219 Miss. 465 | Miss. | 1954
The appellants, J. D. Milner and R. D. Pruitt, were convicted in the Circuit Court of Rankin County of the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor. Milner was sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and serve 90 days in jail and Pruitt was sentenced to pay a fine of $200 and serve 60 days in jail. Prom the judgment of conviction they appeal.
The proof for the State shows substantially the following: The appellant Milner lives about two and a half miles east of Pelahatchie in Rankin County, where he operates a farm and grocery store. The appellant Pruitt is emplo3Ted by him, working on the farm, and at times in the store. L. G. Holyfield, the Sheriff of Rankin County, had received some complaints relative to the operation b3r Milner of his place of business and he arranged with W. Q. Cole, a justice of the peace of District
The appellants testified in their own behalf and denied that they had sold any whiskey to either Cole or Ash-worth, and denied that they had seen either Cole or Ash-worth at Milner’s store on the day in question. Milner’s wife testified that she was present at the store on that day and that she did not see either Cole or Ashworth and in fact had never seen them before the day of the trial.
It is conceded by the appellants that the testimony on the issue of their gnilt or innocence was conflicting and created an issue of fact for the determination of the jury, and that there is ample evidence to support the verdict of the jury. The appellants contend, however, that the judgment of conviction should be reversed because of the error of the trial court in refusing to the appellants a requested instruction and in its rulings upon the admissibility of certain evidence.
The instruction which was requested by the appellants and which was refused by the trial court is as follows: “The court instructs the jury for the defendant that if you believe from the evidence in the case there is a probability of the innocence of the defendant, then there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, and the jury must return a verdict of not guilty.”
In contending that it was error to refuse this instruction, the appellants rely upon the case of Nelms v. State, 58 Miss. 362. It is true that in the Nelms case the Court held that the refusal of such an instruction was error. The Court, however, based its ruling upon the fact that there was nothing in the other instructions for the defendant to cure the error. In the case of McNair v. State, 215 Miss. 510, 61 So. 2d 338, the Court held that such an instruction was proper and should have been given, and called attention to the fact that the action of the court in refusing such an instruction was criticized in Jones v. State, 141 Miss. 894, 107 So. 8, and Nelms v. State, 58 Miss. 362. In the McNair case, however, the Court held that the refusal of the instruction in that case was not reversible error in view of the fact that another instruction which was granted to the defendant sufficiently charged the jury as to the defendant’s right to an acquit
In the case of Smith v. State, 128 Miss. 258, 90 So. 883, the Court held that the refusal of such an instruction was not error where other instructions for the defendant informed the jury that they could not convict unless the evidence showed guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the burden of proving such guilt was on the State, and that the defendant was presumed to be innocent and that such presumption attended him throughout the trial until his guilt was established by evidence beyond every reasonable doubt. The Court said in that case that such instructions for the defendant were more favorable to him than the one which was refused and that, therefore, there was no reversible error in the court’s refusal of such instruction.
The case at bar comes clearly within the pronouncements in the Smith case. In the case at bar, the appellants obtained instructions charging the jury as follows : That the defendants at the outset of the trial wore presumed to be innocent and that they were not required to put on any evidence, and that the testimony should be viewed in the light of the presumption of the defendants’ innocence, and that such presumption abided with them throughout the trial until the evidence convinced the jury to the contrary beyond all reasonable doubt; that in order to warrant a conviction, the evidence on the part of the State on the whole must be such as to produce a moral certainty of guilt to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendants, and unless the evidence has such effect the jury must acquit; that each and every juror must be convinced beyond all reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty from the evidence, or want of evidence, that the defendants are guilty and that no juror should surrender such conviction from or because of anything or any reason whatsoever or for any purpose whatsoever, as long as it remains his conviction from the
It is further contended by the appellants that the court erred in sustaining the objection of the State to the testimony of Bryan Duncan, Chancery Clerk of Rankin County, who was offered as a witness for the appellants. The appellants undertook to show by this witness the amounts which had been paid to the sheriff during the year as his share of the fines imposed in cases of liquor violations. Of course, it is elementary that the fact of a witness’s interest in an action, whether civil or criminal, may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility. This proposed testimony, however, was with
The appellants further complain that the trial court erred in overruling their objections to the testimony of L. G. Holyfield that he had had complaints about the place operated by the appellant Milner. This testimony of the witness Holyfield merely explained why the sheriff sent Cole and Ashworth out to Milner’s place to buy whiskey. Wé are clearly of the opinion that the relation of such fact resulted in no prejudice to the appellants and constitutes no grounds for the reversal of the judgment of conviction.
Affirmed.