486 N.E.2d 1209 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1985
This case is on appeal from the decision of the trial court which overruled appellants' motion for an award of prejudgment interest pursuant to R.C.
The appellants present one assignment of error on appeal.
The sole assignment of error contends that the trial court erred in overruling the motion of appellants and in declaring R.C.
The statute in question, R.C.
"(C) Interest on a judgment, decree, or order for the payment of money rendered in a civil action based on tortious conduct and not settled by agreement of the parties, shall be computed *209 from the date the cause of action accrued to the date on which the money is paid, if, upon motion of any party to the action, the court determines at a hearing held subsequent to the verdictor decision in the action that the party required to pay the money failed to make a good faith effort to settle the case and that the party to whom the money is to be paid did not fail to make a good faith effort to settle the case." (Emphasis added.)
Initially, we determine that this statute is remedial in nature. It merely imposes a civil sanction upon a party for a failure to make a good faith effort to settle. It provides another tool for courts to enforce the rights of the parties to a speedy settlement of their dispute. The court in State, ex rel.Holdridge, v. Indus. Comm. (1967),
As R.C.
It is well-settled that statutes enacted by the Ohio General Assembly are presumed to be constitutional, Monroeville v. Ward
(1971),
The determination of whether a party is entitled to prejudgment interest is within the sound discretion of the trial court on a case by case basis. See Cox v. Fisher Fazio Foods, Inc. (1984),
This does not end our inquiry, however, as we also find that the motion made by appellants for prejudgment interest was not timely. The judgment was entered in this case on July 23, 1982, the verdict having been rendered on July 19, 1982. The motion for prejudgment interest was filed on June 29, 1983, almost one year after the final judgment was entered. The fact that the judgment entered July 23, 1982 was appealed is not relevant because the legislature intended that the motion for prejudgment interest must be made and determined prior to the court's entering of thefinal judgment. This is consistent with Civ. R. 54, which contemplates that the obligation to pay costs of an action are to be included in the final entry of the court which determines the rights of the parties. As explained in the Staff Notes to Civ. R. 54(D), costs include interest, if any, on the judgment. The final entry of the court should therefore include an indication of the date from which interest is to be computed.
A party should consequently move for an award of prejudgment interest before the court issues the final judgment. Ordinarily, the time to make the motion would be immediately after the trial of the action when the verdict or decision is announced. It could be made orally at that time. Civ. R. 7(B)(1). A party is not precluded from moving for interest subsequent to the announcement of the verdict or decision, but the motion must be made prior to the filing of the final judgment with the clerk of courts so that the interest award can be included in the judgment entry. To permit a party to move for prejudgment interest after a final judgment is entered would contravene the well settled legal *211
principle of finality of judgments, lead to additional appeals as in this case, and would be contrary to the intention of the legislature indicated in R.C.
The lower court in this case was correct in overruling the instant motion, not because of the unconstitutionality of the statute, but because the motion pursuant to R.C.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
BROGAN, P.J., and WILSON, J., concur.