that the vessel and the steve- will order a new trial. dore were equally causing at fault in accident. Judge recently
As
Van Dusen has
ob-
served,
court,
speaking
“express
for
question
legаl responsibili
of relative
language
legislative
in the statute and the
case;
ty
very
went to the
essence of the
reports accompanying the 1972 Amend-
jury’s question amply evidences their
amply
ments
that for reasons
demonstrate
importance.
awareness of its
Particularly
policy
major
responsibility
for
circumstances,
under these
we believe that
proper and safe
of the work
conduct
was to Farrell is
entitled
new
Upon
trial.
by remand,
be borne
stevedore.” Brown v. Re-
the district court will now have the
deri,
important
at 860. This
aspect
'advantage
analysis
our
of the 1972
legislative plan,
of the
intended
Brown,
to focus Amendments in
supra, and also in
longshoremen’s
responsibility
safety
Wheeling
Griffith v.
Pittsburgh
Corp.,
Steel
it,
improve
those best able to
the steve-
1975),
denied,
it”.
McGowan,
Appeals
and now-Chief
directly
has
con
himself, Judge
Court
it,
Dodge
the result
thus:
the Ninth
explained
Circuit.
v.
Burger,
sidered
Justice
Ginko,
669,
Mitsui
672
Shintaku
528 F.2d
with an
responsible
jointly
A tortfeasor
1975),
denied,
cert.
425 U.S.
(9th Cir.
the total
compelled
pay
is not
4.
933, as amended.
employee
his
is
from
not an issue in
§
Moreover,
this
question
case.
the
of
event,
Murray
cases of
v.
any
the
2.
In
Murray’s validity was not argued to this
States,
91,
U.S.App.D.C.
405
132
United
which, in
panel,
any event,
is without
v.
(1968),5 and Dawson
Contrac-
1361
F.2d
to overrule
authority
prior decisions of
401,
Corp.,
U.S.App.D.C.
151
Transport
tors
Consequеntly,
this court.
we assume the
(1972)6 were
727
decided before
F.2d
467
continuing validity of
Murray
the
rule
amended
Congress
the
33 U.S.C.
when
1972
application
933,
majority points
its
cases involving
as the
out
the
905 and
§§
reason,
Longshoremen’s
For
opinion.
III of
this
part
its
Harbor Workers’
in
value
prece-
a doubtful
as
Act.”
cases have
these
judicial
ap-
creating a
doctrine of
dent for
leading admiralty jurisdic-
3. Two of the
905(b)
damages in
of
cases.
portionment
§
have written decisions
tions
which indicate
Also,
substantial
reserva-
there are other
will
“equi-
that those Circuits
not follow an
Daw-
applicability
the
of
concerning
tions
credit”
any
table
doctrine or
appor-
similаr
maritime
Murray
the
section
son
liability
905(b)
cases
§
tionment
under
injured longshore-
an
905(b) actions where
the 1972
Dodge
Amendments. See
v. Mit-
vessel,
the
since both Dawson and
man sues
Corp.,9
669,
(9th
sui Shintaku
528 F.2d
672
exclusively
em-
Murray involved
land-based
1975);
Hoegh,
Cir.
Landon v. Lief
521 F.2d
engaged
exclusively
land-based
ployees
760,
756,
(2d
1975).
Cir.
It would seem
occupations
injured.7 Secondly,
that resolution of the “contribution” issue
opinion does not deal with the so-
Murray
necessary step
was a
in Landon and since
right
“lien”
which the
called
admiralty jurisdiction
this Circuit shares
(by way
subroga-
insurer
country’s
with
Second Circuit over the
933,8
tion) have under 33 U.S.C.
as amend-
§
port
major
complex, the New York-New-
Dawson,
by
Judge
P.L. 92-576.
In
ed
area,
ark-Elizabeth
espe-
Landon case
indicated his concern that
McGowan
cially,
Dodge case,
and also the
ought to be
933 had
raised
not been
problems
§
carefully
considered
before this court ac-
in the court’s earlier opinion
considered
cepts
“equitable
credit”
any
doctrine
using
Murray,
language
in note 3 at
similar theory
apportionment
730:
page
905(b)
To enact
judicial appor-
§
cases.
pri-
District Court was concerned
“The
tionment of damages in this
in view
marily
apparent
inability of an
these other cases
Murray
applied,
if
is
undermine the
employer,
to obtain
payments
uniformity
Congress
made under
essential
which the
in-
reimbursement
compensation statute.
[Citing
tended
Long-
the 1972 Amendments to the
cases.]
Murray opinion
apparent
brought
905(b),
5.
It
as
amended
P.L.
important
theoretical considerations
in the
two
92-576.
reaching
(1)
mind in
the result were
court’s
immunity
sovereign
since
the Unit-
Huy
doctrine
Judge
7. This
factor formed
basis for
compensation employer,
was the
“Murray
ed States
rejection
ett’s
in Lucas
credit”
Ryan
(2)
doctrine”
Ges.,
the “indemnification
F.Supp.
Schiffahrts
“Brinknes”
Stevedoring
Steamship
759,
appeal
v. Pan-Atlantic
(E.D.Pa.1975),
dismissed,
Co.
No.
232,
Cir.,
Corp.,
1975),
denied,
Apr.
76 S.Ct.
L.Ed. 133
75-1223
cert.
immunity
sovereign
(1956). The
doctrine has
Congress et
Constantine EVANGELINOS
al., Appellants, AIRLINES,
TRANS WORLD
INCORPORATED.
No. 75-1990. Appeals,
United Court of States
Third Circuit.
Argued Feb. 1976. Before the Court En Banc
Reheard
Nov.
Decided Feb.
