232 Cal. App. 2d 333 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1965
Plaintiff Millsap appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered pursuant to plaintiff’s refusal to amend his first amended complaint after a general demurrer thereto was sustained.
Plaintiff was employed by the San Pasqual Union School District as superintendent of the district, under a written contract, dated February 7, 1957, for a period of three years from July 1, 1957, to June 30, 1960. He began his duties on July 1, 1957, and continued until July 1, 1958, when pursuant to a resolution of the Department of Education, approving the formation of a new unified school district composed of the San Pasqual District and another district, and under the provisions of Education Code (1943) subdivision (b) of section 3418 and sections 3419 and 3420 (1959 Ed. Code, §§ 2230 and 2231), the San Pasqual Union School District ceased to exist. On July 1, 1958, plaintiff made application to the Board of Trustees of the new district for employment in any administrative position available, but was refused employment in any capacity. He then brought this action in which he pleaded four causes of action for breach of contract. Plaintiff concedes that the general demurrer was properly sustained as to counts 2 and 4 in which the nonexistent San Pasqual Union School District was made the defendant, but he contends that counts 1 and 3, naming the new unified school district, do state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The demurrer raised the issue of whether under the applicable statutes plaintiff’s contract survived the old school district’s dissolution and became an obligation of the new district. We find that it did not.
The unification here was effected under statutes passed by the Legislature in 1955 (Stats. 1955, ch. 1140) and in effect when the contract here in question was formed. Appellant’s
The appellant contends that section 4669 of the Education Code of 1943 imposes the obligations of the old school district upon the new school district, including the obligations of the instant contract. Section 4669 reads:
“Funds, Property and Obligations: Elementary, High School or Junior College Districts Within Unified District. Whenever any unified school district is created, all funds, property, and obligations of the elementary, high school, or junior college districts lying wholly within the unified school district shall become the funds, property, and obligations of the unified school district except as provided in sections 4667 and 4668.” [Italics added.]
Though the word “obligations” is broad enough to include the instant contract, apparently the Legislature intended otherwise. In article 6 of chapter 14, the same chapter wherein section 4669 appears, the Legislature has provided for continuance of employment of employees. No provision is found for continuance of employees with the appellant’s status. The omission appears to be intentional when the provisions for continuance of employees under the optional plan in chapter 16 are compared. Specific provisions are made for an employee with appellant’s status under chapter 16. Apparently the
Because the opinion was rendered almost seven years ago and because all the provisions herein discussed were reenacted in the same form in the 1959 Education Code, the principle above quoted is applicable to the instant case.
By the incorporation of the statutory provisions into the appellant’s employment contract, the limitations implicit in those provisions became terms of the employment contract itself.
We therefore find that the appellant’s contract did not survive the old school district’s dissolution and was not by its own terms enforceable against respondent, the new unified district. The demurrer was properly sustained and the judgment of dismissal is affirmed.
Coughlin, Acting P. J., and Brown (Gerald), J., concurred.
Retired judge of the superior court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.