In this appeal from conviction of multiple traffic infractions and other misdemeanors, we hold that the trial judge’s admonition for the jury to disregard a portion of the arresting officer’s testimony did not remove the prejudice caused by the officer’s introduction of incompetent evidence. The poliсe *418 officer, who gave a totally unresponsive answer to a question posed to him, purposefully interjected that the defendant, when arrested, hаd “needle marks on his arm” and that he had “photographs to prove it.” The officer’s testimony had the inevitable, if not intended, consequence of portraying the defendant as a drug addict, thereby inflaming the passions of the jury against the defendant. Although the trial judge’s admonition to the jury was prompt and precise, in the context of this case, it could not overcome the prejudice to the defendant caused by the officer’s statements. Accordingly, we revеrse the convictions and remand the case to the trial court.
Following an eight to ten mile high-speed chase that began in Abingdon and continued into Washingtоn County, the defendant drove his car behind a private residence in an effort to evade the state trooper. In doing so, the defendant wrecked his car and attempted to flee on foot but was apprehended when his pants fell to his knees. During the chase, the defendant refused to stop for the trоoper’s siren and blue light and he also attempted to wreck the trooper’s patrol car. After apprehending the defendant, the officer dеtermined that the license plate on defendant’s vehicle was not registered to it and that the defendant’s operator’s license had been suspended.
Upon arresting the defendant for speeding, improper registration, driving on a suspended license, resisting arrest, and disregarding an officer’s light and siren, the trooper observed an odor of alcohol coming from the defendant and noticed that he slurred his words. Thus, the officer also charged the defendаnt with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The resulting blood test showed that the defendant had a blood alcohol content of .08 percent and testеd positive for marijuana. Incidental to the arrest, another officer inventoried the defendant’s vehicle and discovered more than nine cartоns of cigarettes which had been recently stolen from a local store. The defendant was then charged with petit larceny-
*419 At trial, the following exchаnge occurred between defense counsel and the state trooper:
Q. Okay. And you said you noticed an odor of alcohol about him?
A Yes, I did.
Q. Did he say anything?
A. I don’t recall what he said at this time. The field sobriety test was made available to him and he was arrested. And it appeared from his arms that he had needle marks.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We object to that, if your honor please, and move for a mistrial.
WITNESS: I’ve got a photograph here showing the condition of his arms if you’d like to introduce it.
THE COURT: Objeсtion sustained. Strike the last comment, members of the Jury, and disregard the last comment made by the witness. Motion for mistrial denied.
The trooper was a veteran officer with the Virginia State Police for ten and one-half years, had been with the Division of Motor Vehicles for fifteen years, and had been a truck weight enforcement officer with the State Police for two and one-half years.
The jury convicted the defendant of each charged offense and reсommended the following sentences and fines: petit larceny 1 (one year and a $1,000 fine); speeding ($200.00 fine); improper registration ($200.00 fine); driving while under the influencе of alcohol and drugs (12 months and a $2500 fine); driving on a suspended license (6 months and a $1,000 fine); resisting arrest (6 months and a $1,000 fine); and disregarding a signal to stop by a law-enforсement officer (12 months and a $2,500 fine).
*420
The sole issue is whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after the Commonwealth’s principal witness interjectеd incompetent and inadmissible evidence into the trial during cross-examination. Generally, a trial court may cure errors arising from inadmissible evidence bеing improperly presented by promptly instructing the jury to disregard the inadmissible evidence.
LeVasseur v. Commonwealth,
“Whether improper evidence is so prejudicial as to require a mistrial is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court in еach particular case.”
Beavers v. Commonwealth,
Whether a manifest probability exists that the improper evidence prejudiced the aсcused despite the cautionary instruction depends upon the nature of the incompetent evidence when considered in relation to the nature of the charges, the other evidence in the case, and manner in which *421 the prejudicial evidence was presented. Here, the trooper’s testimony concerning the “needle marks” was totally unresponsive to the question asked him and was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The statement that the defеndant had “needle marks” on his arm was particularly prejudicial in relation to the charges of driving while under the influence of alcohol and drugs, resisting arrest, and disregarding the signal to stop by a law-enforcement officer. The obvious import of the officer’s testimony was to cast the defendant as a hard drug user оr addict, which would in the minds of the jury render more egregious the competent evidence against the defendant. Merely instructing the jury to disregard the troopеr’s statements could not erase the prejudicial effects the remarks had on the jury. Moreover, it is apparent in light of the state trooper’s exрerience, that when defense counsel objected, the trooper intentionally or otherwise compounded the prejudice by immediately intеrjecting that he had photographs showing the needle marks.
Nothing in the record suggests that the Commonwealth’s attorney anticipated or countenanced the state trooper’s actions. Nevertheless, the prejudice was caused by the Commonwealth’s principal witness, and no matter how outragеous the defendant’s criminal conduct may have been, the prejudice could not be harmless. Although evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, we cannot say that the prejudicial evidence did not affect the length of the sentences or the amount of fines that the jury recommended and the judge imрosed. Thus, the error was not harmless.
In summary, we hold that the trial judge’s admonition to the jury did not cure or erase the prejudice that was caused by the trooрer’s incompetent evidence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for such further action as the Commonwealth deems appropriate.
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
. Because we reverse and remand all the convictions, we do not address whether the trial court erred by reassembling the jury to correct the sentence of "one year” for the petit larceny conviction.